





MEMORIAL WINDOW

Arkansas Room, Confederate Museum, Richmond, Va.

Arkansas in War
and Reconstruction

Arkansas in War and Reconstruction 1861-1874

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LITTLE ROCK
ARKANSAS DIVISION, UNITED DAUGHTERS
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*To the
Arkansas Division,
United Daughters of the Confederacy,
and to the
Members of the Forty-fourth General Assembly,
State of Arkansas,
who made the publication of this book possible.*

PREFACE

At the request of the Arkansas Division, United Daughters of the Confederacy, the legislature of 1923 appropriated a sum of money to make possible the publication of a history of the part played by Arkansas in the War between the States. Being no militarist and very much averse to war I hesitated, when requested to write the book, to undertake the writing of a history a considerable part of which should deal with military operations. But the history is made and cannot be undone, any more than the holocaust of the Great War can be undone. If wars must be, there were things in this war of which Arkansas may well be proud, if a people can ever be proud of anything connected with war. Certainly the intimate study of the men and women of this period necessary for the writing of this book has greatly heightened my estimation of them and I hope that the reading of the book will have the same effect upon those into whose hands it may fall. The war in Arkansas, as elsewhere and in all wars, was accompanied by its horrors. These have been set forth, not to open old wounds, but that they may tend to make us hate war more and seek the more to learn how to avert it in the future.

The purely military side of the war was covered fairly well by Colonel John M. Harrell in volume X of the "Confederate Military History" and this was found very useful as a guide. The "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" has been consulted on a

few of the outstanding battles. But the chief source of information on the military operation was "The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies." This has also been drawn upon very freely for material relating to other subjects. Contemporary newspapers, especially the *Van Buren Press*, furnished a mine of information about the election of 1860, secession, and the preparation for war. The House and Senate Journals, the Convention Journal, and the Acts of the legislature shed a flood of light on official action. For the period since 1865 I have depended mainly on the comprehensive "Reconstruction in Arkansas, 1862-1874," by Professor T. S. Staples. Bits of information have been picked up here and there from sources too numerous to mention. As the book was not written primarily for mature scholars I have not thought it worthwhile to clutter up the pages with footnotes. The work was undertaken with the understanding that it was to give a truthful and not merely a partisan account. That end I have striven to attain.

This work was begun at the request of Mrs. George B. Gill, of Little Rock, then President of the Arkansas Division, United Daughters of the Confederacy, and finished under the Presidency of Mrs. Lora Goolsby, of Fort Smith. The manuscript was read by the committee on publication, consisting of Mrs. George A. Leiper, Mrs. P. J. Rice, Mrs. Sherman Atkinson, Mrs. John F. Weinmann, Mrs. George B. Gill, Mrs. Earl W. Hodges, and Mrs. Wm. Stillwell, all of Little Rock, and Mrs. J. E. Watts, of Pine Bluff, Mrs. L. C. Hall of Dardanelle, Mrs. George

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D. Y. T.

Fayetteville, Arkansas, October 1, 1926.

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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE UNION

Some say that the War between the States, 1861-1865, was fought over the question of states' rights, or state sovereignty, while others say that it was fought over the question of slavery. Wars do not usually arise over abstract propositions, such as sovereignty, but they do arise over matters of economic interest. May we not say, then, that the fundamental cause of the war was a difference of views on the matter of sovereignty, but the immediate occasion was the matter of slavery? Men wanted to guard certain property rights and believed that they had a right to withdraw from the Union, if necessary, for the protection of their interests.

Negroes first appeared in the English colonies in 1619 when a Dutch vessel is said to have traded a few to the Virginians for supplies. Massachusetts was the first to legalize slavery, though she went about it in a curiously negative way. The law forbade slavery (1641), "unless it be lawful captives taken in just wars, [Pequot Indians] and such strangers as willingly sell themselves to us [indentured servants], or are sold to us [negroes]."

In the course of time the slave trade, which was fostered by the British government over the protests

of some of the colonies, notably Virginia, grew to be very profitable and the shrewd New Englanders made the most of it. In the period just before the closing of the foreign slave trade in 1808 sixty-one slavers sailed out from Charleston, but only 13 were owned by native Charlestonians. Fifty-nine were registered from Rhode Island, 70 in Great Britain, while 88 of the owners were Rhode Islanders, 91 were British and 10 French. To these people it was simply a business proposition. A few years ago the writer sat at dinner next to a woman from New England, then interested in philanthropic work among the negroes, who casually remarked that her family fortune had been founded in this trade, which, she declared, had proved beneficial to both whites and blacks.

The trade may be said to have followed the sides of a triangle. The traders carried molasses from the West Indies to New England, distilled it into rum, took the rum and a few gewgaws to Africa and traded them to the warring chiefs for negroes whom they brought back to the West Indies and the South, where they found a ready market. The market in the North was not particularly good because gang labor, in which form slave, that is, unskilled, labor is most profitable, was not well adapted to the small farms and growing industries of that section. After a while the moral sentiment of the North combined with economic interests and abolished slavery in those states. But the South believed that slavery was profitable, beneficial to both the white man and the

negro, and clung to it. In defense of this position they appealed to state sovereignty.

To discuss now the question of states' rights, state sovereignty, with a view to reaching a definite conclusion would be profitless. But if we wish to understand the War between the States, we must know something of what the men who lived in the period 1789 to 1860 thought of sovereignty.

Lincoln held that the Union was a reality before independence was declared and Jackson is said to have held similar views. But certainly the men of 1776 did not think so, few did so in 1860, and few so think today. The common danger from Great Britain caused them to stand together in 1776, but even then they were very jealous of their rights, each of his own particular state's. When they came to draw up a scheme of government for the whole country, they provided for the loosest kind of a Union under the Articles of Confederation, a scheme fitted to a league of sovereign states. This soon proved too weak to meet the needs of the people and it gave place in 1789 to the present Constitution.

The failure of the Confederation caused men to see the need of more centralized power and some members of the convention which drew up the Constitution now emphasized national sovereignty as over against state sovereignty. King, of Massachusetts, declared that the states were not "sovereign in the sense contended for by some" and Gerry declared that they never had been independent states and could not be even under the Confederation. Such sentiments

were concurred in by several others and when the convention sent the Constitution to the Congress of the Confederation, it did so with a letter drawn up by Gouverneur Morris in which it was declared that it was "impracticable in the Federal Government of these states to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each and yet provide for the interests and safety of all."

Yet we know that the states were very jealous of their sovereignty and that this jealousy was very evident in the state convention which adopted the Constitution. In Virginia the opposition on this ground was particularly strong. John Marshall, of Virginia, who later did so much to establish national sovereignty, assured his fellow delegates that state sovereignty was not destroyed and Madison, of Virginia, declared that "not the people as composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties," were parties to the compact. Some, both in Virginia and elsewhere, finally gave up their opposition when assured that state sovereignty was not destroyed, but some remained in opposition to the end, among them Patrick Henry, who declared that the Constitution would destroy state sovereignty. Ratification was carried by a very narrow majority in Virginia, New York and Massachusetts. The opposition was so strong in New York that even Hamilton is said to have questioned Madison about the advisability of yielding to the demand for ratification with a reservation of the right to withdraw. However, Madison said there could be no conditional rati-

fication and Lansing's motion for a reservation of the right to withdraw was lost. North Carolina and Rhode Island refused to ratify until the new government had been in operation several months. During this time, the new government treated these states as foreign countries, making no attempt to exercise jurisdiction over them. After waiting more than a year Rhode Island drew up a long list of rights which she considered as belonging to the people and to the states, embodied some of these in twenty-one amendments and offered them, along with her ratification of the Constitution, declaring that these rights could not be abridged, and expressing her "confidence that the amendments" would be ratified. Her first proposed amendment provided that the United States should guarantee to each state its "sovereignty, freedom and independence." Ten amendments were soon adopted and the last of these was designed to guard the rights of the states by declaring that powers not delegated to the United States nor denied by the Constitution to the states were reserved to the states or to the people.

Were the states sovereign after 1789? The advocates of national sovereignty could point to that clause in the Constitution which says that "the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding," and say that that settled the matter. Yet it did not. In the first place the conception of sovereignty current today, that it is

one and indivisible, was not generally accepted in 1789. Men then, and for years afterward, commonly spoke of a divided sovereignty, of the national government as partly sovereign and of the states as partly sovereign. They were simply confusing sovereignty with government. All will agree now that the powers of government are shared by the national government and the state governments, but most people probably will agree that sovereignty is one and indivisible, though a few writers are now putting forward the idea of plural sovereignty. In the second place, the advocates of state sovereignty could agree that the laws of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution were the supreme law of the land, but they differed with the nationalists as to what authority was to decide whether or not a particular law was constitutional. The latter held that the Supreme Court should decide, the former that the states should decide.

A good part of our political history to 1860 turned, directly or indirectly, upon the question of states' rights. Georgia was the first to assert her sovereignty in defiance of a Federal law and she was the most persistent in maintaining her claims. Several times in the early period she was successful in her defiance. On more than one occasion several states took a similar position and prepared to defy the government. Such was the attitude of New England in opposition to the embargo and the war of 1812. The period 1828-33 was one of intense debate and South Carolina prepared to resist the enforcement of the tariff.

There was even talk of secession. But always the trouble was passed over by a successful defiance, or a compromise, or backdown.

Shortly before the South Carolina nullification incident the great Hayne-Webster debate occurred. In this Hayne took the position that the Union was created by the states; that the national government was the result of a compact; that it was a government of delegated powers, and that the states which created it, not the government itself, should determine when it was exceeding its powers. On the other hand Webster held that the Union was created by the people, not by the states. It was, then, the agent of the people of the United States and they could control it or reform it, but the states could not call its acts in question. The confusion of thought on sovereignty found expression in Webster also, for he said that the states were "unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by the Constitution." But, said he, in case of any difference of opinion as to the extent of sovereign the Supreme Court, and not the states, should decide.

Historically, Hayne is conceded to have been more nearly correct than Webster, but he was looking to the past, Webster to the future, and Webster's ideas finally prevailed. This illustrates very well that some of our political writers, present as well as past, have overlooked the fact that national sovereignty was not born full grown, but has evolved with the passing years, especially since 1861-65.

The Hayne-Webster debate sounds today like the discussion of an abstract proposition. It really was called forth by a proposal in Congress which affected economic interests. People had appealed to states' rights against the tariff because they believed that it affected their pocketbooks adversely, just as New England had done twenty years earlier. After the subsidence of the tariff discussion in 1833 slavery took its place as a subject on which to make the same appeal for the same reason. The main questions discussed in connection with this were the right of slave-holders to take their slaves into territories, in the acquirement of which Southern men had taken the lead, the recovery of fugitive slaves, and abolition.

The first threat of secession in defense of slavery seems to have been made by Mr. Rutledge, of South Carolina, in the debate over the fugitive slave law of 1793. The debate over slavery in connection with the admission of Missouri in 1820 was very sharp. In the settlement then effected it seems that very few, if any, denied the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories. But, alarmed by the growth of abolitionism, many were ready in 1850 to deny that Congress had any such power, since prohibition would deprive them of the right to take their property into the territory, which was the common property of all. But, while some now denied the right of Congress to prohibit, there was no strong demand for the repeal of the compromise of 1820, prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30'. The offer of this repeal came as a complete surprise from the North in

1854 in Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska bill, which proposed to leave it to the people of the territories to legalize or to prohibit slavery as they saw fit. Soon after this came the Dred Scott case in which the Supreme Court held that slavery could not be prohibited in the territories.

The Supreme Court, or at least some members thereof thought that they had settled the slavery question. As the settlement was according to Southern wishes the South naturally was pleased. But the "irrepressible conflict" refused to be repressed. The "more effective fugitive slave law" of 1850 had been so displeasing to many of the Northern States that they had passed "personal liberty laws" designed to impede, in some cases to nullify, the operation of this law. In 1859 the supreme court of Wisconsin appealed to the states' rights ideas as stated in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions and actually declared the fugitive slave law unconstitutional, null and void. Of course this was promptly overruled by the Supreme Court. Some abolitionists had denied that the Constitution legalized slavery, but some admitted that it did and William Lloyd Garrison denounced it as a "League with death and a covenant with hell" because it did so. Now came the decision of the highest court in the land upholding the contention of the slave-holders—and of Garrison—on the point of legality.

Though stunned by the decision in the Dred Scott case, the North was determined not to give up its fight against the institution, although the Supreme Court

had declared it legal. That august body was held in great veneration, but even that august body might err and the north thought that a way around its decision must be found. New territory must be kept free, they said, and ultimately there would be enough free states to abolish slavery by the peaceful process of amendment. The south did not fear any attempt at abolition in 1860, but when the party which advocated the above mentioned policy was put in charge of the national government they saw that the majority of the nation appeared to be against the institution of slavery and decided that the time had come to take steps for its defense without waiting for any further attacks. The form of defense proposed was peaceable secession and the formation of an independent nation.

But, while slavery was the immediate cause of secession, it does not follow from this that every one who upheld secession at this time did so in defense of the "peculiar institution." The vast majority of the Southern whites were non-slaveholders. True, some of them upheld slavery because they believed the free negro would be a worse menace to society than the slave, yet not all took this view, not even among the slaveholders. Such can hardly have been the attitude of Robert E. Lee, the strong right arm of the Confederacy. Writing before the war he said: "In this enlightened age there are few, I believe, but will acknowledge that slavery is a moral and political evil in any country." And he followed up this belief in practice, freeing all his own slaves before the war be-

gan. While the war was in progress he made preparations to carry out the provisions of the Custis will for the freeing of those received from the Custis estate and, did so, by a curious coincidence, within a week after the issuance of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, and continued to fight for the right of secession.

Although the threat of secession had been made repeatedly in the North, the dominant party in that section now denied the right and considered it a duty to prevent its exercise in any form, whether peaceable or violent. And here we have one of the curious paradoxes of history. While Lee was freeing his slaves and fighting for the right to leave the Union, Grant was holding on to his slaves and fighting to preserve the Union. He did not even free them when the emancipation proclamation was issued, but held on to them until they were freed by constitutional amendment. But it does not follow that these two men represented, each the majority opinion on his side.

The greater force was on the side of the North and that side prevailed. Whether the right of secession existed in 1860 or not, the war decided that it should not be put into practice at that particular time. The views of most Southern people on the right of secession remained unchanged when they came out of the war, but they accepted the decision of the sword so far as concerned its practice. It was settled for them and the next generation and for this generation.

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The population of the state was 435,450 in 1860, 324,335 free and 111,115 slave, having more than doubled since 1850. All but a small strain was of native American stock, there being only 3,741 foreigners in the state. The Irish (1,312) and the Germans (1,143) furnished the greatest number of foreigners. Of native Americans from outside of Arkansas a large majority came from the other Southern States, Tennessee leading with 66,609, but large numbers came from Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia and North Carolina, with a considerable sprinkling from Kentucky and Virginia. The free states also furnished several thousand, Illinois leading with 3,899. Considerably over half the population had been born out of the state.

While the white population was increasing at a rapid pace (99.86 per cent in ten years), the slave population was growing still more rapidly, increasing from 47,100 in 1850 to 111,115 in 1860, or 135.91 per cent. This relative increase had been going on ever since the first census in 1820. Then the ratio of slaves to whites was 11.74; in 1860 it was 34.31.

The population was spread pretty well over the state, but some parts were much whiter than others. The largest county, Washington, had 14,307 of whom only 1,493 were slaves, and Independence followed close behind with about the same ratio. On

the other hand the slaves outnumbered the whites in six counties, in Union 6,371 to 5,957 and in Chicot 7,512 to 1,722. In general, the mountainous counties were white, while the lowlands supported the slaves. No county was without some slaves, but five had fewer than one hundred, Newton standing at the bottom with only 24.

Measured by the present census standards the population was nearly one hundred per cent rural. The largest city, Little Rock, had only 3,727. Next came Camden (2,219), Fort Smith (1,530), Pine Bluff (1,396), and Fayetteville (967). Under such conditions it was easy for the people to be home builders; there were only a few hundred more families than dwellings.

As a matter of course the leading vocation was farming, 48,475 being so classed to which should be added 438 "planters." To these should be added the vast majority of the slaves. Next on the list was farm laborers (8,350), laborers (7,044), blacksmiths (1,094), teachers (933), and on down to one oculist. Some comparisons may be of interest. In 1860 there was one teacher to every 347 white inhabitants, one lawyer to 694 whites and one doctor to every 350 of the total population. Negroes needed neither teachers nor lawyers, but did need doctors.

Property values had increased in ten years much more rapidly than the population, rising from \$39,841,025 assessed valuation in 1850 to \$219,256,473 in 1860, an increase of 450.32 per cent. Only five states and one territory had shown a greater per-

tage of increase. The influence of slavery on these values is seen in the fact that personal property outranked realty, \$147,246,393 to \$115,761,431; also, that the counties in which slaves were numerous led in property values, Phillips county leading with \$18,-269,187, followed by Jefferson with \$16,799,150, Pulaski with \$13,427,406. In the last the whites outnumbered the slaves more than two to one, but it contained the capitol of the state. Chicot, with only 1,722 whites and 7,512 slaves had property worth \$7,098,587. The most populous county in the state, Washington with 13,180 free and 1,499 slaves, reported only \$5,805,186. It does not follow that slaves alone accounted for the larger values; the nature of the land must also be taken into account.

The state was well churched having 1,008 of all denominations. The Methodist led with 505, the Baptist following with 281, the Cumberland Presbyterian 75, the Presbyterian 65. While the state had many of the rough characters always found in a pioneer stage, judged by the number of convictions, 200, it was not steeped in crime. Yet occasionally revolting crimes did occur and in 1860 Crawford county was so aroused by the horrible murder of a man and woman that a mass meeting was held in Van Buren to take measure for the better protection of life and property. Fifty-six persons were appointed as special police, one for each township. Be it said to the credit of the citizenry that when a mob formed in Washington county to hang a reputed murderer it

was forced to desist by the law-abiding citizens who protected the jail.

The census report for 1860 shows that there were 727 public schools with 757 teachers and 19,242 pupils, but this was hardly a fair representation, for, according to the report of the secretary of state, only twenty-five of these schools were entirely free. No tax whatever was levied for the support of the schools, the expenses being paid out of the funds realized from the lands granted to the state by the United States for that purpose and from tuition fees. Under such condition is it not surprising that illiteracy was more common than it is today, there being 23,642 adults, or one to every fifteen of the white population. In his inaugural address Governor Rector lamented the condition of the schools and made some suggestions for improvement. He also lamented that the state was "without colleges, male and female, suitable for imparting a knowledge of the higher branches," in consequence of which the youth of the state were being educated elsewhere. He feared that that might tend to loosen the ties that "bind them to the institutions of their native land." Also, it was taking thousands of dollars out of the state. As a remedy he suggested the creation of two colleges.

It is doubtful if the governor's statement about conditions other than in the public schools was altogether correct. There were 109 private schools and academies with 168 teachers and 4,415 pupils. The newspapers of the day carried advertisements of these schools, some of which gave particular attention to

girls and furnished instruction in music, modern languages, Greek, Latin and mathematics as the standard subjects. Some of these schools were chartered institutions, thirteen being chartered in 1859 and nine in 1861. The best known were located at Arkadelphia, Batesville, Fayetteville, Fort Smith, Little Rock, Princeton, Rocky Comfort, Spring Hill, Sylvania, Tulip, and Washington. Four colleges were reported in 1860 with 225 students, St. John's College at Little Rock, Cane Hill College at Cane Hill, Arkansas College at Fayetteville, and a fourth, the location of which is not known. Arkansas College was founded in 1852 by the Rev. Robert Graham, who continued as its president until the war came on, when, being loyal, he left the state. Its buildings were burned in 1862. Little Rock College was being conducted as a military school when the war broke out. Cane Hill College, founded in 1852, Robert F. King, president, was forced to suspend during the war. Professor James Mitchell, who taught ancient languages, did not take advantage of the exemption allowed to teachers, but served in the army. After the war the college was reopened, but was soon overshadowed by the University and closed down. While these institutions did not measure up to the standards of colleges today, or even to the best of that time, they did good pioneer work in the cause of higher education in a new state. In spite of the large number of illiterates the amount of culture in the state was surprisingly large.

The state was well supplied with papers, having some 40 publications, or one to every 4,350 inhabitants against one to every 9,500 in New York, 7,200 in Ohio, and 5,000 in Massachusetts. There was one religious paper, the *Arkansas Baptist* (Little Rock), one literary, *The Picayune* (Fort Smith), and one *Independent Reform* (Harmony Springs, Benton County). Of the secular papers the vast majority were Democratic, only seven belonging to the "Opposition." In making the comparison with the Northern states the writer does not wish to imply that the state was better served. The news gathering facilities were meager, but the papers were well written in good and forcible English. Among the notable papers were the *Van Buren Press*, the *True Democrat*, the *Old Line Democrat*, and the *State Gazette*, the last three being published at Little Rock.

The make up of these papers should be interesting to the newspaper reader of today. The *Old Line Democrat*, for example, was a large sheet of four pages with eight columns to the page. The first two columns on the first page were devoted to "professional cards," that is, advertisements of lawyers, architects, druggists, paperhangers, milliners, etc. For a time it carried a continued story, "Lichtenstein," translated from the German by a "talented young gentleman of this city" (probably a teacher of German). Then there were articles devoted to literature, science, and the Pope's salary. Letters on political subjects were common and occasionally a political speech was published in full. The second page was

devoted to editorials and letters, nearly always on political subjects. The third page was devoted to local items and advertisements (over half). The fourth page was almost wholly given over to advertisements, with an occasional "communication." The *Van Buren Press* published a good account of the proceedings of the Democratic Convention at Charleston. It was upon such means, together with stump speeches and speeches sent out by Congressmen, that the people depended for their political information and education and this means that it was intensely partisan.

Economists are agreed that slavery was an economically wasteful system of labor, some even holding that it was actually unprofitable. That free labor is more productive than slave labor is easily shown, but to prove that slave labor was absolutely unprofitable to the planters is a different proposition. The facts, some of which have been given above, are on the other side. The rising price of slaves is another evidence. In territorial days a good field hand brought \$500. In August, 1860, at an administrator's sale near Fort Smith, Sam, aged 29, brought \$1,525; Bob, aged 33, \$1,335; Ned, aged 27, \$1,376; Jim, aged 6, \$608; Angeline, aged 27, and a child of two, \$1,475; Betty, aged 25, \$1,182; Sally, aged 15, \$1,252, and Lizzy, aged 9, \$715. January 2, was the day for hiring out slaves for the year. On that date, 1861, "spite of the tightness of the times, the dangers of the 'irrepressible conflict,' " negroes were hired out at Van Buren for \$170 to \$250 a year, and "found," that is, boarded. When we learn that the

average wage of farm hands was only \$14.25 and board per month and that day laborers were paid only 84 cents a day and board, we may even doubt if free labor was more profitable in this community, but the wages for the hire of slaves probably were above the average for the state. In Arkansas at least, if not in some of the older cotton states, there must have been some real competition between free white labor and slave labor and possibly this accounts in part for the strong Union sentiment in the state.

Certainly the dominant element in the state was devoted to slavery and the laws were moulded to preserve, protect and defend the institution and look after the interests of slave owners. The earlier laws provided for imprisonment of slaves guilty of criminal offenses, but this deprived the master of his services and in 1859 this was changed to stripes on the bare back, not exceeding one hundred in one day. Ample provision was made for the recovery of fugitive slaves and any master or owner who knowingly allowed the slaves of another to remain on his plantation more than four hours without the consent of the owner was liable to have to pay to the owner five dollars for every such offense. Any one harboring a fugitive slave was liable to imprisonment for one to five years (1858).

Yet, in spite of the wealth brought to the white man by the slaves and the safeguards of the law for its protection "dark care sat behind the man on horse-back." The earlier laws allowed emancipation, but in 1859 this was forbidden. The free negro never

was in great favor. While such persons were not subjected to all the legal disabilities imposed in some states, the tendency was toward greater restraints. In 1843 the coming of any more into the state was forbidden and in 1859 all in the state were required to leave by January 1, 1860. Anyone remaining after that date should be sold into slavery for one year. If he did not leave within thirty days after the expiration of this year of bondage he was then to be sold into permanent slavery. The effect of this law was very apparent. In 1850 there were 608 free negroes in the state; in 1860 only 144.

A petition to the legislature to be allowed to remain was answered by an extension of the time to January 1, 1863. The alternative to leaving the state was to choose a master and become a slave. Captains of boats navigating the waters within the state were forbidden to employ free negroes under liability of fines of \$500 to \$1,000 and imprisonment not exceeding one year. One bit of restrictive legislation, forbidding the teaching of negroes, seems never to have been enacted, and in 1860 free negroes were reported in school. In numerous instances slaves were taught by their mistresses, as members of the old families in the state relate to this day.

The reasons for such hostile legislation are not far to seek. The free negro was not considered a good example to the slaves and was a specially good agent for the dissemination of abolition doctrine, especially if he could read. Cases can be cited where free negroes were used by abolitionists to stir up trouble among



WAR MEMORIAL BUILDING
(Formerly Old State Capitol Building)

the slaves. And so the law provided that, if any free negro should be found in the company of slaves, at any unlawful meeting, or should harbor or entertain any slave, he should be subject to a forfeiture not exceeding \$100 and not over thirty lashes. Any white person caught in company with negroes, in suspicious places, or in the company of slaves at any unlawful meeting, or guilty of harboring or entertaining any slave, was subject to a fine not exceeding \$100 and imprisonment not over ninety days. This law was passed in 1838 and does not represent the real fear of abolitionism and insurrection which became somewhat more common later. The law of 1858 requiring free negroes to leave the state reflects it somewhat better.

It would be incorrect to say that every home was in constant fear of a slave insurrection; the general relation of masters and slaves is said to have been that of kindly affection. Yet there was a constant dread of the activity of abolitionists and this dread probably was sometimes worked for all it was worth by politicians. The time of the following stories, when the presidential campaign of 1860 was well under way, does not necessarily mean that they were being exploited for political purposes. They were news items of great interest to the readers.

June 7, 1860, the Fort Smith *Times* carried the story, copied from the Memphis *Argus*, of an abolitionist found at Buchanan, Texas, with a copy of *Helpers'* "The impending Crisis of the South and How to Meet It," a violent attack on slavery based

on a good many economic facts, and some other tracts. A missing slave just captured confessed that the man under arrest had helped him to escape, had given him a knife with which to cut his way to freedom and had advised him to burn his master's home. The abolitionist was then given a coat of tar and the slave was compelled to apply the torch to the fagots. Several weeks later this was followed by the publication of a letter from a woman in Paris, Texas, to her father in Fort Smith in which she told of great excitement in the northern counties of Texas over "abolitionists and negroes that have burned so many towns lately," Dallas among them. At Dallas about forty whites and negroes had been arrested and three or four of each had been hanged. At Fort Worth a man whose house was found to be filled with arms and ammunition for an insurrection on the day of the local election was hanged. Several negroes arrested confessed that they had been directed to burn and kill.

August 5, 1860, the *Van Buren Press*, which was somewhat conservative, carried the following head lines:

FEARFUL ABOLITION RAID—INSURRECTION OF NEGROES

Ossawatamee Brown Among Us—Northern Texas
To Be Laid Waste—The Work Already
Commenced.

This is followed by a letter giving an account of a destructive fire at Dallas, losses \$400,000, and of considerable losses at eight other places.

Another story came closer home. It seems that a man named Marsh came to Little Rock and established a newsstand. In August, 1860, he suddenly left one Friday night for parts unknown, Postmaster Baccus had had his suspicions aroused and opened a letter which came for him the following Sunday. It was postmarked, Warren, Bradley county, but was dated Little Rock, "To be mailed at any place A. G. may stop." The writer says that owing to discoveries in Texas it will be necessary to send him to a more important post. "We want men of backbone and nerve to heal up for a while the feeling against strangers from the North." He is directed to go to Dallas by way of Camden where he will find certain papers that must be carefully provided for. He was not to mention Lemon's name, who was known to be an abolitionist and was recently compelled to leave. This report led to the arrest of Marsh in Memphis by Dr. A. S. Huey, of Camden, and he was taken to Camden as a prisoner. What was done with him is not clear, but "the higher-law preacher and abolitionists,

Parson Buley," was taken back to Texas from Washington county and hanged by the citizens of Fort Worth, who were satisfied with the proof of his complicity in the abolition movement in Texas.

That the state was still in the pioneer stage is shown by the fact that only one-fourth of the land was included in farms and that of this only 1,983,313 acres, or a little over one in six, was improved, valued at not quite \$10 per acre. While there were many small farms—the average size was 288 acres, or not quite 60 if only the improved acreage be considered—the tendency was toward large ones. The size seems to have been governed to some extent by the color line. In the six counties where the slaves outnumbered the whites there were 198 farms of 500 acres or more, Chicot leading with 48; and of these 19 contained 1,000 acres or more. Nineteen counties had no farms of over 500 acres, among them the five counties which had fewer than 100 slaves.

Of farm products, the northern counties led in the production of foodstuffs, Washington county leading with 122,644 bushels of wheat and 663,540 bushels of corn; Benton followed with 76,791 and 426,495, though several counties exceeded the latter on corn. The production of corn was much more evenly distributed over the state, the large slave holding counties measuring up well in this. The total for the state was 957,601 bushels of wheat, 17,823,588 bushels of corn, and 475,268 bushels of oats. There was also a considerable production of potatoes, 418,010 bushels of Irish and 1,566,540 bushels of sweet

potatoes and these were distributed all over the state. So far as food was concerned, the people could live pretty well at home.

The chief money crops consisted of tobacco, 989,-980 pounds, wool 410,382 (of which a good deal was used in home manufactures), cotton 367,393 bales (400 pounds). While only three counties reported no tobacco, the most of it was grown in the northern counties, Izard county (which had only 382 slaves) leading with 199,774 pounds, followed by Independence (85,990 pounds), Randolph (45,-930 pounds), and Washington (43,123 pounds). Only one county, Benton, reported no cotton, though five counties, all in the north, reported fewer than ten bales. Chicot, where the slaves outnumbered the whites over five to one, led with 40,948 bales, followed by Jefferson, where the whites slightly outnumbered the slaves, with 28,586, and Phillips with 26,993.

Manufactures were still constituted an "infant industry." There were 518 establishments with \$1,-316,610 of invested capital turning out a product valued at \$2,880,578. The home manufactures at this time amounted to \$1,019,210. The leading industry was lumber which absorbed over half of the invested capital and turned out nearly half the finished products. Adding to this milling (flour and meal), we get two industries which were producing \$2,087,328 out of a total of \$2,880,578.

For a state about to enter upon war the outlook so far as concerned milling was good, but in other es-

entials the outlook was not at all encouraging. Seventeen establishments were making boots and shoes, but their output was very small. Only three were making clothing; two, cotton yarns; one, hats; sixty-one, leather; twenty-one, saddles and harness; eleven, wool carding; two were making firearms with a capital of only \$600 and a yearly output valued at \$1,650.

A year before the outbreak of war the editor of the *Fort Smith Times* lamented that the state was importing more than it was sending out. Steamboats came heavily laden and went away with little but gold. The southern part of the state sent out cotton, but the region around Fort Smith sent little, a few hides, and brought back shoes and saddles. There was plenty of wood, but Cincinnati was carrying off thousands of dollars for furniture, wooden buckets and churns. Broom corn could be grown easily, yet thousands of brooms were imported. Only the money paid out to the Indians and by the army disbursing officers kept up a sort of balance; when that should cease, what would they do?

Washington county led in manufactures, both in variety and amount, though milling furnished \$290,499 out of \$390,904 of her finished products. Ouachita came next with a better balanced variety of boots and shoes, flour, leather, lumber, machinery, steam engines, etc., a total of \$250,290. In home manufactures, Pope county led with \$77,427, Chicot reported nothing whatever in either class while Phillips, another strong slave holding county, reported

only \$52,050 manufactures, of which \$34,250 was lumber and only \$65 of home manufactures.

For transportation the state still depended largely upon water and dirt roads. Comparatively speaking, it was well supplied with navigable streams, the Mississippi river running the entire length of the eastern border and the Arkansas river being navigable parts of the year beyond Fort Smith, and the White river to Jacksonport. Some use was also made of smaller streams. On the larger streams steamboats plied regularly from such distant ports as New Orleans, St. Louis, and Cincinnati and went as far inland as Fort Smith. As the political excitement of 1860-61 increased there was a demand for southern trade only, particularly with St. Louis, but as late as April 4-9, 1861, three vessels left Fort Smith for Cincinnati.

The dirt roads in the mountainous regions were generally rough and in the lowlands almost impassible because of mud in bad weather. By 1860 several turn-pike companies had been chartered but practically nothing was done before the beginning of the war. As a result military operations were often impeded or made impossible by bad roads.

The state was thoroughly aroused to the need of railroads. When the agitation for the building of a Pacific railroad began, Arkansas hoped that Memphis might be made the eastern terminus and a convention was held in Little Rock to promote such interests. When nothing came of this, various local projects were launched and the legislature chartered several railroad companies. The most ambitious of

these appear to have been the Memphis and Little Rock, the Cairo and Fulton, to which a considerable grant of land was made, the Iron Mountain and Helena, the Des Arc and Dardanelle, the Little Rock and Fort Smith, and the Northwestern Border. The last two were designed to give the northwest the much desired rail connection with Little Rock and St. Louis. Among the incorporators of the last named were such well known names as Jesse Turner, John P. Humphreys, B. T. Duval, W. D. Reagan, A. W. Dinsmore, and Hugh C. Berry. After the establishment of telegraphic communication with St. Louis (July, 1860) efforts for the building of railroads redoubled. In the 1860-61 legislature, efforts were made to secure a donation of the proceeds of the sale of swamp lands in the Clarksville district. Counties were allowed to subscribe for stock. Even after the bombardment of Fort Sumter bids were asked for by contractors on a stretch of road from Fort Smith to Frog Bayou, but nothing was ever done.

The Memphis and Little Rock road was well under way when the war began. The line from Memphis to the St. Francis River was completed and a fine bridge had been built over the stream by the opening of 1861; the stretch from White River (DeValls Bluff) was graded most of the way and the rails had been purchased but the company was forced to suspend work for lack of funds. But the legislature decided that the work should not stop "at this most critical juncture," when the capital of the state imperatively needed to be placed in connection with the

eastern states "by the most rapid communication," and loaned the road \$100,000 for ten years, taking a mortgage on its property. Work was then resumed and the road was completed to the White river, but the stretch between White and St. Francis rivers remained uncompleted. The company advertised its service and sold through tickets, but, because of the unfinished part, travelers from Little Rock to Memphis must go by boat from DeVall's Bluff or overland to the St. Francis and by rail from there to the Mississippi. Telegraphic communication from Little Rock to Memphis and to several points in the state had already been established.

A prime essential of industry today is banks, but, after a sad experience with these institutions, the state adopted an amendment to the constitution (1846) forbidding the chartering of any more. One outsider is reported as having tried to start a private bank after this, but he soon repented. While the absence of banks left the people without some of the conveniences of exchange, it also left them free of the evils of a depreciated currency. When the war broke out the balance in the treasury was reported in gold and silver.

CHAPTER III

THE DRAMA OF SECESSION, I

The Political Pot Begins to Boil.

The attempt to divide the Union 1861-5 belongs to the class of tragic drama and is one of the most dramatic incidents in the history of the United States. For the state of Arkansas it undoubtedly is the most dramatic in all her history.

After the compromise of 1850, in which it was agreed to organize the territory acquired from Mexico without saying anything about slavery, the presidential campaign of 1852 was fought on the finality of the compromise. Both Democrats and Whigs were for it, but the Whigs were honeycombed with dissent and opposition and after their defeat, the party went to pieces. Opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which opened the Louisiana territory to slavery, and to the fugitive slave law of 1850, led to the formation of the Republican party, which first put out a candidate for the Presidency in 1856. Its cardinal principle was opposition to any further extension of slavery. On the other hand, the Democratic party, in its Cincinnati platform, championed the cause of popular sovereignty as expressed in the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which would leave it to the people of a territory to decide the question of slavery or no slavery. When the Dred Scott decision came, saying that slavery could not be prohibited in territories, the Re-

publicans refused to accept this decision—it was a mere opinion of the court and was not really a part of its decision—and declared itself unalterably opposed to any further extension and nominated Abraham Lincoln as its candidate for the Presidency.

Politically the voters in Arkansas had been divided into Whigs and Democrats, but with the disruption of the national Whig party following its defeat in 1852 the state party bearing that name disappeared. A good many went into the American, or Know Nothing, party and the Democrats took even more pleasure in denouncing them under the latter title than they ever had as Whigs. Sometimes they styled themselves simply the "Opposition."

The "Opposition" generally centered its attacks upon the "Johnson family," or Johnson dynasty, as they styled the "regular" Democrats. This faction, they declared, had dominated the Democratic party in Arkansas since 1836. That the Johnson family was prominent in state politics cannot be denied.

The issues in state politics in 1860 were somewhat colored by national affairs. At that time the state issues foremost in interest seem to have been the building of railroads, the repudiation of the bonds issued for the benefit of the Real Estate Bank, and the "Johnson family." The last was by all odds the leading issue, but national issues were not forgotten. In the winter and spring of 1860, county convention after county convention met to select delegates to the state convention and express itself on national issues. The Crawford county convention reaffirmed the Cin-

cinnati platform as a "true exposition of our political doctrines," and Independence county, in resolutions drawn up by U. M. Rose, resolved that they "unqualifiedly approve the * * * platforms adopted from time to time by the national conventions," but the Phillips county convention resolved "That we abhor and utterly repudiate Squatter Sovereignty and other heresies, which a faction at the North, calling itself Democratic, has attempted to engraft on the platform of our party."

The Democratic state convention, which met at Little Rock, April 5, 1860, declared that neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could, directly or indirectly, "amend or impair the right of any citizen to take his slave property into the common territory and there hold and enjoy them." The resolution as introduced read "constitutional right," but for some unexplained reason the word "constitutional" was stricken out. The convention also instructed its delegates to the Charleston convention to support Hunter, Breckenridge, Lane and Dickenson, in the order named and to withdraw from the convention if that body refused to recognize the rights of the states in the territories. The convention was somewhat divided on state issues, but on the paramount national issue, there was little difference of opinion, though the state, as we shall see, was not unanimous on it.

Except when dealing with national questions, the sessions of the convention seem to have been stormy. Some eight or ten counties were not represented while six were represented by proxy. Of these T. C. Peek

editor of the *Old Line Democrat* (Little Rock), a Johnson organ, held two, but the convention refused to let him have Benton county, seating another delegate. In those days, county delegates voted, not by head, but according to the number of votes cast by the county in the preceding election. Ten delegates, among them R. S. Gantt, P. R. Cleburne, Ben T. Duval, and N. B. Burrow, signed a protest against the action of the convention on three counts. (1) Because, while the convention adopted a resolution that a majority of the votes cast in 1856 should be necessary for nomination, in practice only a majority of the votes represented in the convention was required. (2) The president of the convention, in casting proxies, did not abide by the wishes of the people he thus represented, and the convention had voted down a resolution that he be requested to do so. (3) The convention had refused to adopt a platform before making the nomination. But the Johnson faction had its way and R. H. Johnson was nominated for governor.

After the adjournment of the convention, dissatisfaction with its action continued to grow. The Dover convention, called to nominate a candidate for Congress in the northern district, repudiated the nomination of Johnson, requested him to decline to run, and nominated his political enemy, T. C. Hindman, for Congress. On the other hand, the Arkadelphia convention for the southern district endorsed the nomination of Johnson by a small majority.

The three real issues before the people were, the alleged fraudulent character of Johnson's nomination (through proxies and not counting the counties not represented in making up a majority), the repudiation of the state debt due to the failure of the Real Estate Bank, and the "Johnson family." The dissatisfaction with the Little Rock convention became more and more pronounced and finally Judge Henry M. Rector resigned from the supreme court (to which he had been elected by the "Johnson family" without any solicitation on his part) and announced as a candidate for governor. He championed repudiation while Johnson opposed. On national issues, there seems to have been little real difference between the two. Each professed to love the Union, but also to stand for Southern rights. On the latter the supporters of Johnson charged that Rector was none too sound and the fact that some of his supporters were for Douglas seemed to give color to the charge. T. B. Flournoy, who was elected a delegate to the Charleston convention and instructed to vote for four different men in preference to Douglas and who violated these instructions, was a supporter of Rector. When men talked of disruption as endangering the Union the Johnson supporters charged that the Rector men were bolters and were seeking to disrupt the Democratic party in Arkansas in the interest of Douglas and in doing so would help to disrupt the national party, thereby playing into the hands of the Republicans. But neither could charge the other with being unconditional Unionists.

The truth of the matter is that Rector was an independent candidate running as a protest against the "Johnson family" in general and in particular against its high-handed procedure at the state convention. He represented no party, but some of the papers put his name at the head of the Democratic ticket. T. C. Hindman and E. W. Gantt, candidates for Congress, also lined up against Johnson. So did Albert Rust, candidate to succeed R. W. Johnson in the United States Senate, and denounced the "Johnson family" as "a combination in Little Rock whose ramifications extended to all parts of the state."

The result of the election in August was the defeat of Johnson, Rector being elected governor by 31,948 to Johnson's 28,847, a majority of only 3,101 in a total vote of 60,795. Hindman and Gantt were both elected to Congress by good majorities, the former by more than two to one.

CHAPTER IV

THE DRAMA OF SECESSION, II

The Nation Speaks.

Following out its policy of opposition to further slavery extension the Republican party nominated for President in 1860 Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, one of the ablest exponents of its policy, and for vice-president, Hannibal Hamlin, of Maine. While the platform denounced slavery in unsparing terms, Lincoln repeatedly said that he was unalterably opposed to further extension of slavery, but recognized that Congress had no power to deal with it in the states and that slave owners had a constitutional right to recover fugitive slaves.

T. B. Flournoy and J. P. Johnson were among the delegates elected by the Arkansas convention to the Democratic convention at Charleston. The former was honored by being elected temporary chairman, but he did not make a "keynote" speech. The followers of Douglas wanted simply to reaffirm the Cincinnati platform, which meant that the people of a territory could vote slavery in or vote it out, but the Southern Democrats, though they had gladly accepted this in 1856, now that the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case had ruled that slavery could not be prohibited in the territories by any power, would accept nothing short of the recognition of slavery in the territories and its protection by the national govern-

ment. When the followers of Douglas, who had a majority in the convention, adopted a platform reaffirming the Cincinnati platform, Walker, of Alabama, read a protest and withdrew, followed at once by one delegate from each of five states, among them N. B. Burrows, of Van Buren, Arkansas. Next day the majority of the Arkansas delegation concerted with many delegates from other states and joined the seceders, but Flournoy and Dr. John J. Stirman, of Dardanelle, remained. They declared that the safety of the nation depended on a united Democracy and asked why the members of the Arkansas delegation should take upon themselves the responsibility for disrupting the party.

After having taken fifty-seven ballots without avail—the candidate must receive two-thirds of the votes' to secure nomination—the convention adjourned to meet again at Baltimore and there nominated Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, was associated with him. The Southern Democrats also reassembled at Baltimore and there nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, and Joseph Lane, of Oregon, on a platform upholding the right of slave-holders to carry their property into the territories. Remnants of the old Whig party, later the "Know Nothing," now calling themselves the Constitutional Union Party, assembled at Baltimore and nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, on a platform calling for the observance of the Constitution, the preservation of the Union, and the en-

forcement of the laws. C. C. Danley and J. C. Keats, of Little Rock, and M. S. Kennard, of Batesville, were delegates to this convention.

There were now four parties in the field, three of them for the preservation of the Union, one for secession. The national campaign was a heated one, though not as heated as some that had preceded or some that came later. A vigorous campaign of the old-style stump speaking variety was carried on in Arkansas by such prominent men as T. C. Hindman, Albert Rust, James B. Johnson, Dr. Charles B. Mitchell, E. W. Gantt, T. B. Flournoy, E. C. Jordan and John R. Fellows. The last named had moved from New York to Arkansas, was then living at Camden, but after the war returned to New York, where he became district attorney. At Little Rock he and E. C. Jordan engaged in a debate which lasted several days and they also spoke at other places. Jordan was for secession, but Fellows pleaded for the Union with a power and eloquence few could equal.

All four of the parties really were sectional, though at least three of them tried to be national, taking their nominees from both sections and appealing to the voters in both. Lincoln did not have any tickets in the lower South and the support given to Douglas there was negligible. The Breckinridge Democrats still tried to be national, but, being dominated by the planters of the South, it is not surprising that the small farmers of the northwest and the laborers of the east ignored them. The surprising thing is the size of the vote received in such states as Massachu-

setts (5,939), Maine (6,368), and Pennsylvania (178,871). The appeal of Bell was distinctly national, but his strength was small in the North, his vote exceeding that of Breckinridge in only three states, Ohio, Illinois, and Iowa, where both were barely noticed.

Of the popular vote Lincoln received 1,866,452; Douglas, 1,376,957; Breckinridge, 849,781; Bell, 588,879. The electoral vote stood 180 for Lincoln, 12 for Douglas, 72 for Breckinridge, and 39 for Bell. This gave Lincoln a majority of 57 in the electoral college, but in the popular vote he was 949,165 behind the combined vote of his competitors. It was also clear that the Republicans would lack eight of having a majority in the Senate and twenty-one in the House.

In Arkansas the popular vote stood, Breckinridge, 28,732; Bell, 20,094; Douglas, 5,227, giving Breckinridge a small majority over the combined vote of his opponents. The most interesting thing about the vote in Arkansas is the results in the various counties. Bell and Douglas were known to stand for the Union as against possible secession. The somewhat surprising thing is that, the fewer slaves there were in a county, the more likely it was to support the radical candidate Breckinridge. For example, Madison county, with 7,444 whites and only 296 slaves gave Breckinridge 626 to 248 for the other two. A few notable exceptions to this occur. For example, Independence, with 12,790 whites and 1,337 slaves, gave 722 votes to Breckinridge, but 1,174 to Bell and

Douglas. Washington county, with 13,106 whites and 1,493 slaves, gave 1,028 votes to Breckinridge, 1,125 to the other two. Crawford county, with 6,986 whites and 858 slaves, was decidedly conservative, giving Breckinridge only 244 to 731 for Bell and Douglas, but Sebastian, just across the river, with even more whites in proportion to the slaves, rolled up 754 for Breckinridge to 476 for the combined opposition.

Of the five counties with more slaves than whites, three gave conservative majorities and, in general, those with a considerable slave population tended to support the conservative tickets, though Lafayette is a notable exception to this rule.

While many understood the issue to be secession or Union, this can hardly mean that the white counties were consciously voting for disunion, the black counties for Union. Rather, they were largely following the old lines of party division between Whigs and Democrats. The support of Bell undoubtedly was drawn almost wholly from the old Whigs.

CHAPTER V

THE DRAMA OF SECESSION, III

The Legislature is Moved to Action.

A few days after the election of Lincoln the legislature met (November 15) in regular session at Little Rock. In his inaugural address, Governor Rector declared that the "irrepressible conflict" was on. The issue, Union without slaves, or slavery without Union, had been made by the North, and now dissolution must come. The passage of the personal liberty laws by eleven states, designed to impede the operation of the fugitive slave law, was enough to justify secession. Reconciliation and compromise might possibly be effected by Northern and Southern conventions, but, should any state declare her independence, Arkansas ought not to withhold her sympathy and active support. In preparation for that day, he advised a revision of the militia code.

The legislature does not seem to have been greatly excited by the governor's secession message, but gave its attention to regular routine matter. Prominent men of the state, however, continued to stir up public interest by the methods used in regular campaigns. On several occasions the hall of the house of representatives was turned over to individuals, such as Albert Pike and Colonel John R. Fellows, while some made speaking tours about over the state. Naturally

the newspapers had a good deal to say about the "issues of the day."

As for what should be done, some favored secession, others called for a state convention to decide, still others for a Southern convention, while some opposed any action. Senator R. W. Johnson and T. C. Hindman, the latter had just been elected to Congress, were for secession, as was also E. W. Gantt, though the last named was not as urgent. Mass meetings were common about over the state, some of which appear to have acted without any direct suggestion from prominent politicians, though it is impossible to be sure of this at this time. The most of them adopted resolutions which were sent to the legislature and given to the press. Some of these meetings called for secession, a few opposed any precipitate action, but the most of them favored a convention.

Prominent among the opponents of secession were Senator W. K. Sebastian and W. M. Fishback. In an "Address to the People," the latter said: "Politicians, political extravagance, political bitterness, vituperation of opposing sections by the politicians of each, have brought on a momentous crisis." Complaint was made of the fugitive slave law. "But," said he, "we have the Constitution and laws, the Federal courts and police, and the obligations of official oaths; also, the army and the navy and thousands of friends scattered throughout the North to assist in enforcing the law. Would secession improve the situation? After secession a standing army of 50,000 would not give any more security. Instead

of mobs and a few hostile state laws, we should then have a great and powerful nation at our very door seeking to crush our institutions." It was objected that we had no protection in the territories. On the contrary, we now had a Democratic Congress, thousands of pro-slavery emigrants in the territory. Would secession and cowardly surrender of all the territory to the North afford the remedy for the evil? Instead of being a protection of slavery, secession would prove the shortest road to abolition. The *Arkansas State Gazette* warned that Arkansas was not pecuniarily or geographically prepared for secession. Her commercial interests were with Louisiana, but secession would mean war on her western border. Abolitionist enemies would then loose their Indians on her, and she would be subjected to organized murder and robbery from Kansas and the territory. The *Van Buren Press* opposed secession on financial grounds and warned South Carolina that it would cost her millions to maintain her independence, entailing a new tax of \$33 per capita. The removal of Federal troops from Texas would throw upon that state an expense of \$3,000,000 or \$4,000,000 for defense. Senator Sebastian warned against secession except as a *last* remedy.

A public meeting at Pine Bluff, presided over by Colonel W. P. Grace, adopted resolutions drawn up by a committee of seven, ex-Governor J. S. Roane, chairman. The resolutions declared that a "government hallowed by long years of trial and glorious memories" should not be broken up "for light and

transient causes." The election of Lincoln was not sufficient cause for secession, but this was the culmination of a long series of abuses. A convention should be called and measures taken for safety. Thanks were due the people of the North who voted to sustain Southern rights. No "Black Republican" administration should be permitted to coerce any Southern state by force of arms. Governor Roane spoke for an hour in defense of these resolutions. He was followed by Mr. A. A. C. Rogers, who deprecated the governor's inflammatory remarks, but he supported the resolutions and they were adopted without a dissenting vote. A mass meeting at Columbia, Chicot county, declared that the election of Lincoln and Hamlin was a menace to Southern institution and that the people ought not to submit to it.

The action of only one religious body has come to the notice of the writer. The Methodist Conference in session at Van Buren adopted a resolution appointing the Friday before Christmas to be observed as a day of fasting and prayer "for the preservation of our political union."

Within the legislature, London, of Sebastian, admitted that the election of Lincoln was a calamity, but held that this did not justify secession. The secession of South Carolina or any other state would not justify Arkansas in following. In the impending crisis, it was our duty to maintain the Constitution and boldly assert our rights in the Union, where we could secure them better than when out.

Then, if rights could not be secured, we should resist in conjunction with our sister state.

For some time after the election public opinion in the North and to some extent official opinion and action (or non-action) in Washington did not indicate strong measures against secession. Horace Greely, editor of the *New York Tribune*, a strong anti-slavery paper, came out against coercion of the cotton states, if they attempted to secede. Henry Ward Beecher and some of the abolitionists seem to have been of like mind. The commercial interests, whose trade would be injured by war, did not encourage stiff measures. In his annual message, President Buchanan admitted that the South had many grievances, chief of which was the personal liberty laws, and appealed to the North to cease anti-slavery agitation. He denied emphatically that any state had the right to secede, but also declared that he had no right to prevent it by coercion, that is, war.

About a week later, Ben T. Duval, of Sebastian, as chairman of the judiciary committee of the house, presented a bill for a convention and accompanied it with a report bitterly criticising the North and the Black Republicans in particular. He drew up twenty-two indictments against the Republican party, among them five for prospective action, the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, prohibition of interstate slave trade, the repeal of the fugitive slave law, the remodeling of the Supreme Court, and negro equality. To crown all their misdeeds they had now elected Lincoln. The South had made many conces-

sions, giving up the Northwest Territory and then all north of 36° 30', all to no avail. True, Buchanan had said that the United States had no right to coerce a state, but Lincoln would find a way. It now seemed certain that several states would secede. Arkansas could not remain an idle spectator. A state convention should be called and a Southern convention be held at Memphis.

In all probability, he and Governor Rector were acting in concert, for soon after he finished reading his report, the governor's secretary appeared with a special message. In this, the governor declared that the Union was practically gone forever, a prey to "the madness and fanaticism of its children." The Southern states were now seceding. The border states were conservative—so was Arkansas. Missouri might divest herself of slavery, but Arkansas never could. Without it, her fertile fields would be deserts, and her people penniless and impoverished. The only thing left her was to cast in her lot with the lower South. If done before Lincoln was inaugurated, it would be accomplished peacefully, as guaranteed by Buchanan's message.

As for measures to be taken, he favored arming the militia and securing supplies, not for war, but because he believed in preparedness. The bringing in of negroes from other states should be prohibited. Some were advocating the suspension of the collection of debts to get back from the North what they had taken in slaves not surrendered to their owners, but he opposed this and favored paying to the last farthing.

He questioned the propriety of electing a United States senator, as Arkansas would soon be out of the Union.

Clay, the great compromiser, was no more, but leading men in Congress were trying to find a way. Senator Weed's proposal was pay for fugitives not returned, the extension of the line $36^{\circ} 30'$ and recognition of slavery south of that line. Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky, who was then occupying Clay's seat, now brought in three propositions as a basis for compromise, prohibition of slavery north of $36^{\circ} 30'$, recognition of slavery south of that line, and the admission of states on either side of the line with or without slavery as each should decide for itself.

It looked for a while as if the current of Northern opinion was running strongly for the Crittenden resolutions. For a time Seward wavered, but, after an indirect consultation with Lincoln, he announced that he could not support them. At this juncture Johnson and Hindman telegraphed the situation as they saw it from Washington—that the cotton states would secede, the border states were calling conventions, and that there was no hope of salvation from Congress—and advised the calling of a convention to enable the people to join the common councils of the South.

The pressure upon the legislature from the outside steadily increased. More mass meetings were held and commissioners arrived from Mississippi and Alabama. A motion was made not to elect a United States senator, but this was defeated 23 to 72. Dr. Charles B. Mitchell was then elected to succeed

Robert W. Johnson, who was not a candidate for re-election.

By this time, South Carolina had withdrawn from the Union and other states had called conventions. Resolutions continued to come in—among them two very moderate sets from Van Buren and Fort Smith deprecating hasty action, praying that the non-slave holding states be given time to retrace their steps, opposing separate secession, but favoring a state convention with power to appoint delegates to a Southern convention. But Monroe County was more radical. It deplored the election of Lincoln by a sectional vote and declared any people of a sovereign government that would commit their destinies to a power foreign to it by locality, antagonistic to its interests, and hostile to it in feeling were unworthy of the name of freemen, being in reality slaves. They further declared that South Carolina was justified in her action. They then concluded:

“That, under the present state of affairs, the only safe or practicable course for the South to pursue, is the separate secession of each state for itself, to take effect on the 4th of March next, with the ordinance of secession conditioned: that if the North will consent by that time to give us good and sufficient constitutional guarantees of our rights and our honor, to wit: the faithful execution of the law requiring the return of fugitives from justice and of fugitive slaves—an efficient protection of our persons and property in the territories, or an equal participation in the same—our rights of property and person to be pro-

tected in the District of Columbia, in the forts, in the dock-yards, and upon the high seas, or wherever else the Federal authority may exclusively extend—no interference with the slave trade between the different states or in the same—no tariff, except on strictly a revenue standard—no internal improvements by the general government, except for general defense, or the improvement of the harbors and rivers, traversing the different states with specified limitations—and a constitutional guarantee for the future—that in the election of a President and vice-President of these United states, before they should be declared elected, that they should receive a plurality of the electoral vote of both slave and non-slaveholding states, or failing in this, a plurality of the votes of the representatives in the House, or of the senators of both sections, in addition to the present regulations of the Constitution; or the equivalent to these specifications, or such guarantees as may be agreed upon by a convention of the Southern states, provided, one should be assembled—then and in that event, the ordinance of secession or the government established by it to cease its force and effect, otherwise provision to be made for the Union of the seceding states, and means of defense provided for.”

A committee of thirteen had been appointed in Congress to consider the Crittenden resolutions. With the consent of the other Republican members, Seward announced the day before Christmas the utmost they were willing to concede, an amendment providing that the Constitution should never be so altered as to au-

thorize Congress to abolish slavery in any state, and that Congress should recommend to the states the repeal of their personal liberty laws. In return, they demanded the amendment of the fugitive slave law so as to allow jury trial for fugitives.

December 26, commissioners arrived in Washington from South Carolina to demand recognition and the surrender of the forts in Charleston harbor. The next day, it was learned that Major Anderson had moved his forces from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter for greater safety. The commissioners now demanded that he be ordered back. President Buchanan wavered for a time but finally refused to give any such order. He now reconstructed his cabinet, leaving out the Southern members and prepared to send the *Star of the West* with supplies for Major Anderson. January 8, he sent to Congress a message somewhat shorter than the one of December 3. While still admitting that neither the executive nor Congress had any right to begin an aggressive war upon any state, he now declared that he could not recognize the independence of any state, but that it was his right and duty to execute the laws of the United States in all the states, even to the extent of using the military force defensively against those who resisted the Federal officers and assailed Federal property. The *Star of the West* was already on the way to supply the garrison in Fort Sumpter, only to be fired on and turned back the next day.

The same day that Buchanan sent in his message Johnson and Hindman issued an address to the peo-

ple of Arkansas advising a convention to follow the other states in secession. If the Union was to be preserved, the least the South could accept, said they, was an amendment to the Constitution guaranteeing: (1) The recognition of the right of property in slaves in the slave states, the District of Columbia, and the territories and a requirement of Congress to protect it everywhere. (2) The admission of the territories as states with or without slavery when ready for statehood. (3) The right of the slaveholder to travel in and reside temporarily in free states with his property. (4) A prohibition on Congress to interfere with the slave trade between the states and in the territories. (5) A provision for the enforcement of the fugitive slave law of 1850 and a denial of representation in Congress to certain states until their personal liberty laws were repealed. (6) A provision making these guarantees and the representation based on three-fifths of the slaves forever unalterable. "Immediate secession," they concluded, "is the true and only path that leads to the reconstruction of the Union on a basis guaranteeing these rights."

Mississippi carried out this advice January 9, and the next day, Senator Jefferson Davis told the North that the way to avoid war was to allow peaceable secession. The same day, Florida seceded and Alabama did so on the 11th. The next day, Seward, who, it had already been announced, was to be Secretary of State in Lincoln's cabinet, told a packed Senate chamber that there would be no further concessions. He would not support the Crittenden compro-

mise, he did not even support the proposition to submit it to a popular vote, but suggested that a convention be called in two or three years, when passions had cooled, to amend the Constitution.

The Arkansas senate had already passed the convention bill, and it now passed the house, possibly before the members had received the address of Johnson and Hindman or the speeches of Davis and Seward. There were only fifteen votes in opposition, nearly all of them coming from counties where slaveholders were comparatively few. The bill was promptly signed by the governor and became a law January 15. It directed the governor to call an election on February 18 at which the people should vote on the question of "convention" or "no convention" . and also elect delegates to the said convention.



The Old Capitol Building, located at Washington, Ark.—During the War between the States, Washington, Arkansas was the seat of the State Government.

CHAPTER VI

THE DRAMA OF SECESSION IV

The Convention Meets.

When Governor Rector signed the act calling the convention (January 15) four states had already seceded, South Carolina, December 20; Mississippi, January 9; Florida, January 10, and Alabama, January 11. Eight days later Georgia withdrew, followed by Louisiana January 25 and Texas February 1. The Confederate government was then organized at Montgomery and Jefferson Davis was elected President. Virginia called a convention, but that body voted down secession 88 to 55 and called a peace convention to meet in Washington February 4. North Carolina voted against it by nearly 12,000. The peace convention met on February 4 with delegates from twenty-one states. Arkansas was not represented.

This body submitted to Congress a proposed amendment dividing the territory on the line of $36^{\circ} 30'$. This was done, however, by a majority of only one state, Virginia herself not being pleased with it. When submitted to Congress Mr. Hindman opposed it as "unworthy of the vote of any Southern man." Meantime strenuous efforts had been going on in Congress for a compromise and just two days before dissolution that body proposed (March 2) the following as a thirteenth amendment: "No

amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said state." This was carried only by a combination of Democrats and conservative Republicans. Possibly it was thought that this would relieve the fears of those who charged that the Republicans intended to admit only free states until they could get a three-fourths majority and then abolish slavery, but although it would withhold from Congress forever the power to abolish slavery in the states, it laid no prohibition upon abolition by constitutional amendment.

Within the state considerable attention was being given to military preparation in anticipation of coming trouble. Early in 1860 the agitation for preparedness began. In May the editor of the *Fort Smith Times* lamented that while the "incendiaries of the John Brown school" were at their "hellish work" in the Cherokee nation the Fort Smith Rifles, a military company, was meeting with little encouragement. But after this, preparedness "picked up," old companies were reorganized and filled up, arms were secured, and several new companies were organized and drilled. They were continually calling for arms. Early in January Governor Rector reported that the state had lately received 1,100 stand of new and improved arms and later 600 were secured, the major part of which went to the northwestern part of the state. In January N. B. Burrow, commanding the First Brig-

ade, Arkansas militia, was ordered to muster the several regiments for review at an early date and to report the effective strength of each and the number and character of arms. As the situation became more tense it became more and more difficult to secure arms from the North, several shipments being seized en route.

Shortly after the election in November a troop of sixty artillerymen was ordered from Kansas to Little Rock. Ordinarily such a move would have attracted no attention, but Governor Rector, who thought that they were needed worse in Kansas than in Arkansas, suspected that the move had some connection with prospective secession. Whereupon the people of Helena offered the governor 500 men to capture the arsenal. Governor Rector replied that he thought that the arms in the arsenal should neither be removed nor destroyed and that he would not permit the fort to be reinforced by United States troops. Under the circumstances, he did not need any help from Helena. But the Helenes did not take this view of it and they came to Little Rock several hundred strong. This alarmed the citizens of Little Rock, who feared that there would be considerable bloodshed, if an unauthorized band undertook to seize the arsenal. The mayor and city council shared the alarm and asked the governor to prevent unauthorized action. About the only way to prevent it was to give the authority and the governor now demanded (February 6) of Captain James Totten the surrender of the arsenal, giving as his excuse the presence of the citizens who had

come to take it and rumors of the coming of more. Another reason, not given to Captain Totten, was the constant rumors that reinforcements were on the way to the arsenal. Being convinced that evacuation was the only way to avoid bloodshed, Captain Totten agreed to get out, if guaranteed unmolested passage through the state and allowed to carry everything they had brought with them. To this the governor agreed and Captain Totten marched out February 8*. The act was roundly denounced in the *Van Buren Press*, but seems to have met with general approval. This happened just ten days before the election of members to the state convention, but probably had very little, if any, influence on the results.

A few counties gave majorities against the convention, Crawford, 151; Washington, 974, but the state vote stood 27,472 for the convention, 15,826 against it. In a total vote of 54,053 in 1860 Breckinridge had received a majority of 8,411 over the combined vote of Bell and Douglas. The majority for the convention was 11,586 in a total vote of 43,238. But this did not mean a majority for secession. Judging by the votes cast for the candidates according to the stand they took the majority against secession was 5,699. But the majority of delegates opposing secession was small, as later events will show.

*Captain Totten seems to have been in high personal esteem in Little Rock. Before he left, some of the citizens presented him with a sword. After he had entered the war on the Federal side, John Baker Thompson, who had written an "eloquent and classical letter" to accompany the sword, wanted to make it a "personal matter" with him, that is, fight a duel, alleging that, when presented with the sword he had declared that it would never be drawn against those who presented it. The opportunity for this "personal matter" never came.

The convention assembled at Little Rock March 4. It was a very respectable body, composed of planters (a few "farmers"), lawyers, lawyer-planters, doctors, merchants, editors, and one hunter. The planters and lawyers predominated and dominated. Four members, W. M. Fishback, Clark H. Flanagin, A. H. Garland, and Isaac Murphy, afterward became governor of the state, and Clark H. Flanagin and Thomas B. Hanley, had been and two others, W. W. Mansfield and David Walker, afterward became, members of the supreme court, and several served either in the Confederate Congress or the United States Congress, or both. The convention organized by electing David Walker, of Washington county, an anti-secessionist, president over B. C. Totten, of Prairie, a secessionist, by a vote of 40 to 35. E. C. Boudinot, also of Fayetteville, a half-breed Indian, was elected secretary. The governor, members of the supreme court, and members of Congress were invited to seats in the convention.

By this time seven states had withdrawn from the Union and had formed the Confederacy at Montgomery, Alabama. In his inaugural address President Jefferson Davis said that the organization of the Confederacy illustrated the American idea that "governments rest on the consent of the governed and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the ends for which they were established." He denied, however, that this was a revolutionary act. Rather, it rested upon the right of each sovereign state to judge

for itself whether the "compact of the Union" had ceased to accomplish the ends for which it was established. This the states had done by a "peaceful appeal to the ballot box and they had decided that, so far as they were concerned, "the government created by that compact" had ceased to exist. Continuing he said:

In this they merely asserted the right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, defined to be "inalienable." Of the time and occasion of its exercise they as sovereigns were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct; and He who knows the hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we have labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit.

The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the United States, and which has been solemnly affirmed and reaffirmed in the Bills of Rights of the states subsequently admitted into the Union of 1787, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus the sovereign states here represented have proceeded to form this Confederacy; and it is by abuse of language that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each state its government has remained; so that the rights of persons and property have not been disturbed. The agent through which they communicated with foreign nations is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations. Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy has not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform every constitutional duty,

moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States will be found equal to any measure of defense which their honor and security may require.

As the South was an agricultural community, whose chief interest lay in the exportation of commodities required in every manufacturing country, the policy would be peace and freedom of trade. There could be no conflict of interest between the South and the Northeastern states, which were interested in manufacturing and navigation. But if passion or lust of dominion of their part should lead to war, then the Confederacy must prepare to maintain its rights by the arbitrament of the sword.

We have entered upon the career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy with our late associates of the Northern states, we have vainly endeavored to secure tranquility and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But, if this be denied to us, and

the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause.

The delegates had had time to read this before assembling in Little Rock. While they were organizing (March 4) President Lincoln was delivering his inaugural address in Washington. He knew that the formation of the Confederacy was exercising a profound influence on men's thinking. In his address he now sought to counteract some of this influence. In the very beginning he declared that he had no intention and no right to interfere with slavery in states where it already existed. He also quoted a paragraph from the Republican platform promising to maintain inviolate rights of the states to control their domestic institutions. On the matter of the return of fugitive slaves he said that the Constitution was very plain and that he was taking the oath to support it with no mental reservations. The law forbidding the importation of slaves was equally plain. The great body of the people accepted both, but both were broken by a few. This could not be perfectly cured where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supported the law, but the violation would be worse in both cases after separation than before. The right of secession he denied, holding that the Union was perpetual. It was his purpose to see that the Constitution and laws were faithfully executed in all the states, holding the property belonging to the government and collecting the revenue.

No force would be used beyond what was necessary for this. Where hostility to the United States was so great and universal as to prevent resident citizens from holding office he would make no attempt to force obnoxious strangers upon them. The mails, unless rejected, would be furnished to all the states.

He then went on to say that the nation was a geographic unit, that separation was impossible, and asked the South not to try it. He pleaded for delay at least and closed with a strong emotional appeal based upon historic associations and the hope of the future.

Such was the situation when the convention organized in 1861.

CHAPTER VII

THE DRAMA OF SECESSION, V

The Convention Decides.

Something was said in the preceding chapter about the personnel of the convention. A few words may be added now concerning its behavior. It was a body of young or middle-aged men—some were under thirty and only four over sixty—and youth adds fervor. The printed journals are commonplace; none of the speeches have been preserved, but reminiscences of members tell us that there was much eloquence of the fervid type to which the South had long been accustomed. Such, for the most part, came from the secessionists, who taunted the Unionists with being unfaithful to the South. Some of the sessions were turbulent and there are intimations of personal encounters, but none of these led to serious consequences. This was probably due in large part to the tact of President Walker, who was master of such bodies and always presided with "gravity and urbanity."

In the convention were two sharply defined parties, the Unionists and the secessionists. If any came without convictions, they soon fell into one group or the other. The outside pressure recruiting for the secessionists was strong. "Little Rock," said a member, Mr. Alfred Holt Carrigan, many years later, "was filled with politicians of excitable natures who were anxious for secession at any cost; adventurers and

would-be soliders, for all conceded that to take the step meant war, and the pressure was intense. The Union men were taunted as submissionists, abolitionists, and all kinds of raillery came from the galleries and lobbies, which were always crowded." The Unionists are said to have returned the raillery in kind.

It is impossible to tell now whether Lincoln's address was received on the day of delivery, but probably not. On the second day, Mr. Grace, of Jefferson, moved that a committee of 13 be appointed and instructed to report an ordinance of secession. By March 7, the address certainly had been read and then Mr. James L. Totten, of Arkansas county, introduced a set of resolutions declaring that it "should be regarded as a menace, involving the inhuman doctrine of coercion," that the declaration of the President's intention to recapture the forts and the assembling of an army in Washington and the recall of the navy from foreign nations presaged war and that the only path of honor left to Arkansas was immediate secession.

The disposal of these resolutions illustrates the somewhat informal character of the proceedings of the convention. Mr. Totten moved to adopt his resolutions, Mr. Kelley moved that they be referred to the committee on Federal relations, Mr. Floyd moved to adjourn until 10 o'clock next day and Mr. Mansfield called for the yeas and nays on Floyd's motion. The motion failed, whereupon Mr. Watkins moved to take a recess until 2:30 p. m., and this carried. Some-

times three or four motions would be made (and presumably seconded), then the convention would take up other matters and finally adjourn without disposing of any of the motions.

The first tilt came, as we have seen, over the election of a president and the Unionists won. The next tilt came over what to do about President Lincoln's address and the convention refused to put itself on record as condemning it. No individual seems to have been enthusiastic about it, but some declared that it furnished no occasion for uneasiness. However, the convention did refer to the committee on Federal relations (March 9) a resolution offered by Mr. J. P. Johnson, of Desha, that any attempt to reinforce any of the southern forts then held by "the government of Lincoln," the first gun fired against the seceding states, would be considered as coercion. In substance, this was afterward adopted.

Commissioners had already been received (March 5) from South Carolina and Georgia. Just after the above resolution was referred and while one by Mr. Echols, of Calhoun, recognizing the Confederacy, was pending, Governor Rector, in response to a previous invitation, sent in a message dealing with the situation. In this, the governor went over the ground covered in his message of December 12 to the legislature and lamented that that body had relied chiefly "upon the hand of Providence to stay the wind and dissipate the storm." After arguing the right of secession, he comes to what he calls the immediate cause of all the trouble, slavery. If, said he, we agree that

slavery is a sin and should be abolished for the good of the whites and blacks, then we should remain in the Union. Some draw great solace from the promise of the Republicans not to molest slavery in the states where it now exists, though they announce that it shall not expand to any new territory. According to physical science the law of life is growth. Things must either grow or die. "The area of slavery *must be extended correlative with its antagonism*, or it will be put speedily in the 'course of ultimate extinction.' " It must extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific south of $36^{\circ} 30'$, "else when hemmed in by a cordon of fire, 'like a scorpion, it will sting itself to death.' " Continuing he said:

The extension of slavery is the vital point of the whole controversy between the North and the South, as is plainly manifested by the persistent opposition of the Northern people to its being engrafted upon any newly acquired territory, whether south or north of the negro line. Does there exist inside the borders of Arkansas any diversity of sentiment, as to the religious or moral right of holding negro slaves? Do any imagine that the non-slaveholder will be less involved pecuniarily and socially, in the extirpation of this institution than the slaveholder himself? The productive portion of the soil of Arkansas is so geographically circumstanced as to preclude the idea that it can be successfully cultivated by white labor. From these more fertile regions is produced by slave labor in superabundance, the staple commodity—cotton—justly styled commercial king of Europe and America * * * Who could find a market for the surplus products of North Arkansas, if the more genial soil of the South was deprived of slave labor? God in

His omnipotent wisdom, I believe, created the cotton plant—the African slave—and the lower Mississippi Valley, to clothe and feed the world, and a gallant race of men and women produced upon its soil to defend it, and execute that decree.

As for the Union, that is already destroyed. The question is to which fragment shall Arkansas attach herself? The doctrine of coercion is now at the summit of the controversy. Shall Arkansas help to coerce the seven seceding states or cast in her lot with them? Withdrawal will at once relieve her of any duty to coerce. Some advocate amendments to the Constitution as a panacea; the old Constitution is amply sufficient, if only enforced. But the South wants evidences of good faith, not mere paper agreements and compromises. "They believe slavery a sin, we do not, and there lies the trouble."

Secession will pay. The fifteen slave states, with a population of 12,433,508 and an area of 857,090 square miles—"having exclusive control of the cotton zone of the world, with the necessity on the part of Great Britain, France, and other European governments of securing aliment for their looms and spindles"—the fifteen slave states, making up the Southern Confederacy, "could not only soon induce peace at home, but exert an important influence upon the commercial interests of the world." The North cannot afford to keep up war with us.

Some object to the expense of keeping up a separate government. The indirect tax paid by the slaveholding states under the tariff will more than main-

tain a Southern Confederacy. When relieved of the fishing bounties paid to New England, the tax on iron now given to Pennsylvania as a peace offering and a gratuity, "the annual loss of slave property abstracted from the Southern by the Northern states, our expenses in supporting a new government would be less than in the old."

Both honor and interest, then, demand secession. But the question should be submitted to the people, whose "voice is omnipotent." Such was the argument of Governor Rector.

A week later, W. S. Oldham, of Texas, presented his credentials from the Confederacy and handed the president of the convention a letter from President Davis urging Arkansas to join the Confederacy. Under such influences, the convention continued its work. But it seems to have pursued the even tenor of its way without being influenced very greatly by any of them.

Resolution after resolution was introduced by the secessionists, to secede, denouncing the "Black Republican" party, affirming the right to secede, that any attempt to coerce a seceding state would be resisted by Arkansas "to the last extremity" (the last was by Fishback, who was not a secessionist), but they were always countered by a motion to reject, or to postpone, or more frequently to refer to the committee on Federal relations.

March 11, Mr. H. F. Thomason, of Crawford, introduced a series of resolutions giving the causes of complaint and proposed remedies. Among the

grievances were the election of a President by a sectional party hostile to Southern interests, the denial of equal rights in the territories, the demands made upon Congress for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, obstruction to the operation of the fugitive slave law, denial to slave owners of the right to take his slaves with him when residing temporarily in a free state, and the giving of the ballot to the negro. To redress these grievances, he proposed that the Constitution be amended so as to provide for (1) the election of President and vice-President alternately from the free and slave states; (2) division of the territory on the line of $36^{\circ} 30'$; (3) Congress to have no power over slavery except to protect it; (4) payment for the recovery of fugitives; (6) the right to travel in free territory with slaves; (7) no negro suffrage anywhere; (8) that these amendments and the clause providing for representation based on three-fifths of the slave population and the provision for the rendition of fugitives slave should not be amended without the consent of all the states. A national convention should be called to consider these proposals.

The committee on Federal relations now presented its report, holding that the government of the United States was a compact, that a sectional majority tends toward despotism; that the inauguration of the present sectional administration was a grievance, that any attempt to coerce the states should be resisted, that United States troops should not be kept in the South-

ern forts, and that the execution of the Federal laws in the South would be tantamount to coercion.

Previous to this, Mr. C. W. Adams, of Phillips, had offered a resolution calling on the committee to report an unconditional ordinance of secession. This was now taken up and while it was under discussion, a petition from sixty-two citizens of Washington county was presented praying that the Crittenden proposition be taken as a basis for compromise. At this juncture, Mr. O. H. Echols, of Calhoun, disgusted with the strong Union sentiment which, he said, made secession impossible, and with the expenditure of state funds for which nothing of value would be received, offered resolution to the effect that the convention was a nuisance and should adjourn *sine die* immediately, that the people be requested to take their destiny in their own hands and live as free men or die as soldiers, and that "liberty or death" should be the rallying cry of the South now as it had been of Washington in 1776. All of which the convention promptly rejected. Thomason then moved that his resolutions be substituted for that of Adams, which called for unconditional secession. Mr. T. B. Hanly, of Phillips, seeing that his colleague's motion was likely to be lost, moved to amend Thomason's resolution by striking out all after the preamble and inserting an ordinance of secession with the proviso that it be submitted to popular vote.

That night (March 13) Senator Robert W. Johnson, who had previously sought to influence the legislature in calling the convention, delivered a strong

speech in favor of secession. The next two days were spent in routine business, mainly in discussing an election to settle a tie vote in Fulton county. The convention also learned by inquiring of the governor that it was costing \$22.55 per day to hold the arsenal. The Adams resolution, with proposed amendments was then taken up and discussed two days. And the second day Mr. Oldham, representative of President Davis, addressed the convention, inviting Arkansas to join the Confederacy. That afternoon the vote was taken on Hanly's motion for secession with popular referendum, and this was defeated 35 to 39.

The secessionists were greatly disappointed, the Unionists greatly relieved, some being highly elated. At Fort Smith and Van Buren 39 guns were fired in honor of the 39 who voted against the ordinance.

But the secessionists were not ready to give up. Mr. Felix I. Batson, of Johnson, proposed a popular election on secession or no secession, but this was tabled. Now they were ready for compromise and Mr. B. C. Totten, of Prairie, moved to take a popular vote on "co-operation" or "secession." If a majority voted for secession then the convention should act accordingly; if a majority favored co-operation, then the convention should co-operate with the border slave states to secure a permanent and satisfactory adjustment of the difficulty. Mr. Adams, unconditional secessionist, now moved the adoption of this ordinance and it was carried without a division. August 5 was set as the date for the election. But this was as far as some of the secessionists were willing to go and

when Mr. W. W. Watkins, of Carroll, moved to accept the invitation of Virginia and Missouri to send delegates to a border state convention and named Frankfort, Kentucky, May 21, as the place and time, it was adopted only with 43 to 31. Messrs. Albert Rust, S. H. Hempstead, T. H. Bradley, E. S. Warren and J. P. Spring were elected as delegates.

A few other significant votes were taken. When Mr. W. M. Mays, of Monroe, moved that it was necessary for the South that the Federal government be forever prohibited from levying a tariff "beyond a strictly revenue point," in no case above 25 per cent, his motion was defeated 28 to 38. When Mr. Adams moved that no state should be admitted south of 36° 30', unless its constitution guaranteed slavery, this was defeated 18 to 45. The vote was then taken on the Thomason resolutions and they were adopted 37 to 29. The report of the committee on Federal relations was now adopted without a division. On the last day (March 21) Mr. R. H. Garland, of Hempstead, succeeded in getting adopted a resolution which he had offered some time before, that the people of Arkansas prefer "a perpetuity of this Federal Union," provided it can be perpetuated upon a basis guaranteeing equal rights to all the states, and that it is more in accord with the spirit of our institution to meet in convention to consider the causes and nature of complaints and to amend "the Constitution to meet the exigency," than to overthrow or change our present government. This carried 40 to 24.

The day set for the reassembling of the convention was August 19, but the president was authorized to call it earlier, if, in his judgment, the circumstances should demand it.

For a few weeks after the convention adjourned there was comparative quiet. No more states seceded. Within the state there were many expressions of satisfaction and of dissatisfaction with the action of the convention. Some meetings praised it while others denounced it. In Ouachita county a mass meeting asked the governor to call a special session of the legislature to provide for the election of a new convention.

But events outside of Arkansas now shaped events within the state. Shortly after seceding South Carolina appointed commissioners to treat with President Buchanan, but they got no satisfaction. As early as February 15 the Confederate Congress resolved that immediate steps should be taken to secure Forts Sumter and Pickens by negotiation or by force and President Davis sent Martin J. Crawford, John Forsyth and A. B. Roman to try negotiation.

During the first few weeks of his administration President Lincoln, who had never had any experience in large affairs, especially in dealing with a critical situation, seems to have been somewhat at sea, uncertain which way to turn or what to do. Now Wm. H. Seward, his Secretary of State, was a man of considerable experience in national affairs and seems to have thought that his would be the guiding hand in

the administration and started out to develop a policy of his own.

When the Confederate commissioners appeared in Washington Seward refused to receive them officially, but communicated with them several times through Senator W. M. Gwin, of California, and Justices William Nelson and J. R. P. Campbell, of the Supreme Court. March 4, the day of Lincoln's inauguration, he assured Senator Gwin that the administration meant to settle the questions between the two governments in an amicable manner. The commissioners replied that, with the United States flag flying over Forts Sumter and Pickens and troops and ships seemingly in preparation for relief, the Confederate government could not admit of delay except on the most reliable guaranty. Seward then said that the administration was troubled with applicants for office and the pressure of radical Republicans and that he would not answer for the results, if forced to reply at that time. March 8 the commissioners sent to the State Department a memorandum stating that they would agree to a delay, not over twenty days, if assured that the military status would not be changed. Before replying (March 12) Seward consulted Lincoln and then wrote that the refusal to receive the commissioners was not due to any lack of respect, but to considerations of public policy.

As early as March 5 President Lincoln had issued an order to General Winfield Scott to use "all forcible vigilance for the maintenance of all the places." March 11, finding that nothing had been done, he

reduced the order to writing and the next day Scott ordered the U. S. S. *Brooklyn*, then lying in the harbor of Pensacola, to land troops at Fort Pickens. By this time Seward must have known of this order, for he and Scott were hand in glove. March 13 the commission asked for an official interview. Two days later Justice Nelson told Seward that there were serious constitutional objections to coercion of the states and Justice Campbell then joined him in urging the secretary to receive the commissioners. Seward, however, said that the evacuation of Sumter was as much as the administration could stand at one time and assured them that it would be evacuated before a letter could reach Montgomery and that no action was contemplated affecting the ports on the Gulf. Campbell now reported to the commissioners that Sumter was to be evacuated in five days and asked for a delay of ten days to see the effect of evacuation. Yet Scott's order for the reinforcement of Pickens had been issued three days before and it is hard to believe that this was unknown to Seward.

March 21 Campbell again saw Seward and reported to the commissioners that his "confidence" was "unabated." Three days later the Russian minister reported to Roman that Seward had said that there would be no coercion, no blockade; that he hoped that the states would return, but that, if they persisted, they would be allowed to go in peace. The last statement was in harmony with an editorial which appeared that very day in the *New York Times*, which said that there was a growing senti-

ment in favor of letting the Gulf states go in peace, though the editor did not accept this view, as Horace Greeley had done a few months before.

March 28 was an eventful day—the twenty days delay expired, the Senate adjourned, Scott's order for the reinforcement of Fort Pickens was published, and Lincoln called a meeting of his cabinet to announce to them that Scott advised evacuation. After some discussion it was found that three, Chase, Cameron and Welles, favored relief, while Bates was non-committal, and Smith and Seward favored evacuation. Seward declared that an expedition for relief would provoke an attack and result in war. He thought it not desirable to provoke war at Charleston in attempting to relieve an untenable position. But he advised preparations "for a war at Pensacola and Texas, to be taken, however, only as a consequence of maintaining the possessions and authority of the United States."

After the cabinet adjourned Lincoln issued orders for a relief expedition to be ready April 6. Next day (March 30) Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, telegraphed to ask the reason for the delay in evacuation. When asked about this Seward said that he would have to consult the President and could give no definite reply until Monday, April 1. Meantime (March 31) orders were issued to hurry up the preparations for relief. When Judge Campbell called on Monday Seward wrote that the President might want to supply Sumter, but would not do so without giving notice to Governor Pickens. Personally Seward did not think that relief would be sent. Judge

Campbell then said that it would not be well to give a reply that did not express the purpose of the government. Seward then went to consult the President and on returning wrote: "I am satisfied the government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens."

While what Seward wrote did not expressly say that there had been no change in the policy previously announced by him, evacuation, Campbell certainly left him with that impression. Yet Seward knew that preparations for a relief expedition were being made and he himself had advised measures which would change the "military status" at Fort Pickens. But he now decided to play one more card and (April 1) actually proposed to President Lincoln that they stir up a foreign war as a means of reuniting the country and avoiding a war at home.

By April 4 a final decision was reached for the relief of Fort Sumter. By this time the Confederate commissioners had become suspicious and Judge Campbell sent a note to Seward (April 7) expressing their apprehension. In reply Seward wrote: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see; other suggestions received, and will be respectfully considered." The commissioners were now convinced that a "hostile movement" was on foot and notified the State Department that they would call next day for the long delayed answer to their note of March 12. Seward now delivered his reply, which had been held back since March 15. In this he said that the "events of the last few weeks" did not represent a "rightful

and accomplished revolution and an independent nation, but rather a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to the inconsiderate purpose of an unjustifiable and unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and authority vested in the Federal government'' * * *. For a cure of the evils he looked to a peaceful procedure through regular constitutional channels.

April 8 the first part of the Sumter expedition left New York and Governor Pickens was promptly informed of the event.

The attempt by the United States to provision troops in a fort now claimed by people who held that they represented another nation, naturally was looked upon in the South as conclusive proof that there was no intention to recognize the right of the Confederacy to the fort, and that an attempt would ultimately be made to coerce the states back into the Union. Granting the right of the South to secede, the right to take this fort seems as incontestable as the right of the Americans to drive the British out of Boston in 1776. This right Lincoln denied, Davis affirmed. While the Montgomery cabinet were a unit on the rightfulness of taking Sumter by force, now that peaceful negotiation had failed, they were divided on the wisdom of doing so.

To the argument that this would arouse the North to the fighting point it was replied that it would also bring the other slave states into the Confederacy. But Lincoln was sending supplies and the Confederacy seemed to be left no alternative. When called

on to surrender Major Anderson replied that lack of provisions would force him out in a few days. An order was now issued giving to the authorities in Charleston the decision whether to fire or await starvation. Anderson finally agreed to evacuate by April 15, if in the meantime he did not receive controlling instructions or supplies. The four men sent to make the demand, three South Carolinians and Roger Pryor, a Virginia secessionist, rejected his proposal, Pryor telling his companions that bombardment would bring Virginia into the Confederacy, and at 4:30 a. m., April 12, the first shot was fired. The next day Anderson agreed to evacuate and on the 14th marched out.

The effect was electrical, almost unifying the North on the one hand and the South on the other. April 15, President Lincoln called for 75,000 militia to suppress combinations opposing the execution of the laws and commanding the persons composing such combinations to disperse within twenty days. Four days later he issued another proclamation declaring that an insurrection existed in the seven states composing the Confederacy and proclaimed those states in a condition of blockade.

Here was indisputable proof that force was to be used to coerce the South, something which most of the Unionists in Arkansas had said they would not tolerate. When Governor Rector received notice from Washington that Arkansas was expected to furnish a regiment for this work he replied:

* * * The demand is only adding insult to injury. The people of this commonwealth are freemen, not slaves and will defend to the last extremity their honor, lives and property, against Northern mendacity and usurpation.

Another part of his reply was the sending of a company of militia, commanded by Colonel Solon Borland, to Fort Smith to seize the arsenal there. They arrived April 23, and when they went next day to demand surrender were very much mortified (a private who was there said "gratified") to find that the enemy had fled in the night, taking large quantities of arms and munitions with him!*

The governor's written reply was very pleasing to the Confederate authorities and Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, wrote saying that he presumed that this "patriotic reply" meant that Arkansas was ready to join in repelling the invasion of the South and calling on her for a regiment to defend Virginia, which had passed an ordinance of secession, subject to a popular vote, April 17. Without waiting to see if Arkansas would secede a few individuals tendered their services to the Confederacy, among them Colonel Wm. L. Cabell, who resigned from the United States Army. Colonel T. B. Flournoy, who had refused to secede at Charleston, organized a regiment and was ready to depart for Virginia by the time the convention acted. Others were active in organizing companies for state service.

*On the return trip down the river from this "lark" the members of the company were so hilarious that, according to the owner, they damaged the boat transporting them to the extent of \$500.00.

Before adjourning the legislature had authorized the procuring of arms. Some arms contracted for in New York were reported as seized by the people of Cincinnati, whereupon the people of Helena and Napoleon seized two vessels, the *Mars* and *Ohio Belle*, belonging to the citizens of Cincinnati, to be held until restitution should be made. The retaliatory character of the act is attested by the fact that goods on these vessels belonging to citizens of Chicago were transferred to another vessel and allowed to proceed.

Whilst these things were happening, E. W. Gantt, R. W. Johnson, Robert C. Newton and T. C. Hindman were going about over the state, mainly in the counties where Union sentiment was the strongest, speaking on the "issues of the day" and urging secession. At Searcy Senator Robert W. Johnson denounced the "well drilled forty" who were determined to prevent secession from being submitted to the people. When he spoke at Van Buren, hitherto opposed to secession, the Confederate flag, thirteen * * * for thirteen states (including Kentucky and Missouri) was raised "amid the shouts of the assemblage and the firing of cannon." Soon the cannon were to be fired for a different reason.

Such pressure could hardly have been resisted, had there been any inclination to do so. Besides, the condition which the convention had pledged the state to resist, an attempt to coerce the seceding states, had arisen and President Walker now issued a proclama-

tion summoning the convention to reassemble on May 6.

When the convention reassembled the original secessionists took the lead. Mr. C. W. Adams promptly moved that the committee on ordinances and resolutions be instructed to report an ordinance for immediate and unconditional secession, Mr. W. P. Grace reported it as chairman of the committee, and his colleague, J. Yell, moved its adoption. Mr. A. W. Dinsmore, of Benton, who had opposed hasty action in the first session, offered an amendment providing for submission to the people, but this was voted down 55 to 15.

The motion to adopt the ordinance of secession was now ready to be put and this brings us to what is perhaps the most dramatic incident in this most dramatic period of Arkansas history. A writer of the time tells us that the convention presented a solemn scene. Every member was impressed with the importance of the vote he was about to give and probably realized that he was enacting high tragedy as well as making important history. The hall of the house of representatives was crowded almost to suffocation, the lobby, the gallery, even the floor of the chamber being full, and the vast crowd was excited to the highest pitch. A profound stillness reigned as the roll was being called and the votes recorded, except occasionally when some well known Unionists rose and prefaced his vote by some expressions of stirring Southern sentiments, these calling out loud and prolonged applause. When the

roll call was furnished and the clerk announced the result, 65 to 5, the applause and noise of approbation "shook the building."

The five negative votes were cast by Bolinger and Murphy of Newton, Campbell of Searcy, Gunter of Washington, and Kelley of Pike. President Walker now rose and appealed to these gentlemen to make it unanimous. In the previous session several members, among them Jesse Turner of Crawford and Stillwell of Pulaski, had made it known that they did not believe in the right of secession. Whether their view had changed the writer cannot say. Messrs. Bolinger, Campbell, Gunter and Kelley now changed to the affirmative, saying that they did not believe in the right of secession, but favored the resolution. Isaac Murphy alone remained in opposition. At least one lady in the gallery approved of his stand for when his second and final "no" was uttered she threw him a bouquet of flowers. When the ordinance was signed next day (May 7) considerable influence was brought to bear on him to change over, but he remained steadfast in opposition. However, he retained the confidence and respect of his fellows, remained in the convention to the end and participated in its proceedings, even taking a prominent part.

The convention now quickly finished up this part of its work by repealing the ordinance submitting the question of "co-operation" or "secession" to popular vote, ratifying the provisional constitution of the Confederacy and electing delegates to the new gov-

ernment. Eight members, Messrs. Bolinger, Campbell, Dinsmore, Gunter, Fishback, Murphy, Turner, and Walker voted against ratification, holding that it should be submitted to the people. Messrs. Robert W. Johnson, A. H. Garland, Albert Rust, H. F. Thomason, and W. W. Watkins were elected delegates to the Confederate Congress. Only the first was an original secessionist.

Virginia had already preceded Arkansas in seceding. Tennessee followed two days later in a somewhat irregular way and North Carolina elected a convention which seceded May 20. All were promptly admitted to the Confederacy. The next problem was that of defense.

Why did Arkansas secede? We have seen that the convention refused to follow Governor Rector when he appealed for secession on the ground that the institution of slavery was in danger; we have also seen that a majority of the people of Arkansas could have had no interest in slavery, not being slaveholders, but when President Lincoln called on Arkansas to furnish troops to coerce the people of the lower South and bring them back into the Union most of the anti-secessionist gave in and said that, forced to make a choice, they would not fight the people of the South, who were closer kin to them than the men of the North and who, they felt, were fighting for principles which they held dear. Let the reader, whatever his views on the wisdom and rightfulness of secession, ask what he would have done, had he been placed in a similar position.

CHAPTER VIII

PREPARING FOR DEFENSE

Arkansas had hesitated to secede, partly because of her exposure to attack on the west from the Indian country and on the north from Missouri, if that state did not secede. In the course of the war she was invaded from all quarters except the southwest.

We have seen that the legislature passed a new militia bill and that numerous military companies were being organized during the winter. We have also seen that the Federal arsenals at Little Rock and Fort Smith were seized, and that Brigadier-General N. B. Burrow, of the Third Arkansas Brigade, First Division of the Arkansas Militia, was ordered to get his forces in readiness, all before the convention had met for its second session. Also, before the convention met the Confederate government called on Arkansas for a regiment for the defense of Virginia and the call was answered by volunteers raised by Colonel T. B. Flournoy.

As soon as secession was voted Edmund Burgevin, Adjutant-General, directed Lieutenant-Colonel Jere R. Kannady to supersede General Burrow at Fort Smith, having in mind the defense of the northwest, and particularly charged him to avoid waste and corruption. But the convention, instead of going home and leaving the military problem to the state government, decided to remain in session and assume the general management of affairs. Possibly this was



ST. JOHN'S SCHOOL

due to the influence of the Johnson faction in the convention, Governor Rector being of the opposition. However, the governor accepted the situation and upon an invitation to "communicate any views" he might desire to submit, sent in a message giving a few facts and some recommendations. He informed the convention that the supply of arms consisted of "10,000 stand of infantry, cavalry service for one regiment, with thirty pieces of artillery, all told—the latter generally of small calibre, and many pieces unfit for service." He advised that efforts be renewed to secure more arms, at least to the amount of the unexpended balance from the appropriation of the legislature, \$63,045.74. He also turned in Adjutant-General Burgevin's report on the militia and his suggestions for the defense of the northwest and himself advised that five regiments be called out of the volunteer companies and brought to Little Rock for training. Some of these were already uniformed and well drilled, while others were poorly equipped and had had little training. The same in general was true of the militia. The untrained should be held in reserve in training for emergencies. If not given training before being sent to the field, the most serious disasters would follow. The troops should be turned over to the Confederacy as soon as possible to avoid expense to the state.

But the convention seems to have paid little attention to anybody's ideas but its own. It decided that there should be two divisions, western and eastern, with a brigadier-general in charge of each. It

then elected General N. B. Pearce, a graduate of West Point, to take charge of the western division, and Thomas H. Bradley, a member of the convention, for the eastern, and the president of the convention was directed to commission them. General Pearce was directed by the convention to take charge of the forces in the west, with headquarters at Fort Smith, and organize them and to co-operate with General Ben McCulloch, of Texas, who had been sent by the Confederate government to defend the Indian country. The convention also directed that 2,500 stand of arms and one battery be placed at his disposal out of the arsenal, and a committee was appointed to see that this was done.

The next thing was to create a military board consisting of the governor as chairman and two advisors to be elected by the convention. This board was given full military power, subject to the order of the convention and subsequent acts of the legislature. The sum of \$2,000,000 was appropriated for its use and it was authorized to call out 30,000 men, and, if necessary, "the whole force of the state." A subsequent amendment provided that the advisers should hold four years, if the war should continue beyond the term of the present governor.

Provisions were now made for the "Army of Arkansas." It must have one major-general and the other necessary subordinate officers, the general officers to be elected by the convention and commissioned by the president. The army should be composed of volunteers from the militia. If the militia failed to

respond in sufficient numbers, then the military board was authorized to draft such numbers of them as were needed. The militia was declared to consist of "all able-bodied free white male inhabitants having a residence of ten days" in the state, eighteen to forty-five years of age, or in case of extreme danger, sixteen to sixty. When the President of the Confederacy should call for volunteers, the military board was to call for volunteers by companies, regiments, or brigades, as the case might be, from the Army of Arkansas; if not enough responded, then they should call for volunteers from among the militia; if not enough from the militia volunteered, then the board should draft the necessary number from either or both sources.

Governor Rector beheld these proceedings with uneasiness. When General Pearce resigned from the militia and began to issue orders in his new capacity the governor called on him to show his authority. Of course he cited the ordinance of the convention and his election. Governor Rector now told the convention that the constitution made him commander-in-chief of the military forces and directed him to issue commissions, and that the convention, in assuming these powers, was violating the constitution. However, the country was in danger and, in order to avoid friction for the brief time until the army should enter the service of the Confederacy, he would yield on points of law and co-operate with it so long as it was possible to preserve his self-respect, his own manhood, and the liberties and constitutional rights

of the people. The only response of the convention was to suspend so much of the constitution as was in conflict with its actions.

The election of James Yell as major-general, of Captains C. C. Danley and B. C. Totten, of Prairie, as advisers on the military board*, and of Albert Pike as commissioner to the Indian tribes, completed the major part of the work of the convention on military affairs. Several efforts were made before adjournment to get an ordinance passed directing the military board to call General Yell into active service, but all of these failed. However, as long as the convention was in session it kept its hand in military affairs, sometimes dealing with petty matters of administration. One day it approved the account for the expenses of the first regiment, Colonel James F. Fagan†, which was ordered to Virginia; another ordered certain stores to be given to Churchill's troops out of the arsenal and charged to the Confederacy; another referred to the military board Hindman's telegrams—his first one asking for an immediate reply was ignored for four days—asking if the convention would allow \$10,000 to pay for clothing and supplies for troops he was raising at Helena for the Confederacy, the payment to be in the nature of a loan to the Confederacy until the troops were mustered in.

*While on the way to Memphis, intending to go from there to Richmond on official business, Captain Danley received injuries from which he never recovered. He was succeeded on the board by L. W. Williams who, when he became colonel of a regiment, was in turn succeeded by L. D. Hill.

†Colonel Flournoy had expected to be elected to command this regiment, which he was largely instrumental in raising, but was disappointed.

Before adjourning the convention saw a little of the fruits of its policy of electing officers. As noted above, it had elected Thomas H. Bradley, one of its own members over sixty years of age, and wealthy, brigadier-general of the eastern district. When he went to take charge near Memphis the troops refused to have him and asked that Colonel P. R. Cleburne be appointed in his place. Cleburne's account of the behavior of the soldiers was not complimentary, saying that they had returned in haste from Bearsfield Point, abandoning a picked party of scouts and a quantity of material with no enemy nearer than Cairo, thereby making the whole army the laughing stock of the Tennesseans. Bradley announced that he was coming to Little Rock to demand an investigation, but the telegrams were all buried by being placed on the calendar.

It was unfortunate that the first days should be marked by conflicting counsels and confusion of voices, but this situation was by no means peculiar to Arkansas or even to the South. The convention out of the way, the military board could now begin to function, but this was not the end of its troubles. General Pearce had already issued a call for troops from Fort Smith. The board now issued a call for 10,000 volunteers for a year in the state service and then set about finding provisions and equipment. Immediately following this came a call by General McCulloch for the entire military force of the state to volunteer for the Confederate service. Both were published in the newspapers throughout the state.

This piqued Governor Rector, but he said nothing. However, when he issued another call (September 5) and this was followed five days later by another from McCulloch, that was too much for him and he wrote the Secretary of War that this was a violation of states' rights, such as had never been perpetrated by the United States; even Lincoln had called on him, not on the people, for troops. Surely the state had not lost any of its rights by withdrawing from the United States and joining the Confederacy. Apart from policy and law, said he, this practice was "attended with discordant effort, confusion, contrariety of opinion, unsatisfactory results, and great waste and improvidence in expending the resources of the country." If McCulloch should raise the troops needed, then those responding to his call would have to be disbanded, having been called out at a needless expense to the state. Other Confederate officers of lesser rank were engaging in the same practice. Hereafter he hoped that the Confederacy would address its appeals for troops to the proper authorities. Irresponsible recruiting now declined—the Confederacy refused the requests of several for permission to raise regiments—but did not entirely disappear for a while. A few raised commands and then marched them out unarmed and asked for commissions.

The response to the call for men was prompt and hearty. Soon the recruiting stations about over the state were pouring men into Little Rock for training at the arsenal camp. The board was at once confronted with a difficulty which remained to the end

of the war, that of procuring arms. Some of the men brought their ancient fowling pieces, but many were without any arms whatever. The people were then asked to bring in their guns and when this failed to bring the desired results requisitions were issued for them.

But the end of the convention was not the end of confusion and bickering. The bringing together of large numbers of troops without any previous preparation to take care of them will always result in confusion and suffering. Grumbling over the "tardiness and inefficiency of the officers in command" was loud and constant. Charges of favoritism and nepotism were freely bandied about until a council of officers was called at Camp Walker (Benton county) to investigate the charges against General Pearce, but they gave him a clean bill of health. The complaints of the soldiers against Ben T. Duval, paymaster, were also loud, but he showed clearly that the delay was not his fault. Rather it was the fault of "the system."

Volunteers for the Confederacy were required to furnish their own clothing, for which they were to receive an allowance when mustered in. In spite of the fact that this had been published widely, many went into service under the impression that the government was to furnish them at once. Besides, the recruiting took place in the spring and summer when the men felt little need for clothing. But by September, with cool weather coming on, they began to feel the need and to realize that they were practically

without any. Hundreds of the men were barefoot. Naturally such conditions produced discontent. A private writing from Camp Frank Rector shortly after the battle of Wilson's Creek, declared that the men wanted to be off for "Home, sweet home," they wanted their pay and discharge, especially the latter and did not want to be trifled with by officers placed over them by the "Universally obnoxious military board."

In his second call for troops (September 10), asking Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas each to send five regiments for three years or the war, General McCulloch promised two suits of winter clothes, two blankets, and tents, if they could be had, but as a precaution he advised the bringing of clothes. Major Clarke, quartermaster, now called upon the citizens for clothes. In response a mass meeting was held at the courthouse in Van Buren and this recommended that the people in each township organize for efficient action in furnishing material for clothing and making clothes for the soldiers. Mr. James E. Woolsey, of Crawford county, furnished each member of a whole company of volunteers with a pair of shoes.

In spite of all the criticism and working at cross purposes the success in raising troops was noteworthy. By the end of the year the state had 21,500 men in the field, or nearly half the voters of 1860. Her ratio of troops to her population was exceeded by only two states, South Carolina and Virginia.

For more than a year the question of transferring the state troops to the Confederacy was a vexatious

one. Governor Rector desired to save the state the expense of keeping the troops in the field and for that reason favored transfer. Yet he feared that, once transferred, they would be taken across the Mississippi river, thereby stripping the state of its defenders, and for that reason he opposed transfer. June 21 the Confederate government commissioned Dandridge McRae to go to the northwest and swear in the men, but Pearce would not allow him to read his order or the men to be sworn in. At this time the men were said to be willing to make the transfer. After consultation with General Wm. J. Hardee, whom the Confederate War Department assigned to the command of the "Upper District of Arkansas" with headquarters at Pittman's Ferry, the military board (July 15) signed an agreement authorizing the transfer, provided the troops voted for it. The transfer was to include the use and control of the arms, munitions, etc., but Arkansas was to receive them or their equivalent back at the end of the war. The board further agreed to furnish the soldiers with clothing, for which the Confederacy was to compensate the state.

But the transfer was not easily effected. Hindman declared that Adjutant-General Burgevin and General James Yell and N. B. Burrow did all in their power to defeat the plan. Captain C. C. Danley, a member of the military board and editor of the *Gazette*, criticised Burgevin so severely for his conduct in this matter that he received a challenge for a duel, delivered in person by Governor Rector, who thus

violated the law he had taken an oath to enforce, but nothing came of it. Danley wrote to L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, that he had intended going to Richmond, but was detained by "the distressing intelligence of the entire disbandment of our troops on the western frontier by General Pearce, and the dangerous predicament in which General McCulloch was placed by that unprecedented act. Governor Rector also blamed Pearce and declared that his conduct deserved "the severest reprehension."

The private quoted above wrote: "Hindman will address us in a day or two on the importance of remaining in the service and of allowing ourselves to be transferred, like so many cattle, to the Confederate service. He will be very eloquent and will appeal to sentiment, but we understand the matter and he will do well to get a company instead of a regiment to join Hardee's forces at Pittman's Ferry." Here is to be found a part of the cause for refusal to transfer. They were unwilling to go to Hardee, partly, no doubt, because he had refused to co-operate with McCulloch and Pearce, but more because they were unwilling to go off and leave their home country exposed. They might stay with McCulloch, but they would not go to Hardee.

Pearce's account of his part in the affair differs from that of Governor Rector, and Hindman sided with him in the controversy. He (Pearce) says the main trouble was due to the fact that the transfer was left to the vote of the soldiers, not made mandatory. The order was received two days after the bat-

tle of Oak Hills (Wilson's Creek) and Hardee had no agent there to receive them. After consultation with McCulloch, who had no authority to receive them, he decided to march back to Arkansas, and sent a messenger to Little Rock urging the board to make the order mandatory. On the way to Camp Walker he met Hindman, Hardee's agent. The board declined to make any change and ordered Pearce to carry out the original instructions. He then got Hindman to address the troops several times ("very eloquent"), and he himself tried by appeals and orders to induce the men to enter the Confederate service.

All to no purpose. The men had been in the service three to five months and had never received a cent of pay or any clothing. And when the board said that they could honorably leave the service, being "naked and barefooted," they decided to go home. "We are as good Southern men as any persons. We have fought the enemy, and driven him away; we are needy and will go home, and when another call is made, we will have clothes and shoes, and will again do battle for the South." All of 3,000 except about 20 went home. They also carried their arms with them intending to keep them until paid by the state, but Totten, of the military board, arrived just in time to save most of these. The 600 loaned to Pearce's men were not returned. The men were not merely "holiday soldiers who happened to be at Oak Hills." According to promise they later entered the

service. Pearce hastened to Richmond to clear himself.

As for the eastern division, mention has already been made of the fact that General Yell told his men to go home. They went and two or three hundred others went with them. Hindman says that the other four regiments were transferred to the Confederacy only by his hurrying to their camps and mustering them in before Burgevin could arrive. Many of those who went home from Pocahontas entered the service later.

The Confederacy managed to get through the first year of the war with volunteers, but as the expiration of the term of enlistment for the twelve months' men was approaching and it was clear that many of them would not remain and that their places would not be filled by volunteers Congress passed a conscription act in time to catch 148 companies (April 16, 1862). All white males 18 to 35 years of age were declared subject to the President's call for military duty for three years, unless entitled to exemption. Certain privileges were allowed those who enlisted within thirty days. The President might employ state officers to carry out the conscription, if available, or he might use Confederate officers.

The idea of using state militia instead of turning everything over to a national army died hard in the South. In fact, it never died and in some states produced some very baneful results. The idea was still strong in Arkansas and a few weeks before Congress passed the above mentioned act the legislature passed

(March, 1862) a new militia bill abolishing the old system and relieving the officers of the same and providing for enrollment by civil townships of all males 18 to 45 years of age and for a system of drafting them into the service when necessary so as to equalize the number in service in proportion to the population. All persons coming into the state must secure a permit, or enroll in five days. Provision was also made for auditing the accounts by civil instead of military officers. The sum of \$75,000 was appropriated to carry the law into effect.

As soon as the legislature adjourned Governor Rector vetoed the militia bill and approved the appropriation bill. The latter had specified that the money was to be used for the "present" militia system, meaning the new one. After the veto the "present" system was the old one and Governor Rector proceeded to use the funds for this, much to the disgust of the "Johnson family," who had put through the other bill partly to legislate some of the governor's friends out of office.

How the conscription law was put into effect in Arkansas will be brought out later.* It will then appear that Governor Rector's fear that the state would be stripped of defenders was well nigh justified by the events, but it does not necessarily follow that all his opposition to putting the men into a unified system under Confederate control was equally justified. The idea that the state could be best defended on its own soil was an obsession common to

*Below, p. 99f.

several governors, especially to Governor Brown, of Georgia, who was far from the field of action. While this spirit had a strong hold in Arkansas, the military board on the whole co-operated with the Confederacy, responding heartily to its calls. The opposition never was as severe and prolonged as in some of the other states. It may be added that in 1864, more than three times as many Arkansans were serving east of the Mississippi river as were serving in Arkansas.

Aside from the taking of the troops out of the state there were two other objections to the conscription law. The first was that it did not allow the creation of new regiments, which would have furnished berths for more officers. The second was the exemption provision. As first passed the law exempted Confederate and state officials and their clerks, mail carriers and ferrymen on post roads; pilots and employees engaged in railroad and river transportation; telegraph operators; ministers regularly engaged; employees in mines, furnaces and foundries; printers; teachers having twenty pupils or more; employees in public hospitals and insane asylums; and one pharmacist in each drug store. The Secretary of War was allowed to exempt superintendents and workers in wool and cotton factories.

The reason for these exemptions it is easy to see. It is also easy to see why the vocations included suddenly became popular among those averse to military service. Apothecaries became numerous and the teaching profession was crowded. Salary was no

consideration now and sometimes pupils were paid to come when the necessary twenty could not be secured otherwise. People offered \$50 to \$500 for clerkships in postoffices or position as postmaster in some remote place. Some even received sudden calls to preach. These schemes for evasion occurred for the most part in other states, but some evasions were practiced in Arkansas.

Now one of the prime essentials for war is food, yet no exemptions had been provided for planters. A propaganda program for their relief was carried on through the spring and summer and the act of October 11 was passed for their benefit. Naturally other classes strove for exemption and some editors even declared that to conscript them would be a violation of the freedom of the press guaranteed in the Constitution! The additional exemptions covered a list of vocations too long for enumeration here, but the "twenty nigger" law must be mentioned. This exempted one white man on each plantation having twenty negroes or more. Another class was salt-makers making twenty pounds or more per day. Some effort was made to tighten up on some of the classes, teachers now being required to have had two years' experience in teaching and physicians five years of practice before being exempt.

The "twenty nigger" law was particularly odious to men in the army and to the small farmers, because it exempted the very class that they thought should be doing the fighting. One man in Arkansas who had been prominent in the secession movement and

had secured a brigadier-generalship, but had been captured, is said to have denounced the conscript law on his release from prison and then to have bought a plantation and twenty negroes. He certainly did not serve the Confederacy any more, but took the oath of allegiance to the United States. Criticism of the law led to its modification (May 1, 1863) to include only the plantations of minors, dependents, and men in the service. An overseer who had served as such a year before the passage of the law might be exempt, provided the owner of the plantation paid \$500 into the public treasury.

When the law was passed (May 1) the crops for the year were well under way. To save them and to keep the negroes under control the operation of the law was held up when seemingly necessary and temporary exemptions were granted overseers until fall.

Another cause of odium was the fact that many of the exempts engaged in speculation. Cotton growing and trading with the enemy became very profitable and popular with some exempts and a source of loud complaint in Arkansas. As a precautionary measure to keep up the food supply the legislature of Arkansas (1862) imposed a tax of \$30 a bale on cotton and limited the amount of land that might be planted in cotton to two acres per hand under penalties ranging from \$500 to \$1,000. Though the law was not very strict, as persons under fourteen years of age were not counted, it seems to have had some effect, for in September the *True Democrat* estimated that 50,000 acres formerly devoted to cotton

had been planted in corn. As a further precaution for the saving of food and against the evils of drunkenness the legislature prohibited the distillation of any kind of grain or potatoes into spirituous liquors during the continuance of the war. Violators were subject to fines of not less than \$500 and imprisonment for not less than one month.

In the summer of 1862 President Lincoln appointed a military governor of Arkansas with the purpose of restoring a loyal government in the state. When the legislature elected that year met in regular session in November, in order to discourage any such movement, it passed a somewhat stringent sedition act. This provided that anyone giving aid and comfort to the enemy, counseling or conspiring to restore a government loyal to the United States, giving information to the enemy, or acting as guide, should be liable to the death penalty in some cases, in others to imprisonment in the penitentiary for from five to twenty years. Trading with the enemy was forbidden under penalty of fines ranging from \$1,000 to \$10,000.

Throughout the war arms and ammunition were more or less scarce in all the South, especially in the Trans-Mississippi Department. The seizure of arms belonging to the United States netted about 10,000 stand, but they were old and of little value. Arkansas had practically no manufactures of this sort at the opening of the war and her exposed condition made it very difficult to get any from the east after the fall of Vicksburg. At the opening of the war

the railroad shops at Hopefield, opposite Memphis, were turned into an armory for altering and repairing guns, but the capture of Memphis broke this up. The arsenal at Little Rock had no machinery for the manufacture of arms, but it was fitted up for repair work and several guns abandoned by Captain Totten when he surrendered the arsenal were repaired and some that were being used as posts "saw service" in the field. The penitentiary was turned into a factory for the manufacture of carriages, caissons, wagons, boots, shoes, clothing, etc., for the army. By the end of November, 1862, the superintendent reported 3,000 suits of clothing, 8,000 pairs of shoes, 250 wagons, 100 sets of wagon and artillery harness, 500 drums, 200 tents, 600 knapsacks, 500 cartridge boxes. But for the blockade he would have been able to produce much more.

After the fall of Little Rock (September 10, 1863) the manufacture of munitions was carried on to some extent in the southwestern part of the state. By this time the greater part of the work was done by the Confederate government, which established branches of its ordnance department at Camden, Arkadelphia, and Washington. At Arkadelphia haversacks, knapsacks, bullets, powder and cartridge boxes were made. The raw material was often hard to get. Until they were captured by the enemy lead was secured from the lead mines of Missouri and northern Arkansas. Saltpeter was also obtained from this region and from Pike, Polk, and Montgomery counties. Paper for making cartridges was scarce, so scarce even before

the fall of Little Rock that the archives in the state-house were used for this purpose. The Confederate government collected hides around Camden and Washington, had them tanned, and sent shoemakers to make shoes for the soldiers. The legislature authorized the taking of the carpets from the floor of the statehouse for blankets.

There was a cotton and woolen factory at Van Buren, another in Pope county, a cotton factory in Washington county and one near Murfreesboro, Pike county (which the Confederates took particular care to guard), but most of the cloth seems to have been woven on looms in the homes. Prizes were offered for the women who would weave the most. But cards were difficult to secure. In 1862 the legislature appropriated \$300,000 to encourage the manufacture of salt, iron, and cotton cards. The governor was to loan sums to applicants to be repaid with interests at six per cent in installments extending over six years. If a factory was erected on public lands, the owner should receive a deed to not more than 160 acres. In September, 1864, Governor Flanagin reported no applications had been made for any of this fund and very likely none was ever received, but in August, 1864, one factory for the manufacture of cotton and wool cards was in operation in Columbia county. However, it was so hampered by a scarcity of labor that the legislature requested General Kirby Smith, on application of the proprietor, to detail such persons from the military service as might be

necessary to keep it going. This was allowed under the conscription law.

But this was not enough and the legislature authorized the governor to buy and sell, at such prices as he saw fit, cotton and wool cards, drugs and medicines and appropriated in 1864 \$35,000 in specie out of the fund to pay interest on war bonds, and the internal improvement, seminary, saline, common school and swamp funds to carry on the business. Fearing that this would not meet the needs they authorized the governor to buy and sell cotton (through Mexico), and use the proceeds to buy machinery for the manufacture of these articles of prime necessity. He was further authorized to carry on the manufacturing on the account of the state and to fix the price of the articles and was given \$1,000,000 for the business. But the business never materialized.

It is very difficult to find out the details about how the war was financed, but most of the essential facts can easily be given. Before adjourning the legislature of 1860-61 appropriated \$100,000 to buy arms. When the convention met the specie in the treasury amounted to \$216,277.74. While secession was pending the state government seized all the United States property within the state, including the public lands. The value of these properties cannot be given, but the arsenals, about 10,000 stand of arms, some ammunition, and money in the hands of receivers, amounting to about \$250,000, constituted about all on which anything was realized. The

last named was used to pay obligations of the United States to citizens of Arkansas and to carry on the postal service.

Following the precedent set in Revolutionary days the convention confiscated debts due to citizens of the United States, excepting the border slave states; also, the property of such citizens situated in Arkansas, though a few special exceptions were made. W. M. Fishback presented a strong report against confiscation as contrary to international law and B. C. Totten, who owned some property in the North, tried to prevent the passage of the ordinance, fearing retaliation. It is impossible to tell how much was realized from this source, but it did not amount to much, if any.

Bonds and taxes were a better source of funds. A bond issue of \$2,000,000 bearing 8 per cent interest was authorized. In order that the bonds might be used as currency they were issued in denominations ranging from \$5.00 to \$500.00. The auditor was also authorized to issue treasury warrants bearing 8 per cent interest when there was no money in the treasury to pay sums due. The moneys collected and to be collected from the various sources were to be thrown into the military chest, saving enough to pay for executed contracts. For the year 1862 a tax of one-third of one per cent was levied on all objects of taxation in addition to the sums then being collected and a supplemental tax of one-sixth of one per cent was levied for the year 1861. For the years 1861 and 1862 an income tax of 10 per cent was

levied on the net incomes of all persons subject to taxation. A motion was made for an additional tax of \$15 on every slave over five and under fifty years of age, but this was tabled 41 to 17. Counties were authorized to tax for war purposes. Petitions were presented asking that the families of soldiers be exempted from taxation, but the convention refused to grant this.

The Confederate war tax in Arkansas, levied on the basis of assessed valuation, amounted to \$750,-000. The legislature which met in November, 1861, recognized this tax and tried to facilitate its collection, but up to the close of 1862 only \$400,-000 had been collected. How much, if any, was collected after that it is hard to tell, but a good deal of cotton appears to have been accumulated under the tithe or ten per cent produce tax. Prominent people, such as A. H. Garland and Judge E. H. English, went up and down the state (1861) speaking for the Confederate produce loan and taking subscriptions in cotton.

With the transfer of the troops to the Confederacy the reason for a good part of the state expenditures was gone and the legislature now abolished the convention war tax, took steps to encourage the circulation of Arkansas bonds and treasury notes and, the next spring, backed these bonds and warrants with the public lands, but forbade (November, 1862) the issuance of any more bonds. However, a second issue must have been authorized, for the auditor reported \$700,000 of the bonds still subject to order in Au-

gust, 1864, after an expenditure of \$1,691,609.34, apparently from the bond sales. Evidently the legislature was for economy for, instead of increasing taxes, as usually happens in war, it gave us the remarkable example of suspending the collection of state taxes (December, 1862) until further notice and ordered the refunding of those already paid.

Both the state war bonds and the Confederate currency soon began to depreciate. Some patriotic merchants announced that they would receive the war bonds from soldiers at par, but this did not help the families of soldiers who had the same kind of currency. In 1864 collectors were required by the legislature to receive Confederate currency at the value fixed by Congress and Arkansas war bonds and treasury warrants were made receivable for county taxes. To meet the need for small change the legislature authorized (December, 1862) the issuance of treasury warrants in denominations ranging from 25 cents to \$5.00.

CHAPTER IX

OAK HILLS, OR WILSON'S CREEK

The problem of defense in the northwest soon became a vital one. The state convention of Missouri, Sterling W. Price, president, had refused to secede, but Governor Jackson was determined to take the state into the Confederacy, especially after Lincoln's call for troops. Certain loyal citizens were equally determined to prevent this and began war on the governor and his legislature. Price had hoped for neutrality, but, when he saw that this was impossible, cast in his lot with Jackson and the Confederacy. For safety he and Governor Jackson retreated southward, Brigadier-General Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Sigel in pursuit. It was now clear that the latter had two objectives, to destroy the Jackson government, or drive it out of the state, and capture the lead mines of Missouri and Arkansas.

June 26 Brigadier-General Ben. McCulloch, who had brought up some troops from Texas and Louisiana and had been joined by Brigadier-General N. B. Pearce with his Arkansas troops, issued a proclamation calling on the people of Arkansas to rally to her defense. The troops at Fort Smith had already been put in training camps at Elm Springs, Camp Walker, and Osage Mills in Washington and Benton counties. July 4 McCulloch and Pearce left Camp Walker with Colonel T. J. Churchill's Confederate cavalry, Colonel John R. Gratiot's Arkansas infantry, Colonel Charles A. Carroll's cavalry, and Colonel W. E.

Woodruff's battery and hastened northward to help out Jackson and Price. By forced marches they reached Neosho the same day, where Churchill captured 108 men and 130 small arms (one account says 137 men and 150 arms) and several wagons of supplies which Sigel had left there to protect the loyal citizens. The next day Sigel was defeated by Price in a battle at Carthage.

The combined forces of Price, McCulloch and Pearce now amounted to about 11,000. Of these Price had raised 6,500, but it was a motley crowd, of whom 2,000 were unarmed. In fact, the army needed almost everything necessary for a campaign or a battle. Brigadier-General William J. Hardee had been sent to Arkansas by the Confederate government and was then stationed at Pittman's Ferry, near the Missouri line, and was expected to co-operate, but he refused, saying that he "did not wish to march to their assistance with less than 5,000 men, well appointed, and a full complement of artillery." Now Hardee was a tactician and, had he come up, probably would have wanted to spend several months in drilling the Missourians and then go into winter quarters.

The accounts of what happened with regard to unity of command vary. A good many believed that there was friction over the right to command and that McCulloch, moved by contempt for the "mob" of Missourians*, refused to co-operate unless given the

*In spite of, possibly because of, lack of discipline, Price's troops were devoted to him, referring to him affectionately as "Old Pap."

supreme command. One writer said that Price was a civilian who had resigned from Congress to enter the Mexican War where he rose to the rank of "brigadier-general when McCulloch was only a captain of scouts, and had won more battles than McCulloch had ever witnessed," but he wanted to fight, not drill, and that he and Pearce, who had loaned him 1,000 arms for his unarmed men, yielded to McCulloch.

That they differed over the right to command seems to have been very generally believed at the time, yet General Pearce, writing thirty years later, declared that the day they went into Cassville (July 29) he went to Price's tent and told him that they were likely to meet the enemy soon and ought to have unity of command, that he was willing to serve under either Price or McCulloch†, but wanted a definite head. Price agreed with him and suggested that they go to see McCulloch. On finding McCulloch, Price informed him of what Pearce had said, and, without waiting for any reply, told him that, although he as major-general (of Missouri) outranked him, a brigadier-general, he and Pearce would, in compliment to the Confederacy, serve under him. McCulloch, says Pearce, who knew nothing of this before, now thanked them for the offer and accepted it.

The accounts of what followed also vary. The armies all marched toward Springfield to meet Lyon.

†The convention had ordered him to co-operate with McCulloch as a subordinate.

At Dug Springs General James S. Rains encountered and drove back the advance guard of the enemy, after which Lyon returned to Springfield. The armies then continued their march to Wilson's creek. Here it is generally agreed that the commanders spent three days in discussing, some say wrangling over, the question of making an attack, Price and Pearce urging it, McCulloch refusing. McCulloch's reason for his position was that he did not want to advance without some knowledge of Lyon's numbers and position. How he expected to get this knowledge it would be hard to say, for he seems not to have sent out any spies or scouting parties. On the afternoon of the third day (August 9) it came to him unsought when two ladies of Springfield, who had secured passes through the Federal lines and evaded the Federal pickets by a detour by Pond's Springs, came into the Confederate camp. They gave all the information needed and McCulloch then issued orders to march at 9 p. m. The intervening time was spent in preparations, special attention being given to the moulding of bullets and the making of cartridges.

Before 9 o'clock it began to rain and McCulloch now issued orders for the soldiers to rest on their arms and keep their powder dry until further orders. When the original order for the march was given General Rains called in his pickets and, through somebody's negligence, they were not sent out again when the march was delayed. As the rain continued no further orders for marching were given and the soldiers slept on their arms. A great many citizens of

Confederate sympathies who had fled from their homes on the advance of the Federals were now following in the wake of McCulloch's army, hoping to return home. This, together with the fact that many of the soldiers had no uniforms or arms, made it easy for Union sympathizers to enter the Confederate lines. Through such spies Lyon was informed of McCulloch's order to march within a few hours after it was issued. Lyon had previously called a council of war and had told his officers that they would have to evacuate Springfield before a superior force (22,000 was his estimate), but favored giving battle first that they might retreat in greater safety. All concurred with him and a united attack was agreed upon by all except Brigadier-General Franz Sigel, who seemed anxious to have a separate command. He had studied European tactics and, in a long, private interview, finally prevailed upon Lyon to give him the command and make a divided attack. Orders for the march were now issued. The plan was excellent, but the execution was wretched, owing to the defection of the one who proposed it.

Leaving Springfield at 5 p. m. Lyon marched until 1 a. m., when he came in sight of Rains' camp fires. Sigel left Springfield about 6 o'clock, following the Fayetteville road, and, making a detour, turned the Confederate right opposite the brigades of Churchill and E. Greer just across the creek. They, like Rains, had drawn in their pickets and knew nothing of what was going on. Pickets were sent out from Rains' brigade shortly after Lyon's arrival.

When they returned and reported the enemy in front Colonel Hunter was sent forward with 300 men to find out what this meant. While the commander was forming the rest of his men on the northern slope of what came to be known as "Bloody Hill," Hunter was seen falling back. After a brisk skirmish with Lyon the brigade fell back to the southern slope.

The Confederates were now between Lyon on their left and Sigel on their right, and, except for Rains' command, in utter ignorance of their presence. Sigel now took precautions to keep them in ignorance. Posting four of his guns on a hill commanding Churchill's camp and leaving a small body of infantry to support them he crossed Wilson's creek just below the mouth of Tyrrell's creek with the rest of his command and waited for the signal gun from Lyon.

Rains, who was on the east side of the creek, though his command was on the west, had become uneasy and sent Colonel Snyder out to reconnoiter. Up to this time neither Price nor McCulloch knew that Lyon had left Springfield. When Snyder came rushing back and reported the enemy advancing 20,000 strong with 100 pieces of artillery (a considerable exaggeration) McCulloch said that this was "one of Rains' scares" and that he would go to the front presently. But he had hardly said this when he looked up and saw a panic stricken horde rushing toward him and heard a tremendous noise.

The first noise was the roar of Totten's guns, the same Totten who had evacuated the arsenal at Little Rock six months before, firing on the fleeing crowd, and this was immediately followed by Sigel's guns which opened on Churchill's and Greer's camps. McCulloch had ordered the refugee civilians to remain a mile or more in the rear, but they had not obeyed this order. These terrified civilians were now fleeing for safety, a perfectly natural and proper thing to do. Unfortunately, in fleeing through the soldiers, they threw them into confusion, but there was little difficulty in bringing them back into order as soon as the civilians were out of the way.

The battle of Oak Hills, or Wilson's Creek, had begun and the Confederates were caught unaware between the forces of Lyon and Sigel. The Federal plan was excellent, Lyon to destroy the left wing, Sigel the right, and at first all went well. Lyon was driving back Rains' brigade and Sigel was advancing through the camps of Churchill and Greer whose men had fled under the fire of his guns.

But the Confederates soon brought order out of chaos. McCulloch and Colonel James McIntosh now hurried to the east to deal with Sigel, leaving Price to meet Lyon. Price hastened to "Bloody Hill" and checked the retreat of Cawthorn's brigade, holding it under the crest of the hill and out of the range of Totten's guns until he could bring up reinforcements. He soon had 3,100 men, including Colonel H. Guibor's battery, in line. In this he was greatly assisted by Woodruff who had hastily posted his battery on

the bluff east of the ford whence he fired upon Lyon and held him in check while Price brought up his Missourians.

The battle was now assuming some of the aspects of tragic drama. Captain Totten had left Little Rock only a few months before when forced to evacuate the arsenal and had come away without his family. Here now was Colonel Woodruff training on him some of the guns he had been forced to leave at Little Rock and they were manned in part by men Totten had trained.

In this part of the field the Confederates outnumbered the Federals, but they were much more poorly equipped. As the majority of Price's men were armed with shotguns—some had no arms at all—but were protected by underbrush, he decided to await the attack of Lyon. The lines were only 300 yards apart and he soon heard the order, "Forward" on the enemy's side. It was now rifles against shotguns, battery against battery, Kansans and Missourians against Missourians, Arkansans, Louisianans, Texans, and a few Indians. For hours the battle raged, a veritable battle of the states, one side advancing to fire then falling back to reload and come again, the other doing likewise.

Meantime things were happening on the east side of the creek. Sigel had left the frontal attack to Plummer and had posted his Germans on the Fayetteville road to cut off retreat. The army was to be destroyed. McCulloch now disposed his forces to prevent this disaster, placing a battery here, sending

a regiment there as occasion required. Reid's battery was placed on a bluff and Colonel J. D. Walker's regiment sent to support it. When Woodruff was hard pressed Gratiot was sent to support him, while McIntosh was sent with his own regiment, the third Louisiana, and Colonel Dandridge McRae's battalion to meet the Federals swinging out east from the creek. Pushing through a dense thicket to a corn field McIntosh found them behind a rail fence. It was Plummer's battalion of United States regulars, supported by some home guards, but he soon drove them back across the creek.

Meantime Sigel had advanced through the camps from which he had driven the Confederates at dawn and placed his battery of six guns on a bluff and posted his men, 1,200 in number, on both sides of the Fayetteville road, completely ignorant of what was happening in his front. And here began his undoing. His men, thinking their work over, had turned to plundering the camp, or in some way had become demoralized. McCulloch and McIntosh, having finished with Plummer, now turned on Sigel. When one of his scouts saw a gray-coated regiment hurrying down the hill toward him he assumed that it was the First Iowa and so reported to Sigel. That officer spread the news and ordered his men not to fire on their approaching friends. Captain J. G. Reid's and Captain Hiram Bledsoe's batteries now both opened on them. "It is impossible for me," says Sigel, "to describe the consternation and frightened confusion caused by this unfortunate event.



This shows the chimney of Gen. Zachary Taylor's living room. Here President Jefferson Davis, then Colonel and stationed at Fort Gibson wooed and won Miss Knox Taylor, the General's daughter for his bride. Erected about 1830. Was converted into a Shrine on grounds of St. Anne's Academy.

'They are firing on us' spread like wildfire among our ranks. The artillery men could hardly be brought forward to serve their pieces. The infantry would not level their arms till too late." According to his fellow officers, when McCulloch and McIntosh dashed up with the Third Louisiana and Captain T. H. Rosser and Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. O'Kane followed right up to the Federal battery, his men turned in panic stricken flight without firing a shot and it became a case of "Save himself who can." If Sigel and Charles E. Saloman ever made any attempt to rally their men, there is no record of it. They also sought safety in flight and Sigel made it back to Springfield, accompanied by one subaltern, before the battle was over. About 200 of Sigel's men were captured, the rest were scattered in confusion; his battery also was captured, but the Confederates now turned their attention to Lyon without moving it. Lieutenant Charles E. Farrand collected several hundred of Sigel men and, while the Confederates were not looking that way, slipped away with one of the six guns of the battery.

All this was over by 9 o'clock. On the other side of the creek Price was hard pressed. Fortunately many of his unarmed men had stayed with him and now when one fell another picked up his gun and took his place. When driven out of camp by Sigel Churchill had crossed the creek and helped Price, first on the left, then in the center. By this time McCulloch had crossed over and was rendering help, but more was needed. On the east side were 1,700 men

(Gratiot, Tom P. Dockery, J. D. Walker) who had not fired a shot. Price himself now galloped over to Gratiot, who had followed him faithfully in Mexico, and begged for help. Without waiting for an order from Pearce, his superior, Gratiot at once put his men in motion.

Lyon was now getting desperate. His men were being raked by the batteries and he and his officers were asking, "Where is Sigel?" They also were deceived by the gray coats and allowed the Louisianans to march by within musket range, thinking that they were Sigel's men, but they did not flee. But when Sigel's flag, with Lyon's name on it, was flaunted before them in bravado and Gratiot was seen coming up with reinforcements, they knew that Sigel had been defeated, yet Lyon decided to make one more supreme effort. Every available man was now brought up and put into action. The First Iowa and the Second Kansas were hurled against the Confederates. As Price hurried from one part of the line to another, strengthening the weakest points, his clothing was pierced by several balls and he suffered one flesh wound. Churchill had two horses killed under him and Gratiot one. Lyon, who had had one horse killed under him, mounted another, and, though severely wounded, waved his hat and cheered his men. Just then he was pierced by another ball and the gallant commander fell dead into the arms of some of his companions.

The Federals now lost heart. Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis assumed command and, seeing Dock-

ery's Arkansas regiment, together with some Missouri and Louisiana troops, coming up, ordered a retreat and the battle was over.

This battle was commonly called that of Wilson's Creek by the Federals, Oak Hills by the Confederates. The popular name among the Confederates was the battle of Dutch Run, so-called from the precipitate flight of Sigel's Germans (Deutscher). General John M. Schofield, sometime commander of the district of Missouri, and nine other officers wrote out reports severely condemning Sigel and protesting against giving a command to such a man.

The battle had lasted five hours with a loss of 1,317 killed and wounded on the Federal side, 1,218 on the Confederates side. At "Bloody Hill," where Price had placed his men, the losses were, Missourians and Arkansans, 988; Federals, 892. The numbers engaged were, Federals, 5,400 with 16 guns; Confederates, 10,175 with 15 guns, though large numbers of the Confederates were unarmed and can hardly be said to have taken part. The Indians scattered beyond all concentration after a few discharges from Sigel's guns. While burying their dead the Confederates found the body of General Lyon and surrendered it to a company coming under a flag of truce to look for it. In their haste to get out of Springfield the Federals left it there and General Price turned it over to Mrs. John S. Phelps, who buried it on her husband's farm near the city.

CHAPTER X

PEA RIDGE, OR ELKHORN

The battle of Oak Hills (Wilson's Creek), being over, Price urged McCulloch to pursue the enemy and destroy his army before it could be reformed at Rolla, but the Confederates were poorly armed and short of ammunition and Federal reinforcements were reported coming, consequently McCulloch, insisting on his orders from Richmond to pursue a defensive policy in the Indian country, returned to Arkansas while Price followed the enemy northward. As he progressed many came to his standard until he had 18,000 men and 16 guns. He then marched to Lexington and besieged the place until it surrendered, capturing 3,500 prisoners, 5 guns, 2 mortars, 3,000 stand of arms, 750 horses, and stores worth \$100,000. He also restored to the Bank of Lexington \$900,000 which had been taken out by Colonel James A. Mulligan, the commander of the enemy.

While Price was moving northward the Federals were creating a diversion in southeastern Missouri. Instead of going to the help of Price, Hardee now used this as a pretext and began concentrating his forces at Pocahontas and Point Pleasant, Arkansas, the latter place being on the Mississippi river. Major-General Leonidas Polk, whose command had been extended (September 2, 1861) to cover military operation in Arkansas and Missouri, sustained Hardee's move and the latter, saying that he could fight

better for Arkansas east of the Mississippi, crossed over, taking with him the Arkansas troops who had voluntarily transferred their services from the state to the Confederacy, as noted in a previous chapter. At this time the troops under Pat R. Cleburne, T. C. Hindman, and R. G. Shaver went over, others refusing to go. Hardee left Colonel Soloy Borland in command at Pocahontas with seven companies of cavalry, four companies of Colonel J. S. McCarver's infantry, and an independent company under Captain Roberts.

Colonel J. C. Tappan, of Helena, in command of the Thirteenth Arkansas Infantry (A. D. Grayson, Lieutenant-Colonel; J. A. McNeely, Major), had been sent to Belmont, Missouri, to help hold the river against attacks from Cairo, where he and his men displayed great valor, as they did subsequently at Shiloh.

Returning now to the northwest we find Price compelled to evacuate Lexington, largely because of the failure of McCulloch and Hardee to co-operate with him. The former actually stopped a train of supplies going to Price on the ground that they would fall into the hands of the enemy before reaching him. Possibly this was not in retaliation for the arms loaned to Price and, according to McCulloch, never returned. As McCulloch had taken his forces below the Missouri-Arkansas line and all Confederate forces had been withdrawn from the southeastern part of the state, there was nothing left for Price to do but move southward. Instead of helping him McCul-

loch put his own men in winter quarters and, when mildly reproved by the Secretary of War for this, he went to Richmond to lay his side of the controversy with Price before the officials. He there expatiated (December 22) on the want of discipline in Price's troops, the incompetence of his staff, and even questioned the bravery of his men.* He denied that he was unwilling to assist in Missouri, but insisted that he had been assigned to the Indian country.

At the same time the other side was being presented from the front. General McIntosh, whom McCulloch had left in command, wrote from Van Buren (December 7) that he thought it better for the health of the soldiers, which was bad at the time, for them to be ordered to the field in Missouri. General Leonidas Polk was more pointed and wrote: "I am perfectly satisfied that the force now in McIntosh's hands should be controlled by some one who would co-operate freely and vigorously with General Price. His army, as it appears to me, might be better employed than in the inaction of winter quarters."

This better employment was soon found for them, or forced upon them. As a solution of the difficulty between McCulloch and Price President Davis created (January 10, 1862) the Trans-Mississippi Department No. 2, comprising Missouri, Arkansas west of the St. Francis, Indian Territory, and a part of Louisiana, and placed Major-General Earl Van Dorn in command.

*A few had fled at Oak Hills, but probably none except the unarmed.

The point of strategy about the war in Missouri was something more than a defense for Arkansas. There were many Federals in eastern Missouri and one object was to prevent their transfer to the east to help Grant. On the other hand the Federal strategy was to invade Arkansas and thus prevent the transfer of troops to the east to the aid of General Albert Sydney Johnston. When Van Dorn established his headquarters at Pocahontas and ordered certain troops to repair to that place it seemed certain that he would follow in Hardee's tracks and cross the Mississippi, possibly delaying long enough to restore harmony between McCulloch and Price. But this controversy was soon settled in a different way.

As Price retreated southward Fremont followed him with a well equipped army variously estimated at from 30,000 to 50,000, which he had been collecting at St. Louis. At Springfield he overtook Price and had the mortification of having his body-guard, the gorgeously dressed Jesse Fremont Guards, named for his wife, ambushed and cut to pieces as they were riding into the city. Price had greatly improved the condition of his troops and, knowing the character of Fremont, he wished, though inferior in numbers, to give battle. By order of General Halleck, Fremont was now (November 2) superseded by General David Hunter, who retreated northward to avoid battle while whipping Fremont's hordes into shape. Price felt too weak to assume the offensive alone and appealed to McCulloch, now encamped near Fayetteville, to help him, but the latter still held

the Missourians in contempt and refused to budge. In spite of this Price followed the retreating Federals as far as Osceola. December 23, Sigel arrived at Rolla under Halleck's orders to prepare the troops for early operations. By the time this was done he was superseded by General Samuel R. Curtis, who, on December 29, began to move toward Springfield. At Lebanon he delayed a month, leaving there February 10. As he advanced Price fell back, occasionally fighting rear-guard engagements. Bitterly cold weather now set in and some of Curtis' men, Sigel among them, had their feet frozen while moving at night. By February 18, 1862, they had crossed the Arkansas line. Some halted at Elkhorn Tavern, some at Sugar creek. Curtis himself pushed on to Cross Hollows, twelve miles farther south, while two companies went to Bentonville.

On reaching Fayetteville some of Price's army complained bitterly of McCulloch's failure to support them. Price and McCulloch now held a conference and decided on a retreat to Cove creek in the Boston mountains. Unable to carry away their supplies the officers opened the quartermaster's and commissary's stores to the soldiers and citizens. Unfortunately the soldiers did not stop with this, but in some cases broke open private stores.

As the army retreated many of the citizens fled with them and the demand for transportation became so great that horses, mules, and even oxen suddenly trebled and quadrupled in value. As far south as Clarksville the roads were reported filled with refu-

gees from Washington and Benton counties and from Missouri.

Next day a band of Confederate cavalry dashed into town and began firing the buildings which had been used for military purposes, among them the female college. As this had a few bomb shells in it the destruction in that vicinity was complete. The mill was burned at the same time. This is said by an observer to have been done by order of General McCulloch, who, of course, wished to prevent the materials and the mill from falling into the hands of the enemy, but some of the Confederates denounced the destruction as unnecessary.

On the following day (February 23) General Alexander Asboth (Federal) rode into town and was joyfully received by the Union sympathizers who' were natives of New England, but had been living there for several years. The stars and stripes were now raised on the public square, but they did not fly there very long. Asboth soon withdrew to Elkhorn and when the Confederates returned McCulloch had some of the Union sympathizers arrested, among them Judge Jonas M. Tibbets, and carried to Fort Smith for trial on a charge of treason.

As the Confederates fled southward Curtis decided not to follow, but scattered his forces from Pineville and Maysville on the west to Huntsville on the east, partly for the sake of getting supplies. Curtis' line was now about fifty miles long, but his main forces were stationed at Elkhorn and on Sugar creek under Colonel Jeff C. Davis and at Bentonville and vicinity

under Sigel. The official report gives his effective force at 10,500, with 49 pieces of artillery.

Having reached a place of safety in the Boston mountains Price and McCulloch conferred, but the old dispute recurred. Probably jealousy of rank had as much to do with McCulloch's refusal to co-operate as his distrust of the Missourians as soldiers. He did not want Price, a major-general of state troops, to command him, a brigadier-general of the Confederacy. Price now laid the matter before Van Dorn and suggested that he settle the matter by commanding in person. Van Dorn decided to act on this advice, made the trip over in five days and was ready to march on Bentonville by March 4, 1862. By this time General Albert Pike had brought a force of 1,000 from the territory, mostly Indians and a few Texans. The combined forces of Price, McCulloch, and Pike, according to official figures, amounted to 16,202, with about 60 pieces of artillery.

Van Dorn's plan of campaign was to bag Sigel at Bentonville before he could reach Curtis at Elkhorn and then dispose of the latter. A scouting party drove off the foragers at Huntsville and, so well had the movements been concealed, the main army reached McKissick's farm, four and a half miles south of Bentonville, before the enemy knew of their approach. Early next day Sigel's forces were to be "gobbled up." Unfortunately the enemy outposts were driven in at Smith's (Osage) Mills, seven miles east and Sigel soon learned of this and decided that it was time to obey Curtis' orders to withdraw to

Sugar creek. He started Asboth from McKissick's farm at 2 a. m. (March 6) and he was soon followed by P. J. Osterhaus. They reached Bentonville at 4 and were halted for the trains to come up. After this the two proceeded toward Sugar creek in advance of the rest, Sigel remaining in Bentonville with some 600 men to take care of the trains and provide for the escape of the troops at Osage Mills. By eight o'clock the trains had cleared the town.

The Confederates had not been idle. McIntosh and Elijah Gates had been sent out with two bodies of cavalry, one to the west, the other to the east, to intercept the retreat and D. M. Frost came up at double quick. The roads were very rough, however, and McIntosh and Gates failed to unite before Asboth and Osterhaus had gone, but Frost and Gates got in front of Sigel and brought him to a stand. It must be confessed that Sigel kept his head and behaved much better here than at Oak Hills, but, in all likelihood, he would have been bagged, had not Asboth and Osterhaus heard the firing and returned to rescue him. Even then the Confederates pressed hard upon the fleeing Federals fighting three engagements and capturing a few prisoners and wagons, and gave up the pursuit only at nightfall when they arrived at Sugar creek.

The valley of this creek was from a quarter to half a mile wide, was flanked on both sides by high hills, and was intersected at right angles by the road from Fayetteville by Cross Hollows to Keetsville, the road from Bentonville to Keetsville following the

valley for some distance and then turning off parallel to the main road. Curtis had taken in the situation and was making his preparations for the coming battle while Sigel was struggling to join him. The troops not sent to the rescue of Sigel were employed in felling trees across the roads, both on his right and left to block the progress of the enemy, should he attempt a flank movement. Strong breastworks were erected on the headlands of Sugar creek "as if by magic" and earthworks were constructed near the road crossing to shield a battery. In his front stretched out the broad valley of Sugar creek, along which he hoped that the enemy would come from the south. In his rear was the broken plateau known as Pea Ridge and still farther back the deep valley of Big Sugar creek or Cross timber. Between the two were his headquarters at Pratt's store. Such was the situation on the night of the 6th when Sigel arrived from Bentonville with the Confederates in pursuit. If only those trees across the road prevented the enemy from flanking, it would be exceptionally strong.

The Confederates who had followed Sigel lighted their camp fires almost within sight of the latter and those who had anything to eat there ate supper. Some had consumed their three days' rations and had nothing to eat. But they did not remain there. To make a frontal attack they would have to cross an exposed area and then face breastworks. Because of this Van Dorn decided to get in the rear of the enemy with the main body of his troops and then, using prac-

tically the same tactics employed by Lyon and Sigel at Oak Hills, to attach each wing and try to bag the enemy. Leaving McCulloch with his Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana troops and Pike with his Indians to make the attack on the left, Van Dorn and Price moved up the Bentonville and Keetsville road in the midst of a snow storm, hoping to get in Curtis rear and attack by 8 o'clock in the morning. But the rough road and Curtis' fallen trees delayed their movement so that it was 10 o'clock before they were in position and ready for action.

For some reason McCulloch had delayed and did not get into action until Price, who had marched much farther, was about ready. While Curtis had hoped for the frontal attack he was not caught unawares, for he learned of the flanking movement early in the morning and, after a conference with his officers at Pratt's store, determined to about face, abandon his works, and meet the enemy in a new position. Had McCulloch moved a little earlier, he might have kept Curtis in uncertainty a little longer. The battle began about 10 o'clock with an infantry attack upon Major Eli W. Weston's pickets at Elkhorn Tavern. Price, who was strong in artillery, followed this up with a battle of guns which lasted several hours. During this time there were charges and counter charges, the infantry sometimes advancing under a sort of barrage. Having waited in vain for news of success by McCulloch, Price finally, about 3 p. m., ordered a general advance. Curtis vainly

tried flanking movement, but was driven back a mile beyond Elkhorn Tavern.

McCulloch's delay had enabled Sigel to shift his forces and get in a strong position near Leetown. Other difficulties now confronted him, open fields, fallen timber, and dense undergrowth where ambuscades of infantry lay in wait. Sometimes one party attacked, then the other, each side using its artillery with telling effect. A cavalry attack by Osterhaus was repulsed and the cavalry was forced back beyond their original position and a battery captured. McCulloch led a second attack in person, but was shot through the heart and fell on the field. While observing the action through field glasses, McIntosh, commanding the Arkansas cavalry, now succeeded to the command and led a charge to recover McCulloch's body only to fall dead himself*, while Colonel Louis Hebert, of Louisiana, next in command, was captured. Thus disaster followed disaster and the men, now leaderless, knew not what to do. General Albert Pike, though commanding a detached regiment, was nominally next in command, but, though McCulloch and McIntosh fell before noon, he knew nothing of what had happened until 3 o'clock, when he began to try to gather up the troops and hold them against the enemy. Many of his Indians would pay no attention to anybody's command. Before night he decided to abandon the field and try to lead such

*McCulloch's body was later recovered by a charge by Colonel Frank A. Rector's regiment.

of the troops as he could to Van Dorn. Some had already marched off toward Bentonville.

Night now came on and closed the second day's fighting. The Confederate artillery fired the last shot, Curtis' men reporting "no ammunition." Van Dorn was in possession of his camp ground and Sigel was marching his troops off to their old camp two miles distant to give them supper (and really abandoned the battle field), but Curtis ordered him to halt his troops and send for food and hurried men off for the caissons to get more ammunition. He knew of the death of McCulloch and McIntosh and determined to stand his ground and renew the battle next day. As day came on Van Dorn saw that the enemy had improved his position and determined to withdraw, but Curtis renewed the artillery fire and there was nothing to do but fight it out, which was what Price wanted to do. Van Dorn seems to have intended to fight a little while to allow McCulloch's men to withdraw. In fact, the contest lasted several hours and in this the Arkansas men played a conspicuous part. But the broken ground occupied by the Confederates made impossible easy evolutions to meet the movements of Curtis on the open plain and, as the supply trains had been left on the Bentonville road and were not easily accessible for more ammunition, the artillery was gradually withdrawn and the retreat began. It is said that the men did not know that they were retreating, supposing that they were shifting to a more favorable place of attack, and were somewhat

disappointed when they learned that the enemy was to be left in possession of the field.

The pursuit of Van Dorn and Price on the Huntsville road was not at all vigorous; in fact, Van Dorn says that he was not pursued and that he camped ten miles from Elkhorn without molestation. The pursuit of the remnants of McCulloch's division was more vigorous, Osterhaus following some of them as far as Keetsville. Those who turned south were also followed as far as Bentonville, but most of them escaped. Colonel Frank A. Rector's men (about 500) were so worn out physically and so demoralized that he gathered up their arms and disbanded them in the Boston mountains. The reason for this was that they were likely to abandon their arms in the flight.

The Union losses were 203 killed, 980 wounded, 201 captured or missing. Among the captured was Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Herron, who was later to fight Hindman at Prairie Grove. The Confederates lost about 1,000 killed and wounded and 200 or 300 missing. Some of the other statements regarding losses are hard to reconcile. Van Dorn says that he got away without the loss of a gun, captured two batteries, one of which was burned up, and carried off four guns, several flags, and four loaded wagons of the enemy. Curtis says that he recovered several guns that had been captured by McCulloch's men, that he did not lose a single one, but captured several from the enemy and picked up many muskets which had been left behind in the flight.

After the battle Van Dorn requested of Curtis permission to collect and bury his dead. Curtis replied that he would be glad to do so, but complained that several of his men had been scalped. It seems that several had also been knifed after being wounded. Van Dorn's adjutant-general, Colonel Dabney H. Maury, replied that the Indians were regarded as civilized and regretted that it had occurred. He also reported that several of his men who had surrendered were said to have been "murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be Germans."

The friction between McCulloch and Price was now ended. In meeting out praise Van Dorn said of Price: "During the whole of this engagement, I was with the Missourians under Price, and I have never seen better fighters than these Missouri troops, or more gallant leaders than General Price and his officers. * * * General Price received a severe wound in the action, but would neither retire from the field nor cease to expose his life to danger." Of General McCulloch, he said: "I found him, in the frequent conferences which I had with him, a sagacious, prudent commander, and a bolder soldier never died for his country." Speaking of the peril he was in at one time, Curtis said: "The fall of Generals McCulloch, McIntosh, and other officers of the enemy, who fell early in the day, aided us in our final success at this most critical point." The Confederate Congress expressed its thanks to "Generals Van Dorn and Price and the officers and soldiers under their command, for their valor, skill, and good conduct in the battle of

Elkhorn," * * * and "heard with profound grief of the death of Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, who fell in the midst of the battle, gloriously leading their commands against the enemy."

CHAPTER XI

CURTIS' EASTERN CAMPAIGN

Van Dorn and Price retreated by way of Huntsville and ten days after the battle of Elkhorn the former reported that the entire army which he had marched against the enemy was then encamped near Van Buren. He also announced that the army could not be subsisted any longer there, that he did not think that the enemy would make any demonstration in that region until later in the spring, and that he would leave in a few days for Pocahontas. There he wanted to collect an army and try to relieve Generals Johnston and Beauregard at Corinth, Mississippi, by marching against New Madrid or Cape Girardeau and possibly St. Louis. Next day he ordered General T. J. Churchill to take his brigade and Gates' cavalry and proceed as rapidly as possible to Forsythe, on White river, thence to Springfield where he was to capture and destroy the stores of the enemy which were being transported from that place almost without guard and then report to him at Pocahontas. General Albert Pike was left in command of the Indian Territory and Woodruff's battery was ordered to report to him.

The rest of the orders related to the east. Price was to march with the First Division, Army of the West, and Major W. L. Cabell was directed to concentrate supplies at Des Arc, which place was also made the point of rendezvous for all companies or-

ganized under the call of Governor Rector. The lower Arkansas and White rivers were assigned to Brigadier-General Albert Rust. As soon as Van Dorn arrived at Jacksonport it became evident that he would not go into Missouri, but intended to transport the troops to the east of the Mississippi.

April 8, General Price, who had received a commission as brigadier-general of the Confederacy, announced to his soldiers that he was no longer their commander as state troops, but, in stirring words, reminded them of their past achievements at Carthage, Wilson's creek, Fort Scott, Lexington and Elkhorn and begged them to follow him. "Soldiers," said he, "I go but to make a pathway to our homes! Follow me!"

The most of them did, but, unfortunately, too late to prevent the disaster at Shiloh, for General Albert Sydney Johnston fell there the day before Price issued his address. Those who did not go were organized by General Rains into a band of partisan rangers who operated in the northwest and were called guerrillas by the enemy. Van Dorn also crossed over about the same time, thus taking from Arkansas a considerable body of troops.

Northwestern Arkansas was now virtually stripped of defenders. Had Sherman or Sheridan been in command of the Federals when the Confederates retreated to Van Buren, either one probably would have pushed on to Fort Smith and, finding the enemy gone to the east, then gone on to Little Rock or Texas and the Gulf. But Curtis was a timid sol-

dier and, calling piteously for reinforcements, he pushed eastward down the White river in the hope of getting help. General J. G. Blunt was left behind at Fort Smith to collect Kansas troops, popularly known in Missouri as "Jay-hawkers," to look after the rangers of Rains and Colonel T. J. Coffee.

The military board at Little Rock had sent men to work the saltpeter caves on the south bank of White river near Talbot's Ferry, not far from Yellville, and a detachment under Colonel Coleman to guard them. Some of Coleman's men seemed to have ventured some distance up into Missouri, whereupon Lieutenant-Colonel S. N. Wood came down from Rolla and forced them back. Colonels Coleman, Woodside and A. McFarlane now met at Spring River, just south of the Missouri line, and proceeded to consolidate their forces into one regiment. Here Wood came upon them (March 13) and gave battle, forcing them to retreat. Wood followed only to find that they had taken refuge in "one of those pest-holes of creation, an Arkansas swamp." He then spent several days in skirmishing with them around the swamp, which he did not dare to enter, and finally returned to Rolla in disgust, having lost 4 killed, 18 wounded, and one missing. According to his estimate the Confederate loss was greater.

Coleman now gave his attention to the mines and when Curtis came along he sent out a detachment under McCrillis to destroy the works (April 24, 1862), but they were driven off before completing the work of destruction.

After a slight skirmish at Pocahontas (April 21) Curtis' main army reached Batesville May 4, entering the town on one side as Colonel Coleman left the other. Batesville had been the scene of many manifestations of opposition to secession and several hundred now offered their services to General Curtis and followed his army to Helena. Pushing on to Cotton Plant, Curtis encountered Coleman who offered resistance, but retired before superior forces (May 14). Dashing up into Missouri, Coleman struck a train at Hardin bringing supplies to Curtis (May 18), capturing several wagons and a few prisoners. Meantime Colonel W. L. Jeffers had opposed a force trying to cross White river at Chalk Bluff (May 16) and next day a troop of cavalry foraging on Little Red river was met by Captain Chrisman and suffered a loss of 20 killed and 36 wounded. May 26 another skirmish occurred between Hicks' men and a detachment of Federals, another at West Point the next day, lasting an hour, and another at Cache river bridge the 28th. June 2, Colonel Albert G. Brackett (Ninth Illinois) retreated from his camp at Jacksonport as the Confederate gunboat, *Maurepas*, commander Joseph Fry, came up.

One purpose of these raids on the part of the Federals was to gather forage. Speaking of these raids, General Eugene A. Carr said: "Men of mine who were with the Germans today foraging, report great excesses on their part, going into the private apartments of ladies and opening trunks and drawers and ransacking everything and taking away what they

wanted. If these excesses are permitted, we cannot wonder at guerrilla warfare."

Another object in view was to feel the way to Little Rock. General Osterhaus reported that he had collected enough supplies to last him on the trip to Little Rock, but had been compelled to forego the trip by the enemy and their ally, rains. He also reported that they had burned enormous lots of cotton in anticipation of his advance. As a matter of fact the way to Little Rock lay open for a while to an energetic commander, but Curtis did not see it and seize the opportunity.

When Van Dorn passed to the east he assigned General J. S. Roane to the defense of Arkansas and instructed him to gather all the troops available. General Albert Pike, still called commander of the Indian Department, had 3,453 scattered in various places. He was now ordered to send all he could spare exclusive of Indians to Roane, but he failed to do it. Whether his duel with General Roane in the Mexican War was the cause of this it would be hard to say. Threatened by jayhawkers and Indians in the northwest and by Curtis in the north, the situation was indeed alarming. The Arkansas delegation in Congress now wrote to President Davis complaining that Little Rock had been stripped of munitions and troops "until she was left defenseless and open to the invasion of Yankees and the invasions of savages and Kansans so completely that 10,000 men could march from one end of the state to the other in the midst of plenty and unopposed." This was exceedingly

galling, as only two states, South Carolina and Virginia, had exceeded Arkansas in supplying their quotas of troops.

Smarting under this treatment Governor Rector issued a proclamation describing the conditions, complaining of the treatment accorded Arkansas, calling out the militia, and asking for the organization of troops for defense. He even intimated that, if the southwestern states were to be abandoned, they would have to "build a new ark" and "seek their own safety." At first Van Dorn thought of replying to the governor, but, on inquiry, decided that public opinion did not sustain the executive in his policy which had been thrust on him by "shallow politicians" and determined to put a vigorous man in the field for defense of the state.

For this job T. C. Hindman was selected by General G. T. Beauregard and was authorized to conscript troops under the act of April 16, 1862. His field was a large one, comprising Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana north of the Red river, and the Indian Territory.

He started at once and acted vigorously, commanding arms and munitions, medicine, all sorts of supplies, and money (\$1,000,000 in Confederate money) at Memphis, Helena, and Napoleon. He also turned back two steamboats ascending the Mississippi and brought them into the Arkansas river for use in transporting troops and supplies. Thousands of bales of cotton were burned to keep them out of the hands of the enemy.

On arriving at Little Rock he found that General Roane had with him several regiments of Texas cavalry, eight unarmed companies of Arkansas infantry, and a six-gun battery, but no artillerymen. He now assumed command of this district and issued an address appealing to the people to rally to his support with man and money power. He also took drastic measures to raise troops, though he had no authority beyond the enforcement of the conscription act, which prohibited new regiments. Considering that the safety of the state was the supreme law he decided not to wait for a new law, but to raise and organize a force at once. Governor Rector was now trying to raise troops under a promise not to transfer them to the Confederacy, but abandoned this on the threat of Hindman to conscript whatever forces he raised. Hindman then divided the state into districts and stationed enrolling officers in each, authorizing them to purchase or impress arms, ammunition and supplies. In his own language, "military posts were established. * * * Measures were adopted for manufacturing many important articles for army use. * * * Machinery was made for manufacturing percussion caps and small arms. * * * Lead mines were opened and worked; a chemical laboratory was established and successfully operated * * * in the manufacture of calomel, castor oil, spirits of niter, the various tinctures of iron and other valuable medicines." The most of them were near Arkadelphia. Several regiments were brought up from Texas and, to revive the spirit of the Missourians, authority was given "to

various persons to raise companies and regiments there and operate as guerrillas." Believing that all cotton in Arkansas and north Louisiana was in danger of capture he ordered all adjacent to the enemy line to be burned at once, the rest to be removed at least twenty miles inland and burned when the enemy approached. Before the burning ten-pound packages were allotted to each family.

Curtis soon became alarmed by Hindman's activities and Hindman took care to work upon his fears by spreading exaggerated reports as to his strength. He even had Curtis believing that Van Dorn had come over with 30,000 men. The result was that Curtis became over cautious. June 5 a considerable cavalry force retreated before inferior members, retiring beyond Bayou Des Arc. Hindman then ordered the gunboat *Maurepas* up White river to destroy supplies along the river as far as Jacksonport and to threaten the enemy's communication with Batesville. This, together with a frontal attack, caused Curtis to retreat beyond the Little Red river and ultimately to Batesville. Skirmishing continued, mainly by Major Chrisman and Colonel Coleman. The latter made a sort of Stonewall Jackson raid, passing entirely around Curtis' army, destroying a supply train from Missouri and capturing important correspondence.

The accounts given by Curtis and his subordinates of these operations are for the most part contradictory to the Confederate account, but the fact remains that the west bank of White river was now prac-

tically cleared of Curtis' men for a time and Little Rock was safe from him, but Memphis had fallen (April) and Helena soon after, and the Mississippi was now open to Vicksburg, giving the enemy's gunboats access to White river, up which they might ascend to DeVall's Bluff, only sixty miles from the city. June 16 the Federal fleet appeared, consisting of two iron-clads, the *St. Louis* and the *Mound City*, each with 13 guns, and three smaller vessels only partly iron-clad, conducting three transports with a considerable force of infantry under command of Colonel G. N. Fitch. As the *Maurepas* would have been useless against the iron-clads, it and two other steamers were sunk in an effort to block the river below St. Charles. The guns had been taken from the boat and a battery formed on the coast, all under command of Captain Joseph Fry. Landing his infantry two and a half miles below, Colonel Fitch went on to silence the batteries with the guns on his boats. At first the balls from the shore batteries, in the language of participant, rolled off the iron-clads "like hailstones on a slate roof," but noticing a large port-hole that had been opened in the *Mound City*, a solid shot was fired at her, killing a gunman and passing through the steam drum. About half the crew of over 100 were scalded to death and such as were able jumped through the port-holes into the water where they were fired upon from the shore. He now ordered the boats to cease firing and brought up the infantry which drove off the Confederates,

capturing the guns and a few prisoners, among them Captain Fry, now disabled by a wound.

Among other things General Hindman had authorized the people to organize and arm themselves and operate against the enemy independent of any command. These and other similar companies he spoke of as guerrillas. As Colonel Fitch proceeded up the river some of these companies fired upon him, whereupon he issued a proclamation to the people of Monroe county urging them to remain at home and assuring them that they would not be molested in the peaceful pursuit of their daily vocations, but warning them that he would hold them responsible in persons and property if such "barbarous warfare" was repeated by these guerrilla bands. General Hindman replied (June 25), justifying his order and threatening to retaliate "man for man."

As Fitch was proceeding up the river in the hope of finding Curtis and making a junction with his forces Captain P. H. Wheat met his infantry with some cavalry on the border of the prairie, near Aberdeen and engaged them for thirty minutes, but was forced back. Next morning they were allowed thirty minutes to gather up their dead (84) and then Fitch started in pursuit of the main force. Twelve miles further up toward Clarendon, Colonel R. G. Shaver, who had superseded Captain Wheat, met the Federals about midnight and attempted to cut off the advance column but retreated when fired upon by a howitzer.

July 8 Fitch reached Clarendon and was preparing to push up the Cache in search of Curtis. The

Confederates at DeVall's Bluff had been unnecessarily frightened at Fitch's advance and left there for Little Rock, tearing up the railroad behind them. Fitch was somewhat uneasy about the force in front of him and was on the point of turning up the Cache in search of Curtis when he received a dispatch from Grant saying that he could not furnish him any more troops and ordering him to remain at St. Charles. The falling water made it impossible for the boats to advance and even dangerous to remain, so Fitch returned at once to St. Charles.

Let us return now to the operations of Curtis and Hindman. Learning that Curtis was leaving Batesville (June 24), short of supplies, for a march down the east side of White river, Hindman ordered General Rust to cross the river at Jacksonport and dispute Curtis' passage of Black river. In order to delay Curtis so as to give Rust time to reach Jacksonport Hindman threw Sweet's Texas regiment across the river above Batesville where it fell upon Curtis' rear, killing, capturing and wounding about 200 Federals and capturing several wagons of supplies and sutler's goods. But he was soon driven off and the delay amounted to nothing, for Rust reported that it was impracticable to cross at Jacksonport and was allowed to go down to Des Arc and cross there. His force, now augmented by Colonel D. McRae's infantry which had come up by forced march of twenty-five miles a day, C. L. Dawson's regiment of infantry just arrived from General Pike, and a six-gun battery commanded by Major W. E. Woodruff,

amounted to 5,000 effective men. In addition three regiments of mounted infantry were being raised on the east side of the river. With this force Rust was ordered to resist the enemy "to the last extremity, blockading roads, burning bridges, destroying all supplies, growing crops included, and polluting the water by killing cattle, ripping the carcasses open and throwing them in."

Hindman thought that no army could march through the country thus opposed. The alternative route lay along the east bank of White river, crossing the Cache at Clarendon. To meet that contingency a gunboat was improvised by Captain John W. Dunnington by lining a steamboat with cotton bales and mounting an 8-inch columbiad at her bow. Hindman himself hastened to DeVall's Bluff, for which Fitch seemed to be headed. Believing that a garrison of 500 could hold the place against Fitch, he decided to take the rest, 1,500, across to reinforce Rust as soon as he could get shotguns and rifles for them from Little Rock to replace the pikes and lances with which many of them were armed. This consumed two days.

In the meantime Rust was attacked by Curtis at Hill's Plantation (July 7), with skirmishes at Round Hill and Bayou de View, and after hardly more than half an hour's resistance, he retreated in great disorder across the Cache. So closely pressed was he, or thought he was, that he did not even burn the bridge behind him. A more vigorous enemy would have pursued, but Curtis reported that he needed a

few boats to assist in crossing the White river and that with a few days' rations, he could drive the Confederates to Little Rock and beyond.

As a matter of fact, they went there without any driving, but authorities differ about how it happened. In his report, written nearly a year later, General Hindman admits that Rust retreated in great disorder across the White river, but says nothing about any further disorder. He adds "No longer able to prevent the juncture of Curtis and Fitch, I withdrew my infantry from White river, evacuating DeVall's Bluff without loss of any kind and taking up a new line—that of the Bayou Meto, twelve miles from Little Rock." In his retreat he took time to tear up the railroad.

Another Confederate writer, who was on the scene of action, says that the evacuation was as precipitate as the retreat of Rust. It was due to panic fear which pursued Rust's command, rumors being exaggerated into reports that they were being surrounded by the enemy. In their hasty crossing they actually left two flat boats which Curtis might have had for the taking.

It so happened that Colonel Jo Shelby, who had followed Price to Corinth and had been detached and sent home with a small company of Missourians to raise more troops, came up just at this time. Some of his men swam over and got the boats, transporting the whole band. Reaching the other side they found a few heroic officers—who that their names were known—who had remained behind in a desperate effort to save the artillery, ammunition and quarter-

master and commissary supplies which had been abandoned in the flight. Shelby's men now fell in and "All that long, hot day, and all that weary night, the devoted men worked, stood guard, did picket duty, and saved for the Confederacy everything intrusted to the charge of an officer [Rust] disqualified for any military position whatever."

Hindman had said that he was unable to prevent the junction of Curtis and Fitch, but as a matter of fact, neither Curtis nor Fitch knew of the other's whereabouts and the timid Curtis, who had received orders to assume the position of military governor of Arkansas on occupying the capitol, instead of pursuing Hindman and Rust, turned eastward and made his way toward Helena. Getting word of his advance Fitch made several efforts to come in touch with him, sending six companies on two transports back up to Clarendon and then across country only to reach the road several hours after Curtis had passed. He then gave up and returned to Memphis.

This was virtually the end of the eastern campaign, though there were numerous skirmishes and raids around Helena up to the end of the year. The conflicting accounts given of one of these illustrates the difficulty of giving the exact truth about them and sometimes this applies to larger engagements. For some reason Major Henry S. Eggleston was operating with a small force around Marianna, "foraging for horses, as also for the negroes (who came into camp in large numbers)." General Hindman says that he sent out a portion of his cavalry, numbers not



Old Commissary Building erected under supervision of General Zachary Taylor, in 1837, while he was stationed in Fort Smith. Gen. Taylor resided here for four years. Building has been preserved for a museum.

given, under Colonel W. H. Parsons, against a Federal cavalry regiment, "with about 200 armed negroes and as many more unarmed," and that he surprised them in camp near Hughes' Ferry on the L'Anguille river (August 3) and cut them to pieces with a loss of over 400 in all, killed, wounded and captured, with all the baggage. "Our loss was 30 killed and 58 wounded." Major Eggleston reports that he was attacked at daylight by 600 Texas rangers (his own number not given) and that, after a severe fight of thirty minutes, his men fell back into the woods, leaving the camp in the hands of the enemy. They took 7 wagons, all the horses and mules (a lot of them "contraband"), and destroyed everything they could not take off. His loss was "11 killed (3 have since died, making 14 in all), 40 wounded, and about 25 taken prisoners." In a postscript he mentions the probable loss of the enemy as 25 dead, but did not think the proportion of wounded would be as large as his own, since his men used Belgian rifles and Springfield muskets carrying heavier and more fatal balls, while they used mostly double-barrelled shot-guns loaded with buckshot.

No more battles of consequence occurred in the east during the year, but scarcely a week passed without a skirmish of some sort. July 14, one occurred near Batesville and the same day one near Helena. July 30 another occurred at Gaines' Landing, where Curtis had gone to interrupt the transportation of guns, small arms, and ammunition into Arkansas. A considerable quantity was brought over before he

arrived, but he destroyed 70 or 80 flat-boats. July 24-26 an expedition sent out from Helena to Marianna reported a skirmish with a company of Confederates encamped on L'Anguille lake, four miles southeast of Marianna, the capture of a few prisoners and the confiscation of supplies. July 28-31 a scouting party of 507 cavalry went from Helena to Old Town and Trenton where they heard of large bodies of Texans, but found none. About the time of the fight at L'Anguille Ferry (August 3) a skirmish was reported at Jonesboro. August 4-17 General A. P. Hovey made an expedition to Clarendon as a demonstration against Little Rock. Near Clarendon he attacked a company of Texans on two mornings while they were at breakfast and made them leave without finishing the meal. He reported that many citizens were taking the oath of allegiance. August 11, an insignificant skirmish occurred near Helena. August 28-September 3, Colonel Wm. H. Raynor went by boats with 200 infantry from Helena to Eunice Landing to get a wharfboat and annoy the enemy. On the way down at Carson's Landing some negroes reported "solgers ober dar" and he sent 175 men to scatter them, which was soon done, with no casualties on either side. Later a small band scattered a band of guerrillas, killing one, capturing one man and a few supplies. September 6 an insignificant skirmish occurred at Lagrange. September 11, Colonel Wm. Vandever, with a force of 900, was fired upon at Lawrenceville, twenty miles below Clarendon. He then passed over to St. Charles

and drove off a small company and sunk a flat-boat which they were loading with iron taken from the gunboat sunk in the river sometime before. September 23, a light skirmish occurred at McGuire's Ferry. September 26, Captain Jas. T. Drummond pushed up to Lagrange in search of guerrillas. He was fired on from the bushes with a loss of one killed and one wounded. Later he was attacked by supposed guerrillas, but it proved to be a company under Major T. W. Scudder retiring from Marianna and Jeffersonville. In this one was killed and one wounded. October 11, a skirmish eight or nine miles from Helena resulted in several casualties on both sides. October 14, a skirmish occurred near Trenton. October 18, 20 and 22, skirmishes took place near Helena. November 6, Captain M. L. Perkins reported that he was attacked three times ten miles from Moro by about 100 Confederates. At Lagrange while feeding their horses they were attacked by 500 mounted troops who wheeled and fled at the first whiff of grape and canister. They attacked twice more, but were driven off with an estimated loss of 50 killed and wounded. His own losses were 23 wounded and several horses killed. November 19 General A. P. Hovey dropped down the river with 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry for a dash on Arkansas Post. After ascending White river a distance he landed and prepared for the dash, but was recalled on the ground that his forces might be needed at another point.

CHAPTER XII

PRAIRIE GROVE

After the retreat of Van Dorn and the advance eastward of Curtis, following the battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn, the northwest was almost stripped of soldiers. Several independent, or semi-independent, companies commanded by J. V. Cockrell, John T. Coffee, D. C. Hunter, J. T. Hughes, and James S. Rains, and several bands of guerrillas commanded by W. C. Quantrill and others operated in this region, occasionally raiding into Missouri, living off of friend and foe, where they were watched by scattered companies under the command of General J. M. Schofield. His troops occasionally raided into Arkansas in pursuit of these bands. A resident of Fayetteville declared that the raids and counter raids were so frequent that the people could hardly tell from one day to the next whether they were "under Jeff Davis or Lincoln rule."

The latter part of June General E. B. Brown sent three companies to raid Washington, Benton, Carroll and Madison counties and pursue Coffee, Rains and Hunter, who were then reported to have 1,200 or 1,300 men. They captured several officers and men, including a recruiting officer, and at Fayetteville arrested several prominent citizens, among them Hon. David Walker, president of the secession convention, who took the oath of allegiance and was released on a bond of \$10,000 to report to Cassville. July 15,

Coffee, Hunter and Rains, while encamped eight miles southeast of Fayetteville, were attacked by Federals, who had concealed their approach by marching at night and hiding in the woods by day, and were pursued to Cane Hill. A considerable quantity of lead was captured.

Hughes and Quantrill now made a counter raid into Missouri and captured Independence (August 11), where the former was killed. Six days later Cockrill, Coffee, Jackson, Hunter, and Henry Tracy won a considerable victory at Lone Jack, Missouri.

The authorities at Little Rock were alarmed by the Federal raids and shortly after the arrival of Colonel Jo Shelby's regiment, which had rendered such valiant service in the evacuation of DeVall's Bluff, as described in the preceding chapter, it was ordered by Général Holmes to Fort Smith. General Hindman soon followed and assumed command (August 24) and undertook to organize the independent companies into a unified command. He is reported to have ordered Rains and Coffee to enter the service of the Confederacy or disband.

Exercising much the same energy which he had displayed in Eastern Arkansas he now whipped together a company of 2,500 white infantry, 3,600 white cavalry, and about 3,000 Indians. He managed to get together 14 guns, but very little camp equipage. With these forces he established his line on the northern border of Arkansas, stretching from Carrollton on the east through Elkhorn and Pineville to Elk Mills, twenty miles west of the latter in

the territory, with the Indians twelve miles further west at Carey's Ferry. Having ample supplies behind his line for double his force for three months, he threw out pickets as far north as Neosho and established a training camp at Elm Springs, where he collected 4,000 unarmed Missouri and Arkansas infantry. At this juncture Holmes ordered Hindman to repair to Little Rock after turning over the command to Rains with instructions not to assume the offensive. Now Hindman had definitely planned a bold offensive and he protested against this order. However, the Richmond authorities were calling on Holmes for every available soldier to reinforce Pemberton in Mississippi and wanted Hindman to protect Little Rock. A second order came, which Hindman found excuses for disregarding, whereupon a third order came peremptorily calling for obedience and he started south September 10, leaving orders as directed for no aggressive action.

In spite of these orders Colonel D. H. Cooper, commanding the Texans and Indians, advanced upon the enemy and fought an all day battle at Newtonia, Missouri (September 30). His object was worthy, to save the lead mines at Granby from the enemy and his success—he was left in possession of the field—atoned for his disobedience to orders. But the tide soon turned in favor of General J. M. Schofield, who fell upon Rains and forced him to retreat toward Fayetteville.

Holmes now admitted his mistake in recalling Hindman and ordered him to return to the north-

west. On arriving there he found some of the troops at Huntsville with the other commands scattered at various places, all in a state of panic fear. Hindman charged that this was largely due to the fact that their officers had been imbibing too freely of the cup that intoxicates.

Hindman's first objective was to collect his scattered forces and restore order, that of his opponent, Schofield, to prevent this. The latter sent an expedition to Yellville against General M. M. Parsons, but this was forced to return with no results except a few wagons and horses which they had taken from the settlers. October 17 a skirmish occurred at Sugar creek, above Fayetteville. Five days later the Federals appeared at Huntsville, but were driven back by Colonel Shelby. October 24, and again on the 27th skirmishes occurred at Fayetteville, where Hindman had established a hospital. October 28 a Federal force under General Herron appeared at Oxford Bend, four miles east of Fayetteville, and, after an engagement lasting an hour, forced a little band commanded by Colonel Jesse L. Cravens to retire. Practically all of Hindman's forces had retired south of the Boston mountains without any serious mishap and Schofield, deeming it inexpedient to pursue them, retired into Missouri.

Meantime Hindman was busy whipping his forces into shape, beginning with the officers. Cooper had already been disposed of. He now accepted Rains' resignation and arrested Coffee and appointed Colonel G. W. Thompson to take his place. He also arrested

Colonel J. G. Stevens, commanding the Texas cavalry, and Colonel Thomas C. Bass, though the latter was allowed to return to his command. Brigadier-General John S. Marmaduke was put in command of the Missouri cavalry, Colonel Cravens of the Texas cavalry, and General J. S. Roane was sent to the Indian Territory. His forces were now scattered along the Arkansas river from Clarksville to Van Buren, where they were soon joined by Colonel Dandridge McRae's brigade of infantry and Colonel M. M. Parson's cavalry from Yellville. He now clothed his men—many of them were in rags and suffering terribly—and armed his unarmed men with weapons which had been rushed up from Little Rock by General Holmes, paid off a considerable part of the arrears due them, and soon had them in better spirits and ready for action.

Both commanders were now planning to take the aggressive, the plans of both being somewhat similar. Hindman knew that General James G. Blunt was in or near Fayetteville while General Francis J. Herron was supposed to be somewhere about Yellville. He asked Holmes to detain Herron in the east by a diversion while he marched over the mountains and drew Blunt off to the west and destroyed him before they could unite. We have just seen that Schofield, who had now been called elsewhere, was trying to keep Hindman's forces from uniting while he destroyed them in detail. Having sent Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis R. Jewell, commanding the Sixth Kansas, out for a reconnaissance south of the mountains and

learned something of the enemy's position and number, Blunt reported to Schofield that, if given a small reinforcement, he could capture Van Buren and Fort Smith, provided General Frederick Steel occupied the attention of Holmes so that he could not reinforce Hindman from Little Rock. The plan of each was Napoleonic, to divide and conquer.

But Hindman got into action first, sending Marmaduke, with Shelby's and Carroll's brigades, over the mountains only twenty-four hours in the rear of Jewell. At the same time Quantrill was creating a diversion near Newtonia, Missouri. Hindman's plan was to have Marmaduke draw Blunt off to Cane Hill while he marched to his rear so as to prevent Herron from joining him. Unfortunately for the Confederates, deserters and spies gave Blunt a pretty accurate account of his enemy's equipment and some idea of his plans, so that when Marmaduke moved up to Cane Hill Blunt hastened there by forced marches to meet him with superior numbers—5,000 men and 30 pieces of artillery—before Hindman could arrive.

A patriotic young woman, Miss Sarah McClellan, who lived four miles west of Cane Hill, rushed into Shelby's camp to tell him that the Federals were preparing to surprise him. But the Confederates were ready for the battle, which began between 9 and 10 a. m., November 28, and lasted until after sunset. The description of the encounter given by one of the participants, Captain John N. Edwards, of Shelby's brigade, is so vivid that I cannot resist quoting from his account.

Marmaduke, notified of danger by the thunder of Shelby's cannon, galloped immediately to the front with his glittering staff. In sooth, it was a glorious sight. A strong northwest wind tore down the leaves in great gusts of broken pinions, and flared the rival flags in broad defiance above the rival armies. Every movement of Blunt could be plainly seen in the valley below, and his lines came gleaming on,

Ere yet the life-blood warm and wet,
Had dimmed a glistening bayonet.

Collins opened first and shot a great gap in the leading regiment, while the stars and stripes went down dimmed in the battle's van. A hundred eager hands grasped the fallen banner, but a fresh discharge scattered the regiment like chaff to the shelter of the woods behind. There went up a fierce yell from the Confederates, and their skirmishers ran swarming down the hill to engage at closer range. Battery after battery rolled up to the front and poured a terrible fire upon Shelby's devoted brigade, waiting for the onset—a fire rarely if ever surpassed for accuracy and precision. Ahead of all, Rabb's notorious six James' guns plied their bloody trade, and shredded life and limb away like stubble to the lava tide.

* * * The artillery fight lasted an hour, when Blunt threw forward a large force of infantry for the assault. Three times they came to the death grapple and three times Shelby's lone brigade hurled them back in confusion. Both parties took breath and glared upon each other with earnest hate. Shelby could not leave his position, and Blunt could not carry the hill by a front attack. Suddenly, two heavy columns broke away to the right and left, and General Marmaduke knew further resistance to be useless, as his vastly inferior force could not engage the

enemy on equal terms. The bugles sounded retreat, and Shelby moved off in magnificent style, bringing with him his dead and wounded. Massing his cavalry in solid column, Blunt hurled them upon Shelby's brigade in one long, continuous charge, supported promptly by the rapid infantry. Furious at being baffled by such small numbers and stimulating his jayhawkers and Indians by drink, Blunt led them on in person, bent upon destroying all before him. The pursuit and retreat were equally determined and deadly. Here Shelby inaugurated and put in practice his own peculiar system of fighting on a retreat, afterward carried to such bloody perfection by all his officers. It was this: stationing his regiment by companies on each side of the road, he had thirty positions for the thirty companies in his brigade. The company next the enemy was only to fire at point blank range, break rapidly into column, and gallop immediately behind the other twenty-nine still formed, and take position again for the same maneuver. Thus, the advancing forces met continually a solid, deadly tempest of lead driving into their very faces, and the companies delivering their fire in rotation had ample time to reload carefully and select most excellent positions.

After retreating some distance Shelby made a stand on the summit of a hill. "About its base the cavalry surged in wild eddies and fell off from the rocky sides before the steady fire of its defenders, while Lieutenant Richard A. Collins poured a destructive volley upon the advancing infantry. The sun, hitherto obscured all day, shone out suddenly like a ball of fire, and seemed to crest the waving banner with a crown of golden radiance." With a true instinct for

the dramatic Shelby pointed to it and exclaimed, "It is the sun of Austerlitz!" But it was the Austrian, not the Napoleonic, sun for him.

The final stand was made in a gorge flanked on one side by a stream, on the other by a high cliff, a veritable *cul de sac*, according to Edwards. "Up this cliff the men climbed; waist deep in the freezing water, they crouched behind the bank; while further to the rear, in the road, a few mounted men showed themselves as decoys. Hooting, yelling, swearing—Lieutenant-Colonel Jewell at their head—the Sixth Kansas in advance, galloped down upon the ambush with sabers drawn. From the rocks above the road, from the zigzag banks of the creek, from the pines on every side, a deadly fire poured upon them from the concealed foe." Their leader, Jewell, fell mortally wounded and, according to Edwards, in their frantic efforts to rescue him, "twenty-nine men and nineteen horses were blended together in one solid heap of agony."

The account given by Blunt is a matter of fact statement of what happened, without any attempt at a florid style, and probably is nearer the truth. He represents the rout of the Confederates as complete. Perhaps he judged the whole by Carroll's brigade, which, Edwards himself says, never rallied after the first fire and "thundered away to Van Buren, carrying tidings of defeat and disaster."

The battle lasted nearly a whole day, covered fifteen miles, and both sides agree that it was furious and bloody, yet the casualties, 8 killed and 32

wounded on the Union side, Confederate losses not accurately given, but not large, were very small compared with the numbers engaged, 5,000 Federals and about 2,000 Confederates. The mortality among the horses must have been considerable, for Colonel Shelby had four killed under him. The Confederates retreated back across the mountains by the Evansville road without any loss of prisoners and were soon ready to return with Hindman for a still fiercer struggle.

Holmes is said to have agreed somewhat reluctantly to allow Hindman to give battle and finally did so on condition that he return at once to Little Rock, whether victorious or defeated. Hindman was now ready to march over the Boston mountains and attempt to carry out his plan for the destruction of Blunt, although he knew that his scanty equipment would not allow him to follow up a victory, even if Holmes should permit it. December 3 he left Van Buren with 9,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 22 pieces of artillery. He seems to have been a master at mystifying the enemy regarding his numbers, for this is the force constantly referred to by the Federals as numbering 28,000 to 30,000. It would have been slightly larger, had not a scarcity of shoes and arms compelled Hindman to leave a part of his forces behind.

Four roads crossing the mountains converge at Van Buren. The main army followed the telegraph road, Marmaduke's Missouri cavalry in front, with one detachment on the Frog Bayou road to the east and

another on the Evansville road to the west. Stand Watie was ordered to halt his Cherokee Indians in the vicinity of Evansville. Blunt's main force was encamped near Newburg, a hamlet on the Cane Hill ridge. When the firing began Watie was to advance and occupy certain mills—both sides in this region always looked out for the mills—and attack Blunt's train, if it retired toward the village of Cincinnati. Unexpected delays held back the main army so that it did not reach Morrow's until the morning of the 6th. Shelby's brigade there encountered Blunt's cavalry and drove them back almost to Newburg. In the course of the afternoon Colonel J. C. Monroe moved up with his Arkansas cavalry and prepared to attack in front and on the right flank on Reed's mountain, but when he had approached to within ten paces the enemy broke and fled.

Now this movement was precisely what Blunt had expected and he had telegraphed (December 2) Totten at random that Hindman and Marmaduke were advancing 25,000 strong and begged him to come to his aid. Herron, who, unknown to Hindman, had moved back from Yellville to Springfield, received this telegram next morning at Wilson's creek and at once hastened to the rescue. Most of the cavalry was sent on in advance and reached Cane Hill the night of the 6th. The main army, six brigades of infantry, 500 cavalry, and 30 guns, moved by forced day marches, covering 35 miles a day, and reached Fayetteville about 3 a. m., Sunday, December 7. Curtis had telegraphed Blunt from St. Louis

to fall back to meet Herron, as he was too far advanced from his supplies, but he probably never received the message, as he was still at Cane Hill when Herron reached Fayetteville. He also warned Herron to beware of the "shrewd and active" Hindman, lest he be deceived and ambushed. Herron's second division of cavalry had passed him on the road and marched toward Cane Hill until midnight, the 6th, when they camped, expecting to hasten on to Cane Hill at daybreak. The First Arkansas Infantry (Union), Captain M. La Rue Harrison, camped with them.

After Monroe had driven back Blunt's cavalry and Hunter's infantry had occupied the ground thus won, Hindman called his commanders together to receive their final instructions for the morrow. Just then he received news of Herron's approach. This caused a complete change of plans and he decided to get in between Blunt and Herron and try to crush the latter, who was the weaker, before they could unite. At midnight, after replenishing his camp fires, Parsons moved his command back to Morrow's and Monroe's brigade was instructed to remain on the crest of the mountain and skirmish as infantry at daybreak to deceive Blunt and detain him at Newburg as long as possible and then to press him vigorously when he began moving toward Herron. The trains were sent to the rear on the telegraph road under a small guard, which left Hindman with less than 10,000 effectives to meet the combined forces of Blunt and Herron, should they unite.

At 4 a. m., Sunday, December 7, Hindman set his army in motion toward Fayetteville and about the same time Herron, who had had only one hour to rest, started his forces to Cane Hill. Bad roads, "the breaking of artillery harness and debility of the battery animals" caused Hindman's infantry to move very slowly, but Marmaduke's cavalry had gone on in advance and a little before sunrise they encountered Herron's cavalry on the road to Cane Hill. In Herron's own words they were "stampeded * * * closely pursued by at least 3,000 cavalry."* They kept running until they met Herron's forces six miles from Fayetteville. "It was with the greatest difficulty," continues Herron, "that we got them checked, and prevented a general stampede of the battery, but after some hard talking, and my finally shooting one cowardly whelp off his horse, they halted."

Up to this point Hindman's strategy had been almost Napoleonic in conception, but he now fell short in execution. Instead of following up Marmaduke's initial success and throwing his whole army on Herron while still confused, he disposed his forces behind the Illinois river, near Prairie Grove, and waited for Herron to attack. Instead of pounding the enemy to pieces by sledge-hammer blows, he would now let the enemy wear himself out by assaults, that too, when he knew that Blunt was within easy reach. Captain Edwards blames Colonel F. A. Shoup for this, saying that he had been ordered to

*This was a considerable exaggeration.

attack, following up Marmaduke, but that, instead of doing this, he waited an hour for Herron to attack and then wasted another hour hunting for Hindman to tell him that his forces were insufficient to drive the enemy. This may be true, but Hindman did not reproach him in his report for inaction. On the contrary, when he met Shoup and learned that Marmaduke was falling back he went forward to inspect Shoup's position and pronounced it an exceedingly strong one. Perhaps this arrangement was the best possible under the circumstances. Hindman tells us that his infantry was still far in the rear and that "it was painful to observe the exhaustion of the men," who had marched nearly fifteen miles, had eaten nothing since the preceding day, and had been on insufficient rations for a month.

The delay enabled Herron to marshal his infantry and drive Marmaduke back. As he fell back Shoup was arranging his division on the edge of a densely wooded hill, which descends abruptly to Crawford's prairie, directly across the Fayetteville road, along which Herron was advancing. On coming up Marmaduke's cavalry took a position on his right. When Hindman came up he approved of this arrangement and placed Frost's division, now enlarged by the addition of the brigade of Texans, with Clarke's Missouri regiment, commanded by Brigadier-General Roane, on the left to meet Blunt, who, Hindman knew, was sure to come up, as dense columns of smoke indicated that he was burning his stores at Rhea's Mills and Newburg preparatory to leaving.

When Herron came up he declared that the position of his enemy was "the strongest I have ever seen."

The battle was opened about 12 o'clock by the Federal artillery. Meantime Blunt was enraged and confused. He was enraged at Colonel M. La Rue Harrison, who had encamped his First Arkansas Infantry (Union) Saturday night with the cavalry of the second division and reported that he could not move again until Monday, whether out of regard for the Sabbath or the fear of getting into a fight Blunt could not tell. He was also enraged at Colonel J. M. Richardson, whom he had sent out with a detachment on the Hog-eye road to observe and report what the enemy was doing, because that officer did not report to him until 10 o'clock next morning that the enemy had been moving toward Fayetteville since midnight. Before this, however, he had already become convinced that Monroe's attack was only a feint and sent his transportation to Rhea's Mills and ordered his troops to move toward Fayetteville to form a junction with Herron. Here confusion of orders caused delay, but about noon he heard firing and at once got his army in motion in that direction.

As for the battle itself, General Hindman himself shall speak in his own graphic words:

The line of battle determined on was nearly in the form of a horseshoe, conforming to the shape of the hill. Only Shoup's division and Shelby's brigade of Marmaduke's division (the latter dismounted), were at first placed in that line, filling the right and center opposite the line taken by Herron, which was

upon the farther side of Crawford's Prairie, on a bluff that rose up steeply behind a stream flowing into the Illinois river. Frost's division, to which had been added the brigade of Texans, with Clarke's Missouri regiment, commanded by Brigadier-General Roane, was held in reserve to await the movement of Blunt. MacDonald's regiment of Missouri cavalry and Lane's regiment of Texas cavalry (the latter commanded by Lieutenant R. P. Crump) were held in readiness to meet any attempt upon the flanks. About 12 o'clock the enemy opened with artillery, to which ours began responding, but this I prohibited.

At 1 p. m., aided by a tremendous artillery fire, the infantry of Herron's command advanced against the position held by Shoup and Marmaduke. It was permitted to approach within 60 yards, and then, as it charged, making gallantly past one of our batteries, and having it a moment in possession, Fagan's Arkansas brigade, part of McRae's brigade, and the Missourians, under Shelby, delivered a terrific fire from their shotguns, rifles and muskets and charged the enemy furiously. Hawthorn's regiment of Arkansans retook the battery. The Federals broke and fled. Our men pursued them far into the prairie. The slaughter was great, the earth in many places strewn with Federal wounded and dead. Very soon the attack was renewed, a little farther to my right, with great vigor and determination. I ordered Shaver's Arkansas brigade, of Frost's division, to the support of General Shoup. The enemy was again repulsed with heavy loss, and retired in confusion.

Blunt had now formed line of battle 2,000 yards to the front and left of Shoup, and commenced advancing. I ordered Frost's division forward on the left of Marmaduke's. The thick undergrowth on that flank rendered it difficult to execute the move-

ment, which was further embarrassed by the well-directed and maintained fire of the enemy's batteries. There was, however, no confusion. By the time Frost's division was in line, the enemy was nearly across the prairie, and our skirmishes engaged his almost as soon as deployed. His attack was directed against Parson's brigade. It was fierce and prolonged, but ended in his being driven back with disorder with heavy losses. One of Marmaduke's regiments and one of Roane's (both Missourians) shared the honor of this achievement. The enemy now brought up all his artillery, many pieces of which were rifled, and endeavored to shake our troops by playing upon the entire line for nearly an hour. Then he attacked with all his infantry, at the same time threatening the extreme left with a heavy cavalry force and attempting to turn the right. MacDonald's Missouri cavalry defeated him in the last maneuver. Lane's Texas cavalry and Roane's brigade deterred him from seriously assailing the left, and Shoup's division, Shelby's brigade, of Marmaduke's division, and Parson's and Shaver's brigades, of Frost's division, gloriously repulsed him in his desperate attacks upon their lines. He again fled beyond the prairie, leaving his dead and wounded, and the colors of several regiments, in our hands, besides a number of prisoners. Some of these were ascertained to be of Totten's division, which had arrived upon the field, still further increasing the disparity of forces.

In the midst of this struggle, information reached me that a considerable body of Federal cavalry was approaching Hog-eye, to which place I ordered my trains. I directed the wagons retired on the Telegraph road to Oliver's. This was done without loss. A furious cannonade was kept up by the enemy until near sunset: then a last attack of his infantry was directed against the line held by Frost. This was a

most determined effort to retrieve the fortunes of the day. It signally failed and the enemy paid dearly in killed and wounded for the attempt. At dark the battle closed, leaving us masters of every foot of the ground on which it was fought.

Both sides claimed the victory. Four days after the battle Herron said, "The victory is more complete and decisive than I had imagined." But this was after the Confederates had retreated. General Schofield wrote: "At Prairie Grove Blunt and Herron were badly beaten in detail, and owed their escape to a false report of my arrival with reinforcements." Why did the Confederates not follow up their victory? General Hindman says:

Considering the strength of my command, as compared with the enemy; considering that my men were destitute of food, their wagons thirty miles in the rear, and not to be brought forward without danger of being lost; that my small supply of ammunition was reduced far below what would be necessary for another day's fighting, and that my battery animals were literally dying of starvation, and could not be foraged in the presence of a superior force of the enemy, I determined to retire, and gave the necessary orders for that purpose.

To this should be added the fact already brought out, that retreat was determined on to satisfy General Holmes before the campaign was ever begun.

In order to conceal retreat from the enemy blankets were taken from the soldiers and wrapped around the wheels of the artillery to muffle the sound. By

midnight the rear guard of the infantry had passed out of hearing on the road back to Van Buren.

General Hindman remained on the field with Marmaduke's cavalry to bury the dead and care for the wounded. General Blunt sent the first flag of truce to ask this privilege and he granted a similar privilege to Hindman. He was expecting a renewal of the battle next morning and, when day came, declared that Hindman had abused the flag of truce to cover a retreat. This charge, however, seems not well founded, as he had sent the first flag. Each also charged the other with violating the truce by collecting arms.

The losses on both sides were heavy, Confederate 164 killed, 817 wounded, and 336 missing, a total of 1,317; Union, 175 killed, 813 wounded, 263 missing, a total of 1,251. The Confederates reported the capture of 5 flags, 500 small arms, 23 wagons filled with clothing and other supplies, and 275 prisoners. General Herron reported the capture of 4 caissons filled with ammunition, 300 stand of arms, and 60 prisoners. In addition over 150 came in after the battle and gave themselves up. General Blunt did not report any captures, but his imagination was very fertile in magnifying the numbers of the enemy and minifying his own. He was sufficiently gullible to swallow whole Hindman's story that he had 28,000 men in the battle. His own men actually engaged in fighting he declared did not exceed 7,000, about 3,000 cavalry not taking any part. Possible they had not sufficiently recovered

from the fright given them by Marmaduke's cavalry early in the morning.

According to Hindman one regiment, which shall be nameless here, dishonored itself. After delivering a single fire most of the men threw down their arms and fled, some of them deserting to the enemy. Their officers remained and did their best. "The other troops displayed the greatest courage, constancy, and enthusiasm. There was no place of shelter on any portion of the field. * * * During five hours, shell, solid shot, grape and canister, and storms of bullets swept the entire ground. Many gallant officers and many soldiers equally brave, fell dead or wounded, but their comrades stood as firm as iron. Volunteers maintained their reputation. Conscripts rose at once to the same standard, and splendidly refuted the slanders put upon them by the class of exempts."

General Hindman has been described as excellent in strategy, but poor in execution in the field. The Prairie Grove campaign was a bold one, but certainly it was poorly carried out. Hindman carried ammunition sufficient for only one battle and left his train south of the mountains for convenience in retreat and to avoid the danger of capture. As retreat was decided upon before the campaign was ever begun, it looks today as if the only justification for the expedition was the destruction of Blunt or Herron or possibly both. If that was the objective, then sufficient ammunition should have been carried to accomplish it.

Having retreated to Van Buren, Hindman scattered his forces over a stretch of one hundred miles to make subsistence easier. Marmaduke's cavalry was sent off as far as Lewisburg. The main body of the army was now on the south side of the river, but one of James F. Fagan's infantry regiments was left at Van Buren and a regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Crump was posted at Dripping Springs, nine miles north, to guard against a sudden attack by the enemy. Desertions and sickness, due to exposure and lack of supplies, were now rapidly depleting the forces and about Christmas orders were issued to move the main army to Lewisburg for better subsistence.

Bad weather and the necessity of caring for the wounded prevented Blunt and Herron from pursuing Hindman. The wounded, including some Confederates left behind, were cared for in improvised hospitals, in churches and other buildings. Many died, but the majority recovered. The dead, including those taken from the battlefield, were buried, the Federals to the south of town, the Confederates on the east, and still rest there, free from all wars and rumors of wars. A few who had taken part in the battle as Confederates now came and joined the Federals and numerous citizens took the oath of allegiance.

Hearing that a small band of Confederates were committing depredations on Union families in and near Huntsville, especially that of Isaac Murphy, Colonel James Stuart took a small force, including the First Arkansas Cavalry (Union), and drove them away (December 21-23).

A few days after this Blunt and Herron started south at daybreak (December 27), marching until 3 a. m. next morning. Arriving at Dripping Springs that morning, they came upon Crump, who made several efforts to check them, but their cavalry was in Van Buren by noon. This was a complete surprise. Fagan's division was already twenty-five miles away, Frost's ten miles, leaving Hindman an army of only 4,000 to confront an army of 8,000. Shaver's brigade was now posted opposite Van Buren and shelled the town in the hope of driving back the cavalry and Frost was directed to hold Strain's landing, six miles below, to save as much as possible of the government's stores. Most of the fighting was with artillery across the river, the Federals having the advantage in guns and locations (a part of them being on the hills above town), and continued until night fall, when Hindman withdrew. His losses were 100 prisoners, 50 wagons with six-mule teams, 250 head of cattle, a large amount of ammunition, four steamboats and a ferry boat, besides two steamers which he himself had burned. On the steamers was a large supply of corn, sugar, and molasses, which had been sent up from Little Rock. Blunt used all of this he could and burned the rest, about 13,500 bushels of corn. Not being able to subsist the army in that region Blunt and Herron retired north of the mountains and soon withdrew a considerable part of their forces into Missouri, leaving garrisons at Fayetteville and a few other places. Hindman retired to Little

Rock and soon had the Federals believing that Brigadier-General Henry E. McCulloch was advancing on Van Buren with 10,000 or 15,000 men.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FALL OF ARKANSAS POST

December 10, 1862, the War Department assigned Brigadier-General Thomas J. Churchill to the Trans-Mississippi Department and ordered him to repair to Little Rock and report for duty to General Holmes. He was at once put in command of the second division of the second corps and upon him fell the duty of defending Arkansas Post.

Arkansas Post, where the first settlement in Arkansas was made, is situated on a bluff on the Arkansas river, some twenty miles above the junction of the river with the Mississippi. Its commanding position at the end of Grand Prairie appealed to engineers as a good place for a fort to stop progress up the river toward Little Rock, and there they had constructed Fort Hindman. A strong force, properly supported, could easily have held it, but insufficiently garrisoned it proved a trap, as all such places do under like circumstances. General Churchill now had about 5,000 men, only 3,000 of whom were "effective," and 13 guns (6 and 12 pounders).

Shortly after the battle of Shiloh (April 6, 1862) Grant fixed his eyes on Vicksburg, the strongest fortress on the Mississippi river, and determined to capture it, thus opening up the river and cutting the Confederacy in twain. From Shiloh to the fall of Vicksburg (July 4, 1863) military operations in Arkansas were more or less connected with the move-

ments across the river. In December Grant decided that the time was ripe to strike and sent General W. T. Sherman to Memphis to gather up an army with which he intended to co-operate. The movement was somewhat hurried, no doubt to anticipate the arrival of General John A. McClerland, a civilian soldier, who was selected by Lincoln to command the Mississippi river expedition, an arrangement which caused "much bitterness," said General Clinton B. Fisk, "among us generals, who were all anxious of doing brave deeds in opening the Mississippi." Sherman managed to get off just ten days before McClerland arrived, but the movement was slow enough that his men, according to General W. A. Gorman (Union) "wantonly burned much property." This army had earned an "uninevitable reputation for plundering, robbing, and burning property." Sherman had seven of the guilty parties shot, a procedure which he did not later follow in Georgia. Being reinforced with 11,000 men from Helena, which almost stripped it of defenders, he advanced on Vicksburg with an army of 30,000, hoping to surprise the small garrison before Pemberton could reinforce it. But the brilliant dash of Van Dorn upon and capture of Holly Springs, where he captured or destroyed \$400,000 worth of supplies, and other movements in north Mississippi and Tennessee, kept Grant busy so that he could not co-operate. The result was that Sherman miserably failed and was repulsed (December 29) with terrible losses, 1,776 dead, wounded and missing to 207 for Pemberton. The assault was

considered an act of madness by some of his own commanders and undoubtedly was one of the worst mistakes of his career.

Whether Bragg had heard of this defeat or not, he determined to try to crush Rosecrans and then turn upon Grant (then at Oxford), thus putting him between the jaws of a vise. For this he fought three days at Murfreesboro (December 31-January 2), but was forced to retreat.

Having buried his dead and recovered the wounded whom the enemy had not taken prisoners, Sherman embarked his army and sailed for Milliken's Bend, several miles above Vicksburg. Here he was met by General McClerland, who assumed command (January 4, 1863) and the next day issued detailed orders for the attack on Arkansas Post. For this expedition he gave the following reasons: To free the navigation of the White and Arkansas rivers, to co-operate with Curtis' column operating in Arkansas and create a diversion against a Confederate expedition into Missouri, thus repaying Curtis for his co-operation in the Mississippi river expedition; to restore the morale of the troops, which had been greatly lowered by the failure at Vicksburg; and to remove a constant menace upon the rear of any force moving on Vicksburg. Going above the river in transports, Admiral Porter leading the way with his gunboats, he turned into White river and then into the Arkansas through the cut-off on the morning of January 9. His approach was reported to Churchill by pickets.

When Van Buren was captured Hindman started down the river, sans everything an army needs in the midst of snow, sleet, and rains, which made the roads almost impassable. Hunger and cold—the soldiers had no tents and insufficient clothing—caused desertions by the hundreds. Hindman seems to have thought of going south to Arkadelphia, but when Holmes heard of the proposed attack on Arkansas Post, he gave up all thought of responding to the persistent calls for troops at Vicksburg, if he ever had any, and ordered Hindman to hasten to the rescue with his tattered army.

The conduct of General Holmes in this crisis adds one more irrefutable proof of his incompetence for so responsible a position. Possibly he hoped here to repeat the defense of Vicksburg, but there was little ground for the hope that 3,000 men, with fortifications and equipment far inferior to those of Vicksburg, could hold out against 30,000 men well-equipped and backed by a strong river fleet until Hindman could bring up his exhausted and enfeebled army.

But Churchill knew that the enemy would not wait for Hindman and prepared to give the attacking party a warm reception. He ordered out his own command, about 3,000 effectives, and stationed them in some entrenchments about a mile and a quarter below the fort. Colonels James Deshler and J. W. Dunnington held the fort with the first and second brigades while Colonel R. K. Garland held the third in reserve. Three companies of cavalry, under Cap-

tains Nutt, Denson and Richardson, were sent forward to observe the enemy.

During the night the enemy landed and prepared for a combined land and water attack. Next morning (January 10) the gunboats moved up the river and opened fire. Not having anything but 6 and 12 pounders Churchill did not return the fire. He had counted on support by the guns in the fort, but the powder was so defective that they could not reach the fleet. Early in the afternoon finding that he was being flanked by cavalry and infantry, he withdrew to the river line of his entrenchments.

The enemy continued to advance with great caution, but made no charge. A few who had ventured to occupy the cabins of Churchill's old encampment were driven out by Colonel R. Q. Mills. Admiral David D. Porter now moved up and began an attack on the fort which lasted two hours and then fell back with some of his boats slightly damaged, but the fort was almost ruined.

This ended the fight of the first day. During the night Churchill received a telegram from Holmes ordering him to hold the fort "until help arrives or all are dead." This order he communicated to the brigade commanders and next morning prepared to meet a new attack. The enemy took ample time to prepare and not until 12 o'clock did the simultaneous movement by land and water begin. The iron-clads opened on the fort and in three hours silenced every gun except a small 6-pounder Parrott gun on the

landside. This made it possible for the boats to pass up the river and open a cross fire.

The land attack was delivered in eight fast and furious charges, all of which were repulsed although the entire line of rifle pits had only one battery for defense. Let General Churchill himself tell the rest of the story.

The fort had been silenced now about an hour, most of the field pieces had been disabled, still the fire raged furiously along the entire line, and that gallant band of Texans and Arkansans, having nothing to rely upon now save their muskets and bayonets still disdained to yield to the overpowering foe of 50,000 men who were pressing upon them from almost every direction. Just at this moment to my great surprise, several white flags were displayed in the Twenty-fourth Regiment, Texas dismounted cavalry, First brigade, and before they could be suppressed, the enemy took advantage of them, crowded upon my lines, and * * * I was forced to the humiliating necessity of surrendering the balance of the command.

My great hope was to keep them in check until night, and then if reinforcements did not reach me, to cut my way out. No stigma should rest upon the troops. It is no fault of theirs. They fought with a desperation and I hope and trust that the traitor will yet be discovered, brought to justice and suffer the full penalty of the law. Many thanks are due to Colonels Anderson and Gillespie for the prompt measures taken to prevent the raising of the white flag in their regiments. In the Second brigade, commanded by the gallant Deshler, it was never displayed.



Entrance to Confederate Memorial Park, Prairie Grove, Ark.
Erected by Arkansas Division U. D. C.

Hindman got no further than Pine Bluff when he heard of the surrender and turned back to Little Rock. General J. M. Hawes, who was encamped near DeVall's Bluff with three regiments of Texas cavalry, Chrisman's Arkansas battalion and some light artillery, had been ordered to reinforce Churchill, but got no further than Hick's Station, near Brownsville. Walker's Texas cavalry, after marching to Pine Bluff, back to Little Rock, and then back to Pine Bluff (December 27-January 8)—a private thought because the medical board wanted them to have exercise—was ordered to reinforce Churchill January 11, but that was too late. The only reinforcements Churchill received was 190 men from Colonel E. E. Portlock's regiment at St. Charles. They, marched forty miles in six hours fought their way in and arrived just in time to surrender.

The losses of the Confederates were 60 killed, 75 or 80 wounded, and 4,791 prisoners. They also lost 13 guns ranging from 3 to 12 inches, 5,000 muskets, Enfield rifles and shotguns, 300,000 rounds of cartridges, large quantities of battery ammunition, 4 caissons, 4,000 canteens, 4,000 haversacks and 4,000 accoutrements. The Federal loss was 1,061 killed, wounded and missing. This alone is ample proof of the skill and heroism of the defense.

Why did Holmes give the foolish, criminal order which involved all this loss and would have involved the lives of all the defenders, had his orders been strictly carried out? The capture of the fort would indeed open the way to Little Rock, but a demol-

ished fort full of dead men, however brave they may have been, is less of a defense to an exposed city than an army of living men who have fought and honorably retired before superior numbers. Yet he was retained in command and Kirby Smith thought him superior to Price in strategy, though the latter had the stronger hold on his troops.

McClerland had a detached command, but he was subject to Grant's orders. Whether he purposely kept his superior officer in ignorance of his movements it would be hard to say, but on the very day that he made the attack on Arkansas Post, Grant wrote from Memphis complaining that he had received nothing official from him and the next day, while McClerland was receiving the surrender of Churchill's army, wrote to say that he did not approve of the move and ordered him "unless acting under authority not derived from me," to keep his command where it could be soonest assembled for an attack on Vicksburg in co-operation with Banks, that is, at Milliken Bend.

What McClerland wanted to do was to advance up the river and capture Little Rock, but before leaving Arkansas Post he received Grant's order recited above. Loath to give up this project he wrote to General W. A. Gorman, stationed at Helena and operating on the White river, that he would delay a day or two in order to threaten Little Rock and Pine Bluff in his favor. An excuse for this delay was given to Grant in a letter written the same day (January 14) in which he stated that he would procede to Napo-

leon, on the Mississippi, as soon as he had completed the demolition of the enemy's works at Arkansas Post. He was a citizen soldier and he now appealed to President Lincoln to save him from the "clique of West Pointers" to whom his success at Arkansas Post was "gall and wormwood." Had he failed, as Sherman had failed at Vicksburg, Grant undoubtedly would have caused trouble, but it would hardly pay to attack a successful general who was in favor with President Lincoln, so he reluctantly approved an accomplished fact after Sherman had explained to him its importance.

Immediately following the capture of Arkansas Post Gorman moved up the White river to St. Charles, which the Confederates evacuated thirty-six hours in advance, and then on to DeVall's Bluff and Des Arc. The net result of the expedition was the driving of practically all the Confederates and a good many planters with their slaves up the Arkansas, the capture of 125 prisoners, two 8-inch guns, 70 Enfield rifles, a considerable quantity of munitions and supplies, the burning of three railroad cars, two bridges and the tearing up of the railroad track. Gorman was particularly desirous of recapturing the steamer *Blue Wing* with two barges of coal which the Confederates had captured eight miles below Napoleon, but it made good its escape. He looked longingly toward Little Rock, but snow and rain caused a "sea of mud and water" to intervene and he reluctantly turned back to Helena.

The shake-up in commanding officers which followed the fall of Arkansas Post does not appear to have had much, if any, connection with that event. Hindman had expressed the wish several times for a transfer to the east after Holmes superseded him. He now repeated the request and when Holmes refused he appealed directly to President Davis, saying that he would resign rather than continue in "this grave of ambition, energy, and system."

Meantime political forces had been at work. After having sent two or three letters to President Davis the Arkansas delegation in Congress (Messrs. Johnson, Mitchell, Royston, Garland, Hanly, and Batson) called on him and urged him to place E. Kirby Smith in command of the Trans-Mississippi District, to withdraw Hindman and leave Holmes in command of Arkansas, to place General Price in command of the army of north Arkansas and Missouri; to refuse to withdraw any more troops from Arkansas and send back some of those then serving out of the state, and to send arms and ammunition as promptly as possible. In reply President Davis said that the last request had already been met. The next day (January 30, 1863) an order was issued relieving Hindman of command and ordering him to report at Vicksburg. Down to this time the only news President Davis had had of the disaster at Arkansas Post was derived from "Yankee papers" and he hoped that these were not true. February 9 Smith was instructed to assume command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, though Holmes was not relieved

of the command by Smith until March 18. After he had received a full account of the disaster Davis wrote a soothing letter to Holmes (February 26), explaining that Smith was his ranking officer and that the change had been made "from no want of confidence in you."

So it seems that if the Richmond government had ever conceived any idea of Holmes' incapacity, it had been blotted out by the activity of the Arkansas delegation. They had insisted on Hindman's recall mainly, it seems, because he was "very objectionable to the public feelings of the state," and this seems to have been due largely to his activity in declaring martial law and enforcing the conscription act the previous summer. Yet, at the very time that they were asking the substitution of Holmes for him, that gentleman was asking the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and his request was granted.

It may be that the activity of Albert Pike and his friends had had something to do with Hindman's unpopularity. In the midst of his activity the previous summer Hindman had had a round with Pike. May 31 he ordered him to the Kansas border for the protection of the Indian country against invasion. Though the order was repeated with variations as to destination, Pike made no answer until July 15, when he reported that a part of his troops had departed for Arkansas and that he would follow. A few days later he forwarded his resignation and asked to be relieved at once, saying that, if he did not get

an order relieving him in fourteen days, he would turn the command over to Colonel Cooper.

We have already seen that Pike's Indians played an inglorious part in the battle of Elkhorn (Pea Ridge). For this Pike had been criticised up and down the western border, very unjustly, he thought. He declared that he had gone to the territory to make treaties with the Indians and had very unwillingly accepted the command there to carry out the policy he had inaugurated. Hindman now forwarded his resignation to Richmond with his endorsement and relieved him of the command. Pike then issued a printed circular criticising the administration, but saying that President Davis was not to blame. He complained particularly of the taking of the troops by Van Dorn, which were intended for the defense of the Indian country, and of the interception of supplies. Taking away the troops left the country very inadequately protected and it was liable to be overrun. He told the Indians that, owing to defeats near Richmond, the war would soon be over, but assured them that the Confederacy would never desert them and begged them to remain loyal. He sent a copy of this to President Davis and wrote him at length, making recommendations about the management of Indian affairs and insisting that adequate defense be provided by troops from other states than Arkansas and independent of the commander of that region.

When he saw a copy of the circular letter Colonel D. H. Cooper ordered the arrest of Pike on the ground that he was either insane or a traitor and said

that he should be punished under the act forbidding the furnishing of information to the enemy. When President Davis received his letter and circular he sent a very curt note calling attention to the impropriety of addressing the President through a circular and to the fact that he had committed a grave military offense under the laws for the government of the army. Hindman approved of Cooper's action and ordered that Pike be sent to Little Rock under arrest for trial on charges of falsehood, cowardice, and treason. For some reason Pike was not taken to Little Rock under arrest, but was allowed to go there and visit his family and was granted leave of absence by Holmes, pending action on his resignation. The situation had been so threatening in the northwest that Holmes had ordered Hindman there to straighten matters out. This he soon did, but the commanding officers retreated in disorder before the enemy.

Pike went from Little Rock to Grayson City, Texas. Soon after this a disloyal society was discovered in this part of Texas and forty-six of its members were executed by a popular tribunal. From Texas Pike passed over into the Indian country and assumed command. Hindman then ordered him to be arrested and taken to Little Rock under close guard for trial on the charge of assuming command in the Territory without authority, as well as on the charges previously made. In the press Pike was also charged now with membership in the disloyal society mentioned above, but nothing seems to have come of this. In fact, there seems to have been no evidence

whatever that he ever had any connection with the society.

Pike now addressed a letter to President Davis defending his conduct on the ground that, as his resignation had been declined and his leave of absence had expired, there was nothing left for him to do but resume his command. The right of Hindman to issue orders was denied, as he had never been given command of the district. He then described a condition of anarchy and starvation in the territory and charged that Holmes and Hindman were responsible for it. As soon as released he intended going to Richmond to clear himself of charges of misappropriation of funds belonging to the Indians.

The request for the transfer of Hindman was granted, but the President refused to grant that relating to the keeping of Arkansas troops in Arkansas, a request which was simply backing up a letter from Governor Harris Flanagin on the same subject. This refusal was based on the claim that more troops had been sent to Arkansas than had been withdrawn and because he did not think it wise "to encourage the idea of retaining in each state its own troops for its own defense, and thus giving strength to the fatal error of supposing that this great war can be waged by the Confederate states severally and [n o t] unitedly, with the least hope of success."

The Federals now concentrated all their energy upon Vicksburg, confining their activity in eastern Arkansas to raids, and skirmishes and watching the Confederates. January 12, Lieutenant James B.

Bradford, who had been sent back by Colonel Powell Clayton when ordered to St. Charles, was attacked by Captain Crawley twelve miles from Helena and lost twenty of his twenty-five men. Three days later the forces on the Mississippi burned Mound City. February 19 the village of Hopefield was burned as a retaliation for the burning of the steamer *Hercules* and seven barges of coal and killing one of the crew by a band of "rebel guerrillas." March 5-13 Powell Clayton proceeded to Madison on the St. Francis where he captured some stores and cotton and made prisoners of some 46 citizens, 10 of whom he paroled. March 6-11 Major Samuel Walker proceeded from Helena to Big and Fisk creeks where he scattered a small force of Confederates, killing two and capturing four.

As a matter of fact, there was practically no Federal activity in eastern Arkansas at this time, most of the troops having been sent to participate in the attack on Vicksburg. Transports were moving down the Mississippi and occasionally a town was burned or plantation raided. Occasionally the transports were fired on from the shore.

The Confederate forces present for duty on April 30, 1863, amounted to 1,402 officers and 17,771 men, an aggregate of 22,249 present. Of these 7,185 were in Price's command, headquarters at Little Rock; 4,058 in Marmaduke's command, headquarters at Jacksonport, though 1,041 were unarmed; 2,206 in Frost's division at Pine Bluff, and a few others scattered around east of the Arkansas river. The Fed-

eral forces concentrated at Helena—Arkansas Post had been abandoned—was estimated by Price at 4,000 to 5,000, an estimate far more accurate than that of General B. M. Prentiss, the Federal commander, of the forces of his enemy (15,000). On June 30 Prentiss reported 5,160 present, 4,081 “present for duty.” Among his subordinate commanders were Brigadier-General F. Saloman and Colonel Powell Clayton.

General E. Kirby Smith called on Holmes to reinforce Vicksburg, but, not knowing the conditions in Arkansas, he left action to his discretion. Holmes thought it impracticable to relieve Vicksburg, but, on June 8, asked Price if the condition of his troops would justify an attack upon Helena. Price was for it, but Holmes thought it inadvisable to attack 4,000 or 5,000 there. Smith now ordered him to send at least a brigade of cavalry as far down the Mississippi as Lake Providence to harass the transports. It was reported that 40,000 men had gone down between June 7 and June 17. Holmes thought that he could render Vicksburg better service by stopping the transports—they were not accompanied by gunboats—than by the doubtful adventure against Helena, but, on receiving information which led him to believe that Price’s estimate of the strength of the enemy was too large and a letter from Smith inclosing a suggestion from the Secretary of War for the attack, he decided to make it and issued instructions accordingly on June 26. His forces were to move in two columns, Price’s command (McRae’s Arkansas and Parsons’

Missouri brigades of infantry) and Marmaduke's division (Shelby's and Greene's brigades of Missouri cavalry) to constitute the first and to move down Crowley's Ridge after rendezvousing at Cotton Plant, Fagan's and L. M. Walker's brigades the second, with rendezvous for Fagan at Clarendon. Walker was already near Helena and was ordered not to allow any ingress.

Rains, high water, bad roads, flies, gnats, and heat made the march an arduous one, particularly to Price, who was delayed four days, but on the morning of July 3 the army arrived at Allen Polk's house, five miles from Helena. Holmes had come down to take command in person in the field for the first time. He now found that the topography of the place made it peculiarly adapted to defense, that "all that the art that engineering could do" had been brought to bear to strengthen it, and that it was very much stronger than he had supposed before undertaking the expedition. In addition to the regular fortifications heavily armed with siege guns there were four redoubts, mounted with field pieces and protected by rifle pits, on the neighboring hills.

But there was no thought of returning without an attack and that night all arrangements were made for opening the fight at daybreak. Price was to attack and capture Graveyard Hill, Walker, proceeding by the Sterling road, was to prevent any troops of the enemy from reaching Rightor Hill, which Marmaduke was to storm and capture, and Fagan was to take Hindman Hill, all acting in concert at daylight.

But things did not proceed with clock-like precision. Walker claims that he performed the task assigned to him, but Holmes and Marmaduke say that he did not, allowing the enemy to get on his left and rear and making advance impossible, a failure for which Holmes says "no satisfactory reason" was given.* "Fagan, at the head of his brigade, charged gallantly over four lines under a deadly fire from the rifle pits," but "the brave men who had followed him thus far, overcome by sheer exhaustion, resulting from the inordinate exertion of their difficult charge and the intense heat of the day, were unable to proceed farther." A charge upon the fort, nevertheless, was attempted, and failed. The brigade thereupon took shelter behind the river line of the breastworks, anxiously awaiting assistance. This assistance never arrived. Price's movement was slightly behind time, due, according to his explanation, to the fact that the topography of the country made it impossible for McRae and Parsons to see each other's command when they reached their appointed places. But he stormed Graveyard Hill and planted the Confederate flag on the summit. There he found his troops subjected to a galling fire from the other positions in the hands of the enemy and from the gunboats and decided that the best way to relieve himself was to reinforce Fagan. If Fagan failed the battle was lost. Accordingly he gave orders for reinforcing him, but, before they were carried out, decided that McRae's and

*Two months later Marmaduke killed Walker in a duel, in which he was virtually approved by Holmes. The encounter came of this controversy.

Parsons' brigades both had been so weakened by their heavy losses in killed and wounded, and particularly in prisoners, most of whom had been captured in the neighborhood of the town whither they had gone without orders from him, and by stragglers whom thirst and intense heat had overcome, that he could not support Fagan without endangering his own position and all idea of reinforcing Fagan was given up, Holmes had also given orders for reinforcement and thought that the failure to obey was inexcusable, but no help was given and at 10:30 he ordered a retreat. At the same time Vicksburg was surrendering.

Holmes had taken with him 7,646 men. His casualties amounted to 1,605. Eighteen officers were killed or mortally wounded, among them Lieutenant W. F. Rector, son of ex-Governor Rector, of the Thirty-ninth Arkansas Infantry. The imagination of General F. Saloman, the Union commander, magnified the numbers of the Confederates to 18,000 or 20,000, their losses to 3,000. His own casualties were 239.

The failure of the expedition, coinciding with the fall of Vicksburg, was a great blow to those who participated, especially to Governor Harris Flanagin, who accompanied the expedition. But the army retreated in good order, returning to Little Rock, which was to be the next main objective of the Federals in Arkansas.

CHAPTER XIV

FROM FAYETTEVILLE TO BACKBONE MOUNTAIN

Immediately following the disaster at Van Buren (December 27, 1862) Hindman, for the purpose of diverting the enemy from that place and forcing them to retire from the valley of the Arkansas, ordered Marmaduke to make an expedition into southwestern Missouri. His force consisted of Colonel Jo Shelby's Missouri brigade of cavalry, about 1,600 effective men, some without horses, Carroll's Arkansas brigade, about 500, commanded by Colonel J. C. Monroe, and Colonel Emmett MacDonald's Missouri battalion, about 270 effective men. December 31 they left Lewisville, on the Arkansas river, bound for Springfield and Hartville, 200 miles distant, via Yellville. Colonel J. C. Porter was also ordered to march with White's brigade of Missouri cavalry, 700 men, from Pocahontas and meet the others on January 9 at Hartville. This, when the forces were united on January 10, gave a total of 3,070 men, estimated by the enemy at 4,000 to 6,000.

The march over the mountains was a very trying one to both armies. Most of the horses were unshod and some had to be abandoned. The men were short of provisions and thinly clad and had to march through drenching rains (three days one time) and piercing winds. "The men suffered much," says Shelby, "but, keeping the bright goal of Missouri

constantly in mind, spurred on and on quite merrily."

On the way to Yellville, in the Boston mountains, Colonel Shelby came upon "100 notorious bushwhackers and deserters," of whom he killed twenty, wounded as many more, and took several prisoners, thus breaking up "this murdering, robbing, jayhawking band." Colonel Porter reported a somewhat similar experience on the way up from Pocahontas. The most important battles of the campaign were at Springfield (January 8, 1863) and Hartville (January 11). At the former place the engagement began at 10 o'clock and lasted until night. The Confederates captured parts of the town, which the Federals burned as they retreated, but were unable to drive the enemy out. As the Federals were reinforced during the night Marmaduke thought it best not to renew the fight and turned off to Hartville, where he met Porter. This battle lasted several hours, but the Federals finally fled, leaving their dead and wounded behind. In the course of the campaign numerous forts (blockhouses) were razed and such munitions and supplies as could not be carried off were destroyed. Particular pleasure was taken by MacDonald's men in camping on the farm of General John S. Phelps, sometime military governor (on paper) of Arkansas, where they made bonfires of his fence rails and banquetted from the richly stored larder of Mrs. Phelps.

Immediately after the battle of Hartville Marmaduke returned to Arkansas, reaching Batesville January 18. As for the results, the expedition at least

kept Blunt from Van Buren and saved the valley of the Arkansas for a time.

Though Shelby was not an Arkansan he fought up and down the state with his Missouri brigade and deserves a special paragraph. He belonged to the days "when knighthood was in flower." In deed, he was, in the eyes of his chronicler,

The knightliest of the knightly race
That since the days of old,
Have kept the lamp of chivalry
Alight in hearts of gold.

His official reports are refreshing reading. In fact, they are gems of literature, spite of bits of "fine writing." For example his report of this expedition begins. "On the last day of December, 1862, when the old year was dying in the lap of the new, and January had sent its moaning winds to wail the requiem of the past my brigade" * * * was "on the march for forays on the border's side" * * * through "the grand old mountains standing bare against the dull and somber sky, their heads heavy with the storms of centuries." He makes one think of Scott's border knight. Indeed, he must have been a close student and great admirer of Scott, judging from the bits of poetry with which his reports are interlarded. Here is a gem in praise of certain of his officials which sounds as if torn from the pages of "Marmion":

Still Collins plies his lurid torch
Where balls will rend or powder scorch;
Still Shanks and Gordon, side by side,
Like veteran heroes stem the tide.

But he did not limit his praise to officers. Thomas Smart, private, he tells us, "left behind a name bright as the hills that girt the shores of paradise." No wonder his men worshipped him and followed gladly wherever he led. Nor did he forget to thank "the ladies of Little Rock who so kindly remembered my brigade" for their starry banners under the folds of which "many a noble heart was fired and many a proud step fell quicker when their silken folds caught each warrior's eye."

Although Marmaduke had caused Blunt to turn back, he did not clear northwest Arkansas of Federals. While he was fighting at Springfield and Hartville Colonel John F. Philips sent 75 men from Elkhorn to Berryville where they surprised and killed what he called "a gang of 10 bushwhackers,"* who were "armed with Federal uniforms and arms, and mounted on good horses," all of which were captured. About the same time Major Joseph W. Caldwell made a raid from Huntsville to Buffalo river where he destroyed extensive saltpeter works and captured 14 head of horses and mules from a preacher named Rodgers on the ground that he was engaged in gathering them up for the Confederacy. January 24 a scouting party from Fayetteville, consisting of Illinois and Arkansas troops, raided Van Buren, capturing the steamer *Julia Roan* and 249 prisoners. There was some fighting back and forth across the river without result. Early in February Captains Charles

*Every citizen who went armed—few dared not to—and was opposed to the other side was a "bushwhacker," "jayhawker" or "guerrilla."

Galloway and Robert E. Travis, First Arkansas Cavalry (Union), raided Ozark, fighting two small engagements at White Oak and on Mulberry river. February 4, Brigadier-General J. W. Davidson succeeded in driving Marmaduke out of Batesville and south of the river. February 5 the Illinois and Arkansas troops made another dash on Van Buren, capturing a few prisoners at Threlkeld's Ferry and thirty bales of cotton which was stored in a "vacant church" at Fayetteville. On the return they were attacked by some of Carroll's men, who were taking down the telegraph wire along the Ozark stage road. The sending out of such parties seems to have been the favorite sport of Colonel M. LaRue Harrison, commanding at Fayetteville. March 29-April 5 Captain John I. Worthington and Lieutenant Joseph S. Robb went on such a raid and reported that they were "so fortunate as to leave 22 dead rebels in their track." At the same time Captain J. R. Vanderpool was raiding Newton and Carroll counties where he killed 19. At least one account stands on the other side of the ledger. A party of 35 men sent out by Colonel Harrison to assist the beef contractor in getting in his stock was set upon by Major McConnell who killed 3 and captured 15.

Speaking of these raids many years later Colonel J. M. Harrell, who operated in that region, said:

The country north of the Arkansas was now at the mercy of irresponsible bandits, claiming to be authorized by J. F. Philips of Harrison, and bearing the Union flag whenever they did not deem it

more useful to their purposes to carry no flag at all, and to pretend to be Confederates. Houses were broken open, horses and cattle driven off, fences burned to make fires, women and children terrorized and insulted if suspected of being Confederate "widows" and "orphans." Implements for making clothing were destroyed or taken away—especially cards for carding wool or cotton. These latter were hidden and guarded as precious treasures by the women of north Arkansas, and for these the valiant militia made diligent and rude search. From burning fences they proceeded to burning barns and outhouses, but as yet generally spared the humble dwellings which sheltered the families.

It was a case of Arkansans against Arkansans (Vanderpool was a Missourian) and these raids left traces of bitterness which have not entirely disappeared to this day.

Brigadier-General William L. Cabell, a graduate of West Point (1850) and a resident of Arkansas, served the first two years of the war east of the Mississippi. In February, 1863, just when he had recovered from wounds received at Corinth, he was ordered to northwest Arkansas and instructed to take command of the remnant of Hindman's forces and augment them as much as possible. Appeals soon came to him from the people suffering from the raids recited above and he determined to try to give relief. Accordingly he marched to Fayetteville with 900 men, camped over night south of the town, and at 5 a. m. next morning (April 18), after having learned the positions of the enemy from R. J. Wilson, then a

lad under twelve, attacked a force which he insisted was double his own, though Colonel Harrison reported that "between 300 and 400 men only" were engaged. Lieutenant Colonel A. W. Bishop, Major T. J. Hunt, Major E. D. Ham, and Captain William S. Johnson were among the defenders.

The accounts of the battle given by Colonel Harrison and General Cabell are diametrically opposed on some points. The former says that "during the whole action the enemy occupied ground covered with timber and brush while my command was in the streets and open fields." According to Cabell, Harrison's men never were in the open fields and were in the streets only when running from one house to another as they were driven out. Cabell had brought two guns and placed them on East Mountain (Mount Sequoyah), but made little use of them because he did not wish to cause the citizens any more suffering. As the enemy were armed with excellent Whitney and Springfield rifles while his men had only the imperfect Arkadelphia guns Cabell decided that he could not drive them out without too great a sacrifice of men and horses and withdrew after three hours of hard fighting. After waiting without results for the enemy to attack him in the open Cabell resumed the march back to Van Buren. Although he had failed to capture Fayetteville he felt sure that the expedition would curb the lawlessness of the troops there. Whatever the cause Colonel Harrell says that the atrocities now ended. "The old men mended their plows and women and children be-

gan the cheerful preparation for the cultivation of their little fields."

The Confederate losses were twenty killed, thirty wounded, a good many horses, and 100 stand of arms, mostly shotguns. Harrison's losses were one lieutenant—ran away disgracefully to Cassville, Missouri; missing, thirty-five, "mostly stampeded toward Cassville during the engagement," and one lieutenant and eight men prisoners, "taken while absent without leave at a dance, nine miles from town," and seven privates taken in town.

Before leaving General Cabell sent Captain W. A. Alexander with a flag of truce to ask permission to bury the dead. Colonel Harrison replied that they had already been decently buried in coffins and that the wounded had been taken to his own hospital, where they would receive the best of care.

Some time after this, when neither army was in or near the place, the town was burned a second time, why or by whom is not known. The courthouse is said to have been fired by a man who was insane.

While the battle of Fayetteville was in progress Marmaduke was moving on his second raid into Missouri. He started with 5,000 men, including Colonel Robert C. Newton's Arkansas Cavalry, but 1,200 were unarmed and 900 were not mounted. For these he hoped to capture arms and horses. He hoped to capture McNeil at Oronton or Bloomfield, but that gentleman escaped to Cape Girardeau, which was so strongly fortified that Shelby thought it not wise to attack. Colonel Newton was attacked while

in camp on the Jackson and Fredericktown road, but repulsed his assailant. The army then returned to Arkansas. One of the objects of the expedition was to forage in Missouri for a while, thus relieving Arkansas. The gain was 150 new recruits and a good many horses, and subsistence for a few days (Marmaduke was back in Arkansas May 2). Also, the capture of Elisha Baxter, who was an ardent Unionist and had left Batesville when Curtis abandoned the place. He was recognized by some of Newton's men, was carried to Little Rock as a prisoner, but was released and later became governor of the state. The cost was 30 killed, 60 wounded, and 120 missing, and probably much more ill-will on the part of the Missourians.

After the retirement of General Albert Pike from the Indian Territory things had gone from bad to worse there under General Cooper. In the hope of improving conditions General William Steele was assigned to the command of the territory early in 1863. On arriving at Fort Smith he found that everything was "of the most gloomy description." The country was completely exhausted of its resources by the Confederate troops kept there since the beginning of the war, and Hindman's retreat had left the people completely demoralized. Steele says that his "watchfulness was more taxed by the operations of traitors, deserters, and Union men, known in common as 'jayhawkers' (who were in the majority), than by the movements of the enemy."

At Fort Smith he found 250 men present for duty, all that was left out of fourteen full companies. In the hospitals he found 1,500 in a wretched condition. The few stores left by Hindman had been stolen or scattered. The chaotic conditions he blamed partly upon the incompetent officers who were serving without legal commissions, but he saw no way to improve conditions by displacing them and allowed them to continue in service. Scarcity of forage and subsistence compelled him to send Speight's brigade to the Red river. Many of Cooper's Indians had granted themselves furloughs. Hindman had encouraged universal furloughs for them, but some refused and those who furloughed themselves generally came back—to get something to eat. Yet, in the face of such difficulties, Steele determined to hold Fort Smith, to open up the navigation of the Arkansas, and prevent the enemy from reinforcing Fort Gibson in the territory, whence they might attack Fort Smith in the rear.

A supply of corn was finally secured, but no arms or ammunition. Steele then set to work to make the arms as best he could and sent to Texas for powder, but found that it was of a very inferior quality. His own immediate command consisted of Cooper's Indians, commanded by Stand Watie, Tandy Walker, W. P. Adair, D. N. McIntosh, Chilly McIntosh and L. M. Reynolds, and two regiments of Texas cavalry. Cabell had been ordered to co-operate with him and was now sent on a raid beyond Fayetteville to Cow-skin, Missouri, and ordered to co-operate with Cooper

in an attack on Fort Gibson. But, on account of high waters, Cabell failed to co-operate, the attack was repulsed, and the fort received an immense train of supplies and munitions.

Cabell was now recalled to Fort Smith and ordered to advance up the south bank of the Arkansas and join Cooper for a campaign against Blunt with his mixture of whites, negroes (First Kansas, colored) and Pin Indians. July 15, two days before Cabell arrived, Blunt surprised Cooper at Honey Springs and drove him back. When Cabell came up Blunt retired to the north bank of the river without fighting. After he had marched and countermarched for some time Steele was attacked at Perryville and driven out, the village being burned. Blunt then turned upon Cabell, who had been ordered to assume direction of operations at Fort Smith, and pursued him to Poteau bottom, where he was held in check until nightfall, spite of inferior powder.

Being separated from Steele by the enemy, Cabell now determined to end his Indian campaign and next morning started for Jenny Lind. Blunt, who had a considerable advantage in more artillery and forty wagons in which to haul his infantry, sent Colonel W. F. Cloud in pursuit and this officer came upon him at the foot of Backbone Mountain (September 1). Cabell's force had already been reduced by desertion from over 3,000 to 1,250 and not over half of these could be relied on to fight. After the fight began Cabell says that several companies ran "in the most shameful manner." In escaping they ran

through the provost guard, where he had eighty prisoners under sentence for treason and desertion and carried these with them. Cabell declared that if these men had fought "as troops fighting for liberty should," he would have captured the whole command of the enemy and gone back to Fort Smith. Even with this he lost only five killed and twelve wounded and saved his train. He now turned off toward Arkadelphia, and seems to have been followed as far as Waldron, where there was a light skirmish (September 11), but Blunt and Cloud entered Fort Smith. The "key to the northwest" was lost. A similar fate awaited Little Rock just ten days later.

In explanation of the desertions General Cabell has this to say: * * * "Both officers and men were impressed with the idea that the proper way to defend the country was for each man to go home and defend his own home." Most of his troops were "deserters from other regiments or conscripts and jay-hawkers forced into the service," a very sorry lot. Besides, Schofield had ordered a very lenient policy to encourage desertion. When the men left their commanders never expected to see them again, yet many, who pleaded that they wanted to look after their families in the devastated region north of Van Buren, did return and rendered valiant service.

The day before the capture of Little Rock Colonel Cloud started from Fort Smith for that place with 200 men and one section of artillery. At Dardanelle he attacked Colonel Ras. Stirman (September

12), who, he said, had 1,000 men and 4 guns, and drove him out and across the river, capturing one captain, 20 privates, and 200 head of Confederate cattle and quantities of supplies. There he was joined by six companies (300 men) of Union men, who came in with the stars and stripes flying and helped in the attack. Three of the officers and 100 of the men had fought him at Backbone mountain under Cabell.

CHAPTER XV

THE FALL OF LITTLE ROCK

In the winter of 1862-3 there was considerable friction between General Curtis and General J. M. Schofield in Missouri. The former was an abolitionist and wanted to terrify the Missourians into submission, while the latter was a conservative and favored a mild policy. Schofield's ideas certainly were more in harmony with Lincoln's, but, for some reason, Schofield was withdrawn and Curtis left in command. As the Vicksburg campaign developed Curtis was called on to furnish troops for this, but he was loath to send them, claiming to need them for his "thorough" policy in Missouri. Partly for this reason and partly because his policy was doing much harm to the Union cause in the state Lincoln sent Schofield back to Missouri May 24, 1863, and he co-operated heartily with Grant.

At the same time he went on making preparations for the capture of Little Rock, and the opening up of the Arkansas river from its mouth to Fort Gibson. For this task he had 14,248 infantry, 15,509 cavalry, and 13 batteries of artillery in his Army of the Frontier, scattered throughout Arkansas, Missouri, Indian Territory, and Kansas, with a sprinkling in Colorado and Nebraska. At his request nine regiments of Missouri infantry were now turned over to him by the governor and were equipped by the War Department, bringing his effective force up to

36,816. But just at this juncture he was called on for 11,000 men and 3 batteries in Mississippi and Tennessee and sent them without murmur.

After Vicksburg had fallen, Helena had been saved from Holmes, and Port Hudson had been captured he reminded Grant of the help furnished him and of his plans, and requested that Major General Frederick Steele be assigned to the command in Arkansas. Grant then reported that he was ready to send him 5,000 men, all he had that were not exhausted and worn down, and would send more later, if necessary. The forces at Helena were ordered to operate against Price, then between the St. Francis and White rivers. Steele was also assigned to the command, though he did not arrive at Helena until July 31. August 11 he assumed command of all Federal troops in Arkansas north of the Arkansas river, an aggregate of 13,207 with 9,433 present for duty, including Davidson's cavalry, and 49 pieces of artillery. At Clarendon he received 2,300 infantry furnished by Hurlburt from Memphis.

Schofield's operations on the upper Arkansas had not been seriously interrupted by the Vicksburg campaign and these had been carried on with results already indicated. The day that Grant wrote him (July 15) he ordered Brigadier-General John W. Davidson, with a division of cavalry, to move southward through eastern Arkansas over Crowley's Ridge and effect a junction with the forces at Helena. In seeking to communicate with Helena Davidson sent a band of fifty, commanded by Captain James D.

Jenks, who fought their way through and delivered the contents of the dispatches, having destroyed the papers to avoid their capture. These dispatches gave objectives rather than specific instructions.

The first objective was the destruction of the forces of Price and Marmaduke; the second to gain possession of and permanently hold, as much of the state as practicable, especially to open up communication by the Arkansas river with Blunt in the Indian Territory. The details of operations to realize the objectives he left to the commanders in the field.

Several weeks before the fall of Vicksburg General Kirby Smith, after having removed certain troops from Arkansas to Louisiana, advised concentration on the Red river against General Banks and issued a circular letter advising citizens to destroy their cotton. This alarmed Governor Flanagin as meaning nothing less than the abandonment of Arkansas, and he protested both to Smith and to President Davis against any such move. Smith defended the withdrawal of the troops as a military necessity, but denied any intentions of abandoning Arkansas, though he again intimated that it might be necessary to concentrate all available troops on the Red river to meet Banks, as a result of which the Arkansas valley might be "endangered or even temporarily occupied." He had no help to offer now (July 11), but assured the governor that he was not biased by local influences and that he had the interests of Arkansas at heart.

But this did not assure George C. Watkins, formerly a member of the Supreme Court; R. W. John-

son and A. H. Garland, members of Congress, and C. C. Danley, member of the state military board, who addressed a letter to Governor Flanagin protesting strongly against the policy of abandonment. Among the disastrous consequences sure to come of this abandonment of the richest part of the state to the enemy they named the setting up of a "bogus government" at Little Rock to which the people, left without arms or organization, would inevitably submit, depletion of their forces by desertions of soldiers returning to their families within the Union lines, the defection and submission of the Indian nations and of Missouri, the cutting off of Arkansas from the Confederacy and her subjection to northern domination.

By way of advice they suggested that all of the people, white and slave, be compelled to retire from the banks of the Mississippi and the region allowed to become waste. This would put a stop to illicit traffic with the enemy along the river and make it possible to assail their gunboats and transports by sharpshooters and small artillery without fear of retaliation on innocent inhabitants, as had been done at Hopefield. They opposed calling out the militia, as Smith had suggested, but insisted that he should enforce the Confederate conscription act on men between forty and forty-five, and secure arms from the Rio Grande, though they were willing for the state to help to the extent of the unexpended balance to the credit of the military board. Little Rock should not only be made the point of concentration for Ark-

ansas, but also headquarters for all the Trans-Mississippi District.

Flanagin then took the matter up with Smith and they reached an agreement (August 10) that he was to raise a volunteer force of men 40 to 45 for service in the field, that they were to be under his command for the present, though subject to orders by the division and district commander, while Smith was not to conscript any men in any such companies and was to furnish them with military and quartermaster stores.

So much for the policy, the development of which we have followed beyond the time when it became necessary to begin to carry out a policy of defense. July 23 General Holmes, who was confined to his bed, by illness, turned over the command to General Price. The next day Price arrived in Little Rock from Des Arc, leaving his division in command of Fagan, and began to size up the situation.

On paper, at least, Holmes had turned over to him 31,933 men in the whole district of Arkansas, of whom 14,509 were "present for duty," though this took no account of the losses at Helena. Price's division was the one formerly commanded by Hindman, his brigade commanders being Fagan, McRae, Tappan and Parsons. The other two divisions were those of Marmaduke and William Steele. We have already seen that the latter was in the territory, where he was hard-pressed by Blunt, and it is not likely that any of his men except Dobbin's Arkansas cavalry, participated in the defense of Little Rock. The majority

of these troops were Arkansas volunteers, the rest Missourians and Texans. Price afterward declared that he had "barely 8,000 men of all arms" at the critical time. Some writers credit him with more but, according to his own statement, these were all the forces he had for the defense of Little Rock except a weak battalion and a few unattached companies of cavalry, which he kept on the south side of the Arkansas, picketing the country as far as Napoleon and Louisiana. Governor Flanagin had talked of conscripts 40 to 45 and then of 16 to 60, and he issued a proclamation calling on men to rally to the defense of Little Rock, but the results were small.

The capture of Little Rock was effected by strategy, not by battles. The first move on the military chess board was made by Brigadier-General Davidson, who supplied the daring, if not the brains, of the expedition. Crossing into Arkansas at Chalk Bluff with 6,000 cavalry he burned his bridges behind him, setting his face southward for a junction with Steele.

This happened about the time that Price assumed command at Little Rock. Having looked the situation over he decided to make the first line of defense at the Bayou Meto, twelve miles east of Little Rock, the second at the river, in the hope that the attack would come from the east and north.

No doubt many a reader of this book is familiar with the terrain about the city. It is admirable for defense, provided the enemy comes from the right direction. Across the river, north, lies Big Rock and stretching out east and south from this a bit of stony



The Wallace home as it is today. A few hundred yards east of Clarksville. Mr. Wallace was standing near the front of the house when a gun was thrashed down his throat and fired. One or two of his sons are today residents of Van Buren.

ridge, part of which is now called Park Hill, commanding the approaches from the east and south. Here Price "dug in," constructing a series of rifle pits, breastworks and redoubts, extending in a semi-circle from Big Rock to a point some miles down the river. If you care to follow them, the Park Hill part of the fortifications can still (1926) be traced along the crest of the ridge from the battery position on southwestern tip of the hill for nearly two miles to a point just east of Hickory Addition. At the more vulnerable points you will find rifle breastworks, the outer line being somewhat below the crest of the hill, the second just behind the crest and the third for a last stand back of this. Ascending the paved road that leads up Park Hill from Levy you will find a well-preserved semi-circular artillery position, some hundred feet in circumference. Just beyond this comes a break in the line, caused by the construction of the ridge road, but starting in again where this road turns to the east you can again trace the works for a mile or more, broken here and there by the construction of a house.

Having decided to make the Bayou Meto the first line of defense, Price ordered Dobbin up from Pine Bluff to Little Rock and directed Fagan to station his forces on the Bayou Meto about twelve miles northeast of Little Rock. Marmaduke was to remain at Jacksonport and dispose of his cavalry so as best to hinder the march of Davidson from the north, and Walker was to remain in the vicinity of Helena with

a brigade of cavalry to keep an eye on the enemy and check his advance from that direction.

As Davidson moved down Crowley's Ridge, he glanced toward Jacksonport, but, assured that Marmaduke (who had been instructed by Holmes not be caught on the east side of White river) was getting over the river, he passed on without troubling the enemy. This proved alarming to Schofield and General S. A. Hurlburt (commanding at Memphis) who feared that Price [Marmaduke?] would dash into Missouri, and they almost reprimanded him for his boldness. But Marmaduke believed that the time had come for concentration and he did exactly what Davidson had counted on and fell back toward Price. By August 15 Davidson had reached Clarendon, practically without molestation, though some bands did hang upon his rear. Not only that, he had sent two gunboats (he had asked for the co-operation of the navy) up the river and had captured two steamers, the *Kaskaskia* and the *Tom Sugg*, and had burned the pontoon bridge near Searcy over which the "ubiquitous" Marmaduke, "who keeps Missouri in a fright," had crossed his cavalry to the south side of Little Red river. A later expedition of the gunboats to Augusta resulted in the capture of Colonel C. H. Matlock and the breaking up of a recruiting party. Davidson reported to Steele that the enemy were throwing up rifle pits at Bayou Meto, and that he should have more infantry and guns before attacking the earth works.

Davidson's report was forwarded to Hurlburt who furnished 2,300 infantry, bringing the total operating against Little Rock up to 15,000, but he declared that he had no big guns. Steele was at last ready to move and reached Clarendon August 17. Here he reported 1,000 sick—the men were unaccustomed to the climate—and moved on up to DeVall's Bluff for a more sanitary location for a hospital. The advance toward Little Rock had now begun in earnest.

Price had kept his eye on these movements and ordered Marmaduke and Walker to form a junction near Clarendon to prevent the enemy from crossing. For some reason he now ordered Frost to relieve Fagan of the command of his division, the latter to resume command of his own division. Tappan was kept on the south side of the river. Frost was soon instructed to retire within the defenses, the cavalry being depended on to hold the enemy in check. But the enemy continued to advance and Price now (August 25) ordered Walker and Marmaduke to combine at Bayou Meto under command of the former and hold it as long as possible. Marmaduke was attacked at Brownsville before the junction was formed with Walker, but he held them off and withdrew. Two days later Walker, now in command, was attacked at Reed's bridge, but burned the bridge and retired in good order after dark.

The situation was beginning to look critical, and the dark clouds gathered faster and faster. August 29 Price heard that the Federals had seized Monroe, Louisiana, thereby endangering the stores. A few

days later he heard that Blunt was pushing General William Steele toward Texas. Shortly after assuming command he had ordered the staff departments to send their stores to Arkadelphia. He now ordered the removal of the remaining government stores from Little Rock and Camden and the state government fled, as it had done under Rector the previous year.

Price continued work on his rifle pits, but also constructed a pontoon bridge across the river for safety. He had never expected to be able to hold Little Rock against such a superior force unless attacked in his entrenchments. Of this he now had little hope, as it was comparatively easy for Steele to turn his right flank, cross the river below and attack him in the rear.

As a matter of fact, Steele had concentrated his forces at Brownsville and had ordered Rice to make a demonstration in front while he spent two days (September 3-4) in reconnoitering to see which flank could be the more easily turned. The information received caused him to decide on the right and, though heavily burdened with sick (700), he determined to make the venture. In anticipation of this move Price had ordered Walker to cross the river (August 31) and take up a station some twelve or fifteen miles below the city, but not until the day before the evacuation did he order the construction of any earthworks in that region. September 4 he issued a proclamation calling on the able-bodied men of Little Rock to rally to his support to resist the "iron heel

of the oppressor," and threatening dire consequence to any attempting to cross his lines to the enemy.

It is unfortunate that Price had ever ordered Walker to assume command over Marmaduke. Friction began between them at Helena and this relationship did not improve conditions. Because of Marmaduke's criticisms, Walker demanded a retraction. This Marmaduke refused and a challenge followed. Early on the morning of September 6, when the enemy was hastening down the river to find a crossing, these two men, instead of uniting their forces to defeat him, went out to fight each other. Price tried to stop the duel, but was too late. The result was the death of Walker. According to the laws of Arkansas, which prohibited duelling, Marmaduke was now a murderer. He had not wanted to fight and afterward regretted having killed Walker, but his sense of "honor" blinded him to a way out and caused him to defy the law, just as it does with nations today when they rush into war.

Colonel Archibald S. Dobbin now took charge of Walker's division and did what he could to check the enemy. Several regiments were scattered along the river to guard the fords. By September 7 the enemy arrived in force and had a sharp skirmish with Colonel R. C. Newton at Ashley's Mill. Two days were now spent in reconnoitering and then Steele, ordered Brigadier-General J. W. Davidson to build a pontoon bridge at a bend in the river, where his artillery could sweep both ways, and throw his division across the river while Steele himself passed up the river

on the north side, aiming directly at Price. Dobbin discovered this about daybreak (September 10) and immediately ordered two batteries to play on the enemy. A few shots drove the workmen off, but Davidson's batteries soon silenced the weaker ones of the Confederates and by 10 o'clock the Federals were crossing. Except for skirmishing they met no opposition until they reached Bayou Fourch . Here Marmaduke, who had come up and taken charge of Dobbin's and Newton's cavalry, supported by Tappan's and Fagan's infantry, resisted obstinately until the artillery began to play upon them from the opposite side of the river, when they withdrew.

When Price heard of the crossing of Davidson's division he said that he did not propose to be caught in a trap, like Pemberton at Vicksburg, at once withdrew all his forces from the north side of the river before Steele arrived, burned his bridges and such supplies as he could not carry off, destroyed several steamers, including one large one which was being converted into an iron-clad, and started for Arkadelphia. By 5 o'clock the evacuation was complete and Davidson's cavalry dashed into town hard upon Price's heels. Steele himself came in a few hours later to receive the surrender of the city from mayor, C. P. Bertrand, whom he described as "the first man of this place, and a Crittenden Union man."

The reported casualties of the Confederates was 64, of the Federals, 123. Price had intended to destroy the arsenal, which had been surrendered by Captain Totten in February, 1861, but was too hard

pressed and this now fell into the hands of Davidson's cavalry, which dashed up just in time to save it. In it they captured 3,000 pounds of powder and a considerable quantity of cartridges. Several guns which the Confederates had salvaged from Arkansas Post and repaired were also captured.

The moral effect of the loss of the capital, which the Confederates were never again to occupy, was very great on the people of Arkansas, perhaps greater than the defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg were to the Confederacy. A good many now took the oath of allegiance and asked for the establishment of a loyal government, but the vast majority were still determined to "carry on."

CHAPTER XVI.

FROM THE EVACUATION OF LITTLE ROCK TO THE CLOSE OF 1863.

General Holmes, having been absent from Little Rock when the time came to evacuate it, now returned to Arkadelphia and relieved Price of the command of the District of Arkansas (September 25). That friction existed between the two was generally known. E. Kirby Smith praised Holmes for building up the army in the first part of the year by bringing back the absentees, providing for the comfort of his men, and scattering the disaffected bands throughout the state, but recognized that there were defects in his administration. He reported the discord between Holmes and Price to President Davis without taking sides. The President declared that he was without sufficient information to judge between the men, but barely suggested that Price be transferred to the northwest. Some thought that both should be sent out of the state and such a man as Bragg, or Beauregard, or Hood put in charge. Bragg had previously been asked if he would come, but declined. Holmes remained nominally in command, with headquarters at Camden, until March, 1864, but if he planned anything or did anything of note, there is practically no record of it. He was transferred to the east and Price was again put in command of the district. Possibly the removal of Holmes was partly due to the complaints of the people in southeastern Arkansas that the

soldiers, professedly by his orders, were pillaging and plundering them worse than the Yankees. Certainly the transfer was made soon after such a complaint was transmitted to President Davis by Mr. A. H. Garland.

The friction between Holmes and Price was only a small part of the difficulties which confronted General E. Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department. His chief troubles were lack of men, money and arms. The lack of men was largely due to the lack of money with which to pay them. Even a part of Shelby's men, devoted as they were to their leader, were considered as ready to quit when they lost their horses and had no money with which to buy others. Another cause was the report current in Arkansas long before the fall of Little Rock, that Smith intended to abandon the state. He does not seem ever to have had any such idea, but the enemy was steadily gaining and as the men saw their homes in his hands with little hope of regaining them there was little incentive to them to fight or to the men still at home to enter the service. Especially was this true when General Frederick Steele proved to be a kind and conciliatory enemy and, instead of seeking to crush them with his heel, sought to bring them back to the flag they once loved. The names of some Union commanders may be anathema in Arkansas, but that of Steele is not.* It is true that his soldiers committed some depredations, but apparently no such atrocities as were committed elsewhere. When all of

*One of the ward schools in Little Rock was named the Fort Steele School and retained that name until it was burned in 1915.

the state north of the Arkansas river was abandoned, hundreds had already deserted. When the army retreated from Little Rock hundreds more joined them.

The pay of practically all the soldiers was six months in arrear, some more than that. The Richmond government was not indifferent to their wants, but they were a long way off and after the fall of Vicksburg communication was difficult. A considerable quantity of money and bonds was sent but it was long delayed and some of it never reached its destination. Large and small bonds were asked for and it was hoped that these could be sold, but it was soon found that the large ones—at one time \$700,000 was the smallest draft—were practically unsalable. Then a request had to be sent in for small denominations. As early as June 13 General Smith had reported that the crops were good and that assessors for the collection of the tithe should be in the field. He also suggested that bureaus of the treasury and war departments be established on the west side of the Mississippi. The conference of governors which he called at Marshall, Texas, sanctioned his general plan. This, together with Governor Rector's previous threat of secession, seems to have aroused in some the fear that this meant the creation of an independent Southwestern Confederacy, but there is little evidence that Smith ever had anything of the kind in mind. He simply asked that an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury be sent out with authority to act without having to refer everything to Richmond when communication was uncertain, and that a branch of

the War Department be established to supply arms by manufacture or importation through Mexico. A large shipment was stored at Vicksburg, by somebody's blunder, and all were lost. Later 25,000 stand of arms was shipped and General Joseph E. Johnston promised to see that they got across the river if it took his whole army to do it and warned Smith to be on the lookout for them at the Mississippi.

But the army was badly depleted in numbers and recruiting was difficult, especially after the northern half of the state was lost. Three months before the fall of Little Rock, General Smith explained the situation by saying that the fighting population of the state was east of the Mississippi, that the male population remaining were old men, or had furnished substitutes, or were lukewarm, or were wrapped up in speculations and money making. Also, the conscript bureau was defective. Shortly after the evacuation of Little Rock he wrote; "The despondency of our people, their listlessness, their deafness to the call of both the civil and military authorities, the desertions from our ranks, checked neither by vigor nor by clemency all indicates despair and abandonment." He thought that the people were so demoralized by speculation that submission was preferred to resistance and, unless Providence intervened, the immense effort being made by the enemy would be crowned with success. At the close of the year the total number enrolled in the commands of Price, Fagan, Marmaduke, Brooks, Newton, and Carter (G. W.) was 25,623 "present

and absent," but those present numbered only 13,905. Of course many were absent on furloughs, but the majority probably were deserters. But those present seem not to have been quite as despondent as their department commander and their officers were constantly on the alert. In fact the morale of the army was reported as very much improved by November. Desertions had stopped, though recruits were hard to get.

There were no battles and few movements of much consequence in the state from the fall of Little Rock to the end of the year, though skirmishing took place here and there and scouting parties were sent out for various purposes by both sides. We shall notice first the movements in the north.

A few days before the capture of Little Rock Captain John Gardner left Cassville, Missouri, with dispatches for Colonel W. F. Cloud at Fort Smith with an escort of 75 men (one-third of whom were drunk) from the First Arkansas Cavalry (Union), Captain John I. Worthington. They drove a few Confederates out of Bentonville (September 4) and the next day scattered 65 men believed to have belonged formerly to Major T. R. Livingston's band. At Flint creek they were attacked by a small band of Quantrill's men, but beat them off and chased them ten miles. Having marched about eight miles farther and stopped to feed they were attacked by some 300 Confederates whereupon 50 of Worthington's men fled. While Worthington was trying to rally his fugitives Gardner took command of the others and

fell back to Hog-eye, then to Round Prairie, where, after destroying his dispatches, he surrendered himself and 22 men to Captain Wm. Brown. All these were paroled by order of General Cabell.

At the very time Little Rock was being closely invested Major Fred R. Poole was making an expedition from Missouri to Big Lake in Mississippi county, Arkansas, where he killed "thirteen noted guerrillas and captured twenty-six or thirty others." He said that he found this part of Arkansas more loyal than Missouri.

Just four days before Holmes reassumed command Price ordered Shelby (September 21) to go on an expedition into his beloved Missouri. Next day he started out with 600 men, detached from three regiments, and two pieces of artillery for a trip of 1,500 miles. "The weather was propitious," he tells us in true Shelby style, "and the glorious skies of a Southern autumn flashed cheerily down upon waving banners and glittering steel as we marched by the white-haired chieftain, General Price, and his healthy benediction was solemnly prophetic of my entire success."

September 27 his advance guard skirmished with some "Federal outlaws and jayhawkers" and later came up with about 200 men of the First Arkansas Infantry (Union) about twelve miles south of the Arkansas river and they were driven off with a loss of seventy killed, wounded and captured. Shelby then crossed the river near Ozark and pushed on across the Boston mountains, reaching Bentonville the night

of the 29th after destroying the telegraph wire on the Fayetteville road for several miles. He then passed on into Missouri, where he was joined by partisan rangers from time to time (Colonel D. C. Hunter, Colonel J. T. Coffee and others) until his forces numbered 1,500 or more.

On the way northward the army passed through "the blackened and desolated town of Sarcoxie whose bare and fire-scarred chimneys pointed with skeleton fingers to heaven for vengeance," then on to Oregon, or Bowers' Mills, which, by way of vengeance, was sacked and then "swept from the face of the earth, to pollute it no more forever." At Greenfield Shelby "appropriated the contents of several stores." Continuing he says:

All along this road the inhabitants had their household furniture taken from their houses, and waiting in silence and sorrow for us to apply the torch, it having been represented to them that my command was laying the country waste, as though God had sent the whirlwind and the storm to drive back the laws of nature and desolate the land with fire, pestilence, and famine. On this route every house belonging to a Southern family had been burned, and the family as effectively destroyed as if the waves of the Dead Sea had rolled over them with their dread monotony.

The march through Humansville on the road to Warsaw was "fruitful of good horses, and many changed hands that day." At Warsaw he routed a band of Federals and captured vast quantities of stores and a few prisoners. At La Mine, by a bold dash "in the dark and murky night," he drove off the

guard and burned the magnificent railroad bridge costing \$400,000. At Tipton "a cloud of scouts" went out and destroyed sixty miles of railway. Just outside Tipton he met and routed Colonel T. T. Crittenden with 100 men. The mayor of Booneville came out to ask for mercy and protection for the town and gladly took the oath of allegiance.

"Meanwhile a great storm was gathering. General [E. B.] Brown, with 4,000 men, came up like a black cloud from Jefferson City . . . and was thundering in my rear with disappointed hate and malice." Brown now pursued Shelby to Marshall, having several skirmishes on the way, and there forced a battle which lasted five hours. It must be confessed that Shelby did some brilliant fighting there, holding off more than double his numbers and escaping with no very great loss. Shelby now retreated southward in great haste, hotly pursued by the enemy, until he reached the Little Osage in Arkansas (October 20), where he was rejoined by some of the troops who had become separated from him on the retreat.

While that "dark cloud" from Jefferson City was coming up on Shelby at Booneville (October 11) Colonel W. H. Brooks, who had not followed Shelby into Missouri, led four regiments (Colonels S. W. Peel and Ras. Stirman, Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Reynolds and Captain Wm. Brown) in a demonstration against Fayetteville. Coming up to the city, he demanded its surrender in half an hour, but Colonel T. J. Hunt demurred and told him to come and take it. Colonel Hunt was not sure of his ability to

resist, neither was Colonel Brooks sure of his ability to capture the place and he followed the Fabian policy. That night Lieutenant J. G. Robertson ventured out on the Huntsville road and found some thirty or forty men in the Walker house on West Fork and drove them half a mile when they formed a battle line and Robertson withdrew.

Colonel Hunt decided it was time to fortify and he now brought his quartermaster's train and all the wagons he could find up on the square. That night the men slept on their arms. Next day rumors of scouting parties on various roads kept flying about. On the 13th the colonel decided to move all government property on the square for protection. While this was being done a patrol on the old Missouri road was driven in. Everybody now expected an attack, but no enemy came. That night the colonel erected formidable breastworks on the square "out of the ruins of the town" and continued working on them next day, but Brooks withdrew without ever coming up to inspect them.

Just a week after this Shelby arrived on the Little Osage. His rapid flight had left Colonel Ewing far enough behind that he now had three days of comparative rest. Then Colonel Wm. F. Cloud came at him with 3,000 (probably an exaggeration) from Fayetteville, but his pursuit was not very vigorous (McNeil had blamed him for the capture of Colonel Gardner the previous month) and he never really troubled Shelby until he reached Buffalo Mountain and there his weak attack was easily repulsed. Shelby

then pursued the even tenor of his way to Clarks-ville where he crossed the Arkansas (October 26) and then marched slowly to Washington, reaching there November 3.

While it has no connection with his raid we may mention here that Shelby had only a few days rest at Washington when he was ordered back to Lewisville to protect that town, where there were some factories for the manufacture of cotton and woolen goods, against a raiding party from Fort Smith. This he did with success and soon returned to Washington.

In summing up what was accomplished on the raid Shelby says that he killed and wounded 600 Federals, captured and paroled 500, destroyed ten forts valued at \$120,000, railroad property worth \$800,000, ordinance worth \$50,000, captured a considerable number of arms, 6,000 horses and mules, used or destroyed \$1,000,000 worth of supplies, and gained 800 recruits. Besides this he had kept 10,000 men from being sent to reinforce Rosecrans after his defeat by Bragg at Chickamauga.

At least one man, Colonel C. Franklin, did not take a rosy view of such raids. Writing to President Davis three days after the return of Shelby to Washington, he said:

When Jo Shelby, or any of the old jayhawking captains, makes a raid into Missouri, he and all his followers adopt the pirates' law of property. Man-kind are considered but objects of prey, and, astonishing and painful as the knowledge must be, they rob indiscriminately friend and foe. If such work is not

soon arrested, it may be continued indefinitely, for not a friend will be left in all that country to be ruined. Shelby boasts that on the last raid he completely "gutted Booneville"; also that many Southern families, hearing of his approach, had removed their goods out of doors, expecting him to burn their houses. In fact, sir, the Shelby-Marmaduke raids in that country have transferred to the Confederate uniform all the dread and terror which used to attach to the Lincoln blue. The last horse is taken from the widow and the orphan, whose husband and father has fallen in the country's service. No respect is shown to age, sex, or condition. Women are insulted and abused. On the other hand, General Steele, the Federal commander, is winning golden opinions by his forbearance, justice, and urbanity. I state this without amplifying. Anyone can judge what will follow. If I dare venture a suggestion, it would be that the men who have thus deported themselves should be removed from the district, for their very names have become omens of evil.

There were others also who thought that the raids of Price, Shelby, and Marmaduke produced more enemies than friends in Missouri.

Brooks did not follow Shelby across the Arkansas. November 7 Colonel M. LaRue Harrison received orders from General McNeil, who had been put in charge at Fort Smith, to pursue Brooks and, taking 412 men of the First Arkansas Cavalry (Union) and two 12-pound howitzers, he set out after the game. Two days later he came upon him nine miles east of Huntsville and drove him on, capturing Lieutenant Wm. Mayes. Next day, about sunup, he again overtook him in camp one mile below Kingston and

robbed the men of their breakfast, for which they fought nearly half an hour. At noon there was another skirmish on the Clarksville road and at night still another, when Brooks divided his forces. On the 11th Harrison halted to ration his men and feed his horses, neither of which had eaten for thirty hours. The enemy had gone equally long without food and had traveled 67 miles. Brooks was now moving down Frog Bayou toward Therkyl's Ferry and Harrison sent Worthington to pursue him, but Brooks escaped across the river with the loss of two officers and fifteen men.

November 10 Major A. A. King left Springfield with 200 mounted cavalry for a raid in Arkansas. He passed through Carrollton, Huntsville, and Berryville and reported killing one or two in each place. About the same time Brigadier-General C. B. Holland, Missouri state Militia, made a raid to Salem, Arkansas, where he claims to have routed a band of 400, killing 14 and capturing 6.

While Shelby was crossing the Boston mountains bound for Missouri General Clinton B. Fisk ordered Major J. Wilson and Captain Wm. T. Leeper to go on a raid from Pilot Knob (September 28) into Arkansas to exterminate bushwhackers, guerrillas, thieves and murderers. Straggling, plundering, pillaging and burning were strictly forbidden. They were to assure the people that they came to put down disorder, not to create it. At Evening Shade on Piney creek (Sharp county) Wilson skirmished with some Confederates, capturing eight officers and fifty-six

men. Leeper went as far as Pocahontas and reported that he had killed one Francis Taylor, "a guerrilla and thief of the worst sort."

Following hard upon this came the raid of Major Josephus Robbins from Cape Girardeau (October 26) to Pocahontas in the hope of capturing Captain Reeves' band. Reeves escaped, but at Seven Points Robbins captured Captain Martin. He did not follow Fisk's instructions to Wilson and Leeper for he stole and took back a few horses which he styled "contrabands."

While on a scouting expedition Major John B. Cocke's forces were attacked (November 10) on Dr. Green's farm, about eight miles west of Lawrenceville, by Major W. J. Teed (Union), but escaped with the loss of four killed and one prisoner. Lieutenant-Colonel T. G. Black, Third Missouri Cavalry, had a skirmish near Searcy when hunting for McRae (November 21). He then went on to Jacksonport where two men performed a daring feat, crossing the river in a canoe and bringing back the ferry boat under fire. Black then threw his men across, whereupon Shaver and his men withdrew. In a later skirmish Black made a few captures.

From Helena Major E. Carmichael made an expedition by boat (November 14) to the Mississippi and up to Island No. 65, where he captured a few men in canebrakes and destroyed 4,000 rounds of ammunition and some supplies, which probably were in transit to Arkansas.

November 29-30 Colonel Lee Crandall took a small force to Bloomfield, Missouri, and demanded the surrender of the garrison. Captain Valentine Prewitt refused and began to fortify, whereupon Crandall withdrew. Before Prewitt started in pursuit Major Josephus Robbins came up with a force of 400 and offered to join in the pursuit. But Prewitt kept putting him off and finally set out with 250 men, telling Robbins to stay there and guard Bloomfield. Finally Robbins telegraphed the situation to General Fisk who at once ordered him to join in the pursuit. He did so, but the delay and Prewitt's leisurely tactics had given Black time to escape.

At DeVall's Bluff two Federal officers who had brought in their men from drill and returned in search of a lost pocketbook reported that they were fired upon by guerrillas in Federal uniforms (December 1). Colonel J. Richmond at once sent a party in pursuit with orders to take no prisoners. On returning they reported that they had killed three and wounded three.

December, Captain H. R. Randall attacked a party of Federals ten miles west of Bentonville, killing three and wounding two. The rest barely escaped. Two weeks later Captain Worthington left Fayetteville for a scouting expedition through Carroll, Marion, Searcy, and Madison counties. He reported severe fighting at Stroud's store where he killed eleven. Next day (December 23) on the road to Yellville he encountered "a rebel force of 200 or 300," Captain Marshall, which he pursued five miles and scattered

in every direction. The next day he followed them until sundown, but never could catch up. On Christmas day the enemy, reinforced by Major Gunning with 200 men from Yellville and Colonel Thomas R. Freeman with 500 men from Izard county, gave battle, losing nine killed and five wounded, while Worthington lost four killed and four wounded. That night, learning that Gunning was camped below him and Freeman above and that they intended to attack him at daybreak, Captain Worthington decided to anticipate them and made a night attack upon Gunning and drove off his force, killing 14 and wounding 30 or 40. Colonel Freeman then withdrew.

Captain Worthington's own statements about his losses are contradictory, ten killed and one wounded in one place, four killed and six wounded in another place, the latter being his total for the whole trip.

He reported corn, wheat and meat very plentiful, but declared that the loyal inhabitants were suffering terribly from the refugee Missourians, who were committing all kinds of mischief, plundering the families of those who were serving in his cavalry and the First Arkansas Infantry.

And so closed the year 1863 north of the Arkansas river.

October 25, General Marmaduke taking the Third (Colonel Colton Greene), Sixth and Tenth Missouri, the First (Colonel J. C. Monroe in place of Cabell), Fifth (Colonel Robert C. Newton) Arkansas, and the Twenty-first Texas, all cavalry; also

Major R. C. Wood's battalion of Missouri cavalry, about 2,000 men in all, and 12 howitzers, marched on Pine Bluff and demanded its surrender. Lieutenant M. F. Clark, who was asked to carry the demand to Colonel Powell Clayton, replied: "Colonel Clayton never surrenders, but is always anxious for you to come and take him."

Being equally anxious to defend himself Colonel Clayton brought his whole command to the courthouse square and, no doubt recalling the story of Jackson's defense of New Orleans, set 300 negroes to work rolling cotton bales out of the warehouses for breastworks. In less than half an hour he had all the streets leading to the square "completely and very formidably fortified with cotton bales" and his cannon placed so as to command these streets, with sharpshooters in all the houses on the square. Anticipating a siege of two or three days he set 200 negroes to bringing water from the river and filling all the available barrels.

About 9 a. m. Marmaduke drove in Clayton's pickets and the battle began. It was almost wholly confined to the artillery and sharpshooters and was fast and furious until 2 p. m. Shortly after noon the Confederates set fire to several buildings on Clayton's right, whether on purpose or not is not known; also to the cotton bales. Clayton thought that they were trying to burn him out, but James B. Talbot, "Captain and Superintendent of Contrabands," formed a chain of his negroes with buckets from the river to the top of the bank and put out the fire. The

killing of one and wounding of three others threw the "contrabands" into confusion, but they were soon rallied and Captain Talbot praised them highly for their heroic work. One warehouse containing 200 bales of cotton was burned and Clayton declares that in firing this building Marmaduke burned several of his own wounded men to death. Among the buildings practically destroyed by the artillery fire were the courthouse and the residences of General James Yell, and John Bloom. Most of the other houses showed some effects of the battle.

Finding that it was impossible to capture the Federals except by storming their breastworks, Marmaduke decided that this would be too costly and withdrew. His losses were 40 killed and wounded. He captured 250 mules and horses, about 300 negroes, and destroyed some 400 blankets and quilts and burned several hundred bales of cotton. Clayton reported 11 killed, 27 wounded and one missing; also 5 negroes killed and 12 wounded; also, 62 mules missing.

A feeble effort was made at pursuit. The rear guard, Colonel R. R. Lawther, was attacked when little more than out of town, but easily beat off the attacking party. The second day after the battle Clayton received orders from General Steele to assume command of all the forces sent to his assistance and to pursue the enemy with vigor. Being sick, Clayton turned the order over to Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Caldwell, who had just come up with 500 men of the Third Iowa Cavalry. Caldwell now started

out about sundown in hot pursuit on a cold trail. By marching nearly all night he reached Tulip in Dallas county about 3 p. m., where he captured one lieutenant and drove in the pickets. Hearing that Marmaduke was at Princeton he determined to attack him next morning, but when he reached Princeton he found that the enemy had left the previous night and was well on the way to Camden. He now decided that it was useless to pursue any further and turned off to Arkadelphia, reaching there at 2 a. m. the 29th. He surrounded the town before his presence was known and captured it without a struggle, taking two officers and eight or ten men left there because sick, \$1,370 in Confederate money belonging to the government, and three six-mule teams. Not finding General Samuel A. Rice (Union) there, as he had expected, he now returned to Benton.

Ten days later Caldwell left Benton (November 10) for a raid to Mount Ida and Caddo Gap, via Hot Springs and Murfreesborough. Learning at the latter place that Major Witherspoon was camped 12 miles below he pushed on, ran down the pickets and dashed into the camp. The men fled into the woods, but he captured Major Witherspoon, two lieutenants and ten privates, and all their horses and equipment.

He then sent out notice for all loyal people to meet him at Caddo Gap and hurried on to the gap where he left a garrison and then pushed on to Mount Ida in the hope of capturing General S. P. Bankhead's garrison, but Captains J. R. Vanderpool and G. W. R. Smith, who had been sent down from Fort Smith

and stationed at Waldron, had attacked Bankhead on the 13th with 100 men, killing several, capturing Major Moulton, eight or ten men and 10,000 rounds of ammunition, 15,000 pounds of bacon and a room full of flour. Such as they could not carry off they destroyed. They claimed to have routed ten times their own numbers scattering them through the country. Caldwell found nothing to attack, but he remained there two days, picking up straggling Confederates and some guerrillas. He did not shoot the guerrillas, as most of the commanders did, but sent them in with proof and asked that they be turned over to a military commission by which they should be "tried, convicted, and executed" for their "many inhuman and horrid crimes."

The guard left at Caddo Gap now joined him with nearly 300 loyal men who had come in to join the Federal army. These were furnished arms and put under the command of Colonel Arnold, a resident of the region. The colonel began work at once. While out with a party of 17 gathering in loyal men he came upon a camp of 23 Confederates and charged them, killing four and capturing seven, their camp equipment, ten horses, and eight Union prisoners these men were holding.

From Mount Ida Caldwell marched back to Benton. Ten miles east of Cedar Glades his advance guard came upon a small band of Confederates and charged them, killing two and capturing twenty horses and twenty small arms.

On this raid Colonel Caldwell had marched

through Hot Springs, Pike, Polk, Clark and Montgomery counties. He says that he found many loyalists. In fact, he declares that the mountaineers had never faltered in their loyalty, though they had suffered severely at the hands of Confederate sympathizers. But some must have been loyal to the Confederacy for Caldwell says that he subsisted his army, as far as practicable, off of "secessionists." This he seems to have thought proper, for he boasts that "not a single private house was entered by a soldier on the whole trip except for a legitimate purpose * * * and not a cent's worth of property was taken which it was not legitimate or proper to take."

The first week in December Colonel James M. Johnson and Lieutenant-Colonel Owen A. Bassett went on a scouting expedition from Waldron to Mount Ida and Caddo Gap, capturing a few and reporting the positions of several bands. December 11, Colonel Lewis Merrill, who had come down from Little Rock, attacked a camp of 600 two miles south of Princeton, killing eight, wounding eighteen, and capturing three officers and twenty-five privates, according to his report. Colonel John M. Harrell, who was not far off at the time, says that this was only "a camp of newly formed state troops in an unarmed camp of exchanged men," that they dispersed without any fight whatever, not one being killed or wounded. December 14, another squadron, which had swept down from Waldron to Caddo Gap, fell upon a little camp at Caddo Mill and claimed to have killed two, captured one, eight negroes, and

three wagons and teams. For this remarkable victory over another little camp, probably unarmed, they marched 139 miles.

About this time General Kirby Smith arrived in Camden, having come to "accelerate Holmes in preparations" and to prepare for a move to drive the enemy out of Little Rock and recover the valley of the Arkansas. He hoped that the enemy, who knew the weakness of Holmes' forces, could be drawn away from Little Rock and brought to battle in ignorance of the fact that troops were coming up from Louisiana. But when he reached Camden and learned that Steele had two strong forts in Little Rock and other fortifications in Pine Bluff and Benton and had received reinforcements, he decided that the plan was "Quixotic and impracticable," and gave it up, directing the forces to go into winter quarters. And so closed the year south of the Arkansas.

CHAPTER XVII

OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE ARKANSAS

Nominally, at least, the Confederates went into winter quarters near the close of 1863, when General Smith abandoned the project of drawing General Steele out of Little Rock. The troops were scattered at various posts around Washington, Camden and Murfreesborough. The winter was very severe, but they built comfortable quarters and had a reasonably good supply of food and clothing.*

In camp the soldiers whiled away the time with drills, sham battles—a big sham battle near Camden was General Holmes' last battle in the Trans-Mississippi Department—and in horse races and various games. The young officers were entertained by the fair maidens of the community, some of them appearing at the balls in homespun, others in ancient silk. Some of the well-known families of the state resided in or around Washington permanently or for the time being, while the capital was located there, and contributed much to the social life.

But, while the main army was in winter quarters and enjoyed some rest, both sides were continually sending out scouting parties or raiding expeditions. Smith's injunction to Holmes on going into winter quarters was to build up his army and strengthen its morale. Now about half the state was in the enemy's

*An officer in Shelby's brigade declared that they subsisted upon "the most meager and damnable rations imaginable," but he seems to have had a grouch.

hands and not easily accessible for enlistment in the Confederate cause, but some decided that it should not for that reason be abandoned. . Colonel Dandridge McRae soon tired of the routine of winter quarters and secured permission to cross the Arkansas river for the double purpose of recruiting and of harassing the enemy.

Colonel R. R. Livingston, First Nebraska Cavalry, was now in command of the District of Northeastern Arkansas with headquarters at Batesville. He had published Lincoln's amnesty proclamation inviting the people to submit and take the oath of allegiance. Now this was precisely what the Confederate authorities did not want and early in the year (1864) Colonel McRae, Thomas R. Freeman, and R. G. Shaver appeared in that region to annoy Livingston and his loyalists and to win recruits for the Confederate army by fair words or by conscription.

January 15 Colonel Livingston sent out a small force from Batesville to get some beef cattle and secure information about McRae, then reported to be at Jacksonport. The commander got both and captured some bushwhackers very much wanted by Livingston, but the captives escaped very much to the disgust of the colonel. On the 19th, Captain Elisha Baxter, Fourth Arkansas Infantry (Union) engaged Freeman at Lunenburg and Captain William Castle dispersed some guerrillas at Grand Glaize, capturing Colonel Jim Rutherford. At Jacksonport (19th) and Sylamore (26th) attacks were made on the Confederates to break up their work of conscription. Jan-

uary 30- February 3 Captains A. B. Kauffman and Castle dashed down from Batesville to Searcy Landing on Red river and back by way of Grand Glaize and Jacksonport, but McRae was always gone when they reached his camp. Two scouting parties that came down from Rolla and Houston after Freeman had to confess that he outgeneraled them, though they killed or captured a few guerrillas. While hunting a band of guerrillas Lieutenant John W. Stephens ran into Freeman's forces at Morgan's Mill, Spring river, and lost several men, narrowly missing capture (February 9). Captain Wm. Bausmer now tried his hand with an expedition from Batesville and marched 240 miles (February 12-20) in search of Freeman, but never found him. He seems to have followed the policy of making prisoners of those capable of military service. If he saw two or more men together he pursued and sometimes killed them. He found forage very scarce and left it still more scarce.

Captain Charles O'Connell led an expedition (February 4-8) from Helena up White river after McRae, but he also found the doughty general had always moved on just before his arrival. However, he managed to capture a few prisoners, guns, and horses, and to burn a lot of corn which he could not carry off. In the Indian Bay settlement he found many guerrillas and plenty of supplies for them. A few days after returning to Helena Captain O'Connell made an expedition up the St. Francis river, traveling 135 miles and reporting the capture of seven prisoners, and a few horses and guns. Major E. Car-

michael now tried his hand on an expedition up White river (February 20-26) and reported several lone privates captured here and there, some of them with a gun and horse, some with nothing. He found a blacksmith shop out in the woods and destroyed it, for what reason he did not say, possibly because a roaming private might have had a broken shotgun repaired there. He found the trail of a band of Confederates and undertook to give chase, but found that they were outdistancing him and gave it up. A detail sent out by him under Captain Ezra King suffered the loss of six men captured and three wounded; also, 23 horses and all of the horse equipment and most of the arms.

At the same time Colonel Livingston reported 2,000 of the enemy hovering around him at Batesville in bands of 100 to 400. He had to send out foraging bands forty to fifty miles for food and these were greatly annoyed by the enemy who one day near Waugh's farm captured 35 wagons and 132 men, wounded 10 and killed 4 (February 19). Livingston reported that he was practically paralyzed, for if he sent out enough men to protect the trains and garrison at Jacksonport, he would not have enough left to protect the stores. March 10-12 Captain Edwin Lawler went on a wild-goose chase northwest of Batesville to Wild Hawk and Strawberry creek hunting for a small band of Confederates, but never came in sight of them. Three days later Major L. C. Pace started on a week's scout to West Point, Grand Glaize and Searcy Landing, the net result of



DAVID O. DODD

which was getting on the trail of Little and Rutherford, but never coming in sight of them, and the capture of Captain Hancock and five privates.

Captain Wm. B. Orr, escorting the treasury agent from Rolling Prairie to Batesville (March 19-April 4) encountered Captain J. B. Love at Ten Broeck's Mills and drove him off toward Craighead county after killing one and capturing two. Nearly all of Orr's men were from the neighborhood and he now granted most of them a leave of absence. When they were attacked by the enemy he sent the rest in pursuit and came upon them at Magues' Landing on the White river where he charged them and drove them off, killing four, wounding one, capturing two, and recapturing three prisoners. Freeman now planned to cut Orr off on his return, but his plans were betrayed and a reconnoitering party which he sent out having been exterminated, he gave up the project.

Another expedition led out from Batesville by Captain A. B. Kauffman encountered a band of 25 guerrillas (mostly from Missouri) at Devil's Fork of Red river and killed 19 of them (March 27). Two were captured, tried by a military commission and shot.

At the close of March Colonel Livingston reported that his forces had killed 286 guerrillas and Confederates and that he had made prisoners of 14 officers and a large number of enlisted men. General McRae asked for an exchange of prisoners, but he refused unless the general would recognize four men

of the Fourth Arkansas Regiment of Infantry as prisoners and not as deserters.

Brigadier-General Nathan Kimball, commanding at Little Rock in the absence of General Steele, sent Colonel E. W. Foster with an expedition over to Augusta to learn the number and whereabouts of McRae's forces. At Fitzhugh's woods he was attacked by McRae's and Rutherford's men and roughly handled by them for more than two hours, but he succeeded in withdrawing in good order (April 1).

April 5-10 a small force was brought down by boat from New Madrid to Mississippi County against a band of guerrillas. A drawn battle was fought with them near Osceola, their leader, Captain Williams and Lieutenant Phillips being among the dead. Another engagement was fought with a different band at Pemiscot Bayou. The most serious engagement was the attack on Jacksonport by McRae's combined forces (April 10), but they were forced to withdraw, Colonel Joseph B. Love being among those killed. Colonel Livingston at once followed this up with an expedition to Augusta, gathering up all the cattle, horses, mules, and able-bodied negroes along the line (April 22-24).

No operations of much consequence took place in the northwest the first part of 1864. The latter part of January Brigadier-General John B. Sanborn, commanding at Springfield, sent out an expedition under Brigadier-General C. B. Holland to look after Confederates and guerrillas who were reported to be infesting Izard, Searcy, Newton and Carroll coun-

ties and preparing for a raid into Missouri to capture trains. Captain Charles Galloway, commanding the First Arkansas Cavalry (Union) at Fayetteville, and Lieutenant J. E. Phelps, son of General John S. Phelps, military governor, were ordered to join the expedition. The operations consisted mainly in running up and down the country and killing men reported to be bushwhackers. No doubt there were plenty of these, but little distinction seems to have been made between them and regular Confederates. The net result of the expedition as reported by Sanborn was "seventy prisoners of war, 200 Confederate soldiers and bushwhackers (many of them notoriously bad characters) killed, and at least 1,000 of the rebel soldiers, partisan rangers, and guerrillas driven across the Arkansas river." In Marion county a detachment of twenty-five men bearing dispatches was scattered by the Confederates, seven being killed and five captured. The latter part of February another expedition was sent down to Yellville on a similar errand and reported skirmishes with guerrillas at Buffalo City and Bennett's Bayou. A similar expedition from Yellville skirmished with the enemy at Buffalo river and destroyed some saltpeter works. March 24 another expedition skirmished with Captain Love at Buffalo river. March 26 an expedition that had come down from Lebanon, Missouri, attacked Captain B. Chambers in the neighborhood of Spring River Mills, killing him and several of his men. Prairie Grove and Rhea's Mills were again the scene of action (April 6-7), an

inconsequential skirmish at the latter, a corral guard of nine being wiped out at the former. A band of Federals from Berryville was attacked by Colonel Cooper while foraging on the Osage Branch of King's river in Carroll county (April 16) losing three prisoners, six wagons, and six colored teamsters who were killed. In a skirmish and pursuit in Lime Stone Valley (April 17) Major James A. Melton and Captain Wm. F. Orr reported thirty Confederates killed, eight prisoners, twenty-three horses and twenty-five stand of arms. Major Melton then swept down upon Colonel Sissell on King's river, killing twenty-five and capturing nine (April 19). Inconsequential skirmishes were reported at Maysville (May 8) and Sparinaw (May 13). Major Galloway was sent out from Fayetteville by Colonel Harrison to drive Buck Brown from the country, but Brown outwitted him, came back to within three miles of Fayetteville, where he captured a herd of 240 mules, and escaped with them after killing two soldiers and one negro (June 24).

As forage was abundant in these counties this probably was as great an attraction to the Federal raiders as the presence of Confederates and jayhawkers. Both Union and Confederate authorities agree that the inhabitants were terrorized, each laying the blame on the other. Colonel John Harrell says that the citizens had not dared to sleep in their own houses for a year or more, but took their bedclothing to the hollows and thickets and there slept out in the coldest weather for fear of being murdered in their beds, and if found

in these positions were shot down as "bushwhackers." He also adds that the "natives, having no ivory, palm oil, or ostrich feathers with which to render tribute to the doughty invaders," were stripped of "cows, pet heifers, calves and poor old horses belonging to the old men and widows along the route * * *; saddles, bridles, bed quilts and coverlets of the children, and children's clothing." On the other hand Sanborn and Holland attributed the disturbed condition to the presence of Confederates and mainly to "guerillas, outlaws, and jayhawkers." Probably both were correct. The country was divided in sentiment, the loyalists standing in dread of the Confederates, the Confederate sympathizers in dread of the Federals, and both in terror of guerrillas and bandits.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RED RIVER AND CAMDEN EXPEDITIONS

South of the river the year 1864 opened with an act of heroism which causes a heart throb in the breast of patriotic citizens, whether of Confederate or Federal ancestry, to this day.

When the Federals occupied Little Rock numerous families became refugees, among them the Dodd family, which fled to Texas. Later in the year Mr. Dodd sent his son David, a lad of seventeen, back to look after some stock which he had left behind. When he applied to General Fagan for a pass to reach his home in Saline county the general suggested to him that he go on to Little Rock and bring back details about Steele's army. After attending to his father's business he went on to Little Rock and spent several weeks there visiting friends. He then applied to General Steele for a pass and this was given without hesitation. He passed the pickets without trouble, but later he met a squad of cavalry, one of whom suggested that he be searched. Concealed in the sole of one shoe they found details about the Federal army written in the telegraphic code.

The notes puzzled General Steele for a time, but after a while he decided that they were written in the Morse code and sent for his telegraph operator, Robert C. Clowry.* Clowry read the notes at once and

*It is interesting to note that Clowry became president and general manager of the Western Union Telegraph Company and lived to a ripe old age, dying February 25, 1925, on a Pennsylvania train while on the way to New York.

found that they gave a complete description of the fortifications, information as to the number of soldiers there, the amount of provisions on hand, and other data valuable to the Confederates. General Steele was a kind-hearted man and did not want to execute a mere boy, to whom, he was sure, some one had furnished the information. He offered to let David go, if he would reveal the name of his informant, but he refused, saying: "I will not betray a friend, and, like Nathan Hale, my only regret is that I have but one life to give to my country." And on January 8, 1864, he was hanged by order of General Steele.

Leander Stillwell, a private in Steele's army, has left an account of the execution which is well worth quoting:

The most painful sight that I saw during the war was here at Little Rock this winter. It was the execution, by hanging, on January 8, 1864, of a Confederate spy, by the name of David O. Dodd. He was a mere boy, seemingly not more than nineteen or twenty years old. There was no question as to his guilt. When arrested there was found on his person a memorandum book containing information, written in telegraphic characters, in regard to all troops, batteries, and other military matters at Little Rock. He was tried by a court-martial, and sentenced to the mode of death always inflicted on a spy, namely, by hanging. I suppose that the military authorities desired to render his death as impressive as possible, in order to deter others from engaging in a business so fraught with danger to our armies; therefore, on the day fixed for carrying out the sentence of the court,

all our troops in Little Rock turned out under arms and marched to the place of execution. It was in a large field near the town; a gallows had been erected in the center of this open space and the troops formed around it in the form of an extensive hollow square, and stood at parade rest. The spy rode through the lines to the gallows in an open ambulance, sitting on his coffin. I happened to be not far from the point where he passed through, and saw him plainly. For one so young, he displayed remarkable coolness and courage when in the immediate presence of death. The manner of his execution was wretchedly bungled in some way, and the whole thing was to me indescribably repulsive. In the crisis of the affair there was a sudden clang of military arms and accouterments in the line not far from me, and looking in that direction I saw that a soldier in the front rank had fainted and fallen headlong to the ground. I didn't faint, but the spectacle, for the time being, well nigh made me sick. It is true that from time immemorial the punishment of a convicted spy has been death by hanging. The safety of whole armies even the fate of a nation, may perhaps depend on the prompt and summary extinction of the life of a spy. As long as he is alive he may possibly escape, or, even if closely guarded, may succeed in imparting his dangerous intelligence to others who will transmit it in his stead; hence no mercy can be shown. But in spite of all that, that event impressed me as somehow being unspeakably cruel and cold-blooded. On one side were thousands of men with weapons in their hands, coolly looking on; on the other was one lone, unfortunate boy. My conscience has never troubled me for anything I may have done on the firing line, in time of battle. There were the other fellows in plain sight, shooting, and doing all in their power

to kill us. It was my duty to shoot at them, aim low, and kill some of them, if possible, and I did the best I could, and have no remorse whatever. But whenever my memory recalls the choking to death of that boy (for that is what was done), I feel bad, and don't like to write or think about it. But, for fear of being misunderstood, it will be repeated that the fate of a spy, when caught, is death. It is a military necessity. The other side hanged our spies, with relentless severity, and were justified in so doing by law and usages of war. Even the great and good Washington approved of the hanging of the British spy, Major Andre, and refused to commute the manner of his execution to being shot, although Andre made a personal appeal to him to grant him that favor, in order that he might die the death of a soldier.

While the work of a spy is honorable, his fate is always death, if caught. No one denies the right of the British to execute Nathan Hale or of Steele to execute David O. Dodd. Yet, while the right was his, he might, in consideration of the extreme youth of the offender, have commuted the sentence and kept the boy in duress until the danger was past.

Early in January a small scouting party succeeded in getting through from Pine Bluff to Monticello, where they destroyed 2,000 bushels of Confederate corn, and returned in safety with six prisoners. A few days later Colonel Powell Clayton decided to try a similar expedition on a larger scale. He started out with 600 cavalry and four pieces of light artillery, but below Bayou Bartholomew, some twenty miles from Pine Bluff, he met with stiff resistance (at Branchville). Most of the fighting was in the woods

and without result. Having exhausted his supply of ammunition Clayton returned to Pine Bluff.

At Baker's Springs Captain E. A. Barker, with Kansas cavalry, surprised and killed Captain Williamson and five of his band, whom he styled guerrillas (January 21). February 4 Captain Wm. Harrison surprised and killed at Hot Springs some Federal guerrillas who had been terrorizing the country.

March 11, General Price, who had just returned from a leave of absence in Missouri, superseded General Holmes in command, the latter having been relieved at his own request. A few days before this Price had written General Smith suggesting a concentration of 20,000 men for an attack upon Steele to be followed by an invasion of Missouri for the relief of the armies east of the Mississippi. But the Federals east of the river had already matured plans which were to keep Smith and Price both busy in Louisiana and Arkansas for a season.

Shortly before giving place to General Grant General Halleck ordered General N. P. Banks, commanding at New Orleans, to make an expedition up the Red river with a view to clearing Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas of Confederates. Banks never was enthusiastic about the expedition, but obeyed orders after informing his superiors of certain conditions necessary for success, most of which never were fulfilled. Banks himself had 17,000 men, Sherman was to send A. J. Smith with 10,000, Armiral Porter was to co-operate with the river fleet, and Steele was to come down from Little Rock with 15,000. These

forces were to grip Kirby Smith, whose total strength was estimated at 25,000, between the jaws of a vise and crush out all opposition.

Such was the situation when Grant took command in the east. He soon worked out a plan for the co-operation of all the forces east of the Mississippi in a big drive. He allowed the plans for the Red river expedition to stand, but notified A. J. Smith that he must return to co-operate with Sherman in a drive on Atlanta and Banks that he must move against Mobile in May. If Shreveport was not captured by a certain date, April 25, then Smith was to return to Vicksburg with his forces. This practically meant that the expedition was foredoomed to failure, yet it was allowed to go on.

As the Red river, which is not navigable at all seasons, was usually highest about the middle of March, this was the time set for starting the expedition. General Kirby Smith knew of the plans several days before the expedition got under way and ordered (March 5) General Magruder to join General Taylor at Alexandria. March 14 the Federals captured Fort de Russy and two days later occupied Alexandria. Smith now ordered Price to send all his infantry, Churchill's and Parsons' brigades, 5,000 strong, to Shreveport and General Maxey was ordered from the Cherokee Nation to join Price in Arkansas. The river was lower than usual and the fleet was having trouble in passing the rapids, but on the night of the 21st, in the midst of a rain storm, General Joseph A. Mower captured nearly all of the Second Louisiana

Cavalry, the only cavalry Taylor had for scouting. All seemed to be going well for the Federals and on March 23 Steele moved out of Little Rock with between 8,000 and 10,000 men. Two days earlier Thayer left Fort Smith with 3,000, and their plan was to meet at Arkadelphia and then move against Price or on toward Shreveport and join Banks.

As a precaution Steele instructed Colonel Clayton at Pine Bluff to keep an eye on the movements of the enemy in the direction of Monticello and Camden. As a counter move Price had thrown Shelby's command across the Ouachita toward Princeton with instructions to keep an eye on Steele's movements and to co-operate with General Dockery in annoying the enemy and cutting off his trains. Unfortunately there seems to have been no co-operation, whether through Shelby's fault it is not possible to say. Colonel Clayton, with 600 men and a few guns, completely routed Dockery, who had a much larger force, at Mt. Elba (March 30) and captured his train at Longview. The loss was 420 men killed, wounded and captured, 35 wagons loaded with stores and the paymaster's safe containing \$60,000. Shelby went to Princeton as directed, but, finding no forage there, he scattered his force until he learned that Steele was nearing Arkadelphia. March 29 Steele entered Arkadelphia and waited two days for Thayer to come from Fort Smith, but advanced to Spoonville April 1 without further waiting. Here he had several sharp fights with Lieutenant-Colonel Fayth. Two days before this Marmaduke had ordered Shelby

to attack and he now followed hot on the trail. April 2 he engaged the enemy in rear guard actions killing and capturing 160 with little loss in his own company. At the same time Monroe was fighting the advance guard at the Antoine and Wolf creek. Next day Shelby struck again about a mile north of Okolona and fought for three hours.

How feeble is the strength of men when compared with that of nature in action was well illustrated in this battle. The flash of Collins' guns was brilliant and the roar terrible, but the flashes were dimmed by the lurid flashes of lightning and the roar all but hushed by the peals of thunder which heralded the storm about to break over the battlefield. Men on both sides who had not quailed before the leaden hail now crouched in fear and sought protection from the terrific pelting of the hail from the sky and fled in terror from falling trees scattered by the storm in its fury.

Scarcely had the storm passed in all its majesty when Shelby renewed the battle only to find himself in a position as ridiculous as the other had been sublime. As his men cautiously but steadily advanced in the face of the enemy's fire they suddenly found themselves in the midst of a nest of bee hives which the enemy's guns had overturned. If the gunners had aimed at these hives, they could not have selected a more effective target. The bees now turned upon Shelby and his men for revenge. Horses reared and plunged and men rushed here and there fighting the swarming pests. Shelby swore and stormed at his

men until the bees attacked him, whereupon he fled into a clump of bushes. As bee reinforcements kept coming up the officers interrupted their laughter to shout orders which nobody obeyed. Shelby had not intended any further offensive, but decided that he would rather fight men than bees and ordered an advance. The bees now returned to their hives and, after following the enemy for a short while, Shelby withdrew and camped for the night at Antoine.

While Shelby had been following Steele in the rear Marmaduke had been observing from the front. On the 2d, while Shelby was harrassing the rear guard, Monroe, under Marmaduke's orders, drove back the advance guard twice, first at the Antoine, second at Wolf's creek. By night-fall Steele had occupied Elkin's Ferry and posted his artillery and forces for defense. The next day he brought up his main army and threw a part of it across the Little Missouri river. With the rest he tried to entrap Shelby, but himself suffered a surprise attack and was driven off with considerable loss. April 4 he began to cross over his main army, whereupon he was attacked by Marmaduke with Greene's and Cabell's brigades, Monroe's regiment and Zimmerman's artillery and part of Hughey's battery and a part of his forces was driven two miles.

The next day Colonel John M. Harrell's battalion and Colonel Dan W. Jones' state troops made some captures while Marmaduke, because of lack of forage, withdrew to the south side of Prairie d'Ane, where

he erected make-believe breastworks of logs and dirt to make the enemy think he wanted a fight.

In spite of incessant attacks Steele continued to advance. Price left Camden April 5 with Dockery's and Crawford's brigades and Wood's battery, instructing the guard to destroy the government stores and the pontoon bridge over the Ouachita, and came to the scene of action, arriving on the 7th.

On the 9th Steele was at last joined by Thayer when he attacked Dockery, who was now supported by Shelby. After long and fierce fighting he had advanced only half a mile. Much of the credit for holding him back belongs to Collins' battery of four guns located in an open prairie. All the horses and many of his men were killed, but others took their places and the contest went on with dogged determination, though they had to face three batteries. After night-fall he undertook to advance again, but ran into Shelby and, after a few hours of fighting in the dark, gave it up. The next two days' movements, or lack of movement, on the part of Steele puzzled the Confederates. April 11 Price withdrew from Prairie d'Ane, toward Washington, hoping that Steele would follow and give him an opportunity for a more favorable attack. But Steele remained at Prairie d'Ane and drew up his forces and Marmaduke thought that he was preparing a flank movement on his mimic breastworks, preparatory to moving toward Washington. But in fact he was practicing deceit. After his men had been kept in line sometime the Confederates discovered that his train was

passing in their rear toward Camden. The next day Price and Dockery attacked his rear while Marmaduke and Shelby were sent around to get in front of him. This they were unable to do and Steele entered Camden April 15, just twenty-one days after leaving Little Rock.

Steele's hesitation and final turn from Washington to Camden were caused by unfavorable rumors and reports concerning the Red river expedition.

After some vexatious delays and the wreck of a hospital steamer the Federal gunboats and transports succeeded in passing the rapids and on April 3 the whole force was concentrated at Natchitoches. Here a fresh order was received for the return of Smith's forces by April 10, but the army was within four days' march of Shreveport and the march was resumed.

Meantime General Taylor was marshaling his 16,000 men to meet Banks' 26,000 and protect the roads to Shreveport and Marshall. In position he had a decided advantage. His main army was at Mansfield (April 5) with Churchill and Parsons in supporting distance at Keatchie, twenty miles on the road to Shreveport. On the other hand Banks' advance and rear lines were a day's march apart on a narrow road leading through a fine forest, a part of his troops scattered over a twelve-mile stretch to guard his train. Taylor now chose a good position, placed J. D. Walker's, Alfred Mouton's and Colton Greene's divisions, 11,000 men, in line of battle commanding the road, ordered Churchill and Parsons to join him

(April 8) and waited for the enemy. The night of the 7th Lee's division camped only twelve miles away. He broke camp at daylight next morning, and, after skirmishing with some of Greene's regiments sent out to hold his back while the Confederates were getting ready, halted to wait for his train; A. J. Smith moved up to within two miles of the Confederate line and others came into position. When Banks came up and took in the situation he sent back to hurry up the column.

After watching the enemy some time General Richard Taylor decided that an effort would be made to turn his right and proceeded to shift several of his regiments to meet the expected attack. At 4 p. m., "becoming impatient at the delay of the enemy" and suspecting that his arrangements were incomplete, he ordered General Alfred Mouton to open the attack on the left. "The charge made by Mouton across the open," he says, "was magnificent," but he soon fell and several of his officers perished with him. The "gallant Polignac"* then assumed command and continued to drive the enemy in wild confusion until after

*Prince Camille de Polignac was a Frenchman who had come to America early in the war and offered his services to the Confederacy. After serving some time in the east he was transferred to the west. His foreign language and strange manners caused him to be received with many misgivings by the Louisianans and Texans whom he commanded, but he soon won their confidence and finally rose to the rank of major-general. Early in 1865, at the earnest request of Governor Allen, of Louisiana, he went to France on a political mission, but the war soon ended and he never returned. In 1918 his daughter, the Marquise de Courtivron, came to America with her husband who was liaison officer of the French High Commission and while here visited the battlefield near Mansfield. On returning home she organized the Paris chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy. This chapter provided for a monument to the General and on April 8, 1925, the sixty-first anniversary of the battle, it was unveiled at Mansfield by his son, Prince Victor Mansfield Polignac, in the presence of his mother, the widow of the general.

sunset. The guns of two batteries and many prisoners and wagons were captured. The victorious advance of the Confederates was checked by night-fall and the coming up of General Wm. H. Emory with reinforcements. Writing many years later a Federal commander said:

Emory's division held the ground it fought for, the retreat was covered and the army saved—the army that had set out so confidently to take Shreveport, only two marches beyond; saved by a triumph of valor and discipline on the part of a single division, and of skill on the part of its commander, from complete destruction at the hands of an enemy inferior in everything, whose entire force ours outnumbered almost as two to one.

The Confederates expected to renew the attack next morning, but found the enemy in retreat and started in pursuit. The remnants of the routed Federals were hurried on in advance while A. J. Smith and Emory halted at Pleasant Hill to cover the retreat. Churchill and Parsons had come up too late to take part in the battle of Mansfield. With another march of ten hours in hot pursuit they were fagged out. They were now given a rest of two hours and the battle of Pleasant Hill was begun (April 9) about 5 p. m. The Union troops now had the advantage in position and in the condition of their men and, though the Arkansans and Missourians fought bravely, they were hopelessly beaten and retreated six miles to the nearest water.

But next morning the Union forces were in full retreat and it was clear that Banks had completely abandoned all thought of any further advance. Indeed, his only thought now was to save his army and the fleet from destruction. He was followed by a small band of cavalry.

When General Kirby Smith heard of the fight at Mansfield he started at once to join the army and rode 65 miles on the 9th, but did not arrive until the battle of Pleasant Hill was over. He now discussed plans with Taylor. As the whole country below Natchitoches had been completely stripped of supplies and the navigation of the river obstructed it was considered impossible to pursue with the whole army, especially while Steele was advancing through Arkansas. Smith then left Taylor to follow and harass Banks while he started for Arkansas with Price's troops to help him dislodge Steele from Camden, where he was a menace to any further operations against Banks.

Before leaving he had ordered Price to throw a cavalry force across the Ouachita to cut off Steele's supplies from Little Rock, but, for some reason, Price failed to do this and as a result Steele received (April 18) a train of 200 wagons escorted by only fifty cavalry. Smith at once organized an expedition of 4,000 cavalry, Fagan commanding, and ordered them to cross the Ouachita and destroy the supplies at Little Rock, Pine Bluff, and DeVall's Bluff.

But while one train had come in to Steele, another suffered a different fate. April 17 Marmaduke in-

formed Price that a large train had gone out toward Prairie d'Ane to forage, guarded by three regiments and four guns. Having only 500 men Marmaduke asked for reinforcements and received Cabell's and Crawford's brigades from Fagen's division and General Samuel B. Maxey joined him with Gano's Texans and Tandy Walker's Indians. With these forces Marmaduke selected a position at Poison Spring. Maxey was Marmaduke's senior and might have commanded, but he said that the plan was Marmaduke's, yielded to him and retired, after turning over his forces.

The enemy was returning heavily laden with plunder. Each side had rushed for the choice elevation near Poison Spring, but Cabell got there first and held the position. Marmaduke now used Maxey's forces, about whose presence the enemy knew nothing, for a surprise flank attack. As they turned to meet this the battery redoubled its fire and the Arkansas and Missouri troops swept down upon them. Over half the enemy, 2,500, consisted of negroes and these fought wildly or fled incontinently when not held in line by muskets of their own men. The cavalry soon fled and the artillerymen cut loose their horses and escaped with them. It was a complete rout and the whole train was captured; also many prisoners. Marmaduke ordered up Colonel Bob Woods' mounted battalion and went on in pursuit, but Woods did not come and he finally gave up following and returned his men to their mounts. When he reached the captured train he found that General

Maxey had countermanded the order to Woods, had "captured" the train and was getting it ready for withdrawal. Soon after this Price arrived and complimented Maxey in fine language upon the brilliant success he had achieved, all of which he duly took unto himself. Marmaduke gave Cabell the greater part of the credit for the victory.

The Confederate loss was twenty killed and sixty wounded. The enemy lost 400 negroes and sixty whites killed, 125 captured, four pieces of artillery, four caissons, and 200 wagons (6 mules to each) and some ambulances. The wagons held a great variety of things, not only "every kind of provision from the farm-yard, the pantry, the dairy, and the sideboard, but [also] men's, women's and children's clothing, household furniture, gardening implements, the tools of the mechanic, and the poor contents of the negro hut." When the Confederate troops swept by the train there was no attempt on their part to stop and plunder, but the Indians were restrained only by the stern commands of Marmaduke. After the battle they helped themselves very freely as part compensation for their wild yells which had helped to terrorize the enemy in the flank attack. The excess of the number of negroes killed probably was in part due to vengeance for their plundering.

The disaster to Banks at Mansfield had caused Steele to alter his course. The disaster to his train at Poison Spring was a severe blow and at once raised the question whether he could continue to live in the heart of the enemy country. Two days after the

disaster at Poison Spring a train came in from Pine Bluff, but it brought provisions for only ten days and it was started back (April 23) for another supply, there being 240 wagons accompanied by three brigades of infantry, 1,200 men, two sections of Battery E, Missouri light artillery, two detachments of cavalry, and a large number of Arkansas refugees, sutlers, and some 800 negroes.

Without knowing anything of this move Fagan started for Little Rock (April 22), though Smith now modified his earlier order and directed him not to cross the Arkansas river and to cut off Steele's supplies. When he reached El Dorado (April 24) he learned of this train through Shelby's scouts and determined to intercept it. Next morning he started at daybreak and by midnight had covered 45 miles and had nearly caught up with the train. It had yet to pass Mark's Mills and Fagan determined to attack it there. He now ordered Shelby to detour to the right and, by rapid marches, get in front between the train and the Mount Elba crossing on the Saline while he attacked from the rear. Cabell's division was dismounted and placed in line parallel to the road being used by the train. His skirmishers were soon fired on and the battle of Mark's Mills had begun (April 25). General Dockery had found a lot of corn and had stopped to feed his famished horses. Owing to this and the distance Shelby had to go, Cabell's brigade, backed by Captain W. M. Hughey's excellent battery, had to fight the enemy alone for an hour or more. But Shelby covered ten miles of rough road in less

than an hour and fell upon the enemy without waiting for his entire force to arrive. His appearance was well-timed for Cabell was weakening and could not have held out much longer. The impetuous assault of Shelby came as a complete surprise to the enemy, who was now thrown into confusion. General Fagan ordered Colonel John M. Harrell's battalion to guard against a cavalry attack on the right. They found no cavalry, for it had fled, but ran upon 1,000 infantry who ran up the white flag and surrendered; also 100 wagons deserted in the woods. Fagan's estimate of the results was 500 killed and wounded, 1,300 prisoners, all their artillery (6 pieces) captured; also 300 wagons (there were only 240 in the train), a large number of ambulances, many small arms, and 150 negroes. The Federal commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F. M. Drake, says that many of the negroes and Arkansas refugees were killed. The "refugees" had taken the oath of allegiance when Steele entered Camden and were now fleeing in fear of the wrath of the Confederates. Such as had not been killed in the course of the battle were soon released and the prisoners of war were sent to the detention camp at Tyler, Texas.

By this time Steele had lost 635 wagons and 2,500 mules. The situation was assuming an air of desperation. His adjutant-general at once reported the situation to General Sherman, then at Nashville, Tennessee, and begged for more mules and 3,000 cavalry, or at least that many cavalry horses. But Steele decided that he could not wait for uncertain succor and next

day (April 26) set his army in motion to get it out of the trap before it was too late.

General Kirby Smith was now commanding in person and he sent Price, with Churchill's and Walker's divisions, in hot pursuit of the retreating foe. Churchill's division (2,000 strong), after marching the latter half of the night through a furious rain storm and mud ankle deep, came in sight of the enemy at Jenkins' Ferry, 22 miles north of Princeton. Marmaduke, who had gone by a different road, was already there and was fighting the enemy when Churchill arrived. For two hours the battle raged, "the severest fighting I ever witnessed," says Churchill, and the armies swayed back and forth over the field. But let us follow the description of Colonel John M. Harrell, who took part in the action:

This conflict of the two armies can only be understood by a view of their relative positions on the ground. At first, woods and wet marshes were on the right of the Confederates, and a succession of little fields in front toward the ferry, two miles distant. When near the ferry the road descends into a little valley or defile, to the left of which, in cane and underbrush, lies an impassable bayou with morass beyond, while on the right rises an abrupt, almost inaccessible hill, or bluff; the road and valley affording barely room for the alignment of a full brigade. The land to the right of the road was a field of muddy plowed land and marsh, the fences of which had been removed or destroyed, and the field cut up and trampled into a quagmire by Steele's trains, artillery, cavalry, and masses of soldiery. The canon was over a mile long, ending at the ferry. Gigantic trees had

been felled, lapping across the valley, but had not been joined throughout their length, leaving spaces between them for the movement of batteries and masses of infantry. Behind this breastwork of trees the Federals had lodged themselves in desperation, to hold off the Confederate advance until they could cross their trains and their artillery, which latter was immediately planted across the river to command the approach thereto. There were dead trees standing in the fields also, which gave positions to their sharpshooters, from which to pick off all who came within range. Upon the repulse of brigade after brigade by the fire from the resolute defenders of this narrow gateway to the river, Parsons' Missouri brigade advanced, and forming on the left of Gano's Arkansas brigade, charged through the mud and logs that lay in their march, but they, too, exhausting their ammunition, were forced to retire. Major-General Walker's division had now reached the field. Led by General Smith they pushed beyond the lines that had preceded them, and, supported by Churchill's division, which once again marched with renewed energy to the contest, General Smith had the pride of beholding the foe suddenly take to flight and leave the hard-fought field.

General Dockery's men, under Colonel Williams, had been detached and, under the supervision of General Smith, marched around and across the creek and morass to the left, where they formed a position from which they could reach the enemy's flank. When Gause's brigade had driven the enemy nearly a mile, and Clark's brigade on his left gave way, Colonel Gause resolved to hold his ground, and sent to General Churchill for reinforcements. General Tappan offered to go forward, while Colonel Burns formed his regiment at an angle to protect the brigade; but fresh troops of the enemy began to sweep around to

the left and he fell back in some confusion, seeing which, General Churchill, commanding the division, dismounted, seized a rifle, and rallied the remnant of the brigade around him under fire. Soon after this, upon the advance of Walker's division, Gause again moved forward and engaged the enemy, who soon yielded possession of the field.

Yet the victory was dearly bought and a barren one. The Confederate loss was over 500 killed and wounded, while the Federal loss was somewhat heavier—Salomon's division alone lost 63 killed, 413 wounded, and 45 missing. Steele crossed the stream and continued his way to Little Rock. That afternoon the First Missouri Cavalry Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Elliott, which had taken no part in the battle at Jenkins' Ferry, but had skirmished near Princeton on the 28th, skirmished at Whitmore's Mill with 2,000 Federals who, thinking that Fagan's whole force was after them, precipitately fled, burning such of their stores as they could not carry. They burned 200 wagons in one place, says Colonel Elliott, and ordnance and ordnance store were strewn for miles on the road, while hundreds of blankets, oil-cloths, and overcoats were piled and burned. On Sunday (May 1) Colonel Elliott skirmished several times with the rear guard, but he did not have a force sufficient to inflict serious damage and Steele escaped to Little Rock, arriving there May 3.

The next day, in summarizing the results of the move to check the Red River and Camden expeditions, General Kirby Smith said:

The fruits of this brilliant campaign, inaugurated at Mansfield on the day of national fast and humiliation, are, under Providence, most glorious and satisfactory. In Louisiana, 5,000 killed and wounded, 4,000 prisoners, 21 pieces of artillery, 200 wagons, 1 gunboat (the *Eastport*) and 3 transports have already been reported. In Arkansas, 1,400 killed, 2,000 wounded, 1,500 prisoners, 13 pieces of artillery, and 900 wagons are the result of the campaign. Two brigades of Steele's command with almost his entire transportation, have been destroyed or captured.

This grand expedition, for which with formidable numbers and boastful confidence the enemy has been for months preparing, has in less than fifty days been broken and hurled back in shame and disgrace by a force not much more than one-third their numerical strength. When the distances marched, the obstacles encountered, and the enemy's superiority in numbers are considered, this army deserves well of their country. Since the opening of the campaign the troops have marched from 400 to 500 miles, made forced marches of 40 miles on short rations, and fought three general engagements. Prisoners were taken from the Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Army Corps. We have to regret the loss of Generals Mouton and Green in Louisiana and Generals Scurry and Randal in Arkansas. Our losses will not fall much short of 3,000 killed, wounded and missing. The enemy's is full 14,000.

Smith might very well boast of turning back both armies and inflicting great losses, but the escape of

both can hardly be justified. The escape of Banks probably was inevitable, but the same cannot be said of Steele. Banks was turned back at Mansfield April 8 and two days later was in full retreat. Steele did not leave Camden until the 26th. Within that time Smith, instead of simply sending Fagan to cut off supplies, might have thrown his whole army between Steele and Little Rock and thus have forced him to retreat upon Banks or accept battle and probable destruction, for the Federal forces at Little Rock and Pine Bluff were not large enough to cause any serious concern. Smith says that "A freshet which overflowed the banks of the Saline for two miles alone saved Steele's army from destruction." But his army should have been beyond the Saline and between Steele and Little Rock long before this freshet came. Then Arkansas might have been cleared of Federal troops and the way would have been open for an expedition into Missouri. As it was neither Arkansas nor Louisiana was cleared.

CHAPTER XIX

PRICE'S EXPEDITION INTO MISSOURI

So far the operations north of the Arkansas had not accomplished much, either in weakening the enemy, or in gaining recruits. Two days after Steele re-entered Little Rock General Price ordered Shelby to go into that region to see if he could not embarrass Steele by preventing the navigation of White river and preventing the use of the railroad between Little Rock and DeVall's Bluff. Shelby complained bitterly of the "skeleton mules and wheezey and ramshackle wagons" which were given him by "the quartermasters in and around Camden," but decided to make the best of it.

On the way up he surprised a "nest of jayhawkers, boomers and deserters," killing 23, wounding 2, and capturing 2 who were shot next day. He planned to cross the river at Lewisburg, but a band of 400 Federals came over and attacked. After repulsing these with considerable loss to them and none to himself he decided to go up the river to Dardanelle. A part of the garrison had fled on hearing of his approach, but he dashed into the town and captured 100 who had failed to get away and saw a number of others drown while attempting to escape on an overfilled flat-boat.* A large number of mules, several wagons and large quantities of supplies and many negroes

*Edwards, *Shelby and His Men*, 317, says 233 were captured, 374 killed and wounded.

were also captured. Such as he could not use Shelby sent south.

Next day Shelby crossed the river and, hearing that the garrison had evacuated Lewisburg, sent a scouting party there, but they found smallpox raging and returned empty handed. Before starting on his main objective Shelby turned aside to Clarksville where he attacked a force of 700 and drove them out, killing and wounding a large number. Probably this was done to avenge the terrible atrocities being committed by Colonel G. M. Vaughn's men. Turning back he now pressed on by way of Dover, where the ladies greeted him with flowers, and on through Clinton. In the mountains he came across many "robbers and Federal jayhawkers and guerrillas," killing some and scattering the other to the great delight of the peaceful inhabitants. At Buck Horn alone he reported 47 killed and 2 captured and shot the next day. Crossing White river twelve miles above Batesville he pressed on to that town only to find it deserted by the Federal troops who had carried about 200 refugee families with them. Hearing that their boats had run aground at Grand Glaize, Shelby rushed after them, but arrived two hours too late.

The situation which he found can best be described in Shelby's own words:

The condition of this country is and has been pitiable in the extreme; Confederate soldiers in nothing save the name, robbers, and jayhawkers have vied with Federals in plundering, devouring and wasting the substance of loyal Southerners, and new cruelties

have been devised to torture from unwilling lips the secret of some hidden treasure. The entire valley is swept bare of forage and subsistence, and there are hundreds of families that must suffer for bread. I am forced for the first time in the history of the war to graze my horses and feed my men on meat alone. In three weeks the wheat crop will be ready for use; but until that time we shall be compelled to live on meat alone. The condition of the so-called Confederate force here was horrible in the extreme—no organization, no concentration, no discipline, no law, no leader, no anything. The seeds of cotton speculating, horse stealing, illicit and pernicious trading with the Federals was carried on with a high hand, thereby debauching the officers and demoralizing the men. They are scattered from Yellville to Helena, from the Missouri line to the Arkansas river, five and six at a house, sweltering in the hot fumes of Memphis whisky, and riding rough shod over defenseless families on stolen horses, while predatory bands of Federals, unmolested and unfought, roamed about like devouring wolves and swept whole neighborhoods at a breath. Many good Southern families fled to the various posts for protection, and they were not to blame. Thus was the country devoured; and now when a regular Confederate force comes up to their help they find an enemy worse than armed men—starvation.

He published his orders from General Price and exhorted the men "by a common brotherhood and our glorious victories to come up now to our triumphant banner." He told the officers and men that "the time for trading with the Federals, lying out, and dodging the service" was over. His proclamation allowed the men their choice of reorganization until June 10, after

which those who had not reported would be treated as conscripts. Men must go into the Confederate or Federal army or they would be, when captured, "hung as high as Haman."

The effect was instantaneous. McRae had spent months in the northeast and had accomplished practically nothing in the way of recruiting.* Shelby "stamped his foot" and hundreds came to his stand-ard. Edwards, his enthusiastic biographer, estimates that in the course of three months, he brought 6,000 into the Confederate service. This probably is an exaggeration, but he did gather up a good many.

When Shelby arrived at Batesville Colonel Freeman was down on Crowley's Ridge foraging. While he was there a company of 1,500 Federals, led by General Anderson, landed at Augusta and started out on a foraging and pillaging expedition. Freeman attacked them near Augusta and drove them back upon the gunboats with a loss 178 killed and wounded. Anderson then retreated down the river, but soon afterwards another expedition came up the river "for more negroes and cotton" and Freeman fell back before this, contenting himself with a skirmish with their scouts.

After having waited several days for his "command to recover their elan and their horses their strength," Shelby started for Clarendon to begin the work of interrupting Steele's supplies. His route lay through Cache and Bayou de View bottoms, where he found

*Shortly after this he disappeared from the service.



Where David O. Dodd's Funeral was held.

"roads without bottoms, rivers without bridges, and swamps without bounds." In some places the water averaged three feet in depth, but he floundered through and reached Clarendon June 23. Carefully reconnoitering he found an iron-clad, the *Queen City*, and determined to capture it by surprise next morning. Drawing his battery up to the town at midnight, the horses were taken from it and it was drawn by man power to within fifty feet of the water's edge. Just as "the white hand of morning put away the screen of darkness" Shelby gave the order and the pounding of four guns awakened the astonished sleepers on the *Queen City*. Resistance was useless and her captain surrendered 60 officers and men, 9 guns, \$10,000 in greenbacks, and large quantities of supplies and clothing. After these had been removed the boat was blown up.

About an hour after this work was finished three iron-clads came around the bend and opened on Shelby. For two hours this battle raged between the land and naval forces, but the contest was unequal and Shelby withdrew out of range after having damaged two of the boats very badly, one so badly that she foundered while being towed back to Augusta.

On the 26th Federal transports arrived with 3,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General E. A. Carr. As each party landed they attacked Shelby (first at Pikeville, a hamlet at the forks of the Helena and Cotton Plant road) and he drove them back for a while, but each time they came in larger numbers and finally he began to retreat.

The enemy followed all day and Shelby fought them for ten miles. After having camped for the night he learned from his scouts that another band of Federals was planning to cut off his retreat, consequently he broke camp and, marching most of the night, managed to get in their advance. The enemy came up, however, and followed him next day until he turned on them and drove them back three miles in great confusion. After that he crossed Bayou de View without molestation. Shelby's report of the three days' fighting was 250 Federals killed and wounded, 30 of his own men, which probably was an exaggeration for the former. The Federals burned Clarendon, whether by Carr's orders or not is not known.

Just before the attack on the *Queen City* Colonel T. H. McCray, who superseded Colonel Dandridge McRae, was sent over to the Mississippi river for a consignment of arms in transit from the east. He made the trip in safety and brought back nearly a thousand stand of small arms and 68,000 rounds of ammunition, which Shelby used to redeem his promise to furnish arms to the recruits.

Soon after Shelby's return to Jacksonport Captain M. M. Langhorn was sent down to Searcy, where he routed four squadrons just arrived from Little Rock under command of Colonel Guigher. However, when the enemy learned how small his forces were—only 30 men—they turned and forced him back, but he returned to Jacksonport with 10 prisoners. This probably gave rise to an incident which occurred a week later. Lieutenant-Colonel James Stuart came

up to Searcy with the Tenth Illinois Cavalry and sent a challenge for any one regiment to come down and fight. Colonel B. Frank Gordon, of the Fifth Missouri Cavalry (Confederate) accepted the challenge. Led by a trusted guide he made a forced march at night and fell upon the unwary soldiers of the Tenth Illinois while still wrapt in slumber (July 14). Whether this was according to the "code" or not, it followed the rule that all is fair in love and war and Gordon succeeded, for he captured almost every man and all their horses, guns, and camp equipment. One of his subordinates, Captain Shindler, was also fair in war. As they were sending the prisoners to the rear a fair-eyed Yankee girl appeared before him and pleaded for the release of her lover and permission for their return to Little Rock. The captain not only granted this, but also sent an escort to see them safely through the lines. Next day Colonel Washington McDaniel tore up a part of the railroad track between Little Rock and DeVall's Bluff, thus causing the wreck of a train, which killed six and wounded eleven.

But Shelby had not yet really broken the Federal lines of communication and he decided to pay Clarendon another visit. His advance on Augusta was signaled by some negroes and a part of the troops he intended to attack got on board the boats before he arrived, but he pursued the others through the streets, killing and wounding 93 and capturing 78, who were paroled and sent to General Steele. Before making the attack he sent a company down the river to am-

bush the boats as they descended. Concealing themselves on a high bank they poured volley after volley on the unsuspecting occupants and followed the boats down stream for five miles. The Federals reported 137 missing when the boats arrived at Des Arc. Some had jumped into the river.

Numerous plantations around Helena had been taken over by the Federals and were being cultivated with negro labor. Several schools had also been opened by women who had come down from the North. Shelby now decided to stop the work on the plantations and to break up the schools. For this work he selected Colonels Frank Gordon and Archibald S. Dobbin. As they were approaching Helena they met a force of Federals, consisting mainly of negroes (1,000 or more), which they routed and pursued up to the very gates of the city. Two miles below Helena they found the first plantation under government control and this they wrecked and then they passed on from one to another until nearly all the government plantations in Phillips county were blackened ruins. Colonel Dobbin and most of his men were at home in this country and it must have wrenched their hearts to see the destruction of their former homes and those of their neighbors, but the work was done with a thoroughness that attested their estimate of its military importance.

Meantime raids on the railroad continued, McCray tearing up some of it on his way back from the Mississippi, whither he had gone for arms, and Coleman and Jackman each repeated the operation. All

this was very annoying to Steele and he sent out a third expedition, Brigadier-General J. R. West commanding, with order to capture or disperse the forces of McCray and Dobbin and prevent them from joining Shelby at Jacksonport. But all that this general could report was a few inconsequential skirmishes, Hickory Plain and Bull Bayou (August 7), Hatch's Ferry (August 9), near Augusta (August 10), and near Searcy (August 13), and that the enemy had escaped while he marched up the hill and then marched down again.

About the same time that Shelby was sent into northeastern Arkansas Marmaduke was sent to the southeastern part of the state to annoy, if not stop, transportation of troops up the Mississippi. It was known that General A. J. Smith was to pass up the river on his way to join Sherman. May 25-June 2, 1864, Colonel Colton Greene, commanding the Third Missouri Cavalry (Confederate), engaged passing boats about Gaines' Landing and Sunnyside, capturing the steamers *Lebanon* and *Clara Eames*, disabling five gunboats, badly damaging five transports, sinking one and burning two. The cotton speculators were greatly annoyed at this and complained to Marmaduke, saying that Price had issued orders not to interfere with the cotton trade. Marmaduke listened quietly and told them to go on with their business, cotton trading, and he would go on with his, sinking boats.

But soon he had other employment. June 5 the transports carrying Smith's troops landed at Sunny-

side and next day the troops came out to meet the Confederates at Old River Lake, or Ditch Bayou. Colonel Greene, though outnumbered seven to one, had the advantage of position and held the enemy in check until 2:30 p. m., when his ammunition gave out and then he retired. Next morning he learned that the enemy was preparing to embark and proceeded to harass him to his boats. The official report of the Federals showed 221 killed, wounded, and missing, but several officers did not report casualties; the Confederate loss was 4 killed and 33 wounded.

Marmaduke now returned to Shreveport to consult with General Kirby Smith about the Missouri expedition and Colonel Greene was left in command on the Mississippi where he continued to annoy steamers and transports until ordered to join his command for the raid into Missouri.

The Red river and Camden campaigns over, the problem for Smith was what to do next. Except for sending a part of his troops to observe the retreat of Banks and allowing Shelby to cross the Arkansas river, he did practically nothing for several weeks. Differences between him and General Dick Taylor caused him to relieve the latter of command. Scarcely had this been done when Taylor received an order from General Braxton Bragg, then at Columbus, Georgia, to transfer his troops to the east of the Mississippi. While this order did not come directly from Richmond, it was approved there as part of a policy to transfer practically all the forces of the Trans-

Mississippi Department to the east for the defense of Mobile and Atlanta.

This was not altogether pleasing to the west. It was opposed on several grounds, the difficulty of throwing troops across the river, because the troops opposed and it would lead to demoralization and desertion, and because it would mean the abandonment of all territory west of the Mississippi forever, for, once given up, it could never be reconquered. The east might win with the help of the west, but the former would not then be ready to continue the struggle for the recovery of the latter. A counter move was declared feasible, an invasion of Missouri, thereby holding back troops which would otherwise be sent to help Sherman in his Atlanta campaign.

Some of the foregoing arguments from the military officials were backed up by similar ones from Governor Flanagin in a letter addressed to President Davis. In addition he complained of the removal of troops in 1862 and of arms owned by the state and of machinery to make and repair arms. It seemed to be the rule for districts far removed from the Confederate capital to receive little attention. There was not even a copy of the Confederate laws in the state, nor a dollar in the department to maintain the army.

On request of the President the War Department investigated the governor's complaint and reported that 26 regiments, 10,400 men, raised in Arkansas, were then serving east of the Mississippi while 9 regiments, 3,600 men, were west of the river; that no regiment raised east of the river had ever been trans-

ferred to the west. No arms had ever been received from Arkansas save those in the hands of the troops when mustered in and these were now stored in Montgomery, having been replaced by arms of a better type. On the other hand 50,000 arms, 46 pieces of field artillery, 18,000 sets of infantry accoutrements, 2,225,000 small arms, and over 3,000,000 percussion caps had been sent west. All of the artillery and most of the small arms had gone to Arkansas.

Governor Flanagin and the military officials were assured that there was no intention to abandon the west, but the orders for the transfer of troops were insistent and General Smith declared that he did all he could to comply, but the increase of Steele's forces and of the number of gunboats on the Mississippi made the transfer more and more impracticable. Finally Smith ordered Taylor to disobey any orders from Richmond for attempting the transfer, but Taylor, though himself now convinced of the impracticability of the transfer, indicated that he would obey the President. After long hesitation between two plans Smith finally decided (August 4) on the Missouri expedition, but three weeks passed before Price took charge of this at Princeton (August 29). The forces were made up of Fagan's and Marmaduke's division and these were to be joined by Shelby north of the Arkansas river. Fagan's division was now composed of Cabell's, Slemons', Dobbin's and McCray's brigades, the last two at this time being with Shelby, and Lyles', Rogans' and Anderson's unattached brigades of cavalry. Colonel W. A. Coleman

also took his Forty-sixth Arkansas (mounted) regiment.

In anticipation of the march Shelby was informed that Price expected to cross the Little Rock and DeVall's Bluff Railroad about August 24 in order that he might prepare the way and make it safe. Taking the hint Shelby started at once (August 20) with 2,000 men and Collins' battery. Swollen streams caused him to detour south to Austin, where he left Colonel Dobbin to guard the bridge and then turned north again and struck the railroad near Ashley's station, six miles from DeVall's Bluff (August 24). All over the prairie were groups of men, some cutting hay, others on guard, still others drilling, and still others "lolling in the sun." Flying no flags and assuming a careless attitude such as a returning Federal expedition would present when approaching friends, Shelby managed to get close up before any one suspected that an enemy was near. In a short time the garrisons of six redoubts, constructed to protect the railroad, were all captured or scattered and the redoubts destroyed. While the fight was going on several details were busy destroying the railroad, burning the forage, and tearing up the farm machinery.

Attracted by the firing a large force of infantry and cavalry rushed down from DeVall's Bluff and another force came from the direction of Little Rock, but Shelby escaped back to Austin, fighting them off all the way. Next morning the enemy attacked furiously at the crossing of Big Cypress, but was so badly beaten off that further pursuit was abandoned.

Summing up the results of the expedition Shelby says:

Over 450 Federals were captured, 300 killed and wounded, 6 forts taken and destroyed, vast quantities of forage destroyed, ten miles of railroad torn up, the rails heated and bent and the ties consumed, the telegraph line broken down, and hay machines, oxen, wagons, and supplies used up or driven off. Our loss in killed and wounded was 170.

The captives were Colonel G. M. Mitchell and six companies of the Fifty-fourth Illinois Infantry.

After waiting in vain for Price to come Shelby decided that he would cross the Arkansas farther up and sent a considerable force into the Searcy valley to guard the roads in that region and make them safe for his coming.

Having been delayed in getting started Price was satisfied that Steele knew of his plans and decided to follow in Shelby's trail, crossing at Dardanelle September 7. From there he pushed on to Batesville, meeting a few bushwhackers on the way, and from there to Pocahontas, where he was joined by Shelby. Having spent a few days there to get everything in marching order, Price set out for Missouri and crossed the line September 19 with nearly 12,000 men, of whom only 8,000 were armed, and 14 pieces of artillery. The army moved in three columns, Marmaduke on the right, Shelby on the left, and Fagan, with whom Price made his headquarters, in the center.

It will not profit us to follow the expedition in detail, but its itinerary can be traced in a few lines.

Jackman pleased him greatly by capturing a 24-pounder howitzer in a desperate charge, but Colonel James McGhee, of Dobbins' brigade, paid for it with his life at the hands of Captain Curtis Johnson, Fifteenth Kansas. The enemy made furious efforts to recover the gun, but the captors held on to it until night put an end to the fighting. Next morning (the 23d) Shelby renewed the fight, but about noon he learned that Marmaduke had withdrawn, his ammunition having given out, and there was nothing for him to do but retreat in hot haste.

Whatever may have been his intentions, the battle of Westport stopped the further advance of Price to the west. The problem now was to extricate his army from the trap set by the enemy and save it from utter destruction. The pursuit was poorly executed and there was little fighting the next day except for a skirmish with Price's forces at Potosi and the slaughter of his cattle abandoned on the road, which furnished the only food Curtis' men had. At daybreak on the morning of the 25th, by direction of Curtis, Pleasanton fell upon the Confederates at Marais des Cygnes, Kansas, and drove them in utter confusion to the Marmiton woods, or Charlot, Missouri, near the Osage river, and captured Marmaduke, Cabell, "five colonels, many other officers, and nearly 1,000 prisoners, besides wagons, small arms, etc." The rest of the forces fled in panic and all efforts of Price and Fagan to rally them proved fruitless. For many miles the road was strewn with the debris of burning wagons and with arms of all kinds.

General Grant had ordered Curtis to destroy Price's army or pursue it to the Arkansas river, but Curtis was not the man for such a job. His failure to co-operate with Pleasanton had allowed Price to escape when destruction seemed certain. The pursuit was continued for a day or two and the Confederate line was marked by many losses in material and men, the latter mainly through desertion. The disaster had demoralized the army and many of the recruits Price had picked up in Missouri now left him; also, many of the Arkansas troops. But there was no further disaster and on October 30 the army crossed into Arkansas at Maysville and two days later camped at Cane Hill.

General Fagan had come on slightly in advance of General Price and made an attack upon Fayetteville (October 28). When Price arrived at Cane Hill he told him that he had the place closely invested, the garrison having taken refuge in their inner works, and requested enough men to effect the capture. Price sent 400 men and 4 guns, but the approach of Curtis forced Fagan to raise the siege. In his report of the affair Colonel M. LaRue Harrison represents that Price sent 5,200 and that he stood off these and Fagan's forces with 958 volunteers and 170 militia. He speaks particularly of the work done on the fortifications at night by torch light under the direction of Captain H. C. C. Botchfuhr* (*sic.*), of the First Arkansas Cavalry (Union).

*Botchfuhr.

Curtis was anxious to destroy Price's army before it reached Arkansas lest it capture Fort Smith and destroy Thayer's army. But his anxiety about Thayer was needless, for Price was now seeking nothing but safety. Having learned that Steele had been reinforced by a large contingent from Canby's army he decided that it would not be safe to cross between Fort Smith and Little Rock, especially as the march would lead through a country barren of forage, consequently he turned into the Indian country, leaving Fort Smith to the east, and arrived at Laynesport, Arkansas, December 2, where General Magruder directed him to establish his headquarters. At Cane Hill Colonels Freeman, Dobbin and McCray were directed to take the remnants of their commands to the places where they had been recruited in the hope of picking up the deserters. Shelby was allowed to remain in the territory for recruiting and forage and the brigades of Cabell and Slemons, who had been captured, were furloughed.

What was gained by the expedition? Price says:

I marched 1,454 miles; fought forty-three battles and skirmishes; captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers and men; captured 18 pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand of small arms, 16 stand of colors that were brought out by me (besides many others that were captured and afterward destroyed by our troops who took them), at least 3,000 overcoats, large quantities of blankets, shoes, and ready-made clothing for soldiers, a great many wagons and teams, large numbers of horses, great quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I destroyed miles upon miles of rail-

road, burning the depots and bridges; and taking this into calculation, I do not think that I go beyond the truth when I state that I destroyed in the late expedition to Missouri property to the amount of \$10,000,-000 in value. On the other hand I lost 10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,000 small arms, while I do not think I lost 1,000 prisoners, including the wounded left in their hands and others than recruits on their way to join me, some of whom may have been captured by the enemy.

I brought with me at least 5,000 new recruits, and they are still arriving in large numbers daily within our lines who bring the cheering intelligence that there are more on their way to the army. After I passed the German settlements in Missouri my march was an ovation. The people thronged around us and welcomed us with open hearts and hands. Recruits flocked to our flag in such numbers as to threaten to become a burden instead of a benefit, as they were mostly unarmed. In some counties the question was not who should go to the army, but who should stay at home. I am satisfied that could I have remained in Missouri this winter the army would have been increased 50,000 men.

It will be noticed that he says nothing of the loss of 5,000 arms on the retreat and of how his army melted away by desertion.

Price was not restored to the command of the district of Arkansas, but went to Texas on leave of absence to visit his family. On the way he passed through Shreveport to visit General Smith, by whom he was coldly received. It soon transpired that "Governor" Reynolds, from his capital at Marshall, Texas, had published a bitter attack upon Price on the con-

duct of the expedition—lack of discipline, plundering the inhabitants, and military mistakes being the burden of his complaints—and that this had become common talk. A public denial of the charges made by Reynolds brought forth a reiteration, whereupon Price, instead of challenging him to a duel, demanded a court-martial and that Reynolds be asked to prefer charges. Smith insisted on a court of inquiry, which is much less thoroughgoing, and Price somewhat unwillingly accepted it. The court opened at Shreveport April 21, 1865, and Reynolds was summoned to appear, but he took advantage of his civil status and refused to come. The sittings continued until May 3, when Smith adjourned it to meet again at Washington, Arkansas, and ordered Price to appear there. Edwards, of Shelby's command, who was no great admirer of Price, charged that Smith did this to get rid of Price whom he believed to be plotting a revolution in the army so as to displace him in command. The court never reassembled. The testimony up to the time of adjournment was mostly in Price's favor, but there is no doubt that there was some basis of fact in the criticisms of "Governor" Reynolds.

CHAPTER XX

THE CLOSING SCENES

The latter part of 1864 there was much uneasiness in both the Federal and Confederate headquarters in Arkansas, each thinking and fearing that the other was preparing to attack. The situation of the Federals was somewhat precarious, for they held only Helena, Little Rock, Pine Bluff, DeVall's Bluff, Fort Smith, Van Buren and Fayetteville and a few minor posts and were not strong enough to be sure of defense, much less to undertake offensive operations. At first the movements between Steele and the Mississippi were regarded by the Federals as a diversion to prepare the way for the transfer of troops to the east. When Steele heard of Price's preparations for the Missouri expedition he was sure that the objective was Little Rock and appealed to C. C. Washburn at Memphis for 8,000 men, saying that his situation was critical. Even after Price had entered Missouri an intercepted dispatch from President Davis to Kirby Smith, urging the sending of a force to assist General Forrest in cutting Sherman's communications in Tennessee, kept the Federals constantly on the alert from Memphis to New Orleans, gunboats plying up and down the river to prevent the passage of troops, though it is hard to see where they thought such a force could be found. While Price was still roaming around in Missouri Steele was sure that, when forced out, he and Shelby would fall upon Little Rock and

Pine Bluff from the north while Magruder co-operated from the south, and made such preparations as he could to meet the attack.

On the other hand before Price was out of Arkansas Magruder became uneasy for fear of an attack on Washington and Camden by Steele and hurried Walker's and Polignac's brigades from Louisiana to Monticello and begged Governor Flanagin to concentrate five companies of state troops at Arkadelphia. His idea was to play safe both ways. If Price was successful, then the troops should be on hand for an offensive against Little Rock, if not, they would be needed to occupy Steele until Price arrived in safety. He did not expect to undertake any offensive unless reinforced.

That there was some ground for Magruder's uneasiness cannot be denied. It was known that the higherups were somewhat dissatisfied with Steele because he had not accomplished more and it was reported that Steele had declared that he would take Camden. It was also known that troops were moving up the Mississippi, but whether they would go to Steele or follow Price was not known. An expedition sent against Monticello (September 12) had been driven back and pursued by Colonel Crump to within six miles of Pine Bluff with some twenty odd casualties. When 1,600 men advanced on Monticello (October 8) and forced Colonel Isaac F. Harrison back toward Hamburg it is only natural that Magruder should have thought this the prelude to a coming storm. But Magruder now learned that a part

of the forces ascending the Mississippi had gone on to Missouri while the others stopped at the mouth of White river, and he planned a bold dash against Little Rock, expecting to carry it by assault, for he was not prepared for a siege. But the very next day he heard that Steele had received reinforcements and gave up the plan. Shortly after this he ordered Major-General John A. Wharton to move on Fort Smith at once and asked Gano and Maxey to co-operate from the territory. This force was to co-operate with Price in his retreat, should he be able to attack, or to relieve him in case of necessity. He soon learned that Price's army was greatly demoralized, that large numbers of north Arkansans, refusing to follow him below the Arkansas river, had deserted and gone home, many from the northeast doing likewise. From that time on he busied himself with arranging the troops where they could be most easily subsisted and with erecting fortifications.

In this dark hour General Kirby Smith made public (November 24) a proclamation of President Davis calling on the people to assemble in their accustomed places of worship on November 16 and there "unite in prayer to our Heavenly Father that He bestow His favor upon us; that He extend over us the protection of His Almighty arm; that He sanctify His chastisement to our improvement, so that we may turn away from evil paths and walk righteously in His sight; and that He may restore peace to our beloved country, healing its bleeding wounds, and securing to us our own right of self-government, and independence, and

The main line of march led through Greenville, Fredericktown, Arcadia, Ironton, Pilot Knob, De Soto, along the line of the Southwestern Railroad, much of which was destroyed. Rosecrans, in command at St. Louis, had got wind of the invasion and proceeded to gather up all sorts of fighting forces for the defense. A. J. Smith, who had started to join Sherman with a division of infantry, was called to his aid. Troops on furlough passing that way to their Northern homes were besought to stop and help and many did. The raw militia was called out and unorganized citizens were set to work digging trenches. Just how many fighting men Rosecrans really had is unknown, but Price listened to rumors that they exceeded his forces and turned west toward Jefferson City, with General Alfred Pleasanton following at a safe distance in the rear.

Thomas C. Reynolds, the Confederate "governor" of Missouri, had accompanied the expedition in the hope of establishing his government in the capitol instead of following the fortunes of the army in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. Fagan was moving in advance, and, after skirmishing with the enemy the greater part of the day (October 7), drove him within his fortifications. Hearing that Generals Clinton B. Fisk and E. B. Brown were there with 12,000 men, Price decided not to risk an attack. This was a great disappointment to "Governor" Reynolds, who thereby lost all hope of ever sitting in the capitol then in sight, and he thereafter became a bitter critic of

Price, bringing on a court of inquiry, as we shall see later.

By this time Price seems to have given up all hope of accomplishing any political results or of establishing his line on the Missouri. He now headed westward, probably intending to strike Kansas a blow and then escape with his recruits and booty. Shelby was sent on in advance with orders to destroy the railroad, which he did with Shelbyesque thoroughness, again burning the bridge at La Mine, where he had destroyed one in 1863. October 9 Boonville surrendered without resistance. Skirmishes occurred almost daily, one of some importance near Lexington (October 19).

While the pursuit had been poorly managed, the enemy had gathered sufficient forces by this time, some in the front and some in the rear, to cause Price uneasiness. Still he pushed on toward Kansas. The enemy was now burning bridges in the hope of checking Price's advance. October 21 Marmaduke met the enemy at Little Blue and, with Shelby's help, drove him back through Independence the next day. This was the beginning of four days of fighting which some have dignified by calling it the "Gettysburg of the West." It was to prove Price's undoing and settled that there should be no more invasions of Missouri, but hardly deserves to be compared with the battle in Pennsylvania. On the 22d the Confederates pushed on from Independence to Westport, where the fighting against Curtis and Pleasanton was lively enough to delight the heart of Shelby. Collins and

that He will graciously harken to us while we ascribe to Him the power and glory of our independence."

Dissatisfaction with Steele had borne fruit and he was now (November 29) relieved of command in Arkansas, though his successor, Major-General J. J. Reynolds, did not assume command until December 22. But this change in commanders was scarcely noticeable so far as concerned military activity. General Steele may not have been a brilliant soldier, but, enemy though he was, his name has always been respected in Arkansas because of his gentlemanly bearing and kindly disposition.

Two problems now pressed upon Magruder for solution, to subsist his troops and to construct a line of defense. Subsistence and forage were getting very scarce and he planned to dismount as many of the cavalry as possible to save forage. He even ordered Shelby's famous brigade to dismount, but Shelby wheedled him out of it. He was greatly annoyed to have troops not under his command come within his district for the winter. Particularly obnoxious was General Rains, who had no control over his 200 men and whose unsavory reputation seems not to have improved any since Hindman had ordered his arrest earlier in the war. Smith authorized Magruder to send home Dockery's reserve corps, which had been called out when the expedition against Little Rock was planned and of whose conduct the people of Washington were complaining a great deal. Partly due to lack of subsistence and clothing, partly to inactivity a lot of officers and soldiers plotted (Decem-

ber) to desert and go north of the Arkansas, where they could not be easily conscripted, but this plot was discovered and nipped in the bud. As early as October the Texas troops were reported on the point of an outbreak. One is not surprised at this on learning that in some of the companies as many as one hundred men could not hide their nakedness. This was partly due to the fact that the pay was in arrears for fourteen months, partly to improvidence, some of the men selling their clothing and blankets when issued to them.

While supplies were scarce in places, the difficulty in securing them was not wholly due to scarcity. The disbursing officers not only had no money with which to pay the men, but, owing to failure to pay large sums of certified accounts, the credit of the government was so low that farmers refused to sell to it. The tax collector was threatening them with summary proceedings, yet they held certificates of indebtedness double and treble their taxes. February 11, 1865, General Smith declared that the pay department was behind for bounty, clothing and pay over \$50,000,000, and that the quartermaster's department needed \$30,000,000 to \$40,000,000 at once. In October \$4,000,000 of the new issue had been brought into the department and \$102,000,000 placed subject to his requisition, but the sum in hand was a mere pittance. December 13 Smith reported a total of \$8,000,000 received. Another trouble was that the certificates of indebtedness placed at the disposal of the quartermaster were too large, eighty per

cent of them for \$1,000 each. It appears that the total of the appropriation made by Congress set aside for military purposes in the Trans-Mississippi Department to December 31, 1864, amounted to \$78,-488,567, of which \$20,739,660 had been drawn, leaving a balance of \$57,748,907, but that balance did not help when it could not be secured. On top of this was the greatly depreciated condition of the currency.

The Ouachita river was selected for the first line of defense. As this region was practically stripped of supplies, Magruder had to construct depots and bring in provisions. He applied for 1,000 negroes to work on fortification, as authorized by act of Congress, but after combing the counties in his jurisdiction and taking one out of five he secured only 85. Thousands had followed their masters to Texas and Magruder declared that workers should be sent from that state, but he never secured many and much of the work had to be done by soldiers.

In order to strengthen his forces he planned to send Shelby north of the Arkansas to bring back absentees (January 14), but a few days later decided that this was impracticable, owing to the concentration of Federal cavalry at Little Rock. Instead Colonel John C. Moore was sent with a squad of 30 resolute men. He crossed the river and, after many hair-breadth escapes, found General M. Jeff Thompson, commanding in the northeast. He soon recruited a regiment, but surrender was now in the air and the recruits refused to follow him through the territory

and into Texas, whither he led his band. Magruder ordered all troops in northeastern Arkansas except Colonel A. P. Lyles' brigade to come south of the river, but it is not clear that any ever came.

Under such conditions it may be a little surprising that General Smith could so much as think of another Missouri expedition. Probably he never thought very seriously of it, but felt that he must say something, and this is how it came about. We have seen that the Richmond government was calling earnestly for troops and that Price's expedition of 1864 was gotten up as an offset to this. When Hood turned back from Atlanta Major-General Halleck became particularly anxious to prevent the sending of troops from Arkansas and Louisiana to reinforce him in Tennessee. It was supposed that the crossing would be attempted at Gaines' Landing, where Marmaduke had interrupted river traffic the preceding summer, and orders were issued to keep boats in motion day and night to prevent it. After Hood had re-entered Tennessee and had fought the battle of Franklin (November 30) with some measure of success, though at a tremendous sacrifice, urgent orders were again issued for the transfer of troops, at least two divisions, to support him against Thomas, who, it was reported, was to be reinforced by A. J. Smith from Missouri and Steele from Arkansas. If the forces could not be transferred, then Missouri should be threatened to hold back Smith and Steele. After Hood's army had been virtually destroyed President Davis telegraphed (January 31, 1865) to Smith that

the enemy was continually bringing troops from the west to the east and begged him to take charge of operations on both banks of the Mississippi and to cross over with as large a force as could be prudently withdrawn from his department.

In reply Smith declared (February 28) that it was impossible to cross troops at that time of the year, when the river bottoms were impassible. Also, he did not like the idea of being responsible for operations on both sides of the river. Later (March 7) he said that two movements could be undertaken, into Missouri or across the Mississippi, though both would be difficult. Between him and Missouri lay 400 miles of destitution. The Mississippi was carefully guarded by iron-clads and 200 miles of exhaustion separated him from supplies in that direction. Neither could be undertaken before June or July, but he would push preparations and wait for instructions. He may have waited for instructions but there is not much evidence that he ever made any preparations for either venture. It would have been foolish to attempt either.

But one thing he was trying to prepare, a berth for himself in the service of Emperor Maximillian of Mexico. He did not apprehend the final overthrow of the Confederacy, but if it did come, he might be of service to his majesty "in contemplation of possible collision between the Imperial Government and the United States of the North."

In a sense the war may be said to have ended in Arkansas with the battle of Poison Spring so far as fighting was concerned, though something of a real

scrap occurred at Dardanelle January 14, 1865. Colonel William H. Brooks with Colonel R. C. Newton's regiment and Captain Ras. Stirman's brigade, 1,500 strong, had approached the Arkansas to intercept traffic between Fort Smith and Little Rock. Finding a considerable force at Dardanelle they attacked and drove them within the stockade, but withdrew after four hours fighting with a loss of one killed and 15 wounded. They reported 8 of the enemy killed, 19 wounded and 2 captured, but Colonel A. H. Ryan reported his loss as one killed and 15 wounded, that of the enemy 80 killed and wounded. Brooks withdrew to hasten after some steamers which he heard were approaching. Placing his men in ambush at Ivey's Ford he captured and burned the *New Chipewewa* (January 17), making prisoners of the crew, one officer and 29 men of the Fiftieth Indiana, 40 negroes, and several refugee families from Fort Smith. Next the steamer *Annie Jacobs* was attacked. The soldiers on board returned the fire, but she was grounded on an island and many men were drowned in attempting to escape to the opposite shore. Next came the *Lotus* which was driven to the opposite bank. This concluded the action. Colonel Brooks carried off 82 prisoners and the refugee families. On the return Colonel Newton skirmished with the enemy at Boggs' Mills.

While the Confederates were busied mainly with subsisting and planning, the Federals were quietly holding on to their occupied posts, Little Rock, Devall's Bluff, Pine Bluff, Lewisburg, St. Charles, the

mouth of White river, Brownsville and the railroad, Fort Smith and Helena, and occasionally sending out scouting and foraging parties. North of the mountains Fayetteville was held. The garrisons were confessedly on a defensive basis, but scouting and foraging parties continued to be sent out to the end. These were too numerous and too insignificant to be mentioned in detail. Some were sent out against guerrillas and jayhawkers, who were plentiful and the report of the commander generally stated that the quarry was flushed and pursued and that several were killed and wounded, the rest scattered. Supplies of various kinds were secured by plundering the inhabitants, though the army did not get all its living in this way. Brigadier-General C. C. Andrews proudly wrote to President Lincoln that in three months' residence at DeVall's Bluff his troops had consumed \$17,000 worth of beef and it had not cost the government over \$800. A few demonstrations were made toward the Confederate forces. In 1865 these skirmishes ranged from Bentonville in the northwest to Marion in the east and Monticello in the south. Apparently the last to occur on Arkansas soil in which blood was spilt was at Snake creek, April 23, 1865. A company of 18 men was trying to push through to Benton county when they were set upon by Colonel A. Phillips, Third Indian Home Guard (Kansas), three being killed, the rest scattered and the mail lost to the attacking party. If this was not in Arkansas, then probably the last bloody skirmish occurred near Pine Bluff March 4, when Captain J. H.

Norris attacked Captain R. A. Kidd's band, killing five, wounding several, and capturing two prisoners and several horses and mules and a few arms. The very last skirmish to occur before the surrender was with this same Captain Kidd at Monticello, May 24. Captain Norris went down there, scoured the country, drove the Confederates out of town and sent word to Captain Burks that he would "remain there until they surrendered or until every corndodger and pound of meat was eaten and every ear of corn was properly disposed of to U. S. cavalry horses." The next day, May 25, fourteen officers and seventy enlisted men surrendered and the following day Captain Kidd did likewise.

Several weeks before this news reached the west of the surrender of Lee at Appomattox and the perilous situation of the other armies in the east. April 14, Major General J. J. Reynolds wrote to Major-General James F. Fagan, commanding the district of Arkansas—Magruder had been transferred to Texas and was succeeded by General S. B. Buckner, he by M. M. Parsons—inclosing the Grant-Lee correspondence, inviting him to surrender on the same terms, and requesting him to transmit the correspondence to the commanders in Louisiana and Texas.

For ten days or more previous to the date of this letter Fagan had, with the consent of Smith, been planning a dash upon Little Rock with a view of capturing the place. April 25 he declined the request for his surrender, saying: "It is the first instance within my knowledge of a commanding officer hav-

ing been called on to surrender his army to an invisible foe." After some further ironical remarks he declined to pass the word on and declared that when his troops did lay down their arms it would be after peace had been restored, the soil of their country rid of the invaders, and on terms which they would dictate. He did not attempt, however, to find the invisible foe by a dash on Little Rock, but turned over his command to General Dockery and left the state. Churchill had already taken his brigade to Texas.

Just three days before Fagan's note was written an order (dated April 21) was read to the soldiers while on dress parade at Shreveport informing them of Lee's surrender, exhorting them not to lose hope or abandon their colors, saying that their supplies were inexhaustible and that "the eyes of the world were upon them" to save the Confederacy. Spite of this the spirit of the soldiers fell and many talked of desertion and some put it into practice. A mass meeting was now called and speakers representing the different states, Brigadier-General A. T. Hawthorn for Arkansas, addressed the citizens and soldiers. The speakers were all for further resistance and in the audience the ladies were "more determined, more uncompromising" than the men.

April 19, 1865, Major-General John Pope, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, addressed a letter to General Kirby Smith and enclosed copies of the terms of Lee's surrender at Appomattox; also, he stated that Sherman and Johnston were reported to be negotiating on the same terms in North

Carolina. Authentic information had reached him of the surrender of Mobile. This would leave a large part of the Federal armies free to operate in the Trans-Mississippi Department, which would render effective resistance impossible. In view of this he was invited to surrender on the terms accepted by Lee. By doing this he would save western Louisiana and Texas from the devastation suffered by the eastern states. An officer's duty had been performed and his honor maintained when he had prolonged resistance until all hope of success was lost. Any further resistance would only lead to the horrors of violent subjugation.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Sprague, the bearer of this dispatch, was instructed that if Smith or any of his officers, while accepting these terms for their men, should prefer to withdraw themselves to Mexico or some other foreign country without being subject to parole, he should offer no considerable objection. If they should propose to march off their organized bodies into Mexico, carrying their material of war, he should not commit the government to any policy.

While the mass meeting described above was still in session news arrived that Sprague was at the mouth of Red river with the demand for surrender. Smith decided to go down to meet him, but Governor Allen (Louisiana) and "Governor" Reynolds persuaded him that he ought to remain at Shreveport—they were opposed to surrender and seem to have feared to trust Smith—and Colonel Flournoy was sent down to bring Sprague up.

After the meeting adjourned discussion continued in private and the demand for peace on the part of citizens and soldiers increased. At this juncture Price arrived and a council was called at his house to discuss the arrest of Smith and putting the command in other hands. Shelby, who never had enough of fighting, rushed up from Texas only to be assured by Smith that he would fight to the bitter end, if his troops would stand by him, or until President Davis arrived, or he received definite instruction from him.

While waiting for the arrival of Flournoy and Sprague, Smith wrote the Hon. Robert Rose, asking him to approach the Emperor Maximillian on the subject of an alliance with the Confederate States. If the Confederacy should collapse, it was clear that the United States would then aim at the destruction of his empire. There were 60,000 men under his command and more would "gladly rally around the flag that promises to lead them to battle against their former foe." Such troops would be a great help to him. Several weeks before this Governor Allen had sent Polignac to France, and Smith had written to John Slidell urging him to impress upon Napoleon III that the security of his empire in Mexico and the best interests of his own government demanded immediate intervention to restore peace on the basis of the independence of the Confederacy. If slavery stood in the way, he was sure that nineteen-twentieths of the planters would willingly accept gradual emancipation to insure independence.

A few, it seems, were willing to accept almost anything rather than go back under the government of the United States. A few months before this, when all hope of independence was practically gone, the Washington (Arkansas) *Telegraph*, as quoted in the New York *Tribune*, suggested the abandonment of "all pretense and hollow forms of self-government." Rather than become the "abject slaves of low, mean demagogues and crazy fanatics," the editor suggested that they "become subjects of some grave and dignified power," some government which satisfied such poets as Shakespeare, or Corneille, such statesmen as Burke, or Thiers, and raise the cry, "Rule Britannia," or "Vive la France," which reminds one a little of the attitude said to have been held by some in New England just before and during the War of 1812.

May 8 Sprague arrived at Shreveport and had a long conference with Smith. Next day, in a curt note Smith informed Pope that his "sense of duty and honor" would not permit him to accept and that he regretted that the communication had been accompanied with a threat.

The same day he addressed the governors of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Missouri, saying that, in the absence of the President, he wished to consult them, in view of the surrender of Lee and the perilous situation of the other armies in the east, about what should be done. The meeting took place at Marshall, Texas, May 13.

Before this meeting assembled Brigadier-General M. Jeff Thompson received (May 7) at Harrisburg, Arkansas, from Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Davis a demand from Pope for surrender and, proceeded to Chalk Bluff to meet him and arrange the details. The meeting took place May 9. Thompson first asked whether, should he surrender, the Federal army would move over the country or simply go to the designated places to receive and parole the surrendered men, whether the families of those who preferred to leave after being paroled would be banished, and whether the terms covered the private property at home. The answers to these questions were satisfactory, but he asked forty-eight hours to consult his brigade commander, for he doubted his right to surrender a district force which was not surrounded. This was granted and he further asked that the civil officers, judges, sheriffs, etc., be allowed to perform their functions until the civil authorities should settle their status. To this Davis replied that he had no authority to treat with or about civil officers. Thompson then asked if the officers would be allowed to go within the Confederate lines. His reason for this was that many would prefer to go to Texas rather than remain where private animosities would keep the country in a tumult after the military force was withdrawn. In reply to this Davis simply quoted the terms given to General Lee.

Under these terms the officers and men were to be allowed to return to their homes, "not to be disturbed by the U. S. authorities so long as they observe their

paroles and the laws in force where they reside." May 11 Thompson accepted the terms and May 25 and June 5 were agreed upon as the dates for surrendering the forces to be gathered at Wittsburg and Jacksonport. On those dates 636 officers and 6,818 men were surrendered. Davis reported less than 500 arms. He was satisfied that many had been left at home and some destroyed, but the officers assured him that the men had returned from Price's Missouri expedition with but few arms. There was no transportation except 300 or 400 dugout canoes, no public animals, no other property of any kind except \$4,821 in Confederate money. Most of the men were without food and 28,000 rations were issued to them.

In closing his report Colonel Davis said: "They seemed highly pleased at the surrender, and said that all they wanted now was to be allowed to live at home. * * * General Thompson met us in the most friendly manner, and acted very honorably."

The governors and General Smith met at Marshall, Texas, May 13, to discuss surrender. While they were busy with this some of the generals were trying to persuade their men to follow them to Mexico, others were plotting the overthrow of Smith to carry on the war. The leading spirit in this seems to have been Shelby. He and Generals Churchill, Hawthorne and Preston, and Colonel Flournoy met at the latter's house and agreed that Smith should be waited on and told that the army had lost confidence in him, that a change of commanders was necessary and that Buckner was the man to take his place. Buckner

agreed to this and Shelby, accompanied by the delegation, laid the matter before Smith late at night, and also asked that he furnish General Preston enough sound money to pay his expenses to Mexico that he might prepare berths for them in case of the total overthrow of the Confederacy. Smith was greatly affected and replied with a voice full of emotion. He regretted that the soldiers had lost confidence in his leadership, said that he had never intended to surrender and that he was willing and anxious to fight and only asked for sympathy and support. Nominally he resigned the command to Buckner and authorized him to send Preston to Mexico, but he continued to issue commands, though some of the officers refused to obey them.

May 13 the governors in council at Marshall decided on terms Smith was authorized to accept. The memorandum of terms was signed by H. W. Allen, of Louisiana, Flanagin of Arkansas, and by Guy M. Bryan for Governor Murray, of Texas, who was ill, "Governor" Reynolds was belligerent and refused to sign. However, he did join the others in requesting Governor Allen to visit the Federal authorities in Washington with a view to making a complete pacification of the Trans-Mississippi Department.

Returning to Shreveport General Smith handed Colonel Sprague a letter and a memorandum. He said that he could not accept terms which would "purchase a certain degree of immunity from devastation at the expense of the honor of the army." His army was not beaten and it could not be beaten and

the country devastated except at great cost to the United States. The demand to surrender under such circumstances would but "humiliate a people who have contended gallantly in behalf of principles which they believe to be right." In view of this he proposed the following:

First. The U. S. authorities to grant immunity from prosecution for past acts to all officers and soldiers and citizens of the Trans-Mississippi Department.

Second. On the granting of this immunity all resistance to the United States Government to close.

Third. The Confederate Army to be disbanded and its officers and soldiers be permitted to return to their homes, transportation to be furnished them as far as practicable.

Fourth. Such officers and soldiers as chose will be permitted, without molestation, to leave the country with or without their arms, in a reasonable time.

Fifth. The same permission to be granted to citizens.

Colonel Sprague declined to allow Governor Allen to accompany him to Washington. The letter and memorandum he carried away with him.

General Smith and the officers who were afraid that he was going to surrender soon found that the soldiers were not so touchous about their honor. Neither did they respond to the efforts of their generals to persuade them to go to Mexico. May 16 General Magruder notified Smith that 400 troops had attempted to desert the post of Galveston with

their arms. Prompt and decisive action alone prevented it. Maxey and Walker both declared, said he, that their troops could not be depended on. All his efforts to instill a spirit of resistance were in vain. In closing, he said: "For God's sake act or let me act." At Brownville Brigadier-General Jas. E. Slaughter reported: "War meetings have been held, speeches made, but all without the desired effect." The men said, "We are whipped," and thought it useless for the west to try to do what the east could not do. At Alexandria, Louisiana, the assistant adjutant-general reported the country filled with deserters with arms in their hands and that there were only 86 enlisted men in the fort. The officers in Louisiana were acting independently of Smith and Buckner who were determined not to surrender and would bring ruin on Louisiana and Texas merely that they might escape with a corporal's guard into Mexico.

Edwards, the devotee of Shelby, paid the following tribute to Arkansas:

The Arkansas troops, to their eternal honor be it spoken, as worthy sons of one among the noblest states in the Confederacy, held out faithfully and behaved like soldier patriots as they were. No state suffered more, bled more freely, exhibited more genuine and self-sacrificing devotion than Arkansas. The battlefield for both of the contending governments, she was lavish of her blood and treasure. From Richmond to Vicksburg, from Helena to Matamoras, her children sleep thickly in premature but glorious graves. Aspirations for liberty were suggested by her gigantic mountains, and the pure, limpid streams of

her hills murmured forever the stories of the struggles won by fortitude and endurance. Texas, without a battlefield, shuddered as a frightened woman when the war clamors approached her borders. Arkansas, great with the gloom and the glory of fifty desperate fields, still lifted her battered shield high above her timid sister, and dressed her own ranks for another fight. Sister of Missouri, too, she was a mother to Missouri's orphan children. Young and brave, and beautiful, Queen of the South and regal nurse of strong, heroic men, her banner borne so long triumphantly, went down at last untarnished by the stain of panic and untorn by the needless bitter damning hands of cowardice and treachery.

While this contained an element of truth it was touched by the imagination characteristic of Shelby and his devotees. Many of the Arkansas troops had been sent to Texas on account of the scarcity of provisions in Arkansas, Churchill having arrived there April 11. May 20 he announced that furloughs would be granted to his men "to go home and cut the wheat." Of course they never returned.

Without waiting to hear from Sprague Buckner went to New Orleans to negotiate with Major-General E. R. S. Canby. There, on May 26, he for General E. Kirby Smith and P. J. Osterhaus for General Canby, signed an agreement for surrender of all the troops and public property under the control of the military and naval forces of the Trans-Mississippi Department on the same terms as those offered by Pope a month earlier, with the addition of a promise to furnish transportation and subsistence for the men

and officers to the nearest practicable point to their homes. June 2 General Smith approved this agreement with the understanding that the officers observing their paroles would be allowed to make their homes in or out of the United States, but General Canby declined to commit himself on this point. The paroling occurred as soon thereafter as practicable.

It seems that the soldiers in Arkansas were greatly dissatisfied with Fagan's refusal to surrender and many of them deserted. May 8 thirty-seven officers and 293 enlisted men held as prisoners at Little Rock were offered release if they would take the amnesty oath and all accepted. May 11 Captain S. Husband surrendered 24 men to Major Davis, of Powell Clayton's command. Clayton then notified two other leaders that, if they did not surrender by May 15, they would be treated as outlaws. General D. H. Reynolds then told him that he might hunt them down, but not to trouble himself about the matter of outlawry. One surrendered May 20. Dockery, to whom Fagan had turned over his command, managed to hold together 200 of Shelby's men and 100 of his own. May 29 he appeared at Pine Bluff and there secured permission to proceed to Little Rock and surrender to General Reynolds. June 3 he issued an address to the "Officers and soldiers of reserve forces in the State of Arkansas," telling them of the Canby-Smith agreement and calling on them to assemble at Camden, Washington and Monticello on June 20 to carry out its provisions. June 14 Fagan appeared at Washington and, acting under an order issued at

Shreveport (June 8) by Buckner, who now styled himself "Lieutenant-General" and Smith "General," superseded Dockery and turned over the troops for parole. A good many soldiers straggled into the various Federal garrisons and surrendered. Captain John A. Schnable notified General Pope that he wished to surrender at Yellville and Captain J. L. Hodges was directed (June 1) to go there to parole his men.

While Shelby was not an Arkansan he played such a conspicuous part in the war in Arkansas that the reader will want to know what became of him. Belligerent to the end he begged such of his men as were with him in Texas to follow him to Mexico, but most of them declined and on June 2 he bade them a touching farewell. About 500 followed him to Mexico. At Monterey the band scattered, some going to California, some to British Honduras, and some to Brazil. Some joined the French *contra-guerrillas* under Colonel Dupin to avenge the murder of General M. M. Parsons, who had preceded them. Shelby and fifty of his men made their way to Mexico City and ultimately settled in the Cordova Colony of Carlotta.

Among the other prominent leaders who also went to Mexico were Generals Smith, Price, Magruder, and Hindman, Governor Murrah, of Texas, Governor Allen of Louisiana, and many others of lesser grades, but most of them soon returned.

CHAPTER XXI

THE CONFEDERATE STATE GOVERNMENT

In the midst of arms, laws are silent, that is, the laws of peace yield first place to the laws of war so far as war may be said to be regulated by any laws at all. Nominally military commanders are subject to the chief civil executive, but in reality he also is a military commander-in-chief and directs the whole trend of civil affairs to military ends.

In attempting to carry out his duty as he saw it in both fields Governor Rector found himself confronted with many difficulties. One of these was conflicts with Confederate authorities about the raising of troops and turning them over to the Confederacy, another was lack of harmony in his own administration, the convention having sought to tie his hands by the creation of the military board. In the purely civil affairs he was embarrassed by a scarcity of officials. By the close of 1861 he found that about half the civil offices were neglected, the holders having gone off to the war, yet they had not resigned, consequently the governor could not appoint any one to fill vacancies which did not exist. To remedy this he begged the officials to return to their duties or resign the offices.

A special session of the legislature was called to meet November 4, 1861, and remained in session two weeks. The Confederate government had levied a war tax and the legislature now provided for the pay-

ment of this tax. For economy the legislature abolished a few offices, repealed the convention war tax, and tried to facilitate the circulation of Arkansas war bonds and treasury notes. It also authorized counties to do their bit for the war and made a slight provision for sick and disabled volunteers. Next spring a called session (March 17-22, 1862) prohibited the use of grain to make spiritous liquors, backed the bonds and treasury warrants with the public lands, and made a small provision for the relief of the families of volunteers. The title to lands surrendered to the convention by the Cairo and Fulton Railroad was now vested in the state. The further issue of interest bearing war bonds and treasury notes was stopped. The battle of Elkhorn had just been fought and Van Dorn was fleeing eastward by one way and Curtis was following by another. Fearing that Little Rock might be beleaguered the legislature authorized the governor to remove the capital to some other place within the state, and the supreme court was directed to follow.

We have already seen how Governor Rector fled somewhat precipitately when Curtis appeared at Batesville. For this he was criticised severely and ridiculed by Editor Johnson, of the *True Democrat*, who approved of General Roane's declaration of martial law as supplying the want of the government since "the flight of the executive from Little Rock has left the state without any government whatever." Governor Rector returned in a few days and demanded a retraction. This was refused and, although he was

chief executive of a state which imposed severe penalties for dueling, he sent a challenge. Mr. Johnson selected pistols and claimed the right under the "code" to fix the time and place, but no agreement could be reached and the duel never came off.

Considerable excitement was caused early in the year by the report that a treasonable peace society existed in some of the northern counties (Van Buren, Izard) and was acting in connivance with the Federals in Missouri. Governor Rector reported this to the Richmond government, but President Davis declared that it was too remote and the evidence too meager for any action there and left it to him. The Confederate circuit court met at Little Rock in January and fifteen of the fifty who had been arrested were brought before it charged with treason. The grand jury, however, failed to indict them and they were released on taking the oath of allegiance to the Confederacy. Some enlisted in the army. The legislature, which met in March, passed no law on this subject, but the newly elected legislature, which met in November, enacted a stringent law against inducing anyone to foreswear allegiance.*

While Governor Rector and the Arkansas delegation in Congress had protested to President Davis against stripping the state of its defenders and had demanded that defense be prepared, they, at least the governor, did not like such high-handed procedure as that instituted by General Hindman in preparing

*Supra, 101.

an army of defense and began to murmur. June 30, 1862; Hindman declared the state under martial law and placed in each county a provost marshal to have charge of all the independent companies. His excuse for martial law was "the virtual abdication of the civil authorities and the reign of profiteering." He tells us that his officials "exorcised the devil of extortion that was torturing the soldiers into desertion by starving their wives and children; they restored the credit of the Confederate currency and saved the army from starvation; they broke up trading with the enemy and destroyed or removed out of his reach thousands of bales of cotton, that selfish and venal planters were ready to sell for Federal gold; they insured the exclusion of spies, the arrest of traitors, stragglers and deserters, and the enforcement of conscription."

Governor Rector and the Arkansas delegation in Congress protested against this and received considerable popular support. General Albert Pike, whom Hindman had humiliated by ordering him to Little Rock under arrest, was particularly bitter and published a lengthy "card" in denunciation of Hindman's acts. Clothed with legislative, executive, and judicial powers, the provost marshal, "Like a triple-headed Deity," said Pike, "wears the robe of Senator and the ermine of the judge and wields the bloody fasces of the lictor, at once." This substitution of military despotism, he declared, "reconciles men to desertion, sanctifies want of zeal, and is a pretext for cowardice. It renders hardship more irksome, dangers more ob-

noxious, and glory less satisfactory to the soldiers."

July 30, by an order from Vicksburg, General T. H. Holmes, whom the Arkansas delegation had asked President Davis to substitute for Hindman, was sent to Arkansas. August 12, he established his headquarters at Little Rock and relieved Hindman of the chief command, but left him in command in the field and seems to have done very little to reverse his policies, though he must have received an order from President Davis to do so before leaving Vicksburg. Under date of August 6, General Order No. 56, was issued by the War Department stating that military commanders had no authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus; and that martial law, even when declared by the President under the Act of Congress, did not warrant the arbitrary establishment of the price of commodities.

Whether aimed directly at Arkansas or not, the order does not seem to have been observed there. Finally a member of the Arkansas delegation introduced a resolution in Congress calling on the President for information in regard to Hindman's seizure of cotton, his refusal to accept substitutes for soldiers, his declaration of martial law, his enrollment of conscripts into new companies. If he had done the things charged, had the President authorized them, and if so, under what law. G. W. Randolph, Secretary of War, replied that he had no official information in regard to the matter, but having seen orders purporting to come from Hindman proclaiming martial law and "adopting oppressive police regulations," he had

ordered General Holmes to inquire into it and if true, to rescind the orders and regulations. He added that Hindman had "not been sent to Arkansas by the War Department and had never been commanding general of the Trans-Mississippi Department."

The last sentence, which implied that Hindman was an usurper and imposter, together with talk of having him transferred to the east to be sent before the military board of inquiry, Hindman justly resented, for he had been assigned to Arkansas by Beauregard, his superior, and had assumed that that official knew what he was doing. October 11, Secretary Randolph again wrote to Holmes saying that reports were still coming to him of the continued enforcement of martial law and of the arrest of persons and seizure of property by military officials and plainly intimating that such must stop.

In defense of the legality of his orders General Hindman pointed to numerous instances in which commanders had declared martial law, several of them in Arkansas. In justification of it he declared that the opposition to it "never embraced many persons other than tories, speculators, extortioners and deserters, and a few of the smaller politicians who mistook the clamors of these malcontents for the voice of the people." Prominent citizens had urged it and the two leading newspapers, *The Gazette* and *The True Democrat*, had strongly advised it. The last named had been founded by Hindman just before the war began in opposition to the "Johnson family."

True to his states' rights views President Davis took the position that the regulation of profiteering depended on state action and asked the governors to recommend to their several legislatures such legislation as would enable them "to suppress the shameful extortions now practiced upon the people by men who can be reached by no moral influence, and who are worse enemies to the Confederacy than if found in arms among the invading force." A few weeks later (January 29, 1863), apparently in response to a communication from General Holmes, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus in Arkansas and the Indian country, but directed him to abstain from control over persons and property further than was necessary for defensive purposes and military discipline.

But even this was not satisfactory to the civil authorities and the Arkansas delegation supported Governor Flanagin in a protest against martial law in Arkansas except in very special cases or within very restricted limits.

Wearied of the interference of the civil authorities, some of whom were his political enemies, General Hindman urged to be transferred to the command of General Bragg or somewhere east of the Mississippi, but General Holmes insisted on keeping him and he was in Arkansas to lead the forces in the Prairie Grove campaign.

The state officials elected in 1860 under the Constitution of 1836 were to serve four years. We have seen that the secession convention adopted a new constitution in 1861. This provided that certain offi-

cials, naming them, should hold until the expiration of their terms, but did not include in this the governor, secretary of state, auditor, and treasurer. The Constitution also provided that "the next general election for officers . . . not otherwise provided for shall be held on the first Monday of October, 1862." This undoubtedly was a clever trick of the regular Democrats, or "Johnson faction," to shorten the term of Governor Rector.

This seems to have escaped the notice of Governor Rector and he had no intention of standing for re-election or of vacating the office in 1862, but it did not escape the notice of Richard H. Johnson and C. C. Danley and when the sheriff of Pulaski county said that he had no intention of ordering an election for governor, they went before the circuit court and asked for a writ of mandamus. When the court refused to grant this they appealed to the supreme court. This body held that it clearly was the intent of the convention that an election should be held in 1862 for governor and the other officials "not otherwise provided for" and ordered the sheriff to give notice of the election.

Governor Rector accepted the decision, issued a proclamation calling an election and announced his candidacy for re-election. No convention was held to nominate candidates, but the Johnson faction looked after that. Elias N. Conway, William E. Woodruff, John C. Peay, George C. Watkins and several others now published a "card" recommending Colonel Harris Flanagin, of Clark county, then absent in Ten-

nessee with the Second Arkansas Mounted Rifles, for governor, and the opponents of Rector gave him their support. Hindman, who had supported Rector in 1860, but had had a good deal of trouble with him over his policy of conscription and martial law, now supported Flanagin and his paper, *The True Democrat* did likewise. Governor Rector, somewhat late in the day, started a new paper, *The Patriot*, to support his cause. There was not much of a campaign, for Flanagin is said not to have known of his nomination until the day before the election. Certainly he took no part in the contest.

The result was that Flanagin received 18,189 votes; Rector, 7,419; J. S. H. Raines, 708. There were no returns from Crittenden, Monroe, Mississippi and Phillips counties. Governor Rector's term expired November 15, but, in a bit of petulance, he resigned November 4. Thomas Fletcher, of Arkansas county, president of the senate, then became acting governor and served until Flanagin was inaugurated on the 15th. But this was not the end of such trouble. Both the old and the new constitutions provided that senators should hold four years, one-half retiring every two years. But Governor Rector had ordered an election for all the seats in the senate. Oliver H. Oates, whose term expired in 1864, was elected secretary of state in 1862 by the legislature. Now both the old and new constitutions prohibited the election of any member of the legislature to any office within the gift of the legislature during the terms for which he was elected. But the supreme

court held that his term beginning in 1860 had been vacated by the convention of 1861 and that he was merely holding by appointment of the convention which directed that officials should hold until their successors were elected. Consequently Mr. Oates took his seat as secretary of state. The court went on to say that election of all the members of the senate was a mistake and that the decision of the senate to seat, all the members for four years and then in 1866 order that one-half should be elected for two years, the other for four years, was a violation of the constitution and would lead to confusion, but that question was not before the judges and they rendered no decision upon it. The confusion was avoided by the issue of the war, which vacated all the seats and made another election unnecessary.

For the relief of needy and destitute families of soldiers the legislature directed the county courts to look after them and send the governor a list of those in need. For their relief the sum of \$1,200,000 was appropriated, but this does not mean that that sum was in the treasury or likely to be there. Authority was given for the use of the internal improvement funds belonging to certain counties. In 1864 the legislature authorized the use of \$200,000 of this fund to buy salt to supply the needs of families of deceased soldiers, or those in the Confederate army, within such counties as were, or had been, overrun or occupied by the enemy. The sum of \$5,000 was appropriated (1864) to establish soldiers' homes at Washington, Camden and Monticello, the same to

be used whenever private contributions amounted to \$2,000 in Confederate money. These were to be used as temporary homes for soldiers traveling from place to place, but not as hospitals or stopping places for more than one night, or for procuring a meal, unless on special business authorized by the military authorities.

By 1862 the civilian population was feeling the scarcity of clothing. There was a cotton factory at Van Buren and one in Washington county and one near Murfreesboro, Pike county, which the Confederates took particular care to guard, but most of the cloth seems to have been woven on looms in the private homes. Prizes were offered to women who could weave the most. But cards were scarce and difficult to procure. In 1862 the legislature appropriated \$300,000 to encourage the manufacture of salt, iron and cotton cards. The governor was to lend sums to applicants to be repaid with interest at six per cent in installments extending over six years. If a factory was erected on public lands, the owner should receive a deed to not more than 160 acres. It is impossible to say whether any of this money was ever called for or not, but in August, 1864, one factory for the manufacture of cotton and wool cards was in operation in Columbia county. However, it was so hampered by a scarcity of labor that the legislature requested General Kirby Smith, on application of the proprietor, to detail such persons from the military service as might be necessary to keep it going. This was allowed under the conscription law.

But this was not enough and the legislature authorized the governor to buy and sell, at such prices as he saw fit, cotton and wool cards, drugs, and medicines and appropriated (1864) \$35,000 in specie out of the fund to pay interest on the bonds, and the internal improvement, seminary, saline, and common school funds and swamp land to carry on the business. Fearing that this would not meet the needs they authorized the governor to buy and sell cotton (through Mexico) and use the proceeds to buy machinery for the manufacture of articles of prime necessity. He was further authorized to carry on manufacturing on the account of the state and to fix the price of the articles and was given \$1,000,000 for the business. But the business never materialized.

We have seen that Governor Flanagin moved the state government to Washington on the capture of Little Rock in 1863. A year later (September 22, 1864) the legislature met there in called session. At this time there were twenty-five members of the senate and seventy-five in the house; only eight senators and thirty-one representatives were present, which meant that there was no quorum in either house. Many of the counties were overrun by the Federals and it was impossible for their representatives to attend. The members present then asked the supreme court for its opinion on their right to continue in session. The court replied that the enemy could not destroy the government by making it impossible for a few members to attend, therefore the session was legal. The houses then organized and proceeded to

business. By September 27, thirteen senators were present, including one new member, giving that house a quorum, but it is doubtful if the house of representatives ever had a quorum.

In his message Governor Flanagin reported that the law passed at an earlier session forbidding the distillation of ardent spirits from grain was not being enforced. Courts were held irregularly and in brief sessions. The distillers preferred to pay the fines, being able to recoup out of sales. The use of liquor was demoralizing and was leading to violence. He hoped that the legislature would provide for better enforcement. Other matters besides purely military affairs which he laid before the legislature were the matter of electing at irregular times and absentee voting.

Nothing was done about the liquor traffic. The first measure passed was one repealing the prohibition upon the governor to remove the public property beyond the limits of the state. Another provided that elections for senators and representatives and prosecuting attorneys in the overrun counties might be held in military camps where there were at least ten voters for any one county. Also, refugees, ten in number, might assemble in an election precinct and vote. These provisions were also extended to cover elections for members of Congress, but before adjourning the legislature passed another providing that if any district could hold an election, then the act of the Confederate Congress of February 15, 1864, to promote the holding of elections in Arkansas,

should be the law. This provided for the election of Congressmen in Arkansas by general ticket. This was done to secure representation from the districts held by the enemy. Citizens in the army and those driven out by the enemy were allowed to vote at any polling place in the state or in camps of the army.

The assembly was greatly disturbed by the increasing lawlessness and extended the death penalty to numerous crimes, second degree murder, arson, burglary, robbery, counterfeiting, forging, negro stealing, horse stealing, embezzling public money of the state, sodomy, buggery, kidnapping, perjury, subornation of perjury, bigamy, incest, rape or attempt to commit rape, or administer a potion (for rape). Buying any negro or negroes, horses, mules, etc., that were known to have been stolen; enticing away slaves, inciting insurrection contrary to section 1, article 4, of Gould's Digest; unlawfully setting at liberty any person in arrest, were to be punished as provided by law, but the trial judge might commute to whipping or the pillory; the same for forcing a woman to marry. All other crimes punishable by jail or penitentiary sentence could, in the discretion of the judge, be punished by whipping or the pillory.

The legislators called attention to the fact that the illegal seizure, by those pretending to have authority, and the wanton destruction of teams in service by government employees, had so reduced the number of work animals that farmers did not have enough to carry on their farming and requested the governor to ask General Smith to take such measures as were neces-

sary to protect the people. They also protested against an act of Congress exempting farmers and planters from military service under restrictions forbidding them to sell, barter, or exchange, their articles of produce except to soldiers' families on the ground that this prevented them from getting salt, iron, and other articles necessary for farming. The reason was that currency was so depreciated that such articles could be secured only by barter or exchange. The Senators and Representatives were asked to work for a modification of the law.

Before adjourning the legislature fixed the date for the next meeting on the first Monday in October, 1865, unless called earlier by the governor. The governor did wish to call it, but found his will thwarted by General Reynolds.

When Arkansas seceded the Hon. William K. Sebastian was the holdover senator at Washington. He did not resign, neither did he go to Washington when President Lincoln called a special session of Congress. As a result he was expelled July 11, along with eight other Southern senators by a vote of 32 to 11. He remained within the Confederacy, but took no active part in its support. He died in Memphis, May 20, 1865. In 1867 the Senate repealed the resolution of expulsion so far as it applied to him and paid the full amount of his salary to his heirs. Charles B. Mitchell, who had been elected to succeed Senator Johnson, did not go to Washington to claim his seat and those who had been elected to the House of Representatives did likewise.

We have seen that the secession convention elected delegates to represent the state in the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States. Arkansas was admitted to the Confederacy May 18, 1861, by a unanimous vote (each state having one vote) and these gentlemen were at once admitted to seats, though President Davis did not sign the Act of Admission until May 20. One of these gentlemen, Albert Rust, helped to raise the Third Arkansas Infantry and seems to have served sometimes in the army (in Western Virginia) and sometimes in Congress, as though the two positions were not incompatible.

In November, 1861, an election was held for President and vice-President and for members of the house of representatives. Davis and Stephens had no opposition for President and vice-President under the permanent Constitution and received 27,000 votes in Arkansas. This was far below the vote of 1860, but many of the voters were in the field. In the first district (northwestern part of the state) Felix I. Batson was easily elected over H. F. Thomason, a member of the Provisional Congress. In the second (southwestern) district, Grandison D. Royston defeated six competitors. In the fourth (northeastern) district, Judge Thomas H. Hanley was elected by a good majority over James H. Patterson.

The hottest contest of all seems to have been in the third district (southeastern), where six candidates sought Congressional honors. The returns as first filed with the secretary of state gave A. H. Garland 2,157, J. P. Johnson 2,125, leaving a plurality of

32 for Garland. After the returns had been sent in from Arkansas county the clerk claimed to have discovered an error, reconvened the canvassing board, and sent in corrected returns, giving Garland 195 instead of 175 and Johnson 135 instead of 73, which meant a plurality of 8 for Johnson in the district. The day that these returns were filed Governor Rector issued a certificate of election to A. H. Garland based on the first returns. It will be remembered that he was hostile to the Johnson faction. A clerk in the state department gave a certificate to Johnson. Mr. Johnson now offered to submit the matter to the people again, but this was declined.

On the day that Congress opened Mr. Johnson filed notice that he would contest the election of Mr. Garland. A majority of the committee on contested elections finally reported (September 17, 1862) in favor of Mr. Garland, but based their report mainly on technical grounds. Three members presented a minority report in favor of Mr. Johnson, but the House took no action on the matter. At last, after nearly a year of waiting, Mr. Johnson wrote (January 6, 1863) that he would drop the contest. He believed that he was entitled to the seat, but the end of the session was near and he did not wish to distract the attention of Congress from the important subject of defense.

The first senators elected by the legislature were Robert W. Johnson, who had declined re-election to the United States Senate in 1860, and Charles B. Mitchell, who had been elected to succeed him. The

latter died in 1864 and the legislature elected A. H. Garland in his place. He took his seat February 25, 1865, but left on March 3.

The election to the second Congress took place in 1863 and Batson, A. H. Garland and Hanley were re-elected. In the southwestern district R. K. Garland was elected to succeed Grandison D. Royston. When A. H. Garland was elected to the Senate he was succeeded by David W. Carroll, who took his seat January 11, 1865.

The last session of the Confederate Congress was held March 18, 1865. Representatives Batson, Hanley and Carroll held on to the end, but Senator Johnson does not appear to have attended after February 20, Senator Garland and Representative Garland after March 3. Senator Garland hurried back to Arkansas, where he found the Confederate state government tottering to its fall. Governor Flanagin first asked Mr. J. J. Clendennin (May 19) and then Mr. Garland (May 24) to open negotiations with General J. J. Reynolds for him, with a view to the restoration of peace and good order. With the disbanding of the armies he feared that the greatest danger would be from guerrilla bands who might be recruited on the pretense of defending a valid state government which did represent a large majority of the people. There would be many men whose morals would not restrain them from violence. In order to preserve quiet it was very desirable that such as should be pardoned should, at the earliest possible time, regard themselves as citizens and not as criminals and be allowed to partici-

pate in the government. Elections for clerks had been held in almost all the counties south of the Arkansas and he hoped that these officials would be recognized. He proposed to convene the legislature, which would admit subjugation and repeal all hostile legislation. The United States permitting, he would ask it to co-operate with Governor Murphy and his legislature in calling a convention fairly and fully elected to adjust the state government in such a manner as to secure immediate recognition by Congress. The state archives and property he would care for and surrender when no longer of any use to the secession government. He hoped that there would be no invasion of the southern part of the state as this would only result in devastating the country, causing the innocent to starve and stop desertions. Himself he would consider on parole and report to the proper authorities at any time, remaining at Arkadelphia, his home, unless called for.

General Reynolds refused (May 27) to receive Mr. Garland officially but allowed him to enter Little Rock and conferred with him freely as a private citizen. He announced that the legislature would not be allowed to meet, nor would any recognition be extended to the county officers, nor would they be allowed to offer themselves for appointment or election, unless pardoned by the President. He concurred in Governor Flanagin's views on invasion of the southern counties, but would give no assurances. The archives would be sent for and Governor Flanagin would be allowed to deliver them in person. No

convention would be called in which the loyal and rebel should co-operate on equal terms, for this would place the state government back in the hands of the very same men who controlled it before the rebellion. He hoped the presidential proclamation of pardon would exclude the disloyal from the polls, otherwise the state of Arkansas would "in ninety days be politically where she was in 1860."

Governor Flanagin now gracefully yielded to the inevitable, retired to his home in Arkadelphia, and the Confederate state government of Arkansas passed into the realm of things that had been. *Ilium fait.*

CHAPTER XXII

ARKANSAS TROOPS EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER

While this book deals primarily with the war in Arkansas, no description of the part played by the state in the great struggle would be complete without some account of the work of her soldiers east of the Mississippi. While it will be impossible, within the brief space left in this book, to give a full account of their courage and devotion, their sacrifices and suffering, their daring and heroic deeds, we can at least mention the more important names and places.

The organization of the First Arkansas Infantry (Confederate), was begun at Little Rock soon after the capture of the arsenal and before the state had even seceded. This was done by Thompson B. Flournoy, who had supported Douglas and opposed secession, but when the war began he responded to the call of President Davis and issued a call for men. Certain companies already organized came and were admitted. Colonel Flournoy had expected to be elected colonel, but certain gentlemen associated with him gave dissatisfaction and he was passed over for Captain James Fagan, of Saline county. Colonel Flournoy and his associates acquiesced with good grace and afterward served honorably in other commands, Flournoy himself rising to the rank of brigadier-general.

This regiment was summoned to Virginia and on the way attracted considerable attention, partly be-

cause of the distinguished ancestry of two of its captains, Robert H. Crocket, a grandson of Davy Crocket, and Donaldson McGregor, grandnephew of the wife of Andrew Jackson. On arriving in Virginia the regiment was put in the brigade of General T. H. Holmes, who commanded it at the first battle of Manassas. Shortly after this the regiment was sent back to the west and took part in the battle of Shiloh. At Corinth Fagan resigned the command, being offended by Bragg's treatment, and returned to Arkansas, where Hindman made him colonel of a regiment of mounted riflemen. General Holmes soon appointed him brigadier-general and he was succeeded by Colonel J. C. Monroe in command of the cavalry. Later he was assigned temporarily to a brigade of cavalry of which W. L. Cabell took charge as ranking officer. After Cabell's capture it was commanded by Colonel J. H. Harrell to the end of the war.

While the convention was in session at Little Rock T. C. Hindman was busy in Helena organizing the Second Arkansas Infantry (Confederate). Before the war he had been devoted to politics, along with planting, but now he turned all his mighty stock of stored up energy and keenness of intellect to the task of war. Men flocked to his standard as readily as they had voted for him when a candidate for Congress and elected him colonel. J. W. Bocage was lieutenant-colonel; J. W. Scaife, major; Charles E. Patterson, adjutant; Dr. Ralph Horner, surgeon, and Reverend Samuel Cowley, chaplain. The captains were C. A. Bridewell, Thomas Quenlin, E. Warfield, E. G.

Brashear, Anderson, D. C. Govan, B. B. Taliaferro, R. F. Harvey and C. D. Ross.

We have seen that the convention paid little attention to Hindman's request for money with which to equip his troops. Despairing of getting anything from Little Rock or from Richmond, where he thought that political influence was standing in his way, he adopted drastic measures, seizing two steamers bound for Cincinnati and Pittsburg and confiscating the freight as enemy property and using the proceeds to equip his men. He then took the men by boat to Memphis, where he formed "Hindman's Legion" by combining his forces with others waiting there. The legion went to Columbus, Kentucky, to help defend that place against General Grant and Admiral Foote. From there it followed Hardee to central Kentucky. When General Albert Sydney Johnston took command of this army Hindman was made brigadier-general, his brigade consisting of the Second and Sixth (Colonel Richard H. Lynn) Arkansas regiments and Marmaduke's battalion. Cleburne's (First and Fifth Arkansas) and Shaver's brigades (Seventh, Eighth and Ninth) were also in this army, a part of Hardee's division. Major John Pope, of Arkansas, was chief quartermaster to Hardee's staff.

After the fall of Fort Donelson Hindman's regiment retreated from Kentucky with Johnston and performed valient service at Shiloh, rushing through Sherman's camp. After this Hindman was made a major-general and was soon sent to Arkansas, as already related, to enforce the conscription act. His

old regiment followed the fortunes of war back into Kentucky, giving a good account of itself at Richmond and Perryville and later fought its way from Chickamauga to Atlanta, then followed Hood to Franklin and Nashville, making its last stand at Bentonville, North Carolina, and being surrendered by Joseph E. Johnston at Greensboro April 26, 1865.

We have already followed Hindman's career in Arkansas in some detail and have seen how he was finally, at his own request, again transferred to the east (1863). He participated in the battle of Chickamauga, where he won special praise from General Bragg, and then followed General Johnston in his efforts to keep Sherman from advancing on Atlanta. In the course of this campaign his eye was so badly injured as to disqualify him for service. At the close of the war he retired to Mexico, then governed by the Emperor Maximillian, and became a coffee planter. However, his wife did not like the country or Mexican society and, after his hacienda had become the scene of a revolutionary battle, he returned to his splendid home in Helena. About this time General Powell Clayton had married Miss McGraw, of Helena, whose father had been commissary in Hindman's command. Congressional reconstruction was now well under way and Clayton was making some inflammatory speeches to the negroes. After listening to one of these speeches Hindman replied to Clayton in no complimentary terms. Shortly after this he was shot (September 28, 1868) by some cowardly assassin who fired from the dark through a window,

killing the general in his own home when in the act of ministering to his aged mother. In this tragic hour the true greatness of soul which had impelled him all along shone out as never before. Before becoming unconscious he alluded to the trouble between Clayton and himself and said: "I do not know who killed me, but, whoever it was, I forgive him." Thus passed a man who, though quite human and not above making mistakes, was one of the noblest souls that ever adorned the soil of Arkansas.

D. C. Govan, of Helena, succeeded Hindman as colonel of the Second regiment and as such participated in the battle of Shiloh. He was at Murfreesboro and at Chickamaugua, where he led a brigade, and helped Cleburne save the day at Ringgold Gap. That officer is said to have had him in mind when he said: "Four better officers are not in the service of the Confederacy." He followed Johnston to Atlanta, where his brigade held out stubbornly against overwhelming odds until captured. However, he was soon exchanged and followed Hood to Franklin and Nashville and surrendered with Johnston at Greensboro.

When Captain Totten surrendered the arsenal at Little Rock Patrick Ronayne Cleburne was there as a private in a company which had come up from Helena. Cleburne was born in Ireland, March 17, 1828, son of a physician and farmer, and received a much better education than most boys of that time. He planned to become an apothecary, but failure to pass the examination so mortified him that he enlisted in a

regiment then stationed in Dublin. After more than three years of service he bought his discharge and came to America, settled in Helena in 1850 and became a drug clerk, but studied law and entered the profession in 1856. In politics he was a Whig, but when that party was absorbed by the Know Nothings he became a Democrat. In 1860 he helped to organize a military company which came to be known as the "Yell Rifles," so named in honor of General Archibald Yell, who had fallen at Buena Vista.

Considerable confusion arose in numbering the regiments, different regiments bearing the same number. The Yell Rifles were ordered to rendezvous at Mound City, Crittenden county, in May, 1861, where they were joined by several other companies and Cleburne was elected colonel of the first regiment of state troops. For some reason this regiment seems to have been known later as the Fifteenth, which number was also borne by Colonel James Gee's Camden regiment, and by one commanded by Colonels McRae, Hobbs and Boone. But this was not peculiar to Arkansas, the same confusion arising in other states.

September 22, 1861, General Albert Sidney Johnston called on Governor Rector for troops and Cleburne, who was then under Hardee's command, was transferred to Kentucky. About Jamestown and Tompkinsville he found himself in a hostile country, but he did not forget the laws of civilized warfare. Finding that his teamsters' rear guard had, under pretense of being sick, fallen behind to steal some eggs

and chickens, Cleburne paid for them out of his own pocket.

With the promotion of Hardee to be a major-general, Cleburne became a brigadier-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. K. Patten succeeded him in command of the Fifteenth regiment. Patton was killed at Shiloh and was succeeded by Colonel Lucius E. Polk, who on being promoted to brigadier-general, was in turn succeeded by Colonel J. E. Josey. In December, 1862, Cleburne was made major-general in command of a division composed of brigades commanded by S. A. M. Woods, Bushrod R. Johnson, St. John R. Liddell and Lucius E. Polk. In his division were the Second Arkansas, D. C. Govan, Fifth Arkansas, L. Featherston, Sixth Arkansas, Samuel J. Smith, Seventh Arkansas, D. A. Gillespie, Eighth Arkansas, Jno. H. Kelley, all in Liddell's brigade; the First Arkansas, J. W. Colquitt, the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Arkansas, J. E. Josey, in Polk's brigade. The rest of Cleburne's division was made up of Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee troops.

It is impossible for us to follow these Arkansas troops and their intrepid commanders through all the campaigns and battles, but at least a few words should be given to them. Cleburne and his brigade participated in the battle of Shiloh, followed General Braxton Bragg into Kentucky and participated in the battles of Richmond and Perryville, in both of which Cleburne was wounded, retreated to east Tennessee and came back to fight at Murfreesboro. Just before this he was made a major-general (December 12,

1862). Bushrod Johnson's division was now replaced by General T. J. Churchill's Texas brigade. After having fought under Bragg at Chickamaugua and having helped to save the day at Missionary Ridge Cleburne fought under Joseph E. Johnston to Atlanta and then returned to Tennessee with the impetuous Hood and met his death in the bloody battle of Franklin November 30, 1864. The remnants of his old regiment "carried on" with Hood at Nashville and, after the destruction of Hood's army by General George H. Thomas, passed over into North Carolina and rejoined Johnston, helped to fight the last battle for the Confederacy at Bentonville and finally surrendered at Greensboro.

At Richmond, Kentucky, Cleburne's impetuous charge contributed largely to the victory won that day. At Murfreesboro he drove back the enemy lines, but his most distinguished services came at Chickamaugua, Missionary Ridge and Ringgold Gap. At Missionary Ridge he was posted in a most important position. At the close of the first day's fight he knew that the situation was critical and sent a staff officer to headquarters to find out whether the army would retreat or remain to fight next day in order that he might do everything possible to strengthen his position, if there was to be a fight. In reply to the officer, Hardee said: "Tell Cleburne we are to fight; that his division undoubtedly will be heavily attacked, and they must do their very best." With a salute the officer replied: "The division has never yet failed to clear its front, and will do so again."

The events of the next day proved that he was right, for Cleburne pushed Sherman back and captured several colors and hundreds of prisoners, but the rest of the army was beaten and he had to retreat. At Ringgold Gap he saved Bragg's army from destruction by pursuing the foe at great hazard to his own command, for which he received a vote of thanks from Congress.

The Confederate ranks were now being depleted more rapidly than they could be filled and Cleburne, with many others, foresaw the inevitable end. Because of this he wrote a carefully prepared paper giving his views on the situation and advising the freeing of the slaves and using them as soldiers as the only way of averting disaster. This was read to his fellow officers, some of whom approved, but General Johnston, who had succeeded Bragg, declined to forward it to Richmond on the ground that the question was more political than military in character. Cleburne was greatly disappointed, but had no idea of sending it to President Davis over his superior. However, a fellow officer thought that so incendiary a paper should be reported, asked for a copy, and sent it to Richmond. President Davis returned it with the endorsement that he approved and appreciated the patriotic motives of the signers—it was signed by Cleburne and thirteen others, including General D. C. Govan, Colonel John E. Murray, Fifth Arkansas; Colonel G. F. Baucum, Eighth Arkansas; Lieutenant-Colonel E. Warfield, Second Arkansas, and Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Snyder, Sixth and Sev-

enth Arkansas, and Colonel John W. Colquitt, First Arkansas—but he deemed it inexpedient to make the paper public and asked that it be suppressed. Had this paper never been written, Cleburne instead of Hood might have succeeded Johnston at Atlanta. His attention was called to the fact that it might stand in the way of further advancement, the prospects for which then seemed bright, but he persisted, putting what he believed to be the good of his adopted country above personal ambition. However, before his death his proposition was debated in Congress, was later endorsed by Lee, and Congress finally provided for arming a part of the slaves, who were not to be freed thereby, but this came too late to do any good, if it ever would have been worth while.

Of the many tributes paid to Cleburne's memory space will permit us to quote only a few. Robert E. Lee referred to him as "A meteor shooting from a clouded sky." Speaking of the battle of Franklin, where Cleburne was killed, Jefferson Davis said:

Around Cleburne thickly lay the gallant men, who in his desperate assault followed him with implicit confidence that in another army was given to Stonewall Jackson, and in the one case, as in the other, a vacancy was created which could never be filled.

Colonel Henry Stone, a Federal commander, referred to Cleburne's command as a division unsurpassed for courage, energy, and endurance by any other in the Confederate army.

Three men have already been named who came from Helena and attained the rank of brigadier-general or above, Hindman, Govan and Cleburne. A fourth, James C. Tappan, colonel of the Thirteenth Arkansas Infantry, was made brigadier-general in the Trans-Mississippi Department, where he served until the end of the war. He was especially active in the defense of Little Rock. He was a graduate of Yale and had had excellent preparation for the law, his chosen profession until called to the defense of his state. Still another from Helena who served mainly east of the Mississippi was Lucius E. Polk. Another was A. S. Dobbin, whose career we have followed in Arkansas. Still another, Charles C. Adams, is claimed for Helena, but I have not been able to find his name in the official record, though an Adams from Helena, initials not given, commanded a regiment at Prairie Grove.

In January, 1861, long before Arkansas had seceded, Dr. W. H. Tebbs and Van H. Manning, the latter a lawyer of Hamburg, organized two companies, took them to Vicksburg and offered their services to the Confederacy. When this was refused the officers went to Montgomery and, through the help of Hon. Albert Rust, who became a member of Congress after Arkansas seceded, finally succeeded. At their suggestion Mr. Rust returned to Arkansas, raised eight more companies and joined them at Lynchburg, Virginia, where the Third Regiment (Confederate) was organized, Albert Rust, colonel. It was ordered to Western Virginia and there served under General

T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson, whom Colonel Rust did not particularly admire. Yet General Jackson thought well of him, saying that "Colonel Rust and his command merit special praise for their conduct" in the battle of Big Cacapon. When Rust was made brigadier-general Van H. Manning became colonel and later, when wounded, he was succeeded by Richard S. Taylor. The regiment participated in some of the most important battles of the east, such as Malvern Hill, Gettysburg, then went to Tennessee with Longstreet and fought at Chicamauga, back to Virginia, the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, in all of which it served with credit and in some with distinction. At Appomattox it stacked only 300 of the 1,500 guns which it had carried ten months before.

The other Arkansas regiments which had followed the tide of war through Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and North Carolina, were the Fifth (Colonels Cross, Featherstone), the Sixth (organized at Little Rock, Colonels Richard Lyon, A. T. Hawthorn, Smith), the Seventh (Lawrence county, Colonels Robert W. Shaver, Gillespie), Eighth (organized at Jacksonport, Colonels William K. Patterson, John H. Kelley, G. F. Baucum), Thirteenth (Colonels J. C. Tappan, McNeeley), Fifteenth (Colonels Cleburne, Patton, Polk, Josey), Nineteenth (DeVall's Bluff, Colonels H. P. Smead, Tom P. Dockery, C. L. Dawson, Dismukes), Twenty-fourth (Colonel E. E. Portlock), and the Third Confederate, all of which had been combined

into the First Arkansas (consolidated), Colonel E. A. Howell, when surrendered at Greensboro. They were then serving in James A. Smith's brigade of Brown's (late Cleburne's) division. Also the First and Second Mounted Rifles, the Fourth (Colonels Evander McNair, Henry G. Bunn), the Ninth (Pine Bluff, famous for its forty preachers, of whom the colonel was one, Colonels John M. Bradley, Isaac L. Dunlap), and the Twenty-fifth, Colonel Charles Turnbull, all combined into the First Arkansas (Consolidated) and serving under Colonel Henry G. Bunn in Daniel C. Govan's brigade, Winfield S. Featherstone's division of Joseph E. Johnston's army when they surrendered at Greensboro.

The Arkansas regiments, the Seventeenth (Yell county, Colonels George W. Lemoyne, Robert H. Crockett), consolidated with the Twenty-first after Corinth (Colonel Jordan E. Cravens), and the Twentieth (Little Rock, Colonels George King, Henry P. Johnson, James H. Fletcher, Daniel W. Jones), were bottled up in Vicksburg. On being exchanged the latter regiment entered the cavalry service, campaigning in Arkansas and Missouri under Colonel Jones. After the Reconstruction Colonel Cravens was elected to the House of Representatives, and Colonel Jones became governor.

Nine regiments, the Tenth (Conway county, Colonel Thomas D. Merrick, A. J. Witt), the Eleventh (Saline county, Colonels Jabez M. Smith, John L. Logan), the Fifteenth (Camden, Colonels James See, B. W. Johnson), the Sixteenth (Benton

county, Colonels John F. Hill, David Provence), the Seventeenth (Fort Smith, Colonels Frank Rector, John Griffith), the Eighteenth (DeVall's Bluff, Colonels D. W. Carroll, J. L. Daly, Lieutenant-Colonel W. N. Parrish, Colonel R. N. Crockett), and the Twenty-third (Colonels Charles W. Adams, A. P. Lyles, Lieutenant-Colonel Simon P. Hughes), and two batteries, the Second Arkansas (Little Rock, Major John Miller), and Colonel Solon Borland's battery, after having campaigned through Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, were involved in the disaster at Port Hudson (July 9, 1863) where they were surrendered by General W. N. R. Beall. Among those who surrendered were Adjutant-General John R. Fellows, who, though he had come from New York, resisted the importunities of friends and relatives to take the oath, and Simon P. Hughes, later governor of Arkansas. Lieutenant J. H. Berry, afterwards governor and United States Senator, had served in the Sixteenth, but had lost a leg at Corinth and consequently was not at Port Hudson. J. K. Jones, afterward senator, had served as a private in Borland's battalion, but had been furloughed on account of ill health. On being exchanged some of these regiments served in Arkansas, Louisiana and Missouri.

CHAPTER XXIII

ARKANSAS WOMEN IN THE WAR

How much the life of the ordinary citizen who remains at home is affected by war depends largely upon the severity and length of the struggle and whether it is waged at home or on foreign soil. Except for faces missing about the hearth-stone the Mexican War, though it lasted two years, was felt very little in the United States. The Spanish War was played up for more than it was worth by enterprising newspaper men, but, for all that, it produced little more than a ripple in the life of the nation. In 1861-1865 many people, both North and South, thought that the war would be over in ninety days and many soldiers who enlisted in the first burst of enthusiasm feared that it would end before they could get to the front. Instead it dragged out over four years, was fought almost wholly on Southern soil, was often very severe, and brought death, desolation and despair to many homes.

The war has often been referred to as the "times that tried men's souls." It also tried the souls of women and found them pure as gold and true as steel. When the soldier boys marched away to the front they presented them with flags and cheered them on the way and then set to work to supply their own needs and to help provide for the soldiers as best they could. The boys were in need of clothes and in many places societies were organized, such as the "Soldiers'

Aid Society" at Camden, or the "Daughters of the South" at Van Buren to meet such needs. The latter organized with twenty-nine members, Mrs. A. J. Ward, president, Mrs. William Walker, secretary. They declared that from "the sandy shores of Carolina to the grassy plains of Texas the hearts of Southern people now beat in unison" and set themselves to work to do their part while the men were off in military service. Sometimes these societies met at a schoolhouse, a church, the courthouse, or in a private home. The work was done in a systematic way, the most skillful cutter looking after this part and turning the pieces over to the others to sew. The first company of soldiers that left Union county went clad in uniforms made by fingers willing, if none too nimble, fingers of the women who met for that purpose at El Dorado. The same sort of work was done at Little Rock, Fort Smith, and many other places. All day they worked—and talked—making clothing, tents, wagon sheets, haversacks, and many other things useful to soldiers. The knitting needles clicked at night when the societies were in session for work, or by day when the women were passing along the streets, or riding to a neighbor's house. One frosty morning eighty pairs of socks were handed out to General Price's bodyguard at Camden. Children took part in some of the work, especially in scraping lint and making bandages. Not to be outdone, the "colored ladies and gentlemen" of Van Buren, by permission, gave a ball for the benefit of the "Suddern

Fed'cy," charging fifty cents admission, and raised \$76.00.

As the war progressed cloth became more and more scarce. To encourage the making of cloth gold medals were offered for the best records in spinning and weaving. In four months Mrs. Sally Bangs, widow, of Sulphur Springs, wove 108 yards of jeans and 78 of plain cloth and spun a part of the filling; also, she knitted seven pairs of socks and made clothes for her son, who was in the army. Mrs. A. B. Wardlaw, of Mount Elba, wove 73 yards of jeans, 88 of checked linsey, and spun a part of the filling. Mrs. Catherine Yeager wove 68 yards of jeans, 32 of linsey, and 45 of cotton cloth. The record for amounts, though not in this competition, seems to belong to Mrs. Martha J. Starke, of Dallas county, who, from February 6, 1862, to January 11, 1863, wove 120 yards of jeans and tweeds, 69 yards of negro shirting, and 195 yards of linsey, a total of 384 yards. In addition she made two full suits for the soldiers and looked after the family sewing. From September 1 to January Mrs. Elizabeth Skaggs and her daughter, of Roseville, Franklin county, wove 132 yards of jeans and 130 yards of plain cloth. The jeans sold for \$1.25 a yard.

Nursing as a profession was then unknown to the women of Arkansas, but many of them now turned to good account in caring for soldiers the knowledge and skill acquired in looking after the sick at home. Often this consisted in nursing back to life a son or brother who had been invalided home, but many

also rendered valiant service in the hospitals and a few on the battle fields, as at Prairie Grove, where they even helped to bury the dead. Sometimes humor gleamed forth, even in the midst of suffering. One day a young girl of seventeen was distributing flowers among the patients when she heard one who was suffering intensely repeatedly calling out, "Oh, my Lord!" Approaching him with a view to rebuking him for his lack of reverence, she said: "I think that I heard you call upon the name of the Lord. I am one of his daughters. Is there anything I can ask of Him for you?" After gazing on her beautiful face for a moment his countenance lighted up and he replied, "Yes, please ask Him to make me His son-in-law."

As medicines became more and more scarce the women found substitutes for them for themselves and even prepared some for the soldiers and sent them to the front. They were made of roots and herbs, some of them of some real value, some of them probably of none whatever. The poppy was grown and then cut so that the sap oozed out and this was dried and used in the place of opium. Oil was extracted from the castor bean by means of a crude hand press.

For simple acts of kindness women sometimes had to suffer. At Helena Miss S. Alexander, charged with having "furnished clothing and comforts to rebel prisoners at this fort," was ordered by J. O. Pullen, provost-marshal, to appear at his office and pay over the sum of \$25.00 "for the benefit of the refugees from your state," that is, Union sympathizers.

The women of Arkansas responded, not only where there was suffering, but also sometimes where danger called. Just before the battle of Cane Hill, Miss Sarah McClellan, "a fair rebel living four miles west of Cane Hill, came tripping into camp" to tell Shelby that the Federal cavalry was approaching. When Shelby was approaching Dardanelle on his campaign north of the Arkansas he wished to know the strength of the garrison and the location of the forts before attacking. A young woman whose name he never learned volunteered to go in and get the information for him. He hesitated to allow her to try such a perilous expedition—also, he feared that she might be a Federal spy—but decided to let her go. She went and returned with the information desired. Colonel R. R. Livingston complained bitterly at Batesville: "We cannot move, no matter how cautious or secret we endeavor to be, without the inhabitants betraying us. The principal messengers are women, just such bitter enemies as Mrs. Neeby and her daughter, who have been caught *in flagrante delicto*." Near Pea Ridge Mrs. Gibson and her daughter tried to intercept Federal communications by breaking the telegraph wires.

On the large plantations the hard work had always been done by the slaves and continued to be done by them in such parts of the state as were not overrun by the Federals. But the majority of the farmers were not slave-holders and the men of this class had to look after the work in the field. Now they were in a different "field" and the women and children

had to take their places in the fields back home. They now had to chop wood for the fires, build the fences, plow, hoe, and gather the crops by day and card and spin and weave by night or on rainy days, thus supplying clothes for themselves and for the father, son, or husband in the army. And for light by which to work at night they depended on tallow dips, or wicks in a cup of grease, or pine knots. Women who hitherto had been accustomed to ease, freely gave themselves to toil, especially in preparing clothes for the soldiers, many of whom received socks from dainty fingers.

Most of the time the standard grains used for food, wheat and corn, especially the latter, were not particularly scarce except in the parts of the country raided by the Federals, or where the Confederates were sometimes forced to requisition the greater part for the support of the army. But it was not always easy to get the grain ground and sometimes women trudged miles carrying packs of corn to mill. And sometimes they did this only to be robbed of it by raiding bands before reaching home. A party of women in Scott county went as far as fifty miles on foot to a mill. At times when the crop was growing they had to depend on potatoes and green vegetables, roasting ears being a staple diet. Sugar became very scarce, but was not unobtainable, at least in Southern Arkansas, where it could be secured from Louisiana. But real coffee became almost unknown as an article of diet. Various substitutes were found, such as parched corn, peanuts, potatoes, etc. When one man

suggested parched acorns an editor facetiously remarked that he had heard of people with iron stomachs, but now he supposed that people who used acorns for coffee would, owing to the tannic acid in them, soon have leather stomachs!

Differences in prices make possible some interesting comparisons. Naturally there was a considerable increase. In 1860 flour sold at Van Buren for \$6.50 per 100 pounds, corn meal at \$1.40 to \$1.50 per bushel, Irish potatoes at \$1.00 to \$1.25, chickens at \$1.50 to \$2.00 per dozen, eggs at 15 to 20 cents, and other things in proportion. Before the close of 1861 there was loud complaint of high prices. Salt, which had been selling at \$2.00 the sack, jumped to \$5.00, and then to \$20.00. This can have been due only in part to the deranged condition of the currency, for gold, which was being replaced by Confederate currency and state bonds, was at a premium of only 25 per cent. No doubt scarcity had something to do with it, but the greater part of the increase in salt and other articles was charged to forestalling and rapacity. Profiteering became so rampant that Colonel Solon Borland issued a proclamation designed to restrain forestallers and profiteers, but Governor Rector, who was an individualist as well as a believer in states' rights, issued a counter proclamation annulling it, saying that he had no right to forbid exporting or monopolizing certain articles of food and munitions. Six months later (June 20, 1862), however, he did not interfere when R. C. Newton, A. A. General, issued General Order

No. 4, fixing the following scale of prices, ordering that Confederate notes should be taken at par, and providing that violators should be arrested and sent to headquarters "to be dealt with as such inhuman and disloyal conduct may deserve":

Flour, per 100 lbs.	\$8.00
Bacon, per lb.	.25
Beef, per lb.	.10
Corn, per bu.	.75
Meal, per bu.	1.00
Chickens, per doz.	2.40
Butter, per lb.	.20
Pork, per lb.	.15
Turkeys, each	1.00
Salt, per sack	15.00
Sole leather, per lb.	.50
Upper leather, per lb.	.80
Harness	.75
Molasses, per gal.	.40
Sugar, per lb.	.10
Quinine, per oz.	10.00
Calomel	.50
Castor Oil, gallon	5.00
Ipecac, per oz.	8.00
Opium	2.00
Tartar Emetic	.25
Blistering Ointment, per lb.	8.00
Epsom Salts	.60
Soda	.50
Rhubarb, per oz.	.50
Cream of Tartar, per lb.	2.00
Turpentine, per gal.	2.50
Dover's Powder, per oz.	.75

A few days later salt was changed to \$8.00 the sack. It is interesting to note that prices did not fall

much after the capture of Little Rock by the Federals, as the following items taken from a bill of sale dated March 4, 1864, will show: 10 lbs. sugar, \$3.00; 100 lbs. salt, \$15.00; 1 pair cotton cards, \$6.00; 3 tin cups, \$1.00; 1 set knives and forks, \$4.00; 1 lb. soda, 50c; 1 lb. pepper, 50c; 1 lb. spice, 50c; 10 lbs. coffee, \$7.50. Clothing must have been somewhat cheaper: 1 shawl, ladies', \$7.00; 9 yds. calico, \$4.50. But the "1 tucking comb, \$100.00," must have been expensively bejeweled.

We have seen that Hindman, in connection with his efforts to raise an army, attempted to restrict "the devil of extortion" by fixing prices, but the cry of the profiteers reached Richmond and an order came saying that he had no authority to regulate prices, such things being subject to the control of the state, if controlled at all. We have also seen that Governor Rector was not disposed to regulate prices. But when the families of soldiers found themselves forced to pay \$4.00 to \$5.00 for potatoes, \$20.00 per 100 lbs. for flour, and 50 cents for bacon, they raised a cry which was also heard in Richmond and General Holmes, who had succeeded Hindman, issued a restraining order. Salt being particularly hard to get, he issued an order that it be furnished from the government works to citizens in exchange for subsistence stores at the following rates: Corn, \$1.00 per bu.; meal, \$1.25; wheat, \$1.50; rye, \$1.25; dried peaches, \$2.00; sweet potatoes, \$1.00; peas, \$1.50; pork, 10 cents per lb.; bacon, 25 cents; lard, 25 cents; flour, 8 cents.

But before the end of the year this ceased to be operative and prices again soared, Liverpool salt jumping to \$30.00 per bushel. Somebody managed to get in a "pocket" of Mocha coffee which he sold at auction, realizing \$6.80 per pound. When the citizens of Little Rock found themselves compelled to pay \$3.00 to \$6.00 the load for wood—prices not considered unbearable in 1926—they called on the city council to establish a municipal woodyard.

The general attitude of the Confederate government was, as we have seen, that price regulation should be handled by the states, if handled at all. While the state government of Arkansas did make some efforts, as related elsewhere, to protect the citizens from absolute want, except for the feeble effort of R. C. Newton, which was not sustained by the governor, it did nothing to repress speculation and control high prices. It would have been very difficult indeed after the first half of the war to fix prices on a rapidly depreciating currency. By October, 1864, the Confederate notes had fallen to two cents on the dollar. At this rate \$300.00 for 100 pounds of flour and \$50.00 to \$60.00 for a bushel of meal, prices actually paid with complaint by some of the army officials, was not an exorbitant price, provided one had plenty of money, but few did, especially the poor farmers, who could not sell cotton, and the soldiers, whose pay, even in depreciated currency, was often six to twelve months in arrears.

Prior to 1865 there seems to have been little suffering from actual destitution south of the Arkansas

river. While this country had been the scene of some fighting in the spring of 1864 and had had to supply a good deal of food to the Federals, it had not been ravaged, for that was not Steele's method of fighting. But the region north of the Arkansas was suffering some in 1863, much more in 1864, and by the winter and spring of 1865 many had been reduced to the point of destitution. The irony of the situation was that the suffering seems to have been equally severe among those who were loyal to the Union and they had been plundered by Federal troops. But that story belongs to the next chapter.

In some cases the Federal officials tried to relieve some of the suffering. In a few cases rations were issued to the soldiers when they surrendered. In May, 1865, 75,097 rations were issued to refugee families and 46,845 to freedmen. As the surrender did not take place until the spring season was well advanced and as seed and work animals were scarce, the crop of 1865 was not very good. At the close of the year Governor Murphy reported that the destitution and suffering were beyond description, probably worse than in any other state in the South. This, he thought, was due to the internal strife, between the Union element and their Confederate neighbors, while the war was in progress. To this should be added the ravages of the guerrilla bands, some of which operated for a time after the surrender. Thousands were reported to be suffering for lack of food and clothing. The governor believed that destitution pre-

vailed in two-thirds of the counties, but said that it was worst in the western part of the state.

At Fort Smith the Freedmen's Bureau furnished some relief through the winter and spring of 1866. Finding that the commissary was being imposed on by people able to support themselves, the citizens of Fort Smith held a meeting to devise some way to prevent this and yet protect the deserving. They suggested that help be given only to those certified to by the county judge, the mayor, or some justice of the peace, but the bureau officials considered this impertinence and the matter was dropped. If they wished to be imposed on, it was no concern of the citizens. After this it was reported that the ferry at Van Buren was overrun at times by people with little carts, ponies, and cattle, going to the commissary and the superintendent of the bureau announced that no more rations would be issued after May 1.

CHAPTER XXIV

A CHAMBER OF HORRORS

It is not pleasant to write or read of horrors, but such is war. What is said here is not written with a view of stirring again passions between the two sections; if such should be the result, it were better that the chapter had never been written. In former times writers have tended to glorify war by parading the tinsel and gold lace and covering up the horrors. But horrors are characteristic of wars wherever and whenever they occur. If the following recital can only help to bring home this fact to the present generation, which has been fed up on German atrocities, and inspire a hatred of all wars, it will not have been written in vain.

Suffering, poverty and disease are the natural children of war. Generally they thrive most among the vanquished, who, it may be, have been plundered by the victors, but those on the side of the victors sometimes become victims. Writing from Fort Smith (March 8, 1865) Brigadier-General Cyrus Bussey said:

There are several thousand families within the limits of this command who are related to and dependent on the Arkansas soldiers in our service. These people have nearly all been robbed of everything they had by the troops of this command, and are now left destitute and compelled to leave their homes to avoid starvation. They cannot be sent away, as they are dependent on their husbands and sons in the Arkansas

regiments belonging to this command. Many of them are preparing to cultivate the abandoned plantations in the vicinity of this place and Van Buren. Colonel Stephenson has 200 families at Clarksville, which he wanted to colonize on the north side of the river near Van Buren. Colonel Harrison has established colonies at Fayetteville, Cane Hill, Huntsville, Bentonville, at each of which places, a company of the First Arkansas Cavalry is stationed, and the loyal people are preparing to cultivate the land in the vicinity of these places. To protect these people and the telegraph and our mail communication with St. Louis the First Arkansas Cavalry will have to remain at Fayetteville. We are now issuing rations to a large number at this place who will be able to purchase as soon as the troops are paid. I am issuing to none but the families of soldiers in our service. I understand it to be the desire of the general commanding that all such persons be kept here and encouraged to go to work. Many good loyal people have been shamefully treated by our army. The country is filled with irregular receipts for forage, horses, cattle, and other property which cannot be settled, but in most instances everything has been taken and no receipts given, the people turned out to starve, and their effects loaded into trains and sent to Kansas.

The laws of war recognize the right to take the private property of friendly citizens when absolutely necessary for the success of the army, but it must be done under proper orders and must be paid for. The seizures at Fort Smith were nothing but plunderings by uncontrolled individuals.

These same laws recognize the right to seize the private property of enemies only as governed by the

rules affecting requisitions and contributions, but the Federals laid hands on it in Arkansas without much restraint.

When the Union forces occupied Memphis they found one thousand tons of iron rails gathered there by Mr. R. C. Brinkley for the completion of the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad. These they promptly seized and sent to Columbus, Kentucky, for the completion of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which they wanted to use for military purposes. While some justification could be found for this, none could be found for the frequent raiding parties by means of which they lived off the country.

The excesses committed by the Federals in the course of Curtis' march from Batesville to Helena, especially after his arrival in Helena, as reported in the state press, were hardly short of atrocious. That negroes should have been carried off by the hundreds is not surprising, for Congress had already ordered that none should be returned. According to the *True Democrat*, the destruction of property which could not be stolen was systematic. The soldiers broke open bureaus, trunks and wardrobes and destroyed what they or the negro women did not want, and took rings from the fingers of women. They burned fences and in at least one case strung up a planter to make him tell where his valuables were concealed. Particular delight was taken in wrecking the plantation of General Pillow near Helena. By the spring of 1863 it was reported that they had killed every milch cow, shot down every hog, and cut down

the fruit trees in Phillips county; also, that they had made a clean sweep of Chicot county.

This account, which sounds a little like some of the reports of atrocities of the World War, probably was somewhat colored, but it seems to be substantiated in part at least by Federal testimony. The *True Democrat* reported a Federal chaplain as saying that Curtis did not pay for one-tenth of what he took and when he did pay gave less than half the value. The same paper quoted from the *Chicago Tribune* a letter written by a private in Helena who said that "Guitars were stolen, pianos smashed up, shawls, dresses, albums, letters, pictures, silverware, and all such things were stolen and broken up." This, he adds, was not done by the old soldiers, but by the "hundred dollar men, or conscripts, as we call them." He also reported two cases of "assault."

While this account sounds exaggerated, it's credibility is increased by the accounts of "irregularities" given by General John S. Phelps, whom President Lincoln had just appointed military governor of Arkansas. Some of these related to the seizure of cotton. As cotton was the chief article on which the Confederacy depended to finance the war and actually collected taxes in cotton, it became a legitimate article of capture by the Union forces, even if they could not always distinguish between government cotton and that owned by individuals. But thousands of bales were seized by individuals who could not resist the temptation to amass a fortune by such plunder. In August, 1862, General Phelps said that cotton

which had been seized, nominally for the government, was sold at Helena on government account at 14 cents and then shipped by the purchaser, to St. Louis and sold for 40 to 50 cents.

After arriving at Helena Phelps wrote to Secretary Stanton charging that troops had been kept there two months or more to enable speculators and officers of the army to enrich themselves buying cotton from loyal and disloyal men and from negroes who did not own it. General A. P. Hovey, of Illinois, was reported to have exchanged "contraband" (negroes) for cotton, giving two "niggers" for one bale of cotton. This, Phelps sarcastically remarked, probably was not considered as violating the order against the return of fugitive slaves, but as legitimate business. He also gave credence to the charge that Curtis himself had profited by cotton trading. A great deal was seized on government account and never accounted for. Even privates now had horses and mules which had been taken from citizens and they justified their conduct by that of the officers.

The atrocities committed by Sherman's troops on the way down to Vicksburg have already been related. On the return from the first and unsuccessful attack some of the ships shelled right and left. One landed in front of "Bellevue," the beautiful home of Mr. Joshua M. Craig, and burned it to the ground. In a letter to a fellow officer General Curtis declared that this was the work of negroes and regretted the destruction of one of the most beautiful homes in the country, but declared that "this is war."

Later a very notable case of brigandage occurred on the plantation of Richard A. Sessions. As a matter of course his one hundred or more slaves were set free. Mrs. Sessions had had a large quantity of silver buried, but Mr. Sessions, fearing that it would become tarnished so badly as to make it impossible to restore its lustre, dug it up, only to have all of it except a sugar spoon taken off four days later by a band of plundering Federals. The table was set when they came in with a fine set of china which Mr. and Mrs. Sessions had bought in Paris when on their bridal tour. Every piece of this was broken. The library was thrown out in the yard and trampled under foot. With curious inconsistency one bummer carried a Bible away with him. Some twenty years later a man into whose hands the Bible had fallen undertook to find the original owner. His success in this led to the publication of the whole story of the plundering and this led to the restoration of a part of the silver by Judge Lacey, of Albert Lea, Minnesota, who had bought it, but now asked nothing for it on returning it.

In the fall of 1864 the Fifty-third United States Infantry (negro) was stationed at St. Charles. The commander, Orlando C. Ridsen, is said to have ordered all the citizens to leave town. Mrs. Horace B. Toombs, whose husband had died at Corinth, and Mrs. John E. Rossen, whose husband was in the service, were preparing to obey the order, but were foully murdered at midnight in the home of the latter by a negro fiend who shot the former and dragged

the latter into the yard by the hair and beat out her brains. For some reason two little children, a girl and a boy, were spared. The negro was promptly executed by the military authorities.

As the negroes for the most part behaved admirably throughout the war, the vast majority remaining at home and "carrying on" for their masters while they were in the field until the Federal army came with the emancipation proclamation, I have hesitated to relate this one outstanding atrocity to their account. There were others, but probably none so brutal as this and they should be forgotten in the face of such unparalleled loyalty.

When General Hindman urged the people to organize in bands to harass the enemy, firing upon the vessels passing up and down the river, he was encouraging a line of defense which was at least questionable in the laws of war, but when the steamer *Luzerne* was fired upon by some "rebel partisans," probably some organized at Hindman's suggestion, the terrible retribution inflicted by way of retaliation, very likely upon innocent persons, was still more questionable. As a punishment for the act Colonel W. Stewart, by order of Major A. Schwartz, A. A. A. General, went up to South Bend, where the *Luzerne* had been fired upon, and there burned 7,500 bushels of corn and sent a detachment two miles below, where they burned 22,500 bushels and 50 hides. At Clay's place he captured 50 sheep, 6 mules, 50 hides, and one bell and other property "contraband of war." He also burned a fine dwelling and a store-house,

owned by "rebels in arms," near the place where the attack had been made on the steamer. Before leaving Stewart posted a notice that he would devastate the region, if the attack on transports was renewed.

While stationed at Pine Bluff Colonel Powell Clayton frequently sent out raiding parties and some of the large plantations suffered heavily. Here is a list of the stores taken from one place: Twenty bales of cotton, 5 mules, 20 loads of corn, 2,000 pounds of meat, and all the beeves and most of the articles of value in the house. The following extracts are taken from the journal of a Captain Toney, captured in south Arkansas. It is taken from Edwards' "Shelby and His Men," which is not always reliable, and is given for what it is worth.

April 3, 1864. In advance today. Captured two men on the road near some timber. They were said to be bushwhackers. Didn't inquire much, had them shot in an hour. Died game and shouting for Jeff Davis.

April 11. On scout with my company. Rations short and hard to get. Found a contraband who told me where some Secesh lived having bacon hid away. Reached the house and inquired for something to eat. Had nothing, and especially nothing for Yankees. Burned the house, killed all the poultry, and carried off the old man's horses. Pretty dear refusal for one day.

April 12. In advance today. Heavy skirmishing in front. Our colonel said this morning no prisoners must be taken. I am not sorry—and killed two with my own hand.

Colonel Edwards closes with the remark that he made no more entries in his diary, burned no more houses, and shot no more prisoners.

From one example of the atrocities committed in Southern Arkansas "learn all the rest," as Vergil said in recounting the horrors of the Trojan war. The account is given by Mrs. Laura A. Wooten, who lived near Camden.

My father, Rev. William Winburne of the Little Rock conference died in December, 1862, and my mother came to live with me. Her house and all its contents were destroyed by fire and she had the misfortune of breaking her arm in her efforts to escape.

Three weeks after the fire, the enemy came and took every horse that mother and I had. They took our meat and plundered the house generally. Mother remonstrated a little, telling them that she was a poor widow with two girls to take care of and they called her a liar! Then they turned their attention to me, asking where my husband was. I replied that he was in the Confederate army where I wanted him to be.

They spread general devastation. . . . My father-in-law Brazel was totally blind. They went to his home, took every horse, stripped the beds, stole the dishes from the pantry and then went to the smoke-house and after taking the meat emptied three or four barrels of flour on the floor and mixed in a barrel of molasses. They ordered our negro cook to prepare dinner and tried to induce her to run away with them. She refused. Then they plundered her house and took things of no earthly use to them.

But the plunderings and other atrocities in the east and south seem to have been mild compared with

those in the northwest, where atrocities were well under way in the early part of 1863, soon after the retreat of Hindman following the battle of Prairie Grove. After returning from that region, whither he had been sent by General Holmes to obtain information, Captain Joseph G. Peavy, Hunter's Regiment of Missouri Infantry, reported in part as follows:

At Carrollton, Ark., about 65 miles east of Fayetteville, on the 9th instant [April 9, 1863], I saw a body of Federal cavalry, part of Totten's brigade, and I put this number at about 1,000. They have murdered every Southern man that could be found, old age and extreme youth sharing at their hands the same merciless fate. Old Samuel Cox and his son (fourteen years old), Saul Gatewood, Heal Parker, and Captain Duvall, of Missouri, were part of those they murdered. I will call to mind other names and report them to you. They burned on Osage, in Carroll County, fifteen Southern houses and all the out-houses, none of those thus made homeless being permitted to take with them any clothing or subsistence. They seem to have hoisted the black flag, for no Southern man, however old and infirm, or how little he may have assisted in our cause, is permitted to escape alive.

General, I have not the language to describe in truthful colors the ravages these Hessians are committing in the northwest of this state. Their guide and principal leader up there is a former Arkansan, formerly a Baptist preacher in Carroll county, of the name of Cryson.

Clarksville and the surrounding country suffered their full share of atrocities. A Federal garrison was established there in the latter part of 1863, Colonel

Wm. F. Cloud. Soon after this the troubles began, though the worst seems to have occurred while Colonel G. M. Waugh was in command. The men in their commands were responsible for some of the sufferings of the inhabitants, but the credit for the crowning atrocity must be given to a few villains of Colonel Marshal L. Stephenson's Second Arkansas Volunteers, which was recruited in part in that vicinity. These men were after money and they practiced inhuman cruelties upon their victims in trying to make them reveal the hiding places of supposed treasures.

One night in the winter of 1863—some of the old inhabitants of Clarksville still (1926) recall that it was on Wednesday night—a party of eight or ten men began a tour of raids and burnings. They first went to Knoxville and there burned the feet of Miss Emma May (later Mrs. Lorenza Swaggerty). Next in order was the home of T. R. Jett, where they burned the feet of Miss Dee Jett, a girl of fourteen. Some time that night a negro woman was hanged, probably because she would not tell where her master had hidden his money. The raiders then went to the home of Mr. S. J. Howel, a merchant of Pittsburg. Mr. Howel also had a cotton batting factory at Pittsburg and had had an interest in the Hunter-Hanger Stage line that formerly ran from Springfield to Little Rock and was believed to have some money on hand. At the time he was absent in Texas, where he had gone with his servants. His son, Captain J. B. Howel was on General Fagan's staff. Let his

daughter, Mrs. Sallie E. Jordan, tell what happened when the brutes reached her father's home.

On the night of the 20th of February, 1864, five or six Federal soldiers came and demanded money of mother, saying, "I know you have it, every one knows that your husband has plenty of money." When she refused to give them money, they stripped the right foot and leg and thrust it into a bed of red hot coals lying in a large open fireplace. When they took it out they asked her if she would tell them where the money was, and when she said no, they put it back and told her they would burn her to death if she did not tell. The flesh was cooked till it fell off from the knee to the toe. They then brought in my widowed aunt, Mrs. John W. Willis, who was living with my mother. They had been keeping her outside on the lawn, and had previously told her that my mother had sent her word to tell them where the money was, as they were burning her to death. She said she did not believe them and refused. They then took my mother from the fire and put my aunt in, and burned her in the same way, but not quite so severely. At last when they found they were of the material of which heroines are made and Spartan mothers reared, they released them and going to the servants' quarters, they locked them in and told them if they came out before sunup, their heads would be shot off. My poor mother in some way found the linseed oil and together she and my aunt dressed their wounds. Next morning the three negro women in great fear came to them and did what they could for them. Later on these women took the week's laundry and went across the hill, a quarter of a mile from the house, where there was a fine spring, to do the washing, the hill hid the house from their view. Later on one of the women started back to see if there was

anything needed. When she reached the top of the hill, she saw the flames bursting out from the roof. When mother and aunt learned that the house was on fire, they in some mysterious way with those terribly burned limbs, crawled to the wood pile, where they lay and watched the destruction of a fine old Southern home (the home where Brother John and I were reared). When the building was falling into ashes some Federal officers came with ambulances to fill them with furnishings from this house. When they saw the sad plight of my loved ones, they were compelled to take them to Clarksville, where they could receive medical attention. I must say Drs. Root and Adams of Kansas, in whose charge they were placed, were exceedingly kind to them. Mother did not die just at this time, but lingered two years. Poor, dear mother, how she suffered. "I forgive them for the pain and poverty they have caused me," were her words. They destroyed what they could not carry away, shooting large numbers of cattle and hogs.

Another account says that one of the men dragged Mrs. Howel from the burning building. Mrs. Jordan says that some Federal officers took the women to Clarksville and there gave them medical attention. Speaking of Colonel Waugh, she says:

He had never been known to do a kind act for any citizen until my mother's awful treatment happened, when he began to act as a human being. One Federal officer called and said to me: "If my wife or mother had been treated as yours, I would live only to kill Federals and when I came to die, I would regret that I could not live longer to kill more."

Such was the spirit which moved Sydney Wallace, a mere lad of eleven years, who, on December 31, 1863, witnessed the murder of his father, the Rev. Vincent Wallace. He seems to have taken the oath of Hamilcar and became a terror to Johnson county. At his death by hanging in 1874 he boasted that he had "got" all he went after except two.

After burning the house of Mrs. S. J. Howel, the raiders next visited and burned the home of Mrs. Laban C. Howell, a widow, who had been warned by a Federal soldier not to be at home that night and had taken her children to Clarksville for safety. Being intensely Southern in spirit she secretly befriended Confederate soldiers whenever the opportunity arose. She was first whipped for this and later was arrested and taken to Little Rock, where she was kept in jail for some time.

It may be urged in extenuation for such acts as those reported by Captain Peevey that they were simply returning in kind the offences committed by Quantrill and other guerrillas who raided, plundered and murdered loyal citizens in Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas. It is unfortunate that Quantrill was ever employed by the Confederates and he certainly would not have been, had his true character been known, but it was not until after the war. Also, it must be remembered that Confederates suffered severely and that Quantrill was sometimes acting in retaliation. Also, we cannot believe that Captain Totten, so popular at Little Rock before 1861, ever sanctioned the rapine and murders committed in Carroll county.

Yet there was less excuse for this, for the perpetrators were regular soldiers.

Still worse was the conduct of the garrison at Fort Smith and neighboring places, for they plundered, burned, and murdered with little distinction between friends and foes. February 4, 1864, a committee of loyal citizens at Van Buren appealed to Governor Murphy in the following language:

Sir: Permit the undersigned committee of the loyal citizens of Crawford county, farmers and mechanics, and acting in their behalf and by their authority, to state to Your Excellency the deplorable condition of the country by reason of the persecutions, robbing and plundering generally committed by the officers, soldiers and their associates and camp followers now and for the twelve months last past. We have been robbed and personally maltreated to an extent unparalleled; at any rate not exceeded in all Christian history. They have taken from us everything of value, and we have no redress for these and other and multiplied wrongs. These men are protected and encouraged in committing robbery and other outrages by certain officers holding administrative power here and at Fort Smith. They knock down and maim our citizens in the streets of Van Buren, and commit other indignities. It is impossible to obtain redress. It is impossible to keep a horse, a cow, an ox, a piece of meat, or a bushel of meal, unless so far hidden as to defy their search, and we are debarred from entering complaint against them for any of the above named offenses, as they threaten our lives for so doing. The present assistant provost-marshal here is one of their own creatures as most other of his predecessors have been, and it is, indeed, of no use to complain. It is of no use for us to com-

plain to the authorities at Fort Smith, for no attention is paid to us there whatever. These bad men have been retained around certain headquarters for the last twelve months and are a terror to our people. They can commit any offense they choose with perfect impunity, even to the extent of taking our teams and provisions in the streets of Van Buren and personally abusing and maltreating our citizens in the broad light of day, and they have been to our houses in the neighborhood at night committing unheard of atrocities. It is the universal opinion among citizens that certain officers are interested and co-partners with them. The evidence warrants the conclusion. The same are engaged in hunting what few horses and cattle we have left to us in the bottoms. They hitch them out in the brush, or yard them till they get the requisite number, and then drive them off toward Kansas. We are powerless and feel alarmed for personal safety. Every facility seems to be given to these abominably wicked and dangerous men by the provost marshal here, who is a brutal man in his actions and treatment of our citizens. Such, governor, is a faint and insufficient outline of the manner in which people here are treated, and we implore you to lay the subject of our complaint before the commander of the Department of Arkansas, and failing in obtaining redress we earnestly hope you will entreat the President of the United States to interpose his authority in our behalf. Hundreds of our fellow-citizens have been compelled to leave the country, for the North after having been made miserably poor and helpless, thus leaving what was once their comfortable homes. We prefer to remain in our own country, where there exist so many remembrances of former contentment and prosperity. It is wrong that we should be driven away and be made to leave the graves of our relatives,

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others. They feel that they can protect themselves against rebel marauders if the powers that be will allow them to bear arms in self-defense. They think they can furnish their own families in this way, and perhaps to some extent a supply for government troops also, in corn, forage, etc. So earnestly do they feel in this matter that they sent a committee to wait on General Thayer, at Fort Smith, to ask his approval of their plan, but he gave them no encouragement whatever. Last year he (General Thayer) recommended our farmers to purchase broken down government horses wherewith to replace those they had previously lost, and to tend their crops. The farmers acted on this recommendation, but in every instance these horses were also taken from them so soon as they got in condition for service; nor was it possible to reclaim them. Every possible obstacle and device is thrown in the way of a man's reclaiming and getting back his property, and it is now impossible to do it in any instance. We earnestly entreat Your Excellency, we implore you, to take immediate measures for our relief and for the relief of our suffering families and for obtaining authority from General Reynolds for us to colonize in the manner proposed, and that we may be protected from bad men of the Army of the Frontier, and to be allowed to bear arms for our own protection against all marauders and plotters against our property, our peace and security, and as in duty bound we will ever pray.

We are, governor, your fellow citizens and obedient servants.

A. O'BRYAN,

WM. F. OWENS,

Committee on the part of the citizens.

Such things as this, together with a number of incidents given elsewhere, explain the strong feeling which still exists against Kansas among the older

generation in Northwest Arkansas, and which probably will not entirely disappear until all those who lived through the war period have passed into the great beyond.

CHAPTER XXV

ARKANSAS TROOPS IN THE FEDERAL ARMY

While a good many people in Arkansas never favored secession practically all opposition ceased with the passage of the ordinance and most of the opponents gave at least nominal adhesion to the new order of things. After the battle of Pea Ridge, however, in March, 1862, and the eastward progress of General Curtis, many began to doubt the ultimate success of secession and some soon passed into the Union lines and renewed their allegiance to the Union. In fact a few seemed to have fought with Curtis at Pea Ridge and at Batesville he found a number of loyalists awaiting his arrival. Soon after the battle of Pea Ridge numbers of loyalists gathered at Cassville, Missouri, where M. La Rue Harrison, post quartermaster, organized a company with himself as captain. As the loyalists continued to come he decided to raise a regiment and, through the help of the Honorable John S. Phelps, then in Washington, he secured permission from the Secretary of War to do so (June 6, 1862).

By means of recruiting parties sent into various parts of Arkansas squads of from 6 to 30 were brought in. A raid on Fayetteville (June 20, 1862) resulted in 115 recruits. August 7, 1862, the First Arkansas Cavalry Volunteers (Union) was mustered in, but the regimental organization in twelve companies was not completed until October 2. M. La

Rue Harrison of Illinois was colonel, A. W. Bishop of Wisconsin, lieutenant-colonel. The latter was later succeeded by Thomas J. Hunt, of Fayetteville.* Among the Arkansas officers were Charles Galloway, John I. Worthington, H. C. C. Botefuhr.

The first battalion, Major J. J. Johnson, took part in the battle near Newtonia, Missouri, and furnished many scouts and guides during the campaign. Three companies of the third battalion were stationed at Elkhorn and joined Herron in the move against Hindman at Prairie Grove. The part played by Colonel Harrison in this battle has already been given. The regiment, or parts of it, participated in many raids and skirmishes in Arkansas, Missouri, and the territory, a part of it getting as far south as Backbone Mountain. A good part of the time regimental headquarters were at Fayetteville. It did not learn of General Kirby Smith's surrender until July, 1865, and was mustered out August 23. The career of the company seems to have been an honorable one, but desertions from some of the companies were numerous.

In the summer of 1862, an effort was made to organize a regiment at Helena, but failed. Those who did not desert were transported to Saint Louis where they were turned over to John E. Phelps to be used as a nucleus. He took them to Springfield and Cassville, but did not succeed in getting a full regiment of twelve companies until March, 1864. John E. Phelps then became colonel of the Second Arkansas

*Died in Fayetteville, 1924.

Cavalry Volunteers (Union), Hugh Cameron, lieutenant-colonel.

This regiment served in the northwest and was later ordered to Memphis (January, 1865), then to Mississippi. It was allowed by the War Department to inscribe "Independence," "Big Blue," and "Osage" on its banner and claimed the right to inscribe eight more, acknowledging defeat only in one battle, that of Richmond.

Shortly after the capture of Little Rock Captain A. H. Ryan, Seventeenth Illinois Infantry, received authority from General Steele to raise the "Third Arkansas Cavalry of Volunteers," but, in spite of all exertions, he was not able to get a regiment ready to be mustered in until February 10, 1864. As it was desired to make the regiment efficient in the shortest time possible experienced men were selected for field and staff officers, but Arkansans who had been active in recruiting were given the minor offices, saving one lieutenant who had seen service. The regiment saw service in and around Little Rock, accompanied General Steele on his Camden expedition, taking part in all the major battles, and was stationed at Lewisburg until mustered out June 30, 1865.

The work of organizing the Fourth Arkansas Cavalry Volunteers was begun in November, 1863, under the direction of Wm. M. Fishback, who had now abandoned the cause of the Confederacy, and proceeded rapidly for awhile, but the failure of Steele's Camden expedition discouraged enlistments and the regiment was not mustered in until December 29,

1864. All the companies were raised at Little Rock and several of them were in the service before the regiment was complete. LaFayette Gregg, a citizen of Fayetteville, was made colonel, Horace L. Moore, Second Kansas Cavalry, lieutenant-colonel.

After Curtis had passed by Huntsville in his march eastward following the battle of Pea Ridge, Isaac Murphy and Dr. James M. Johnson were forced to leave Madison county because of their Union sympathies. In November, 1862, General Schofield authorized the latter to raise infantry troops from Arkansas. He accompanied the army to Prairie Grove and after that battle opened a recruiting office in Fayetteville and by March 25, 1863, had the First Regiment Arkansas Infantry ready to be mustered into service with 36 officers and 810 enlisted men, Colonel Johnson in command. The members of this company came from Washington, Benton, Madison, Newton, Searcy and Crawford counties.

This regiment's baptism of fire came at Fayetteville April 18, 1863, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Searle and Major E. D. Ham. After campaigning in Missouri and the territory it returned to Fort Smith and followed Thayer to Camden and fought at Poison Spring. This regiment as originally organized seems to have conducted itself reasonably well, but it consorted with bands known to the Federals as "Mountain Feds," to the Confederates as plain bushwhackers and guerrillas. Some of these bands were a veritable terror to the community. Perhaps the most notorious were those of "Wild Bill"

Heffington, of Yell county, and of James R. Vanderpool, of Newton county. When the Federals abandoned the northwest for a time in 1863 the former remained and carried on his guerrilla operations, defying all efforts of the Confederates to capture him, until killed near the Arkansas river in August, 1864. His band held together until the war closed when many of them, fearing to continue to operate as outlaws, joined the army.

The organization of the Second Arkansas Infantry Volunteers was begun at Springfield by Colonel L. L. Stephenson, Tenth Illinois Cavalry, and then transferred to Fort Smith, in November, 1863. Six companies of the regiment participated in the Camden expedition before being formally mustered in and were so reduced by desertion, killed and wounded that the regiment was pronounced incomplete. Two other companies now joined those who had gone to Little Rock and the regiment was mustered in July 6, 1864. It was stationed at Lewisburg, but was driven away by General Price on his advance into Missouri, which was followed by many more desertions, though some of the deserters voluntarily returned. At the close of 1864 the regiment was ordered to Clarksville.

Shortly after the fall of Little Rock, W. M. Fishback, was authorized to raise the Third Arkansas Regiment of Infantry Volunteers at Little Rock, and tremendous efforts were made to this end, but they all failed.

In October, 1863, Edward S. Brooks, of Fayetteville, was authorized to raise the Fourth Regiment of Infantry Volunteers and in December, Captain H. S. Greeno, Sixth Kansas Cavalry, was detailed for this service and put in charge of the recruiting office at Fort Smith, the main office being at Fayetteville. But recruiting for the other infantry and cavalry regiments took up nearly all the available men and little was accomplished. Recruiting officers followed Thayer to Camden and raised a considerable number of recruits in that region only to have them captured before reaching Pine Bluff. Finally enough were gathered up to establish headquarters at Clarksville, but the regiment never was completed. Forty-five deserted, 30 died, 30 were captured, 45 were transferred to the Fourth Arkansas Cavalry, and 73 to the Second Arkansas Infantry.

The Second, combined with the Fourth, is the regiment which made such a terrible record for brutality at Clarksville. Nearly all the officers above lieutenant were from out of the state. Lieutenant-Colonel Gideon M. Waugh, who seems to have been in command when the worst atrocities were committed, came from the Second Kansas Cavalry. Three other officers were from Kansas, four from Iowa, two from Illinois and two from Missouri.

When Curtis was on his march eastward in 1862 a good many people who had banded together to resist the Confederate conscription gave in their adhesion to the Union. They had expected that the occupation would be permanent, but Curtis soon

moved on to Helena and they fled with him for safety, some in such haste that they did not return home to say farewell. At Helena these refugee recruits were organized into the First Arkansas (six months) Infantry, four companies, but the War Department refused to receive them and they were sent to St. Louis and mustered out at Benton barracks December 31, 1863, about 150 having in the meantime died of disease.

In November, 1863, Elisha Baxter, of Batesville, was authorized by General Steele to raise the Fourth Arkansas Infantry Volunteers for twelve months. After two months of recruiting he had only 131 men. Colonel Livingston (Union) said that they did not "rally around the flag with much enthusiasm." Nearly 200 men ultimately joined and were assigned to service with Colonel Livingston, First Nebraska Infantry. In May, 1864, the recruits were turned over to Captain T. A. Baxter, Elisha Baxter having been elected to the United States Senate.

Battery A, First Arkansas Light Artillery Volunteers, was raised in the winter and spring of 1863 by Denton D. Clark, with headquarters at Fayetteville. This battery took part in campaigns in Missouri (against Coffee and Shelby), the territory, and Arkansas, penetrating as far south as Camden. It returned to Fort Smith and remained there until mustered out August 30, 1865. The career of this company was an honorable one.

From first to last 8,789 loyal Arkansans joined the Federal forces, but the "loyalty" of 1,025 of

these was not strong enough to keep them from deserting. In addition, toward the close of the war a few militia companies were organized for protection against guerrillas, such as the Izard County Militia, J. B. Brown, captain.

Early in the war there was very strong opposition in the North to the employment of negroes as soldiers. The first use made of them was as laborers on fortifications. In 1862 some negro troops were organized without any authority of law. July 17, 1862, Congress, in the second confiscation act, authorized the President to employ negroes as soldiers. Even then President Lincoln was loath to do so, but, after the preliminary emancipation proclamation, authority was given and the first negro regiment was mustered in in Louisiana September 27, 1862.

In Arkansas, as elsewhere, soon after the issuance of the emancipation proclamation, many negroes came within the Federal lines and the officers were vexed with the problem of what to do with them, but in the spring of 1863 they began to organize them into companies and May 1, 1863, the First Arkansas Volunteers of African Descent, gathered mainly from Eastern Arkansas, was mustered into service. The same day the Confederate Congress declared that any white commissioned officer commanding negroes in arms against the Confederacy should be considered as inciting servile insurrection and, if captured, be "put to death or otherwise punished at the discretion of the court." The last clause was a saving one, for the penalty of death never could

have been enforced because of the retaliation it would have provoked.

Three other regiments of colored troops were organized in the state, the Second, the Third, and the Fourth, with a total enlistment of 2,348 at the close of 1863. Later all colored troops were designated by numbers of the United States Volunteers (Colored), the First Arkansas being the Forty-sixth, the Second the Fifty-fourth, the Third the Fifty-sixth, and the Fourth the Fifty-seventh. Adjutant-General L. Thomas reported that the majority of the freedmen manifested a partiality for the military service, where they were happy and contented. The officers did not always wait for them to come in and volunteer, but raiding expeditions were sometimes sent out to round them up and bring them in. The losses among negro soldiers from death, disease, and capture were very heavy.

The colored troops raised in Arkansas appear to have conducted themselves reasonably well, but the Fifty-third Colored (originally, the Third Mississippi), which was stationed in the state awhile, brought upon itself a bad reputation.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A LOYAL GOVERNMENT

When the ordinance of secession was up for adoption five members of the convention voted against it, but only one, Isaac Murphy, remained inflexible in opposition. After having voted against adoption David Walker, president of the convention, changed his vote and appealed to Murphy to make it unanimous. In June, 1862, David Walker and W. M. Fishback, who had voted for secession, were the first people of prominence to renew their allegiance to the Union. About the first we hear of Fishback, whose ear was a regular weathervane that always caught the slightest veering in the wind of political opinion, he was on his way to St. Louis to see General Schofield in regard to affairs in Arkansas.

The march of Curtis to Batesville and later to Helena was watched by President Lincoln with keen interest. He was especially pleased with the manifestations of loyalty reported by Curtis and appointed (July 19, 1862) John S. Phelps, of Missouri, military governor of the state with the object of establishing a loyal state government and restoring the state to the Union. In doing this he was extending to Arkansas the Presidential Plan of Reconstruction, though not yet worked out, over which he was later to come into collision with Congress.

August 19 Governor Phelps left St. Louis and established his headquarters in Helena. He appointed Amos P. Eno as his secretary and wrote a few comments to Washington on the improper conduct of the Federal officers and enlisted men in Arkansas and then, becoming ill, returned to St. Louis. Nominally he remained military governor until next summer, but did practically nothing.

The preliminary emancipation proclamation was issued in September, 1862, and was followed by the final emancipation proclamation on January 1, 1863. Naturally this was not very well received in Arkansas, but some who had been loath to free the negroes, felt by this time that the Confederacy was doomed and that, although the war had not been begun to free the slaves, this was a part of the price they would have to pay for the restoration of the Union. Early in 1863 several Union meetings were held, notably at Huntsville and Fayetteville, the latter being described as "large and enthusiastic." The object was to forward the movement for the restoration of a loyal government and of representation in Congress. But the state legislature passed a stringent measure imposing severe penalties on any who participated in such a movement and the military authorities did all they could to stop it, the result being that the movement dragged. By the summer of 1863 Lincoln became convinced that the steps for restoration were premature and revoked Governor Phelps' commission as military governor (July 9).

But a few days later the President decided to try another method and wrote (July 31) General Hurlburt, then stationed at Memphis, and asked him to sound out Senator Sebastian on the question of resuming his seat in the Senate. This, he thought might be a matter of great national importance. The emancipation must stand and would be applied to Arkansas so far as concerned those who had been made free by it. As for the rest, he thought that gradual emancipation would be best for both white and black. But Sebastian, although he had declined to have anything to do with the Confederacy, flatly refused to consider returning to the Senate.

It was believed that the capture of the state capital would have important political consequences. Perhaps this is why Steele adopted a conciliatory policy. He allowed the civil officers to continue in the discharge of their duties, invited the people in the country to bring in their produce for sale, prohibited soldiers, except guards and officers on duty, from entering the city, and ordered that no house should be occupied by any soldier or officer without permission of the general commanding the city.

Judge David Walker does not seem to have taken any part in the loyalist movement after taking the oath of allegiance, but Fishback, who had already taken an active part, was now joined in Little Rock by E. W. Gantt and Isaac Murphy. Elisha Baxter, who appears to have remained Unionist all along, now became active, first in the raising of a regiment and later in political work.

Shortly after the capture of Little Rock Mr. Gantt, who had twice been a prisoner and who considered that he had been slighted by the Confederate authorities, came to the city and issued a lengthy address to the people of the state. In this he humbly confessed his error in ever becoming a secessionist. He was very bitter in his denunciation of the Johnson faction and of Hindman, who, he said, had formed a combination and "feasted, flourished and were glad" while the people suffered.

He was also bitter against President Davis, to whom he had appealed in vain for relief from the "stupid political appointees." The time had come to confess failure and accept the consequences, thus avoiding any further effusion of blood and unnecessary suffering. Lest any might accuse him of seeking an election to Congress he announced that he would not accept any public office, but he advised that Senator Sebastian be instructed to resume his seat as the shortest way to renew relations with the Federal government. A few days later (October 19) Fishback addressed a Union meeting and advised the restoration of a loyal government which would eradicate slavery. A Union Club was organized to promote the work. Several Union meetings were held in various places and the Confederate sympathizers became alarmed and organized a counter movement. Still the Unionists remained active and actually held a meeting at Benton, almost in sight of the Confederate lines. Somewhere in the course of these meetings the idea of a state convention to or-

ganize state government was born and such a body was called to meet in Little Rock, January 4.

After surveying the situation in Arkansas and in other states President Lincoln decided that the time had come for further steps in reconstruction. December 8, 1863, he issued his amnesty proclamation offering full pardon and restoration of property rights, except as to slaves, to such "rebels," with certain exceptions, as would take an oath to protect, support, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the proclamation of the President and the acts of Congress relating to slaves until modified by Congress or declared void by the Supreme Court. Coupled with the amnesty proclamation was the President's Plan of Reconstruction. This was simplicity itself. It provided that when a number of loyal voters equal to ten per cent of the number who voted for President in 1860 established a loyal government, it should be recognized as the true government of the state, though he could not promise that this would be followed immediately by admission of her senators and representatives to Congress.

But progress in Arkansas was much more rapid than President Lincoln supposed. January 5, 1864, the day after the convention met, he wrote to General Steele saying that he wished to afford the people an opportunity of taking the oath and of proceeding as indicated in his amnesty proclamation and that he was sending some blank books for permanent records. Meantime a self-appointed committee, of whom E. W. Gantt was one, had gone to Washington to

petition President Lincoln to order an election for governor. Such an order to Steele was written and put in the hands of Mr. Gantt for delivery. The date set for the election was March 28.

But before this order was written (January 20) the work of the convention was well under way. It must be confessed that the convention was a very irregular body. The delegates in attendance varied from 32 to 45. They claimed to represent 22 out of 54 counties, but some of the counties were apparently within the Confederate lines. A few of the delegates appear to have been self-appointed. But if the convention was irregular, it arose out of irregular conditions and was trying to bring regularity out of irregularity. As the leading men of the state were then serving the Confederacy, naturally the personnel of this body was not very high. Fishback was there, but neither Murphy nor Baxter, unswerving Unionists, represented any constituency. However, it was not a carpet-bag body, for only fourteen members had resided in the state less than ten years. John McCoy, of Newton county, was elected chairman and Robert J. T. White, of Crawford, secretary.

This body took the old Constitution and amended it so as to conform in general to the President's wishes. Slavery was abolished and the first legislature was required to provide for the prosecution of offenders against the ordinances relating to the freedmen. The acts of the convention of 1861 were declared void and the Confederate debt was repudiated. Isaac Murphy was elected provisional governor and

an election was called to be held on the second Monday in March to vote on the constitution and elect officers.

When President Lincoln heard of these proceedings he wrote Steele not to interfere, but to harmonize his orders with the decision of the convention, but Steele was to be master of the situation. Steele now issued an address to the people, congratulating them on the work of the convention and urging them to come out and vote. On the other hand the Confederates did all they could to discourage the movement.

The election lasted three days and resulted in 12,177 for ratification to 226 against. Votes were reported for 43 counties and the total was more than 20 per cent of the vote cast in 1860, 54,232. Of course the voting was somewhat irregular and probably no election was held in some counties for which votes were reported, but absent voting was allowed. For example, William Beshears was elected to represent Desha county in the legislature by two votes cast in Little Rock, one cast by himself and the other by a man who claimed to be from Desha county but who was unknown to the judges. But on the whole the election was as fair as could have been expected under the circumstances. Isaac Murphy was elected governor without opposition. County officers were elected at the same time. Also, T. M. Jacks, A. C. C. Rogers, and J. M. Johnson were elected to represent the first, second, and third Congressional districts. When the legislature met it elected Elisha Baxter and W. M. Fishback to the Senate.

The charge was freely made and supported by some evidence that fraud was used in the election of members to the legislature to secure the election of Fishback. Out of fourteen candidates nominated for the Senate Baxter was elected on the fourth ballot, but the opposition to Fishback, who had been a secessionist, was bitter and it required twenty-one ballots to elect him. Speaker Allis refused to sign his certificate of election and was expelled for the refusal. Neither of these men was ever admitted to Congress. Governor Murphy was duly inaugurated April 18, 1864, thus becoming the head of the new loyal state government, and was greeted with much enthusiasm.

In his message to the legislature Governor Murphy dwelt mainly on two topics, finance and militia. He insisted that a sound financial policy should be followed and that the militia should be organized for protection. Taking up the latter subject the legislature requested the United States government to station all Arkansas troops within the state to protect the people against lawless bands. They also asked for authority to organize the "Arkansas Rangers," to be commanded by officers appointed by the governor and to be armed at the expense of the United States, but met with no response. The organization of Colonel Harrison's farm colony militia has already been mentioned. These seem to have been neither approved nor condemned by the United States authorities and never amounted to much.

The new government had not a dollar with which to begin. The property valuation in 1860 exclusive of slaves was \$153,699,473. In 1864 this was estimated at \$30,000,000. This probably was too low, but at best it furnished a very poor basis for taxes to fill an empty treasury and maintain a state government. The first step of the legislature was to levy a tax on the disloyal population for the benefit of the loyal. The assessment for 1860 was to be used as the basis for collections for the year 1861, 1862, and 1863, the disloyal only having to pay. For the year 1864 a general revenue law provided a rate of one per cent on the assessed valuation, but it seems to have been intended to raise the greater part of the revenue from sources other than real property, for there was to be a tax on various privileges, luxuries, and an income tax on all incomes over \$600 when not otherwise taxed.

This act is interesting, not because of its results—only \$257.97 in currency and \$2,565.80 in auditor's warrants was ever collected—but as illustrating the intent of the legislature and the difficulties it encountered. At a later session the law was repealed and the pre-war revenue act was substituted with some modification. The rate was fixed at one per cent for the state and five mills for counties. Whether the legislature really distrusted the executive or simply wanted to take care of itself it would be hard to say, but a separate act provided for a joint committee of one from each house with power to supervise

collection of the taxes. This was vetoed, but promptly passed over the veto.

The legislators did not want to wait upon the slow process of taxation for their own compensation and provided for a bond issue of \$300,000 at 8 per cent, payable in coin, though the bonds were to be sold for the "lawful money of the United States." Governor Murphy vetoed this, but it was promptly passed over his veto. However, none of the bonds seem to have been sold. The legislators also provided for pay to members of the convention. As the majority of the members of the convention were attached to the military at Little Rock and receiving pay as such this amounted to double pay.

In looking after the interest of loyalists the legislature asked the representatives in Congress to urge upon that body the establishment of a commission in Little Rock to pass upon the claims of loyal citizens for losses sustained at the hands of the Union forces. A stay law was passed suspending the collection of debts contracted prior to January, 1864, but this did not apply to debts owed by the disloyal. It was designed to protect loyal debtors against disloyal creditors.

In April, 1865, a special session was called to consider the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery. This was ratified without a dissenting vote.

Although elections were held in 1864 for county officials the work of reorganizing the counties progressed very slowly. This was largely due to the opposition of the Confederates, but after the sur-

render this obstacle was removed and reorganization went on much more rapidly, though the governor sometimes had to bring pressure to bear on loyal men to get them to accept these offices. The military authorities had assumed police powers in the towns occupied by them and tried to maintain order and establish sanitary conditions. By the fall of 1865 the people of Little Rock set about reorganizing the city government, but when a public meeting proposed to turn it over to the officials who held under the Confederacy General Reynolds announced that he would not allow this and Governor Murphy ordered an election. In addition to the qualifications prescribed in the constitution of 1864 the first legislature had prescribed that any elector offering to vote should take an oath that he had not voluntarily aided the Confederacy since March 18, 1864. When the election commissioners proceeded to disregard this requirement the military authorities stopped the election.

About the same time an election was held for the members of Congress. When one Rison and several other men were debarred from voting because they refused to take this oath they brought suit, Colonel R. C. Newton acting as their attorney. Chief Justice T. W. D. Yonley announced the decision of the supreme court, holding that the clause relating to bearing arms in aid of the Confederacy was unconstitutional. If the offense was against the United States, then it was not within the competence of the state to take note of this. Besides, the offenders taking the amnesty oath, which the plaintiffs had done, had

received full pardon. If against the state, it was an indictable offense and the offenders could not be convicted by legislative act.

Down to this time the ex-Confederates seem to have been somewhat uncertain about the attitude they would assume toward the Murphy government. Some were for accepting it, but many, even after President Johnson announced that it would have his support, tried to build up a party for a complete reorganization. But after the Rison decision their attitude soon changed, for they saw that they only had to wait until the next election (August, 1866) to capture the government. The governor was elected for four years but they captured the legislature, only five Unionists being elected to the house, and most of the state offices. David Walker, who had been president of the secession convention, was elected chief justice of the supreme court.

Although the convention of 1864 had abolished slavery neither it nor the first legislature had done anything to settle the civil rights of the negroes. When the new legislature met a committee, of which R. C. Newton and Simon P. Hughes were members, was appointed to consider this question. Several of the other Southern States had already legislated on this subject and had passed laws so objectionable to the North that they played a conspicuous part in holding up the Presidential Plan of Reconstruction. The committee recommended, and the legislature finally passed, a much milder code, giving them full property rights, but not allowing them to serve on juries,

to vote, to go to school with white children, or to intermarry with whites.

Elections were held in March, 1864, for judicial offices, but practically none of these began to function for more than a year, but by the fall of 1865 the judiciary was complete and in operation. Aside from assisting in maintaining order a very important question came before the courts in passing upon the validity of the acts of the convention of 1861 and of the Confederate state government. Even the second legislature, which was composed of ex-Confederates, was divided on this, but Chief Justice Walker held that the acts of the convention were valid so far as they did not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States and that the state government was not affected by the ordinance of secession, except in relation to the United States, and this was void. The result was that property rights secured under the Confederate state government, except in aid of the Confederacy, were held to be valid.

Under the revenue law the amount of taxes assessed for collection amounted to \$387,234.49 on an assessed valuation of \$38,732,449. Of this sum \$293,043.86 had been collected by November, 1866. As \$153,540.37 would remain in the treasury after meeting all the expenses for the past two and a half years and only \$100,000 a year would be needed for the next two years Governor Murphy advised the legislature (November 8, 1866) to reduce the taxes and make a general revision of the revenue laws. While some changes were made in the laws there seems

to have been no reduction in the amount. The result was that the treasury had a surplus when the military government provided by the Congressional plan of Reconstruction took charge. Nearly \$100,000 of this was invested in United States bonds.

While Governor Murphy was a man of little education and experience in public affairs, he was a man of sound common sense, of good intentions, and of scrupulous honesty. On the whole it must be admitted that his administration was reasonably successful under very trying conditions. Had the following administrations been of like character the state would have had no nightmare of reconstruction as a heritage for future generations.

A loyal government had been established and was now in full operation. The only thing necessary to restore the state to its former place in the Union was recognition by Congress and the admission of her senators and representatives to seats in that body. In May, 1864, the Senators-elect, Fishback and Baxter, presented their credentials and asked for admission. Senator Lane, of Kansas, moved that the oath be administered to Fishback, but the matter was delayed until June, when Senator Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, made a speech in opposition which showed that one reason for the delay was to prevent a small minority of the people in Arkansas from casting the vote of the state in the Presidential election. The question was brought up several times but was delayed until February, 1866, when the House adopted a resolution that neither senators nor repre-

sentatives should be admitted until both houses had passed on the matter. A motion to seat Senator Fishback was then defeated 18 to 27 and a few days later the Senate concurred in the House resolution. All hope for the readmission of Arkansas to the Union with her government set up under the Presidential plan was now gone and she had to await the grueling coming to her under the Congressional plan.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FREEDMAN'S BUREAU

When Curtis marched into Helena he found himself in a region of many slaves and many of these flocked to his camp. With the promulgation of the emancipation proclamation (January 1, 1863) many more came and their presence caused great embarrassment. The freeing of the negroes made them, morally at least, the wards of the nation. How to care for them became a serious problem and never was solved with justice to either blacks or whites.

The first step was the creation, by military order, of the Department of Negro Affairs under the direction of the Secretary of War. This functioned until superseded by the "Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees and Abandoned Lands," which was created by act of Congress (March 3, 1865). This in turn gave way to the carpet-bag government (1868) in all its activities, except in education. This it continued for a year or more and then gave up the ghost.

In 1863 General Lorenzo Thomas came to Memphis to superintend the organization of negro troops. While engaged in this work he conceived the idea of putting the women and children and men not fit for military duty upon "abandoned" plantations—a plantation was considered "abandoned" if its owner was away fighting in the Confederate army—and started this work in southeastern Arkansas. The plantations were leased to private individuals who were to employ and look after the negroes turned

over to their care. Agents visited the plantations and encouraged the negroes to give an honest day's labor, but the scheme was not a brilliant success for several reasons. Some of the lessees were inexperienced in handling negro labor, while some were rascally adventurers out for what they could make out of the government and its wards. A more important cause of failure was the repeated expeditions of the Confederate troops to drive out their invaders. While some of the lessees grew rich out of the venture, without much regard for the welfare of the laborers, many gave up and quit.

In March, 1865, Congress created the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, commonly called the Freedman's Bureau. A single commissioner, under the direction of the Secretary of War, was to take charge of this and put it into operation. Land, not exceeding forty acres to each male, was to be leased to loyal refugees and freedmen out of the abandoned or confiscated lands. General O. O. Howard became the first commissioner, and Brigadier-General J. W. Sprague was named assistant in charge of Arkansas. E. W. Gantt, who had abandoned the Confederacy in 1863, was appointed supervisor for the southwestern district. Capable officers were hard to find among the loyalists and in a few cases Confederates served, notably J. N. Cypert in White county and John M. Bradley in Bradley county, so long as the bureau was confined to the ends for which it was established, namely, the pro-

tection of the freedmen and refugees. Even with salaries which at that time were regarded as high, \$100.00 a month, it was often difficult to get competent and honest men to serve, spite of the fact that many of the best men in the state desired the bureau to succeed.

As already indicated the chief object of the bureau was to protect the freedmen and help them to get started on a new road in life. Families were to be kept intact and respect for the bonds of matrimony encouraged. There was to be no return to slavery. The negro was to be allowed to select his employer and then the bureau agent was to supervise the contract and see that it was carried out. The scale of wages ranged from \$15.00 to \$20.00 per month, in some cases \$25.00 or even more. Those who could pay no wages were allowed to employ laborers on the share system, which has since become so prevalent, the laborer to be "furnished" until the crop was ready for division and sale. Provision was also made for the establishment of schools.

So far as concerned the program mapped out for the bureau there was little to criticise. But it was to be operated by human agencies. Where these were good the results were good, where bad, the results were bad. Many stories have been told of trouble caused by the promise of some of these agents, that each negro should have forty acres of land and a mule.

We have already seen that destitution was widespread in 1865. The bureau did much to relieve this. Before the bureau became active the army issued 75,-

097 rations to 46,845 freedmen. From June, 1865, to September, 1866, the bureau issued 1,260,565 rations to refugees, 444,490 to freedmen. For some time it was hard to convince the negro that this was not to be his permanent way of living. To him freedom meant no work and plenty to eat at the hands of the government and pressure by the bureau was necessary in order to get him to make a contract and then keep it. Even when offering \$20.00 and food and a cabin it was often difficult for planters to secure enough labor. In the hope of meeting this situation an immigration society was organized by prominent men in the hope of bringing in labor from outside the state, but it never accomplished anything. A convention at Memphis seriously discussed bringing in Chinese labor.

With so complete a revolution in the economic system brought on suddenly trouble was inevitable. This trouble was decreased where the bureau officials were honest and competent, increased where they were not. Even honest and well-intentioned officials brought in from outside the state did not always make things run smoothly, due to suspicion of the Southern whites. If the negro was lazy or took too many holidays and the employer complained, or if the negro complained that he had not been paid or was not getting fair treatment, the bureau officials nearly always took the negro's word without question and lectured, if they did not actually fine, the employer. Bureau officials were authorized to administer "justice" as between the whites and the freedmen.

The whites had been accustomed to use the lash occasionally on recalcitrant laborers and it was not easy for them to realize that this privilege was gone. The story is told of a planter who was forced to leave his crop in the busy season and go many miles to answer a charge of this kind. After having paid the fine for thrashing one negro he told the officer that he had two others who needed a thrashing and asked the officer if he could not pay the fine then and not have to come back after the act was done. The officer very kindly accommodated him and no doubt pocketed one, if not both, of the fines.

The greatest trouble came from rascally officials of this class, while the honest official did some times side with the white man, the rascal never did, except for pay. He had been attracted to the job by the good pay and he found various ways to increase his income. This class of officials was always ready to take the word of the negro and to fine his white employer. Commissioners not on salary who served in these courts were allowed to compensate themselves at the rate of \$5.00 a day actually served. If the freedman left his employer without just cause he was to forfeit his wages to the employer. As the negro had no funds with which to pay fines it was usually impossible to see that he did not have a just cause for breaking his contract. The result was that the bureau courts were shot through and through with the gross partisanship and venality. Even in the carpet-bag convention (1868) the corruption of many of the officials was fully admitted.

In the realm of social reconstruction the record of the bureau was somewhat better, at least in the earlier period. As early as 1864 schools for the negroes were established on some of the leased plantations. To promote education was one of the recognized functions of the bureau as established by law. Exclusive of the plantation schools there were thirty or more schools giving instructions to 1,600 pupils by the end of 1866. While the bureau sponsored and supervised the day schools it paid less than half the expenses. The Indiana Friends (Quakers) supported twelve teachers, the American Freedman's Aid Commission (Western Department), nine, and a few supported themselves. Tuition was charged to those able to pay.

While many of the leading whites recognized that the negro should have some education, the whites in general were not friendly to education given by outside teachers, against whom there was a well-grounded suspicion of encouraging social equality. Naturally they were treated as social pariahs. After a while the attitude of the whites toward negro education began to change, but before this change had gone very far the schools were being used for political purposes. Still more were the bureau courts used to promote the cause of Congressional, that is, radical reconstruction. After that the usefulness of the bureau was gone.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE NIGHTMARE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND CARPET-BAG RULE

President Johnson followed President Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction, with a few modifications, and before the close of 1865 had state governments in operation throughout the South, and so announced to Congress when that body met in December. Opposition to Lincoln's Plan, led by Benjamin Wade, Thaddeus Stevens, and other radicals, had developed as early as 1864 and now opposition to that plan in Johnson's hands was greatly intensified. The legislation of some of these new governments in attempting to solve the problem of economic and social reconstruction, some of which was unwise, was seized upon by the radicals as proof positive of design to reduce the negro to slavery again.

The first step to prevent this was the passage of the civil rights act, securing to the negro civil rights equal to those of whites. To make this permanent it was put into the Fourteenth Amendment, along with other matters, and submitted to the states. Although Congress had voted not to admit senators and representatives from the states lately in the Confederacy, this amendment was submitted to them with the intimation that they would be readmitted to the Union when it was ratified. The most objectionable feature in this was section 2, which sought to force negro suffrage upon the South. Following the ad-

vice of President Johnson, who believed that better terms could be secured from Congress after the next election, Arkansas and the other Southern States, except Tennessee, rejected the amendment. Tennessee was one of the three states reconstructed by President Lincoln. On accepting the amendment it was readmitted to Congress and thereby escaped most of the horrors of carpet-bag rule. The other Southern States having refused to grant negro suffrage, were to have it thrust upon them.

We have seen that the Confederates captured the legislature of Arkansas in 1866. In another two years they would elect a governor. This was intolerable to the radicals and they sent a committee to Washington to petition Congress for an enabling act which would make it possible for them to recapture the state government. The legislature also sent a committee of ten which called on the President and presented to Congress a report on conditions in Arkansas and expressed the hope that the existing government would be recognized and sustained.

It is not likely that either committee had any influence in shaping the ultimate results. Conditions in other states furnished material better suited to the needs of the radicals in Congress and they played up the alleged mistreatment of the negro for all it was worth. Shortly after the committees left Stevens reported a bill which became the first reconstruction act, passed over President Johnson's veto on March 2, 1867. This act declared that "no legal state government or adequate protection for life and property"

existed in the ten Southern States. For the preservation of "peace and good order" the South was divided into five military districts and the President was directed to appoint a military governor for each. While the existing governments were not swept away, they were declared "provisional only," subject to the authority of the military governor who might declare martial law and remove any and all of the officials at his discretion. Offenders might be tried in the regular courts or in military tribunals.

A way of escape from military government was provided in an act of March 23, which directed the military commander of each district to cause a registration to be made of all male citizens over twenty-one without distinction of color, who had not been disfranchised for rebellion, or on conviction of felony, and who could take the "iron-clad oath." After this was done an election was to be called for the selection of delegates to a convention to draw up a constitution which must provide for negro suffrage when this constitution was approved by Congress and when the state had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and when the amendment was declared adopted, then senators and representatives were to be admitted to Congress.

The proscriptive nature of the act is clearly apparent. Those who had held office in the Confederacy and taken any leading part and, when the act was strictly construed, even those who had voluntarily served in the army, were disfranchised and debarred from office. Stripped of their old and trusted leaders

and confronted with negro suffrage the native Southerners were heavily handicapped for the coming struggle.

In Arkansas the whites used some intimidation to deter the negroes from registering, but the Union League was there to urge them on. This organization had been formed in the North in 1862 and 1863 to carry on propaganda for the cause of the Union. With the advancement of the Union army it came into the South and put the negroes in leading strings. It was now holding those strings and directing the negroes to support the Republican party. A counter influence was found in another secret order, the Ku Klux Klan, which was also active at this time and sought to discourage the negro from taking part in politics.

The election on the question of holding a convention and electing delegates was called for the first Tuesday in November. Some little campaign work was done before this by the radicals and by the conservatives, as the old Democrats now called themselves. The latter opposed holding a convention, but it carried by a good majority. It was the negro's first vote. They were corraled by their white leaders, marched to the polls and there given the regular ticket. Numerous irregularities occurred, but the election was declared valid, though the results of the vote for delegates were set aside in several conservative counties. The convention carried by a good majority, though probably fewer than 5,000 whites voted for it.

The convention met at Little Rock January 7, 1868, and elected Thomas M. Bowers, president. This man had come to the state in 1863 and soon established a "reputation for villainy." He had no taxable property in the state, knew little of parliamentary law and, on the whole, made a very poor president. Nine members were native Arkansans, of whom three were negroes. Several counties gave negro majorities, but the radical whites saw to it that, except in a few cases, the negroes got only one delegate. Chicot was the one county represented solely by a negro. The total number of negro delegates was nine, one of whom was named Henry Rector. Except for two or three vindictive members the negroes behaved well and were respectful to the whites. On the whole they showed less inclination to squander the public funds than did their white leaders. Twenty-three out of seventy-one were carpet-baggers, that is, had come from outside the state in recent years. It was they who directed the convention.

Most of the members were impecunious and looked after their own. They voted themselves a per diem of \$8.00, traveling expenses, ten newspapers each, and created many needless offices, a custom which has come down through the legislature to this day.

The constitution as adopted denied the right of secession and affirmed the right of all citizens, including negroes, to bear arms. The executive was given an exceedingly wide appointing power and this was increased by the legislature when it met. The clause relating to education alarmed the whites for

two reasons. In the first place it required that schools be maintained a minimum of three months and this would call for taxes from a people little able to pay them. In the second, no mention was made in the constitution of separate schools for white and black. The suffrage was given to the negro and denied to those disqualified under the Fourteenth Amendment, those who had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States during the war and later violated it, and those who had violated the rules of civilized warfare. Yet those in these classes who openly sustained the Congressional policy of reconstruction were declared qualified and the general assembly was allowed to remove the disqualifications from others by a two-thirds vote.

Perhaps the most vicious part of the constitution was that relating to apportionment of seats in the legislature. White counties were joined to counties having negro majorities so as to make sure of Republican success. This view of it was taken even by some scalawags and carpet-baggers. Little, if any, less vicious than this was the appointing power of the governor, which was not restricted by any sort of merit system. Appointments ranging from notary public to the chief justice of the supreme court were in the hands of the governor, subject to confirmation by the senate. The schedule for putting the constitution into operation was used for a nice bit of graft for the members appointed as supervisors of the election at \$8.00 per day with power to hire

numerous clerks and appoint judges and clerks of the election.

The election on the constitution was a double farce. Two sets of polls were provided, one controlled by the military authorities under the act of Congress to vote on the constitution, one by the convention commissioner to vote on the constitution and for the election of officers. The Democrats had warned against voting at the latter. The result was 30,380 for the Constitution, 41 against it at the convention polls, 27,913 for the Constitution, 26,597 against it at the military polls, giving a majority of 1,316 for adoption. Troops had been stationed at various places and the polls had been kept open fifteen days. Professor T. S. Staples says: "Democrats intimidated negroes, and Republicans stuffed the ballot box at will, voted women and children, and 'voted early and often,' traveling from ballot-box to ballot-box," and backs up his statement with proof.* For example, the votes in Jefferson and Pulaski counties exceeded the number of registered voters by 1,925. The Democrats protested to the military governor and asked for an investigation. Captain J. E. Tourtelotte, who was sent to investigate, admitted a number of irregularities, but thought that the constitution would have been adopted, had the election been fair, and so it was certified to Congress as adopted.

Thaddeus Stevens now reported a bill in Congress for the admission of Arkansas on the condition that

*Reconstruction in Arkansas, 261.

the constitution should never be so altered as to deprive any citizen of the right to vote who was enfranchised by the constitution, except as a punishment for crime. This was vetoed by President Johnson on the ground that Congress had no right to impose such conditions, in which he unquestionably was right, but the bill was promptly passed over his veto (June 22, 1868) and Arkansas, having ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, was again a state in the Union.

At the same time that the constitution was adopted Powell Clayton, of Pennsylvania and Kansas, was elected governor; Colonel J. M. Johnson, a loyal Unionist from Arkansas, lieutenant-governor. We have already met with Colonel Clayton in command of the Federal troops at Pine Bluff. He was mustered out of service in August, 1865, bought a plantation in Jefferson county, and gave his attention to planting until the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction was about ready to be applied. He then threw himself into the race for governor, became the Republican boss of the state and held that position to the time of his death in 1914. Comparatively few of the other officials were citizens of the state in 1865. The *Gazette* gave a list of officials, including seven out of ten circuit judges, who were "absolutely unknown to the people of our state sixty days before their appointment or election!" This may have been a slight exaggeration, but it approximated the truth.

April 2, 1868, the new legislature met and the next day listened to a message from Governor Mur-

phy. The retiring governor informed them that his administration had contracted no debt and was ready to turn over \$122,587 to its successor. The members do not seem to have cared particularly about his recommendations, but they were greatly interested in the surplus. The chief object of the meeting was to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment in order to fulfill the conditions for readmission to the Union and this was adopted unanimously. There was practically nothing else that the legislature could do until July 2, when Clayton was inaugurated. One member suggested that they go home and save the state \$25,000, but this did not strike the other members favorably and they remained on the job and drew their per diem. The expenses of this do-nothing session amounted to about \$80,000, of which \$566.75 was spent to send the remains of the Hon. John C. Tobias back to his home in Illinois and pay his mileage and per diem to his widow.

After Clayton was inaugurated things began to happen. A Presidential election was to be held in November and this called for a new registration of the voters, although one had just been made at a cost of \$48,008. The governor assured the people that there would be a fair registration and began to organize the militia, largely colored; about the same time the Ku Klux Klan began to get active. A month before the election the governor decided that the registration in eleven counties, which showed a strong Democratic majority, was not fair and set it aside by executive order. By such means he succeeded in elect-

ing all three Republican candidates for Congress and carrying the state for Grant.

The militia law put an engine of oppression in the hands of the governor and saddled a heavy expense upon the state, the staff officers alone costing about \$25,000. Outrages were now reported and when there were not enough secret agents went about over the state to find more. Governor Clayton purchased 4,000 stand of arms in the North, whereupon the Democrats charged that the Loyal League was sending arms to the negroes. "Unknown persons" threw the arms from the boat into the river below Memphis and the governor had to look elsewhere for arms. But arms of some sort were secured and his militia, 2,000 strong and mostly negroes, moved about over the state terrorizing and plundering the people. In the southwest only negroes were used and for a time the Ku Klux hunted the militia and the militia hunted the Ku Klux. When John G. Price, editor of the *Daily Republican*, ventured to oppose the system of terrorism he was deposed from his position as speaker of the house, and the plundering went on, and the legislature passed an amnesty act legalizing everything done. A pretense at restoring the seized property was made, but the claimant was required to go to Little Rock, prove his claim and swear that he had not advised or sought the overthrow of the government under the constitution of 1868. An appropriation of \$125,000 was made to pay these claims. Carpet-bag lawyers, who hitherto had had almost nothing to do, now reaped a golden harvest

going about over the state and buying up claims or settling claims for a commission. The total cost of martial law and militia rule for a few months was \$330,676.43, or more than twice as much as the cost of the state government for two years immediately preceding or following the war.

As a part of this move to suppress alleged disorders the legislature passed a rather drastic law, ordering the dissolution of the Knights of the White Camelia or Ku Klux Klan and declaring all persons who failed to sever their connection with the order within thirty days, to be public enemies and outlaws subject to heavy fines and imprisonment.

Another item of scandalous expense was that of public printing. A law of 1868 authorized the governor to name papers for the publication of legal notices and another made him a member of a board which was to make a contract with John G. Price to do all the state printing. When Price made himself unpopular by opposition to martial law his contract was voided and he was forced to share the profits of printing with the governor's private secretary and brother-in-law. For two years and nine months of Republican rule, beginning July 3, 1868, the cost of state printing amounted to \$209,213.62, a sum in excess of the whole cost of state government for a year prior to the war. Even Governor Clayton declared the amount excessive and recommended a reduction.

If any Republican showed signs of weakening his fears were worked upon by repeated "outrages" of the

Ku Klux Klan, while Democrats played up the activities of the Union League for all they were worth. Breakers were already in sight for the Republicans. Disfranchisement of so many whites, corruption in elections, burdensome taxation, extravagance in appropriations, and negro officials were enough to produce this result, but on top of this came dissensions within the ranks.

The efforts of the dominant party for the economic and social rehabilitation of the state may have been well meant, but it was impossible for them to conceive of such rehabilitation on a firm basis unless the ascendancy of the party was secured. To develop the latent resources of the state more settlers were needed. On this both Republicans and Democrats were agreed, but they differed on the kind of immigrants needed. The legislature provided for a commissioner of immigration and lands, provided him with clerks and a liberal allowance for traveling expenses and printing. The first commissioner, Dr. James M. Lewis, a carpet-bagger from Massachusetts, soon got busy and went after people from the North, foreigners, and negroes from anywhere. The whites, not yet having adjusted themselves to free negro labor, organized and sent an agent to China for Chinese laborers and a few were actually brought in. The Colored Immigration Aid Society was then organized to bring in negroes and Commissioner Lewis was an active official in this. By 1870 it was clear that the immigration bureau was being used for political ends, to hold the negroes in line and strengthen the party by bringing

in more. The office of deputy commissioner was now created for the special purpose of looking out for negro immigrants. In 1871 Dr. Lewis was succeeded by a negro, but it does not appear that very many negroes were actually induced to come to the state. Neither was there any very considerable number of white immigrants.

Another ambitious program was that of internal improvements. A law of 1868 provided for a commissioner of public works whose special duty it was to look after levees. He was authorized to issue swamp land warrants up to 38 per cent of the contract price on completed levee work in any district and in any amount he thought advisable to any railroad which constructed a road-bed protecting or draining lands. In all fairness it should be stated that Democrats in general approved of this policy, but they did not approve of all the things done in carrying out the policy. A new law of 1871 authorized the issuance of \$3,000,000 in thirty-year bonds bearing 7 per cent, and this opened the flood-gates of jobbery and graft. The commissioner, Benjamin Thomas, was charged with letting contracts at six times the customary price and conniving with speculators on the bond sales. The result was a heavy debt with comparatively little to show for it.

The legislature of 1868 passed a law providing for the issuance of bonds to aid in railroad building. State aid to railroads was nothing new, the Democrats having initiated the policy previous to the war. In general they now approved of this project and when

it was submitted to a popular vote only 4,134 votes were cast against it. As soon as the law became operative a general scramble began to secure the bonds. New railroad companies sprang up over night, the number reaching 86 by the end of 1871, all of them controlled by fewer than twenty men. The aid was to be in the nature of a loan, repayable by taxes levied on the road. The total amount of bonds issued was \$9,900,000, though the Cairo and Fulton road surrendered its allotment, reducing the amount outstanding to \$6,900,000. The results were somewhat better than in the case of the levee bonds. Governor Clayton claimed that 315 miles were built with state aid, but some authorities reduce this to 271. The most successful of the roads, the Cairo and Fulton, was built without any bonds. The panic of 1873 hit the roads hard and the legislature of 1874 relieved them of the unpaid interest. In 1884 Governor Fishback secured the adoption of a constitutional amendment repudiating these bonds.

As part of an effort to bolster up the credit of the state an act was passed in 1869 to refund the pre-war debt of \$3,363,503.19. This was due to the state's adventure in banking and the subsequent failure of the Real Estate Bank and the State Bank. The bonds were commonly called the Holford bonds, though not all of them had fallen into his hands. Although these bonds had been disposed of in violation of the law authorizing their issue, the Democrats now favored paying what had actually been realized on them, but they were reissued at par in thirty-year

six per cent bonds. In 1874, when the Democrats ousted the carpet-baggers, the total bonded debt was \$10,618,166.09, with only about \$100,000 worth of public improvements to show for it, though this takes no account of the benefits that came to the state from the privately owned railroads built with state aid. To the bonded debt should be added \$1,864,-701.54 in script.

Local finances were in an equally bad condition and in many cases the taxes were almost confiscatory. Tax assessors were appointed by the governor and took an oath to assess at full value. In several cases they raised the assessments six or seven fold, in Sebastian county eleven fold. In 1869 the total tax collected in Pulaski County amounted to \$264,000; in 1873, \$715,604.10, the rate the latter year being 5.8 per cent. In some places the rate was as high as 7.3 per cent. Local indebtedness about equalled that of the state and the counties had even less to show for it.

Such were the results of six years of Republican misrule under officers of various kinds. Some of them were intelligent and well meaning, some were intelligent rascals, but more were ignorant dupes. Many of the county officers, both white and black, were illiterate and either corrupt or the tools of designing men. Even the chief justice of the supreme court, John McClure, admitted bribery.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE END OF THE NIGHTMARE

Such a record as that just given was too heavy for any party to carry and survive. In addition to this, as was natural, discord appeared within the party itself.

The treatment accorded the Murphy government was an offense to some who had loyally supported that government. Still others of this group were disgruntled over the contract for public printing. Many of the scalawags were displeased when Colonel J. M. Johnson, a citizen of Arkansas, was passed over by the carpet-baggers and the nomination given to Powell Clayton, with Johnson in the second place.

James Brooks, lately come from Iowa, joined the Republicans and sought a seat in Congress, but was ignored and soon raised the standard of retrenchment and reform. Lieutenant-Governor Johnson and a few members of the legislature organized in opposition to Governor Clayton's policies, particularly with reference to militia, aid to railroads, the refunding of the Holford bonds, and extravagance in general. In 1869 a convention at Little Rock launched the Liberal Republican party and adopted a platform along the line of the Johnson movement and added the immediate removal of political disabilities.

Somewhat alarmed by this movement Clayton announced that he also favored enfranchisement of the

whites in the hope of saving the party in the election of 1870. The Liberal Republicans put out candidates in every legislative district and the Democrats fused with them when they could consistently do so. The result was a gain of several seats in the legislature, in spite of the fact that the regulars still controlled the registration and the election judges.

When the legislature met it elected Clayton to the Senate, but he refused to accept and thereby turn the governorship over to Johnson. The problem was to get rid of him. Impeachment was tried, but this failed, as also the effort to oust him by bill. Then, after the supreme court had been reconstructed with this end in view, *quo warranto* proceedings were begun in the hope of showing that he was not entitled to the office, but this also failed.

By this time the house had become anti-Clayton and impeached him, but the senate was pro-Clayton and the matter was dropped. The final result was a compromise. The secretary of state resigned and J. M. Johnson was appointed his successor. The senate then elected A. O. Hadley as its president and he thereby became governor when Clayton was again elected to the United States Senate and resigned as governor.

This contest left Republicans more divided than ever. The regular Republicans, sometimes called "Minstrels," were made up of the supporter of Clayton. The Reform Republicans, or "Brindle-tails," comprised what was left of the followers of Brooks. The Liberal Republicans constituted a small element

of reformers who refused to follow Brooks. The Democrats hardly need definition. Such was the party alignment at the close of 1871.

An effort was now made to crush Clayton by court procedure, but President Grant removed the officials instrumental in bringing about his arrest and the trial judge released him on a technicality.

At the opening of the campaign for governor in 1872 the "Brindletails" seemed to be supported by a majority of the Republican voters, but the "Minstrels" still controlled the election machinery while the Democrats and Liberal Republicans held the balance of power. A "Brindletail" convention nominated Brooks for governor on a platform calling for "universal suffrage, universal amnesty, and honest men for office." The Democrats were particularly interested in the removal of political disabilities and endorsed Brooks, for which they were given three minor places on the Brooks ticket. The Liberal Republican convention left it to their executive committee to endorse a candidate. Alarmed by the prospective strength of the combined opposition the Republicans now adopted a reform platform and nominated Elisha Baxter, a native of North Carolina and a resident of Arkansas for several years preceding the war. Baxter was far more acceptable to the Democrats than Brooks and as the campaign progressed more and more of them turned to him.

Still the Republicans were determined to take no unnecessary risks and Governor Hadley declared the registration law of 1871 null and void and reverted

to the law of 1868. This opened the gates to many irregularities in registration and election. On election day the friends of Brooks opened "outside polls" where his supporters who had been denied registration might vote. Many voted in both places. The election was the most hotly contested since the war and brought out a vote of 80,721, of which Baxter received a majority of 2,919.

But Brooks was not ready to give up and a convention of his followers was called to meet in Little Rock on January 4, two days before the day for the meeting of the legislature which was to declare the result. Talk of revolutionary proceedings was now heard in political circles. But the Democratic and Reform members of the legislature, considering the character of Baxter and the friendly attitude of the Republicans, decided that they had nothing to gain by such a movement and refused to support it. The outcome was the inauguration of Governor Baxter on January 6. The "Brindletail" convention met and denounced the proceedings and issued an address designed to convince Congress and the country that Brooks had been cheated of the office. The legislature now rushed through an amendment proposed in 1871, enfranchising the whites and this was ratified at the polls by 21,504 out of 28,894 votes. This had the endorsement of Senator Clayton and the future of the "reformed" Republican party in Arkansas looked bright.

But clouds soon began to appear. When it became evident that Governor Baxter was going to pursue an

independent course, an attempt was made to bribe him through Chief-Justice McClure. When this failed Attorney-General T. D. W. Yonley filed a writ of *quo warranto* in the supreme court, but this was denied, McClure dissenting. Brooks then took the matter to the circuit court of Pulaski county, but the court held up its decision for ten months. Down to this time Clayton was supporting Baxter and denounced Brooks, a sentiment echoed by the Republican state central committee.

The adjournment of the legislature was followed by an unusually large number of vacancies and a special election was called to fill these November 8, 1873. The effects of the amendment re-enfranchising the whites were seen in this election and nearly all the new members were Democrats. This put the legislature in the control of the Democrats and this led to an increasing demand for a constitutional convention, which Baxter was believed to favor. Senators Clayton and Dorsey now came to Little Rock and did their best to hold Baxter in line. Finding that they could not do this they turned from him and supported Brooks as the only hope of saving the party. Judge John Whytock now (April 15, 1874) suddenly called the case against Baxter and decided in favor of Brooks.

Armed with this decree Brooks now took the oath of office before Judge McClure and slipped into the executive office when Baxter was not there and seized the capitol building. Some of his henchmen seized the armory and proceeded to fortify the capitol

grounds. Three judges of the supreme court and all the state officials except J. M. Johnson, secretary of state, gave him their support, as did also Clayton and Dorsey.

Baxter retired to the Anthony House, where he established headquarters, declared martial law in Pulaski county, and proceeded to reorganize the militia. Both appealed to the state for support and many now adhered to the candidate whom he had opposed in the election of 1872. Both appealed to Washington, but President Grant, after some gestures in favor of Brooks, decided on a policy of neutrality.

For about a month the forces of the two contestants faced each other and the feeling was tense. Several conflicts occurred, the most serious being in Jefferson county, where several lives were lost, Brooks played a brilliant stroke by placing General J. F. Fagan in command of his militia and this won numerous Democrats to his standard. But Baxter had for commander another Confederate no less highly respected, General R. C. Newton.

When Baxter realized that President Grant was not going to allow them to fight it out he issued a call for the legislature and asked that the members be protected. Brooks, knowing that his title rested wholly upon the decision of a circuit judge, now got it further strengthened by a decision of the supreme court reversing its decision against him in 1872. Each had agents in Washington presenting his claim, Baxter's for a decision by the legislature, as the constitution provided, Brooks' by the courts. For a

time President Grant seemed inclined to accept the Brooks plan for settlement by the courts, but his Attorney-General, G. H. Williams, decided that the courts had no right to decide the contest, whereupon Grant issued a proclamation recognizing Baxter and commanding all in arms against him to return to their homes. The legislature now assembled, refused to recanvass the vote of 1872 and passed a law calling a constitutional convention. Under the circumstances there was nothing for Brooks to do but yield and Baxter again held undisputed sway as governor.

But this was not the end of the struggle. The Democrats were committed to a convention and the legislature now submitted this question to the people and Governor Baxter set apart June 4 as a day of thanksgiving for the deliverance of the state from public enemies. The convention carried by 71,712 out of 80,259 votes and the Democrats secured a large majority of the members. Very likely the election was not altogether free of intimidation and fraud, but the state was now accustomed to that. Only four negroes were elected. Among the white Republicans the scalawags were in control and they were not opposed to reform. The most important changes were: the reduction of the number of offices and the making of these elective instead of appointive; forbidding the requirement of registration for voting; forbidding the state, counties, and municipalities to lend their credit and forbidding counties and municipalities to issue bonds except to take up present indebtedness; limiting the amount of taxes; and reduc-

ing the terms of state and local officials from four to two years.

When the convention adjourned the Democratic state convention met and endorsed the constitution and refused to advocate repudiation of the obligations created by the Republican regime. It offered to nominate Baxter and when he declined nominated A. H. Garland for governor. The Republican convention decided to ignore the convention and its work and to treat as illegal everything done by the Baxter government since the decision of Judge Whytock in favor of Brooks. A vigorous campaign was prosecuted by the Democrats and brought out a vote of 103,500 with a majority of 53,890 for the constitution and majorities almost as large for the Democratic candidates.

The Republicans again took up the cause of Brooks. It should be noted that Baxter's term would have run two years longer had the convention not shortened it. When Baxter yielded to Garland (November 12) the Republicans persuaded the lieutenant-governor, V. V. Smith, to look upon the office of governor as abandoned and claim it for himself. He now issued a proclamation setting forth his claim and hastened to Washington to lay his claims before the Attorney-General. However, he met only rebuffs in Washington and Garland offered a reward for his arrest and delivery, but Grant sent him out of the country as consul to the Island of St. Thomas.

Still the Republicans hoped that Congress would interfere. This body had provided for a committee, Luke P. Poland, chairman, to investigate affairs in Arkansas and report whether the existing government should be recognized. This committee took testimony in Washington and the chairman and two other members visited Arkansas. While the investigation was going on General Sheridan sent a telegram from New Orleans—he had not been in the state—declaring that Arkansas was terrorized by armed bands and urging the President to treat such men as bandits and try them by military commissions. February 6, 1875, Poland presented the report of his committee, signed by all the members except one, advising no interference. Before giving up Senator Clayton made one more desperate effort and secured the passage of a resolution calling on President Grant for information regarding affairs in Arkansas. The President did not have much to offer, but said that the testimony tended to establish Brooks' claims. However, he did not want to assume the responsibility of deciding and asked Congress to take such action as would relieve him of the necessity of such a decision. The House then adopted the Poland report 150 to 81, 56 not voting or paired. Clayton then yielded and telegraphed that this was final. The nightmare of carpet-bag-negro rule was over and Arkansas breathed the air of freedom once more.

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